







A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick 
 








Copyright and reuse:                     
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.  
Please scroll down to view the document itself.  
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to cite it. 
Our policy information is available from the repository home page.  
 






















THE RISE OF ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM IN CARIBBEAN STATES’ 








Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the 








Table of Contents 
 
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………………………........i 
List of Maps, Figures and Tables…………………………………………………………………v 





Part I: Introduction and Theoretical Framework  
 
Introductory Chapter ……………………………………………………………………………1 
   1.Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………….......1 
 1.1 Research questions…………………………………………………………………….4 
 1.2 Unpacking the main hypothesis ……………………………………………………….5 
 1.3 Research rationale…………………………………………………………………......8 
 1.4 Thesis contributions ………………………………………………………………….13 
   2. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………………15 
     2.1 Lack of Caribbean states perspectives in Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature...........15 
     2.2 Lack of developing states perspective in Sino-Latin America Caribbean Literature ……...22 
 2.2.1 Preoccupation with the US role in Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature.……..24 
 2.2.2 US policy, think tanks and media in Sino Latin America Caribbean literature……...26 
   3. Method and sources …………………………………………………………………………32 
     3.1 The Process Tracing method …………………………………………………………32 
 3.2 Data and sources……………………………………………………………………...33 
 3.3 Justifying the case studies ……………………………………………………………35 
   4.Thesis Structure ……………………………………………………………………………...35 
 
Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………………..39 
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………….39 
2. Inadequacy of Realism, Constructivism and Complex Interdependence in explaining 
 developing states foreign policies………………………………………………………..40 
  2.1 Realism’s limit……………………………………………………………………….41 
  2.2 Constructivism’s promises and problems…………………………………………....42 
  2.3 Insufficiency of Complex Interdependence………………………………………….46 
3. FPA and NCR frameworks for evaluating foreign policy……………………………………...48  
 3.1 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) framework for evaluating foreign policy…………….48 
             3.1.1 Criticism of FPA approach …………………………………………………...51 
           3.2 Neoclassical Realism: A Theory of Foreign Policy …………………………………...52 
           3.3 Combining NCR and FPA in analyzing Caribbean states foreign policy towards 





Part II: The Structural Variable in Caribbean States Foreign Policy Towards 
China:  understanding the Caribbean region’s geopolitical structure 
 
Chapter 2: Caribbean States Relations with China: the geopolitical structure and US role    
         ………………………………………………………………………………………58 
 1.Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………58 
 2. Setting the context: the triangular relations between Caribbean states, China and the US…….60 
      2.1 The US role and China’s rising role in the Caribbean region……………………………..61 
3. The geopolitical significance of the Caribbean region and the US Role………………………..64 
   3.1 The Caribbean region’s geopolitical significance in early US foreign policy initiatives….66 
   3.2 The Caribbean region’s geopolitical significance in US foreign policy pronouncements:  
          contemporary contexts….....................................................................................................66 
   3.3 The Caribbean Sea and strategic US interests………………………………………………69 
 3.3.1 The Anglophone Caribbean: key international maritime straits …………………....70  
4. Situating motives in Caribbean states engagement with China………………………………...73 
         4.1 Situating China in Caribbean states motives…………………………………………..74 
         4.2 Situating Caribbean states in China’s motives………………………………………….75 
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………..78 
 
Part III: The Intervening Variables in Caribbean States Foreign Policy   
  Towards China: diplomacy, domestic economic issues and perceptions       
 
Chapter 3: Caribbean States Policymaking in Relations with China: role of diplomacy….80 
1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………80 
2. Caribbean states relations with China: historical period……………………………………….82 
3. Caribbean states diplomacy with China Cold War period: ideological phase….........................84 
   3.1 Caribbean states multilateral diplomacy and China………………………………….85 
   3.2 Caribbean states bilateral diplomacy with China…………………………………….89 
4. Caribbean states diplomacy with China Post-Cold War period: rising economic pragmatism.94 
    4.1 Structural economic constraints versus dollar diplomacy……………………………95  
    4.2 Caribbean states policymakers reinforce ties with China amidst economic 
          constraints………………………………………………………..............................99 
5. The Anglophone Caribbean and China’s new strategic economic diplomacy………………..103 
       5.1 China’s policymaking: Xi Jinping’s diplomatic pivot to the Anglophone Caribbean….104 
        5.1.1 Re-engaging the Anglophone Caribbean under Xi Jinping’s Presidency ……......106 




Case Study 1 
Chapter 4: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China: lending 
                   dimension 2005-2015..…………………………………………………………….114 
1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..114 
2. Contextualising Caribbean states economic turn to China for infrastructure financing………116 
   2.2 Cooperation framework for infrastructure financing ……………………………..............120 
	 iii	
   2.3 Sectoral analysis of Caribbean states lending for infrastructure investments……...............123 
3. Impact of Caribbean States lending: a new dependency on China?...........................................137  
     3.1 Impact of Caribbean states lending from China: renewed debt?.......................................140 
4.  Discussion of research findings and case summary…………………………………………..144 
5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………146 
 
Case Study 2 
Chapter 5: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China: trade dimension 
2005-2015………………………………………………………................................................148 
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...148 
2.Cooperation framework: Consolidating the trade agenda…………………………………….151 
     2.1 Trends in Caribbean states trade relationship with China...........................................154 
         2.2 Placing the Caribbean’s asymmetrical trade relationship with China in context…….156 
             2.2.1 China’s comparative advantage in trade………………………………………156 
       .         2.2.2 What the trade data obscures: increased significance of China for Caribbean 
                           states exports………………………………………………………………….158 
                 2.2.3 Caribbean states and China’s FDI to secure natural resources…………………160 
3. The Impacts of Caribbean and Latin American states trade with China………………………162 
        3.1 Contextualising the debates on China’s impact on the Caribbean and Latin America….164 
        3.2 Impact of Caribbean states increased trade with China: a new dependency …………...167 
        3.3 China a competitive threat in manufacturing in the Caribbean region?..........................171 
            3.3.1 Caribbean states competitive turn to China………………………………...174 
                       3.3.2 Trade and financing nexus: aiding the competitive turn to China………….176 
                       3.3.3 Concern with anti-dumping in manufactures trade with China ……………179 
4. Discussion of research findings and case summary …………………………………………..182 
5.Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………186 
 
Chapter 6: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China:  
         implications for US role in lending and trade in the Caribbean……….………188 
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...188 
2. Caribbean states lending from China: implications for US role.……………………………..191 
 2.1 US pre-eminence in lending institutions in Caribbean states compared to China……193 
 2.2 Caribbean states lending from China in areas not prioritised in lending by         
       traditional actors…………………………………………………………………….196 
 2.3 Caribbean states lending from China differentiated unlike the US in the Caribbean...198 
 2.4 Caribbean states and conditionalities in lending from China and the US……………203 
            2.5 Continued EU significance in financing in the Caribbean…………………………...204 
3. Caribbean states trade relationship with China:  implications for the US role in trade……..205 
    3.1 Comparing Caribbean states import trade with the US and China…………………207 
 3.2 Caribbean states increasing imports from China………………………...................210   
 3.3 China’s rise in Caribbean states import trade - EU’s decline?.....................................212 
         3.4 Comparing Caribbean states export trade with US and China: US prevalence.........214 
            3.5 Continued salience of the EU in Caribbean states export trade……………………..218  
4. Assessing Caribbean states trade with China and traditional partners US and EU……………220 




Chapter 7: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China:  responses to   
  China’s economic practices in lending and trade ……………………………226 
 
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...226 
2. Caribbean states responses to labour practices in China’s economic activities ……………..228 
  2.1 Chinese firms practices and challenges to local labour in the Caribbean………………….230 
  2.2 Chinese firms and challenges to local content in the Caribbean……………………………233 
  2.3 Chinese firms practices contravene labour laws in the Caribbean?.....................................235 
3. Caribbean states responses to environmental challenges in China’s economic activities…….239 
      3.1 Guyana: environmental challenges and responses………………………………………241 
      3.2 Jamaica: Goat Island and environmental constraints and responses…………………….243 
4.Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………245 
 
Chapter 8: Perceptions Mediating Caribbean States Relations with China………………247 
1. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………......247 
2. Significance of perceptions in NCR and FPA ………………………………………………249 
2.1 Perceptions of power, threat and opportunity in Caribbean states relations with China……..251 
2.2 Overview of perceptions in the Latin America Caribbean and China engagement………….253 
3. Countering perceptions of threat with perceptions of opportunity ………………………….256 
    3.1 Political opportunity in Caribbean states engagement with China………………..……...257 
    3.2 Economic opportunity in Caribbean states engagement with China……………………..259 
    3.3 Economic opportunities in US and China’s role in the Caribbean……………………......260 
    3.4 Economic opportunities between the US and China ……………………………………...262 
    3.5 Economic opportunity not threat in China’s security assistance to the Caribbean region…264      
4.Limitations to China’s rise in the Caribbean region…………………………………………...266 
5.Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………268 
 
Conclusion Chapter …………………………………………………………………………...270 
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………...270 
2.Restating the main hypothesis ………………………………………………………………..273 
3.Reiterating main findings……………………………………………………………………..274 
    3.1 Situating the findings in wider literature………………………………………………….280 
4.Limitations of the study……………………………………………………………………….282 









Map 1: The Americas Hemisphere……………………………………………………………...viii 
Map 2: Caribbean Region…………………………………………………………………...........ix 
Map 3: The Caribbean Sea and Global Maritime Routes…………………………………...........x 
2.Figures 
Figure 1.0: NCR framework for analysing foreign policy of states………………………………3 
Figure 4.0: Caribbean States Debt to GDP Ratio………………………………………………142 
Figure 5.1: Trinidad Exports and Imports with China………………………………………….159 
Figure 5.2: Guyana’s Exports and Imports with China………………………………………...159 
Figure 5.3: Jamaica’s Exports and Imports with China………………………………………...159 
Figure 5.4: Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica’s Manufacture Imports from China……………….175 
Figure 6.0: IADB Loan to English-speaking to Caribbean States……………………………...194 
Figure 6.1: World Bank Lending by Region (IBRD) for 2016…………………………............195 
Figure 6.2: Sectors for IADB Loans for 2015………………………………………………….197 
Figure 6.3: Main Sources of Foreign Financing for Selected Projects in Barbados: ……………202 
Figure 6.4: Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana Imports from US and China (US$B)………………….211 
Figure 6.5: Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana Imports from EU (UK) and China………………...214 
Figure 6.6: Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad Exports to EU (UK) and China:  2005-2015………….220 
Figure 8.0: Mapping perceptions in the Caribbean and China Relationship……………………251 
3.Tables 
Table 3.0: English -Speaking Caribbean states diplomatic relations with China in the Cold  
      War Period……………………………………………………………………………93 
Table 3.1:  Selected Caribbean heads of government visits to China:1974-1989……….............93 
Table 3.2: Selected Chinese high level government official visits to Caribbean: 1974-1989…..93        
Table 3.3: List of delegates First China Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum…102 
Table 3.4: Selected high level visits between the Anglophone Caribbean and China………….105  
Table 3.5: Caribbean heads of government meeting with China’s President Xi Jinping in       
Trinidad………………………………………………………………………………………....106 
	 vi	
Table 3.6: Selected diplomatic engagement with Caribbean heads of government and China’s  
      2008-2016…………………………………………………………………………...109 
Table 4.0: Showing China’s Latin America Caribbean region funds for 2015………………….122 
Table 4.1: Showing terms for concessional lending for investments in select Caribbean   
      states………………………………………………………………………………...123 
Table 4.2: Stadium infrastructure projects in selected Caribbean states financed by China 2005- 
      2008………………………………………………………………………………….126 
Table 4.3: Showing health infrastructure projects in selected Caribbean states………………..128 
Table 4.4: Showing selected infrastructure for tourism in Caribbean States: …………………131 
Table 4.5: Maritime infrastructure investments in select Caribbean states by China…………...135 
Table 4.6: Summary of case study: lending for infrastructure investments……………………..146 
Table 5.0: Selected Caribbean countries bilateral trade in goods with China…….……………..153 
Table 5.1: Showing the value of selected Caribbean countries exports to China………………..154 
Table 5.2: Showing the value of selected Caribbean countries imports from China…………...154 
Table 5.3: Showing Jamaica’s balance of trade with China……………………………………155 
Table 5.4: Showing Caribbean states main exports to China………………………………......168 
Table 5.5: Showing Jamaica’s exports to China………………………………………..............169 
Table 5.6: Showing Guyana’s exports to China…………………………………………............170 
Table 5.7: Showing Trinidad’s exports to China………………………………………………..171 
Table 5.8: Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana’s machinery and electronics imports from China….178   
Table 5.9: Case summary of Caribbean states trade relationship with China…………………..186 
Table 6.0: Concessional lending by World Bank to selected Caribbean states ………………….196 
Table 6.1: Showing an estimate of selected funding to Jamaica by China ……………………..200 
Table 6.2: Showing Barbados main sources of foreign financing for projects………………….201 
Table 6.3: Showing Caribbean states imports from China and the United States………………208 
Table 6.4: Showing Caribbean states import trends from China and the US……………………209 
Table 6.5: Caribbean states exports to the US and China for 2015……………………………..215 
Table 6.6: Showing select Caribbean states exports to the US and China for 2000-2015……….216 
Table 6.7: Showing select Caribbean states balance of trade with US (US$B): 2000-2015…… 217 
Table 6.8: Showing exports to the EU/UK by Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana for 2000-2015…..219 
 
	 vii	
List of Acronyms 
CARICOM- Caribbean Community 
CELAC- Community of Latin American and Caribbean States 
CDB-Caribbean Development Bank 
EC-Eastern Caribbean 
EU-European Union 
FPA-Foreign Policy Analysis 
FDI- Foreign Direct Investment 
IADB- Inter-American Development Bank  
IFI- International Financial Institution 
LAC- Latin America and the Caribbean 
NAM- Non-Aligned Movement 
NCR-Neo Classical Realism  
ODA- Official Development Assistance 
ODI- Outward Direct Investments 
OECS- Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States 
SOE- China’s State Owned Enterprise 
US-United States of America 
UK-United Kingdom of Great Britain 
UN-United Nations 










Map 1: The Americas Hemisphere 
 
  
    Source: 1990’s CIA Political Map of the Americas Hemisphere 
	 ix	
















Map 3: The Caribbean Sea and Global Maritime Routes        
 




I wish to thank my supervisors Professor Shaun Breslin and Dr. Timothy Sinclair for their support 
and encouragement through-out this process. My supervisors have been a constant source of 
motivation for me in this journey. They have provided invaluable guidance during this research. It 
was a privilege to work with them.  
 
I also extend my gratitude to my family who has contributed immensely to this endeavour. They 





I declare that this thesis has been entirely my own work and follows the guidelines provided in the 
Guide to Examinations for Higher Degrees of Research of the University of Warwick. The 
dissertation has not been submitted for a degree at another university and any errors within are 





While the existing scholarship has focused on China's rise within developing states of the Americas 
hemisphere, less obvious in the narrative are the perspectives of Latin America or Caribbean states 
in relations with China. Within the Sino- Latin American literature, much of the discourse has been 
preoccupied with China’s motives and the US and China nexus within the region, while also largely 
omitting Caribbean states in the discussions. These underlying deficiencies in the literature point 
to critical missing links in the discourse on China’s rise in the region. Thus, highlighting substantial 
knowledge gaps in the Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature.  
 
The thesis aims to analyse Caribbean states relations with China. The thesis specifically 
interrogates the extent to which the Caribbean region’s geopolitical structure, policymaking, 
economic considerations and perceptions have influenced the region’s foreign policy towards 
China. It examines how and why this confluence of political and economic factors are key to 
explaining the patterns of continuity and change in Caribbean states relations with China. It also 
concomitantly emphasises the primacy of particular variables in influencing the region’s 
relationship with China.  The evaluation is undertaken primarily from the standpoint of Caribbean 
states. Investigating relations from the vantage point of secondary states provide a means of 
advancing knowledge beyond the more established, yet invariably narrow conceptualisations of 
China’s rise in the region. In doing so, valid and reliable assessments of China’s relations with the 
region can also emerge. 
 
The thesis argues that Caribbean states have formulated relatively autonomous spaces for foreign 
policy decision-making regarding China based on economic interests, whilst simultaneously acting 
within the broader construct of a specific systemic environment relating to the US role in the 
region, and embedded perceptions of the region’s evolving ties with China. The thesis explores 
this overarching argument through the lens of Neo-Classical Realism theory and Foreign Policy 
Analysis. These conceptual frameworks combined, emphasise the salience of structural, ideational, 
and domestic variables in shaping foreign policy behavior. The research proposes a multi-causal 
yet targeted approach to evaluating the Caribbean region’s relationship with China. Thus, unit 
level economic issues are considered critical to unpacking Caribbean states relations with China 
in the Post-Cold War period (2005-2015). 
 
 In examining the economic processes of engagement, the thesis focuses on two empirically based 
case studies; financing for infrastructure investments and trade. Through these two economic 
pathways, the study assesses the impacts of the economic engagement, the implications of the 
evolving commercial ties for the US role inside the region and Caribbean states responses to the 
domestic economic engagement. In doing so, Caribbean states interests, agency, constraints and 
the underlying ambiguities in the relationship are highlighted.  
 
The study makes both empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature on Sino- Latin 
America Caribbean relations. More specifically, the research contributes to a rethinking of 
established assumptions regarding the Latin America Caribbean region’s relations with China. The 
study illuminates a more sustained Caribbean and China relationship through distinct phases of 
the engagement. It shows that Caribbean states displayed even in the midst of Cold War rivalries, 
a commitment to China on the basis of Third World solidarity. Caribbean states then reconfigured 
their ties with China on the basis of mutual economic interests in the Post-Cold War period. Such 
issues are still largely under-explored in the literature. The thesis also contributes to providing a 
developing country perspective within a discourse that has been largely China-facing.  Further, the 
study adds to the growing body of scholarly work on NCR for understanding the foreign policy 
behaviour of developing states. The research also contributes to creating additional lines of enquiry 
into the Sino-Latin America Caribbean dynamic, thereby providing further avenues for 
research. More broadly, the study contributes to the wider International Relations literature and its 
inter-related sub-fields of Foreign Policy and International Political Economy. 
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Introductory Chapter  
 
The seemingly intensifying ties between the Latin America Caribbean region and China in recent 
times have been subject to intense scrutiny from observers and scholars alike. However, much of 
the current literature remains focused on China’s motives in the region and the intersecting roles 
of the US and China within the space. Less obvious in the narrative is how Latin American or 
Caribbean states interests, decision-making, structure and constraints fit into the broader discourse 
on China’s rise in the region. Lessening the focus on developing states and viewing them as largely 
peripheral actors in interactions with China not only perpetuate the underlying tendencies within 
IR scholarship to under-represent developing states in interpretations of inter-state relations. Doing 
so, also obscures the very essential role that developing states play in shaping the relationship with 
China amidst the presence of internal and external constraints.  
 
In tandem with the general predisposition to treat developing states as largely peripheral in the 
interactions with China, the Caribbean region’s relationship with China, remains under-explored 
in the broader Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature. These underlying deficiencies, point to 
critical missing links in the literature, thereby highlighting substantial knowledge gaps in the 
current scholarship. 
 
The research adheres to the underlying premise that it is understanding how and why developing 
states engage with China that a more comprehensive, yet critical assessment of China’s rise within 
those very states can be arrived at. Focusing on the dynamic from the standpoint of developing 
states does not trivialise the essential role that states with the requisite power resources play in 
influencing the relations. However, concentrating almost exclusively on more powerful states 
within the dynamic can stymie more in-depth and critical research into China relations with the 
developing world.  Thus leading to invariably narrow portrayals of what is often a multifaceted 
and complex dynamic.  
 
The thesis aims to interrogate Caribbean states foreign policy towards China within a framework 
that inserts Caribbean states specific geopolitical structure, diplomacy and economic interests, 
while also taking into account, the varying perceptions that stems from the region’s engagement 
with China. The study assesses the central question as to how and why this confluence of political 
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and economic factors are key to explaining patterns of continuity and change in Caribbean states 
relations with China.  
 
Given the current status of the literature from the onset, one may note that the research seeks to 
contribute to the existing scholarship through principally two main avenues. One, the research 
seeks a departure from the more conventional analyses in the literature on China’s rise within the 
developing world by seeking to examine the Caribbean region’s relationship with China chiefly 
from the vantage point of such developing states. Two, the research seeks to add conceptual and 
empirical value to the existing debates on China’s emergence in the Americas hemisphere.  In 
doing so, it seeks to assess Caribbean states foreign policy towards China within a theoretically 
informed framework based on FPA and NCR, while concomitantly emphasising an empirical 
approach to analysing the relationship.  
 
In the main, developing states foreign policy vis-à-vis emerging actors like China are frequently 
assumed to be one of reactivity and passivity, rather than that of active agents seeking to shape 
foreign policy processes in their interests despite varying constraints. This stems partly from an 
underlying tendency within the literature to marginalise the experiences of developing states in the 
interactions with China (Large, 2008; Mohan and Lampert, 2013; Hanusch, 2012; Hodzi, 2018).  
 
Within the literature on China’s emergence in the Latin America Caribbean region, much of the 
peer - reviewed sources postulating on the dynamic, are preoccupied with China’s interest in the 
engagement and consequently, the China and US nexus within the region. Implicit in the current 
discourse is the view that traditional US hegemony in Latin America and the Caribbean is being 
challenged, if not out-rightly eroded, by the rise of China as an alternative actor (see Dreyer, 2006; 
Hakim, 2006; Paladini, 2015; Denoon, 2016). The genesis of such debates lie within a broader 
discourse whereby China’s ascent is seen to have implications for the US role in the international 
system (see Lampton; 2008, Shirk; 2008, Shambaugh; 2013, Breslin, 2013; Blackwill and Tellis; 
2015). Hence, an underlying assumption resulting from the preoccupation with the US and China 
factor within the Caribbean and Latin American region is that latter’s engagement with China, can 
have a direct and even inverse impact on traditional US influence in the region. However, there is 
need to go beyond those presuppositions of the “China challenge,” in an effort to arrive at a more 
evidence-based analysis of Caribbean states evolving relationship with China.   
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In order to examine Caribbean states relations with China, the thesis draws from conceptual and 
methodological insights provided by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Neo-Classical Realism 
(NCR). Drawing from the NCR framework, figure 1.0, illustrates the key variables that influence 
Caribbean states foreign policy behaviour vis-à-vis China. The diagram below, further highlights 
how those variables are operationalised within the research. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptualising and operationalising  
                the variables in Caribbean’s foreign policy towards China 
 
NCR Framework for analysing foreign policy of states 
 
Independent Variable     Intervening Variables     Dependent Variable 
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States interact within a complicated international environment while also having to deal with 
domestic issues as well as the psychological milieu that shape foreign policy formulation and 
implementation. In studying the Caribbean region’s foreign policy towards China, the enquiry 
focuses on selected phenomena inclusive of both structural and intervening variables. The latter 
includes diplomacy, economic considerations and perceptions of China’s role in the region. The 
structural variable denotes the external conditions under which Caribbean states articulate and 
implement foreign policy towards China. Consequently, the US role within the region is construed 
as a systemic factor in the region’s foreign policy behaviour (the dependent variable).  
 
 The variables are deemed as relevant and inter-related and undergird the complexity of Caribbean 
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states relations with China. These systemic and intervening elements may not necessarily be 
understood in isolation. Instead, the aforementioned variables, have to be seen as a set of causal 
factors interacting with each other, to shape the Caribbean and China dynamic in the Post-Cold 
War period. However, dependent on time and context, the salience of these issues in the interaction 
are likely to vary.  
 
While certain studies have examined China’s relations with Latin America, there has been limited 
attempts whether implicit or explicit, to situate the analyses with a theoretical framework (see 
Strauss and Armony, 2012; Wise and Myers, 2016; Fornes and Butt-Philip, 2011). Although the 
significance of situating relations within a theoretical construct may not always be readily 
apparent, theory is an important means of harnessing observations within an explanatory and 
predictive framework. Therefore, enabling more rigorous analysis of existing and unfolding 
phenomena.  
 
Moreover, the conceptual framework illuminates the relevance of distinct economic drivers in 
Caribbean states relations with China. The thesis examines two empirically-based case studies 
pertaining to the financing and trade dimension of the Caribbean region’s economic engagement 
with China These areas highlight not only the nature and scope of the region’s commercial 
interactions with China, but also constitute the main pathways through which to evaluate the 
impacts and implications of Caribbean states evolving economic ties with China. These cases 
concomitantly shed light on Caribbean states aims and agency in relations with China while also 
pointing to the underlying opportunities and limitations that arise in engaging China within the 
economic realm. 
 
1.1 Research questions  
In an effort to examine Caribbean states relations with China especially given the knowledge gap 
on the region’s relationship with China within scholarly debates on China’s rise in the Americas 
hemisphere, the thesis is underpinned by a central research question. Consequently, it is asked; to 
what extent have geopolitical, diplomatic, economic and perceptual factors shaped Caribbean 
states foreign policy towards China in the Post-Cold War period (2005-2015)?   
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It may be asserted that the elements highlighted within the main research question are vital for 
understanding how Caribbean states ties with China unfolded in the past, how it is constituted 
within the present and why. These elements also offer critical clues regarding how the relationship 
may be shaped in future and why. The central underlying enquiry also gives rise to other subsidiary 
research questions. These are as follows: 
(1) To what extent has Caribbean states geopolitical structure influenced foreign policy towards 
China? 
(2)  How and why has diplomacy shaped Caribbean states foreign policy towards China? 
(3)  How and why have domestic economic considerations influenced Caribbean states foreign 
policy decision-making vis-à-vis China in the Post-Cold War period (2005-2015)? 
(4)  To what extent do perceptions shape Caribbean states foreign policy towards China? 
 
1.2 Unpacking the main hypothesis 
The study investigates the central hypothesis that; “Caribbean states have created relatively 
autonomous spaces for decision-making regarding China based on economic interests whilst acting 
within a broader geopolitical construct and embedded perceptions of China’s rise within the 
region.” In line with this main proposition, the thesis advances key claims which concomitantly 
emphasise the salience of economic issues in influencing Caribbean states foreign policy towards 
China.  
 
First, it is asserted that while Caribbean states foreign policy vis-à-vis China is partly influenced 
by an overarching power structure informed by the US role in the region, the interaction between 
Caribbean states and China, has to be understood as one driven primarily by mutual economic 
interests. Thus, in explaining patterns of continuity and change in Caribbean states foreign policy 
towards China, the thesis does not necessarily depart from the fundamental assumption that the 
region’s geopolitical structure shapes the relationship to a certain extent. The distinguishing 
characteristic that differentiates the Latin America Caribbean region from other parts of the 
developing world where China pursues economic relations, is the area’s physical proximity to the 
US mainland, the world’s hegemonic power. States pursue foreign policy under underlying 
structural incentives and disincentives. Therefore, there is an underlying assumption within the 
thesis that the Caribbean region’s foreign policy towards China may not be adequately accounted 
for, without at the very least, interrogating the geopolitical structure within which the region exists.  
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However, it is also counter-argued that a focus solely on the underlying hegemonic structure of 
the region does not fully account for Caribbean states foreign policy towards China. Hence, the 
overarching contention of the thesis that Caribbean states relations with China are driven 
principally by mutual economic interests for the period under survey within the thesis (2005-2015). 
 
Next, the thesis argues that Caribbean states have actively sought to influence agenda–setting and 
policy implementation in pursuit of mutual economic interests with China through bilateral and 
multilateral diplomatic contexts. Therefore, the thesis addresses how state decision-makers acting 
through key events and circumstances, have sought to configure the engagement to facilitate 
specific goals in the dynamic. In assuming that the Caribbean region’s policymaking through 
deliberative diplomatic processes is a key factor influencing the relations, the thesis also implicitly 
highlights a more complex relationship. Thus, it reveals an interaction not only steeped in 
ideational elements but more definitively, in economic processes.  
 
While there is consensus in the literature that diplomacy is an integral factor that shapes developing 
states relations with China, much of the Sino Latin America Caribbean literature tends to overly 
concentrate on the Taiwan issue as part of China’s diplomatic outreach to states in the region. Thus 
highlighting China’s motives in the dynamic rather than that of developing states in the region 
(Dominguez, 2006; Li, 2005; Jenkins et al, 2008). Little attention is paid to how and why this 
factor plays a key role in shaping the dynamics from the standpoint of the Caribbean region. 
 
 As will be shown in chapter 3, whereas in the past, Caribbean states policymakers had acted 
through the more ideational underpinnings of the Cold War era to promote policies regarding 
China, by the Post-Cold period, policymaking came to be defined along highly economic lines.  In 
accordance with underlying economic shifts, elite decision-makers in the Caribbean region utilised 
diplomacy as a mechanism to influence policy outcomes in relations with China in pursuit of 
commercial objectives.  Thus, policymakers sought to implement strategies and policies designed 
to further China’s economic role within the Caribbean region. 
 
Moreover, the thesis advances the core argument that domestic economic considerations have to 
be given explanatory priority when examining Caribbean states foreign policy towards China in 
the Post- Cold war context of the engagement. Less documented in the scholarship is the extent to 
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which Caribbean or Latin American states seek to construe their interests in relations with China 
and the consequent effects of those interactions on external actors influence within their space.  
  
 The thesis seeks to more specifically illuminate how and why states within the Caribbean region 
have engaged with China in the economic realm. It also seeks to examine the constituent impacts 
of the commercial ties in terms of the underlying opportunities and constraints within the 
interaction. It also focuses on the wider implications of the domestic economic engagement for the 
US role in the region. The study further examines how Caribbean states have shaped responses to 
China’s increased economic involvement at the ground level.  
 
Finally, the thesis asserts that the salience of economic interests in influencing Caribbean states 
foreign policy decision-making regarding China result in a relationship that is mediated more so 
by perceptions of opportunity, rather than threat. The geopolitical position of the region in 
particular, highlights why perception is such a salient factor in the ongoing dynamic between 
Caribbean states and China. Thus, a particular line of thinking underpinning the region’s 
engagement with China maybe briefly encapsulated as follows; it would help China’s overall 
strategy, hidden or unhidden, to have a cultural and economic presence in the Caribbean and Latin 
America due to the region’s resources and unique geostrategic positioning. 
 
A mixture of norms, culture, ideas, public views, current and historical events, all merge to create 
diverging perceptions of the region’s evolving ties with China. While allowing that ideas and 
experiences can generate a divergent set of perceptions relating to the region’s evolving ties with 
China, little attention has been paid to how Caribbean or Latin American states perceive the 
interaction, and why it is that notions of opportunity as envisaged by such states, have actively 
structured the relations with China. As Erikson (2009:120) explains, China has moved from being 
a peripheral economic actor in the western hemisphere to one that is highly meaningful to the Latin 
American Caribbean region. But rather than this development occurring within a vacuum, it 
reflects the region’s desire to shift its foreign policy outreach to a diverse set of actors in order to 
complement its traditional ties to the US and Western Europe.  
 
Nonetheless, one may also acknowledge that what Caribbean policy-makers have in relation to 
perceptions of a rising China is “historical hindsight.” Wohlforth (1993: 22) notes that “most 
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analysts of foreign policy learning believe that the international system is subject to certain 
regularities about which states ought to learn. As a rule, they see strong incentives for cooperation 
in international relations, and they assess the behaviour and beliefs of historical actors (or present 
incidents) accordingly.” Thus, Caribbean states decision-makers, have consciously or 
subconsciously, internalised US opposing or accommodating perceptions of China as being 
significant to foreign policy behaviour.  
 
However, concentrating largely on perceptions of opportunity more so than threat in the 
interaction, despite its relevance in ongoing discussions of China’s rise in the Latin America 
Caribbean region, is not an oversight.  Rather, this more calibrated approach is based in part, on 
the empirical analyses of the thesis and more normative evaluations of alternative powers rise 
within the region. There are possible limits to the rise non-western actors influence in the region, 
including the preponderance of western actors interests within the space. 
 
Moreover, a focus on the relations from the vantage point of Caribbean states suggests that China 
is seen as a benevolent actor largely interested in shaping south-south economic cooperation for 
mutual benefit, although this does not preclude challenges in the engagement. Hence, the need to 
focus on a more nuanced assessment of Caribbean states ties with China, beyond underlying 
perceptions of threat.  
 
1.3 Research Rationale 
 
The broader objective of the study is to examine the extent to which structural and intervening 
factors shape the Caribbean region’s foreign policy vis-à-vis China whilst simultaneously 
underscoring the primacy of economic considerations in Caribbean states relations with China. In 
doing so, the analytical foci is on developing states rather than the more China-facing analysis 
prevalent in much of the literature on China’s emergence within the developing world.   
 
While there has been a redefined economic pragmatism in Caribbean states engagement with 
China in the Post-Cold War period, these underlying economic elements have escaped empirical 
scrutiny in the literature on China’s rise in the Caribbean and Latin America. The scholarship has 
focused on a more macro perspective of China’s economic role particularly in Latin America with 
little analysis on the Caribbean region (see Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Gallagher, 2016; 
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Ellis, 2009; Roett and Paz, 2008; Peters, 2013).  
 
 Despite the dearth of studies on Caribbean states relations with China, the thesis findings suggest 
that economic issues have been the driving factor in Caribbean states foreign policy decision-
making towards China, for the period under survey within the thesis.  For developing states of the 
Caribbean region, China’s ascent within the international economic system at the dawn at the Post-
Cold War period, not only signaled a broader realignment of economic power at the global level. 
China’s emergence also enhanced spaces for the promotion of development goals within a 
seemingly differentiated international environment marked by the rise of an alternative economic 
power. China appeared to emphasise a different ethos in development assistance. It not only sought 
to act in states with different resource endowments such as those within the Caribbean region, but 
also placed priority on forms of development assistance such as infrastructure financing which was 
not necessarily a central focus for traditional actors. Thus, China’s more prominent role in 
international economic affairs provided considerable maneuvering space for developing states to 
promote economic interests.  
 
Caribbean states economic turn to China may be traced to the 1990’s, a period whereby concurrent 
economic processes aided in facilitating deepened commercial ties between Caribbean states and 
China. As will be seen in chapter 3, China’s rise coincided with significant systemic economic 
changes in the Caribbean region.  These involved a reduction in aid and technical assistance from 
traditional partners such as US after the collapse of the bipolar world order. Added to that, specific 
states within the Anglophone Caribbean faced a loss of preferential treatment in long-established 
markets in the EU for agricultural products. These circumstances in effect, created favorable 
conditions for the expansion of ties between the Caribbean region and China. Consequently, setting 
the stage for increased commercial and political interactions between the two sides. 
 
However, it was in 2005 that the economic relationship between Caribbean states and China took 
a substantial turn. In that year, the First China Caribbean Economic Cooperation Forum was 
convened in Jamaica. The forum was aimed at furthering Chinese actors commercial entry into the 
region. It also served to promulgate the idea of a reinvigorated Caribbean and China partnership 
on new economic terms.  
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To address the evident empirical gap in the existing Sino-LAC scholarship, the thesis examines 
two main case studies pertaining to the financing and trade dimension of the Caribbean region’s 
economic engagement with China. These case studies are crucial to unpacking Caribbean states 
economic interactions with China. Examining these cases also allow for a more rigorous and robust 
analysis of the engagement to emerge. The intent of each case study is not to simply provide a 
descriptive portrayal of the economic relationship. Although, given the knowledge gap on 
Caribbean and China relations, it is important that observed patterns and trends be described, so 
that these can be later analysed. The objective rather, is to examine those cases as a starting point 
to further evaluate the impacts of the economic ties at the ground level and the subsequent 
responses within the local context. The cases also facilitate more critical and evidence-based 
assessments of the broader implications of China’s rising economic role inside the Caribbean 
region in relation to the US. Thus, an analysis of the economic engagement, allows for a 
problematisation of underlying claims that the region’s interactions with China has had a possibly 
adverse effect on the traditional US role within developing states of the Americas hemisphere. 
 
Moreover, the empirical assessment simultaneously highlight the opportunities, challenges and 
complexities involved in the commercial interactions. In examining the financing dimension of the 
domestic economic engagement, as will be seen in chapter 4, China has played a crucial role in 
financing in the Caribbean region. As such, it has become a critical actor in the region within a 
relatively short space of time, alongside established actors. However, the thesis findings also reveal 
the constraints inherent in small Caribbean states engaging a more economically powerful actor 
like China.  
 
Among the impacts the thesis brings to fore, when examining the rapidly evolving economic ties 
with China, is the extent to which the engagement creates the possibility for dependency patterns 
of the past to re-emerge. Therefore, how increased lending from China can impact Caribbean states 
in the long run in terms of more familiar patterns of debt, development and dependency, are critical 
elements examined within the thesis.  
 
As will be examined in chapter 4, these issues are still unfolding and have not resulted in significant 
analysis within the Sino-LAC literature. In the wider scholarship on China’s engagement with 
other developing states, Rotberg (2009), briefly addresses the issue of whether China’s increased 
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development assistance poses a risk for already highly indebted states. In this account, Rotberg 
does not entirely discount the possibility of adverse effects of debt on already vulnerable economic 
environments within developing states. Reisen (2007) provides a slightly more optimistic view of 
increased debt by specific developing countries in relation to China. He argues that the concern is 
misplaced partly on the basis that loans carry a significant grant component. Brautigam (2010) 
also proves to be more measured in her assessment of the possibility of China triggering 
unsustainable debt levels in developing states. 
 
Nonetheless, as will be seen in chapter 4, the research undertakes a much more pragmatic approach 
in assessing the possibility of increasing debt levels within Caribbean states in relation to China. 
Thus, it is asserted that there is a distinct possibility of increased debt to China within the context 
of already high debt to GDP ratios within small states of the Caribbean region. Furthermore, most 
of the financing from China has been on concessional terms, rather than grant funding, as will be 
seen in chapter 4. This incurs obligations over several years in relation to China’s commercial 
actors. Thus raising the risk for higher levels of indebtedness within the region. Such issues 
highlight significant similarities between Chinese commercial players and other international 
financial institutions operating within the Caribbean region such as the IMF and IADB.  
 
Additionally, in examining Caribbean states economic relationship with China in relation to the 
trade dimension of the engagement, the empirical findings in chapter 5, highlight the power 
differentials and underlying asymmetries within the engagement. On the surface, this illustrates 
more familiar trends within the literature on developing states economic relations with China (see 
Zafar, 2007; Jenkins and Edwards, 2006; Moreira, 2006; Kaplinsky and Morris 2008; Alden, 2005; 
Ellis, 2014).   
 
Within the trade relationship two main issues have arisen as will be discussed in chapter 5. One is 
the extent to which Caribbean states appear to be engaging alongside similar center–periphery 
patterns of old in relation to external actors whereby the region is primarily a site for imports of 
higher valued goods while being an exporter of primary products. The second is the extent to which 
China’s rise presents its own set of competitive dynamics to states within the Caribbean and Latin 
American region.  
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However, the empirical findings do belie developing states agency and interests in the trade 
dynamic. Thus suggesting the need to account for a more nuanced assessment of Caribbean states 
economic ties with China. The economic relationship illustrates distinct opportunities and 
underlying prospects in relation to enhancing China’s role as a source of FDI within respective 
trading sectors within the Caribbean region. China’s investments in this regard is especially 
relevant within the resource endowed states of the Caribbean such as Guyana, Trinidad and 
Jamaica. Such issues will be addressed more comprehensively in chapter 5. Moreover, as will be 
shown in chapter 5, trade with China has actually been part of Caribbean states bid to access more 
competitive global markets in goods. Thus China’s rise has enabled a broader diversification of 
trade partnerships.  
 
 In relation to ongoing debates within the literature that China presents a competitive threat in its 
trade with Latin America and the Caribbean region, as will be seen in chapter 5, one may not 
necessarily discount a more competitive turn to China. However the issue of China’s competitive 
threat is a lot more complex. This is due in part to  China’s comparative advantages. Nonetheless, 
as will be seen in chapter 5, this preliminary finding in relation to the Caribbean region, may not 
necessarily be generalised across to the Latin American region. Strauss and Armony (2012) 
suggests that there is reason to question the optimism of earlier studies regarding China’s 
competitive threat to Latin America. As will be discussed in chapter 5, concerns are further 
exhibited through the fairly substantial number of antidumping cases brought by Latin American 
states in relation to China at the WTO. 
 
Further, in examining Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China in relation to 
its implications for the US role within the space, the findings suggest that Caribbean states have 
sought to enhance ties with China alongside established actors. The empirical findings in chapter 
6 suggest that the US and China are playing more complementary rather than competitive roles in 
the Caribbean region. Thus it appears that China’s influence inside Caribbean states is occurring 
in tandem with US economic dominance and not in opposition to it. More specifically, as will be 
seen in chapter 6, the empirical evidence suggests that in economic areas of financing and trade 
where the Caribbean and China have increased economic engagement, the US influence can still 
be argued to be predominant. Such findings problematise claims of possible US decline amidst 
China’s rise within the region. As will be seen in chapter 6, the data also points to the need to 
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interrogate claims pertaining to China’s rise and US influence more broadly in relation to Latin 
America.  
 
Moreover, the research findings suggest that while underlying power differentials, have been 
assumed to impinge on Caribbean states ability to negotiate their economic interests in relations 
with China, this does not automatically equate to a lack of agency on the part of Caribbean states. 
And neither do asymmetries suggest an unwillingness on the part of Caribbean countries to assert 
their interests in the dynamic.   
 
As will be seen in chapter 7, the economic relations between the Caribbean and China can elicit a 
range of responses based on various actors interests. Consequently, the engagement can be 
mediated based on calculations of costs, benefits and risks in the engagement. Responses may be 
linked to perceived threats to environmental norms and labour standards or even in relation to the 
more strategic position of the Caribbean in relation to the US. Thus, despite limitations related to 
economic resources and other underlying vulnerabilities, Caribbean states actively formulate 
responses, implement decisions and aim to assert preferences in the dynamic. Thus, further 
pointing to the need to interrogate more thoroughly developing states standpoints in interactions 
with China in an effort to promote a more critical assessment of China’s engagement inside those 
states.  
 
The rest of the introductory chapter will continue to unfold as follows: the specific research 
contributions of the study will be examined and a literature review will then be undertaken. The 
discussion on the Sino-LAC literature focuses on the sources, phases, themes, underlying debates 
and more specifically; the omissions within the scholarship which in part drives the research 
project. Finally, the chapter provides the overall structure of the thesis in an effort to signpost all 
subsequent chapters of the dissertation. 
 
1.4 Thesis contributions  
The study contributes to addressing the knowledge gap on the Caribbean region’s relationship with 
China within the broader context of China’s emergence in developing states of the Americas 
hemisphere. More broadly, in examining the relations from the standpoint of Caribbean states, the 
thesis simultaneously contributes to placing a developing country perspective in the discourse on 
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China’s rise within the Latin America Caribbean region. Therefore, it seeks to move past the more 
conventional analyses within the literature whereby much of the discussion has been largely 
focused on China’s goals and interests in the dynamic. 
 
Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, the thesis is the first study to examine the various phases 
of Caribbean states relations with China. There has often been a tendency to view the Latin 
America Caribbean region’s relationship with China as more of a Post-Cold War phenomenon. 
Scholars tend to construct China as rather disengaged from the region prior to the Post-Cold War 
period (Roett and Paz; 2008, Ellis; 2014, Fornes and Mendez; 2018).  
 
However, the findings suggest a rethinking of established assumptions regarding the Caribbean 
and China relationship as will be seen in chapter 3. The research findings contrast with the wider 
discourse that often expresses China as aloof from developments in the Latin Caribbean region 
prior to the Post-Cold War period. The relationship between the Caribbean region and China has 
been based not only on shared historical ties, but also, Caribbean states displayed even in the midst 
of Cold War rivalries, an ideological commitment to China which revolved largely on Third World 
solidarity. Later, driven by economic considerations, Caribbean states and China reconfigured 
their relations in the Post-Cold War period. Such issues have been under-explored in the literature 
on China’s rise in the region.  
 
The thesis also makes a significant empirical contribution by focusing on the economic dimension 
of Caribbean states relations with China. Thus, adding to the current state of knowledge on Latin 
America Caribbean relations with China.  As already stated, it examines two empirically based 
case studies of Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China; the financing and 
trade dimensions of the commercial interactions. Economic issues shed light on Caribbean states 
interests in the engagement, their agency, responses and constraints in the broader dynamic. Thus 
facilitating an understanding of the interaction from their vantage point as developing states. These 
case studies also illustrate the wider implications of those economic processes within developing 
states for traditional actors like the US. Thus illuminating how developing states, despite 
substantial economic asymmetries in relation to more powerful actors, do to some extent, 
invariably influence the role of such actors within their space.  
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At the theoretical level, the research contributes to the growing body of scholarly work on NCR in 
the study of foreign policy. The research illuminates how Neo Classical Realism theory can 
broaden an understanding of developing states foreign policy behaviour in relation to emerging 
powers like China. Moreover, in drawing from the conceptual frameworks underlying the analysis, 
the research is firmly located within the IR literature. Thus, it contributes more specifically to the 
subfields of Foreign Policy and International Political Economy.  
 
The study also contributes to opening-up avenues for further research within the context of Sino- 
Latin America Caribbean studies.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Within the nascent literature on Sino- Latin America Caribbean relations, there are at least two 
areas of neglect and these guide the dissertation. One, much of the literature overlooks the 
Caribbean region’s relations with China in the discourse on Sino - Latin America relations. The 
outcome is a sizeable gap in knowledge on China’s relations with the broader Latin America 
Caribbean region. Two, there is a tendency for the literature to be more “China facing” with 
insufficient attempts at interrogating and integrating developing states perspectives in the 
discourse.  
 
Moreover, there is a preoccupation with the US and China nexus within the region in the literature 
which further de-emphasises the perspectives of Caribbean and Latin American states in the 
dynamic. This is evident in scholarly works, US policy documents, think tank research and media 
sources (see subsection 2.2). While this approach is understandable given the intersection of China 
and US interests in the region, concentrating largely on these economic powers, preclude more 
critical and comprehensive assessments of China’s rise in the Americas hemisphere. Consequently, 
it is important to insert into the wider narrative, Latin America and Caribbean states agency, 
motives and responses when analysing China’s engagement with the region. The preceding 
discussion then seeks to locate the research project.  
 
2.1 Lack of Caribbean states perspective in Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature 
Within the broader scholarly discourse on Latin America and China, exists very few incisive and 
critical studies on the relationship between Caribbean states and China. To date, there has been 
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little systematic evaluation into how and why Caribbean states geopolitical structure, policy-
making, economic considerations and perceptions of the engagement shape relations with China.  
In the rare instances that certain studies mention the Caribbean in the broader dynamic, the 
tendency has been to deal with the region rather superficially. Ellis (2009) is among the very few 
scholarly studies to dedicate a brief and separate discussion to China’s economic and political 
activities in the Anglophone Caribbean. Wenner and Clarke (2016) and Bernal (2016) have also 
made some preliminary efforts to examine the economic interaction. However, these studies 
remain largely descriptive.  The impacts and implications of the Caribbean region’s economic 
engagement with China either at the domestic level or in relation to traditional actors, remain 
under-examined. The responses of such states within the context of the commercial interactions 
also remain largely un-explored. 
 
Moreover, the tendency to overlook the Caribbean region as part of the analyses even when 
scholars purport to address the Caribbean region is also rather striking as will be examined below. 
Thus, the literature is predisposed to treat the Latin America Caribbean region as a cohesive and 
monolithic entity when assessing China’s growing ties with the region without necessarily 
accounting for the diversity in China’s relations within particular states in the region.  
 
2.1.1 Sino- Latin America Caribbean Literature 
The existing body of scholarly work on the Caribbean, Latin America and China may be placed 
under the broader rubric of China’s historical relations with the region, its ideological role in the 
Latin America Caribbean region during the Cold war era, and China’s emerging role in the Post-
Cold War context of relations. However, the bulk of those analyses pertain to Latin America rather 
than the Caribbean per se, especially when accounting for the region’s relations in the latter two 
periods mentioned.  
 
Firstly, whilst historical texts reference the Caribbean and China relationship, beyond this more 
historical context of engagement, studies on the Caribbean and China remain relatively scarce in 
the peer- reviewed literature. Lai (2006) focuses on various historical waves of Chinese migrants 
into Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana. Lai documents the early experiences of these migrants within 
the Caribbean context. Wilson (2004) focuses his attention on the various processes of adaptation 
undertaken by Chinese migrants which in turn fostered new identities within the Caribbean region. 
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Likewise, Sanjek (1990) examines Asia’s historical links with the Caribbean in his book, 
Caribbean Asians. Additional efforts to account for the early Caribbean and China ties is seen in 
the Journal of Chinese Overseas (2009, Vol.5, Issue 1).  The said journal dedicates a collection of 
essays to the Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean with the focus still largely on historical 
linkages. Moreover, authors such as Lai and Tan (2010) and Li Anshan (2004) have also expanded 
their enquiries by accounting for Caribbean and Latin America’s cultural links with China based 
on the earlier inter-connections between the region and China. A more recent work, designed in 
part to refocus attention on Asia’s role in the Americas hemisphere, includes Rivas and Lee-
DiStefano (2016).   
 
Secondly, within the context of the Cold War period, there is a rather noticeable void in the 
academic literature with respect to the Caribbean, Latin America and China.  This is partly due to 
the assumption that the area’s broader geopolitical underpinning in relation to the US precluded 
closer engagement with China.  This has led in part to Sutter’s (2012: 323) claim that “China had 
limited standing” in Latin America prior to the 1990’s.  
 
Despite the critical Cuba and China nexus within the Caribbean region during the Cold War period, 
even the interaction between the two, appears to have escaped broader scrutiny in the Sino-Latin 
American literature.  More recently, there has been a few efforts designed to address this wider 
knowledge gap on the Caribbean and China with respect to Cuba especially. With a view towards 
examining China’s more ideological links with Cuba, the Wilson Center’s “Cold War International 
History Project,” published an article in 2012 entitled; The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50.  Drawing 
from various sources, including now declassified documents, the article examines China’s 
engagement with the Caribbean region under Mao. As such, it brings to the fore, China’s attempt 
at bolstering solidarity with Cuba on the basis of revolutionary struggles against US imperialism. 
Notwithstanding the general lack of scholarly attention to the Caribbean region, discussions in 
chapter 3, underscores the shared ideological affinities between respective Caribbean states and 
China. 
 
Despite the limited scholarly research on the Caribbean region and China during the Cold War 
period, two early scholarly works which sought to evaluate Latin America’s relations with China 
during that period bear mentioning. One is Cecil Johnson’s (1970) book, Communist China and 
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Latin America 1959-1967. Johnson posits that Mao attempted to export a Maoist ideology to Latin 
America in an attempt to rival Soviet influence. Also notable is William E. Ratliff (1972) article; 
Communist China and Latin America, 1949-1972. Ratliff focuses on the bid to integrate China in 
the international community by respective Latin American states during the Cold War period. It 
may be said that this more ideological stance in relation to China was in line with the more 
ideational underpinnings of that era. 
 
Moreover, in seeking to go beyond the popular narrative that Latin America’s relations with China 
is largely rooted in the Post-Cold War context of engagement, Jilberto and Hogenboom (2010: xii) 
posit that the relationship is not “terra incognita.” The said authors make a preliminary effort to 
deconstruct China’s role in Latin America by focusing partly on the more hegemonic and anti-
hegemonic undertones evident in the relations in the Cold War period. Rothwell (2013) also 
attempts to further explore this phase of the China and Latin America relationship in his work, 
“Transpacific Revolutionaries.” Rothwell takes up the more ideational elements of Latin 
America’s relations with China and contends that Latin American states exercised a level of agency 
in relations with China. Rothwell also argues that the Chinese leadership under Mao attempted to 
formulate a Maoist identity within Latin America.  
 
Thirdly, although a growing number of scholars have discussed the China and Latin America 
relationship in the Post-Cold War period, much of the discussion overlooks the Caribbean region. 
This has resulted in a substantial knowledge gap in the broader Sino- Latin America Caribbean 
literature. The scholarly literature thus far, has largely concerned itself with the economic and 
political themes that shape China’s relations with the Latin American region post 1990.  Moreover, 
while not necessarily focused on the Caribbean region, within the Sino-Latin American literature, 
geopolitical concerns have been assumed a priori, to have both direct and implicit consequences 
in shaping the region’s relationship with China. This is due to the area’s close geostrategic 
positioning in relation to the US.  
 
The focus on economic issues within Sino-Latin American literature is in line with the scholarship 
on China’s relationship with other regions in the developing world. The economic imperatives 
behind China’s engagement is explicated upon in much of the literature concerning China’s rise 
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in developing states (see Taylor, 2006; Alden,2005; Brautigam, 2010; Brautigam and Tang, 2012; 
Breslin, 2016; Lucy Corkin, 2012; McCormick, 2008; L. Jakobson, 2006; Moss & Rose, 2006). 
 
There are three main economic areas where China’s relations with Latin America has blossomed. 
Latin America’s commercial interactions with China has been linked to its resource drive in the 
region, its market outreach to the developing world as well as its increasing role in financing in 
developing states. Cui and Garcia (2016) and Wise and Myers (2016) have paid close attention to 
the growing economic role played by China in Latin America in such areas. Roett and Paz (2008) 
and Ellis (2009, 2014) have also explored those interlinking elements in China’s engagement with 
the region.  
 
The resource drive behind China’s engagement in Latin America has been linked to an increase in 
“loans for oil” deals between the region and China. Wang and Li (2016) explores how China’s 
natural resource quest has influenced this model of financing within Latin America using 
Venezuela as a case study. This resource oriented economic strategy by China within Latin 
America is also examined by Yanran Xu (2017). The latter develops the central thesis that China’s 
strategic partnerships in specific Latin American countries (Venezuela, Argentina and Mexico) are 
linked to China’s resource diplomacy abroad. Erikson (2006) concludes that much of the 
commercial interactions between China and Venezuela have rested on oil for investments. 
 
Additionally, within the economic context of Latin America’s engagement with China, the peer-
reviewed literature has placed particular emphasis on the trade relations between the two.  To this 
end, there have been some fairly critical expositions particularly on the trade dimension of the 
interactions. Academic studies in this area have managed to examine the challenges, opportunities 
and threats that have thus far defined the Latin America and China trade dynamic. Lall et al (2005) 
is an important initial study in this regard. It is among the preliminary studies to critically assess 
the impacts and implications of China’s economic emergence on the Latin American region. Thus, 
expressing very early on, China’s effect on possible de-industrialisation in the region. Such debates 
have also been taken up by Moreira (2006). The latter explicated on the competitive effects of an 
emerging China on the manufacturing sector in Latin America. Gallagher and Porzecanski (2010) 
also provides a critical synopsis of the implications of China’s rise in trade for Latin America. The 
said authors argue that the case for de-industrialisation in the region is not entirely overstated when 
	 20	
accounting for the effects of China on the region. In examining the effects of a then rapidly 
expanding China on the textile industries in the Caribbean and Latin America, Delvin et al (2006) 
concludes that the decline in this sector in the region effectively correlates with the rise of China 
in similar product structures. 
 
The opportunities as well as opportunity costs of engaging China in trade have also been examined 
by several more authors whose work bear highlighting.  Some have elucidated on the impacts of 
the asymmetrical trade ties between the region and China. These include; Jenkins et al, 2008; 
Jenkins and Peters, 2009; Hernandez, 2012; Kotschwar, 2014; Rosales and Kuwayama, 2012; 
Dosch and Goodman, 2012.  
 
Notwithstanding the more critical assessments of China’s trade relationship with Latin America, 
the financing dimension of the economic engagement and its implications for Latin America, 
remains under-examined. But having said so, Gallagher (2012, 2014, 2016) has made a 
commendable effort in examining China’s financing patterns in Latin America at the more macro-
level. Gallagher is among the limited number of scholars that have sought to lift the lid on Chinese 
financing in Latin America thus far. He also places relative emphasis on the implications for 
traditional actors like the US within the region. Thus Gallagher’s (2012)  article, “The New Banks 
in Town,” catalogues China’s growing influence in lending in Latin America by relying on primary 
documents as well as media accounts of Chinese lending in the region. Gallagher revisits the issue 
of Chinese financing in the region in his book, The China Triangle.  Consequently, Gallagher 
(2016:70) estimates that between 2005 and 2014, Chinese banks made available at least $119 
billion to fifteen (15) Latin American governments.  
 
However, in the main, the impacts of China’s lending on the Latin American region has been 
under-explored in the peer-reviewed literature. As will be discussed in chapter 4, with regards to 
the Caribbean region, while increased lending can contribute to economic gains, broader questions 
of debt and development and the possibility of the former negating the latter, cannot be entirely 
overlooked. Lending has taken place within an environment where Caribbean states already held 
very high debt to GDP ratios. Such a situation does have possible implications for development 
gains within the Caribbean region in the medium to long term.  
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Beyond economic considerations, the literature has also focused on the political themes in the 
Sino-Latin American literature. Such elements to some extent, converge with existing literature 
pertaining to China’s rise in other developing states. According to Brautigam and Tang (2012:799), 
China’s engagement with developing states “bolster diplomacy, China’s image and soft power.” 
Joshua Kurlantzick (2007: xi) argues that public diplomacy is an important part of China’s soft 
power in developing states. Yiwei Wang (2008) also contends that diplomacy is an important tool 
in China's influence abroad.  
 
Among the main concerns in the literature on China’s rise in Latin America is the extent to which 
China’s diplomacy in the region is related to its foreign policy aims in relation to Taiwan. The 
Latin America Caribbean region is the geographical space with the majority of Taiwan’s 
diplomatic allies, despite the declining number of diplomatic partnerships for the latter in favour 
of China. Dominguez (2006) and Ellis (2009) posit that the Taiwan question plays a central role 
in China’s interests in the region.  
 
Moreover, within the Latin America Caribbean region, political motives attributed to China’s rise 
assume even more pressing significance, due to the geopolitical character of the region. Phillips in 
Dittmer and Yu eds. (2010: 77) posits, “while China and Latin America have steered away from 
any form of engagement that resembles an overtly ideological and geopolitical agenda, the 
relationship is fundamentally informed and shaped by geopolitical considerations.” Much of the 
literature is aligned with the thinking that this particular facet is especially significant in the Latin 
America Caribbean context (see subsection 2.2.1). As already stated, the region’s geopolitical 
structure in particular, differentiates it from other areas of the developing world where China 
practices its economic statecraft. 
 
As seen in the above discussions, with the exception of more historical references to the Caribbean 
and China dynamic, the Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature, largely omits the Caribbean 
region in the discourse. Whereas Latin America’s relations with China especially within the Post-
Cold War context of the engagement, have been increasingly postulated upon, little consideration 
has been given to the Anglophone Caribbean.  
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More specifically, within the economic context of engagement, the central focus is on Latin 
America rather than the Latin America Caribbean region. This leads to less rigorous empirical 
engagement with China’s emergence in developing states in the Americas hemisphere. Thus far, 
there appears little effort to critically reflect on the nature of the economic relationship between 
Caribbean states and China, the aims of the commercial interaction, the responses engendered at 
the ground level to China’s rising economic role in the region and the impacts and implications of 
Caribbean states economic relations with China.  
 
Given the current status of the literature, substantial knowledge gaps exist on China’s emergence 
within the region. There is then merit in inserting a Caribbean perspective in the dynamic.  In 
examining at the unit level, how and why particular political and economic factors have influenced 
the Caribbean region’s relations with China, a more critical analysis and a broader understanding 
of China’s rise in the Latin America Caribbean region may be brought forth.  
 
2.2 Lack of developing states perspective in Sino Latin American Literature  
As highlighted in the previous discussions, Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature is perhaps a 
bit of a misnomer as much of it relates to the Latin America region and not the Caribbean.  But 
beyond this knowledge gap on the region lies a very critical issue. Much of the current scholarly 
discourse frequently deprioritise and de-emphasise the perspectives of Latin America and 
Caribbean states in debates on China’s rise in the region, as will be examined below. 
 
The status of the current discourse, indicate how marginal developing states are often understood 
to be within the wider engagement with China. Invariably, in engaging in more peripheral analyses 
of Latin American and Caribbean states perspectives, the literature overlooks the essential role that 
those very states play in expanding Chinese actors influence at the ground level. This not only 
reinforce biases in the existing literature, but also stymie more in-depth and critical research into 
the region’s relations with China.  
 
More broadly, this may be seen as part of a general tendency within academic discourse to focus 
more so on established powers and emerging actors when seeking to postulate on developing states 
relations with such states. For instance, much of the literature on Sino- African relations, tends to 
discount African states agency and interests in the engagement, a point emphasised by Mohan and 
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Lampert, 2013 and Sautman and Yan, 2009. Likewise, similar deficits are apparent in the Sino-
Latin American literature.  
 
In examining the economic and political factors that shape Caribbean and Latin American states 
relations with China, concentrating on what China wants, why its increasing its role in the region, 
and why the US should be concerned, are important debates to have. But conversely, we should 
also be asking; what do Caribbean or Latin American states want? why are Latin America and 
Caribbean states engaging China? And to what extent do the rising interactions impact US interests 
inside those states?  The peer-reviewed literature on Sino Latin American relations has yet to 
sufficiently bridge this significant gap.  
 
The tendency to obscure developing states perspectives in the dynamic is evident in much of the 
academic literature on the region and China.  In Ellis’s (2009) work, he dedicates a main section 
of his book to “China’s emerging struggles in Latin America.” However, it is also important that 
this logic be reversed and that Latin America’s struggles with China for instance, figure more 
prominently in the current discourse. Similarly, Roett and Paz (2008), concentrate the bulk of their 
attention on China even while seeking to dedicate chapters to “South -South Perspectives” and the 
“Latin American View,” within their book. However, much of the discussions undertaken by 
Tokatlian and Hirst respectively, within this particular scholarly work, did not necessarily escape 
the singular focus on China and the US. 
 
 The underlying concern with emerging states rather than developing states in the dynamic is also 
evident in more recent work. Despite the suggestion by Armony and Xiao (2016) that there should 
be a space for “Latin American Perspectives,” in discussion of China’s rise, somewhat 
surprisingly, much of the discussion undertaken by the said authors remain largely China facing. 
As such, the authors emphasise China’s broader international strategy within the Latin American 
region. This strategy of coopting Latin America into China’s foreign policy is assumed to signal 
an elevation of the region in China’s broader foreign policy outreach. Likewise, although 
Chimienti and Creutzfeldt (2017) do recognize the necessity of similar reference points in their 
analysis of Latin America’s relations with China, the focus remains largely on China. Thus, even 
when focusing on “Who wants what for Latin America,” within the account from the said authors, 
Latin American states are seen as more reactive players rather than active participants in shaping 
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Chinese influence at the ground level. As such, the account provided generally fails to recognise 
Latin American states as significant actors in their own right which seek to expand ties with 
emerging actors like China to facilitate domestic and external goals.  
 
2.2.1 Preoccupation with the US role in Sino Latin America Caribbean literature  
The tendency for the literature to be primarily preoccupied with the question of China and the US 
rather than Latin American or Caribbean states perspectives, is evident in much of the peer-
reviewed literature. Fornes and Mendez (2018: 3) argue, “Latin America and the Caribbean are of 
the highest strategic importance to China in the great game of geopolitics.” While on the surface, 
such arguments may appear plausible, such narratives needs to be critically interrogated in an effort 
to determine the limits to such an argument and also to debunk certain myths associated with 
China’s rise in the region.  
 
On one hand, it is understandable that concerns about China’s rise versus US influence occupy the 
literature on Latin America and China, given the salience of the US role in the region. However, 
deliberating almost exclusively on issues from the perspective of the US, can lead to narrow 
assessments of China’s engagement in the region. Doing so further undermines more rigorous and 
evidence-based analysis of China’s role within the Latin America Caribbean region. Thus leading 
to more perceptions driven rather than empirically based analyses that may provide more reliable 
portrayals of the actual engagement between the region and China.  
 
The preoccupation with the US and China nexus in the Latin America Caribbean region in the 
scholarly literature correlates with broader ideas pertaining to more strategic intentions on the part 
of China to increase its influence vis-à-vis the US in the international system. Closely interlinked 
with China and the US are particular debates which place varying emphasis on conflictual or 
cooperative relations between the two (see Goldstein, 2001, 2005; Swaine and Tellis, 2001; 
Hakim, 2006; Blackwill and Tellis, 2015; Ikenberry, 2008; Foot, 2006; Shambaugh, 2013; 
Pillsbury 2015). The more restrictive analysis of China’s rise in global affairs has led Hirono and 
Suzuki (2014: 445), to contend more broadly that, “(analyses of) Chinese foreign policy continues 
to be structured by a powerful discourse which claims that China’s rise to power presents a unique 
and almost unprecedented challenge to the maintenance of the Western-dominated world order.”  
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Contradictory views on China’s rise also permeate the Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature. 
Ellis (2017: 36) while taking a more measured approach to the US and China nexus in the region, 
point out, “(an) underlying question…is whether China’s emergence as a global power, and an 
increasingly important partner for Latin America, will lead to hostile geopolitical competition with 
the U.S.” Paz (2012:22) also postulates on whether China may be construed as a possible 
hegemonic challenge to US interests in the Latin American region. Nolte (2013:587) furthers those 
claims by arguing that China is a challenge to the US within its traditional sphere of influence. 
Nolte bases his argument on two underlying issues. One, he claims that China’s growing economic 
presence may be viewed as a threat to US security interests in the region. Two, he envisages that 
China’s presence may encourage particular states within Latin America to take a more independent 
course with the United States. Certain Chinese scholars do regurgitate similar claims when it 
comes to China’s rise in Latin America.  Hsiang (2006: 121), asserts that China is seeking to 
increase its influence in Latin America to counter-balance the US. Li (2007:838) while arguing 
that Beijing has attempted to be more accommodating of US concerns in Latin America, suggests 
that there is scope for increased competition by the two actors the hemisphere.  
 
However, others such as Spanakos and Xiao (2010:238) instead contend that China has no 
interests in balancing US influence in its traditional sphere of influence. Likewise, Creutzfeldt 
(2015: 24) in postulating on the growing US and China dynamic in the region, argue that there is 
“strong evidence for a comparatively even-handed and fundamentally non-competitive approach 
(in China’s rise in Latin America).”  
 
These conflicting interpretations of China’s role in the region further reinforce the need to advance 
the dialogue on Caribbean states and China beyond the more perception driven analyses that can 
underlie China’s interactions with such states. Harris (2015:156), characterises the current 
literature on China and Latin America Caribbean relations as containing “biases, fears and 
misinformation” which lead to threatening perceptions of China’s rise in the region. A more 
Caribbean and Latin American centered perspective within the literature can arguably debunk 
ideas of a China challenge to US interests in the region. While on the surface, these arguments 
appear to carry some validity, these claims are not necessarily reliable when interrogated against 
the empirical and normative evidence.  
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Arguments perceiving China as a threat to US interests in the region often overlook the domestic 
variables that may act as constraints to China’s rise. Such issues have led Trinkunas (2016:23) to 
be quite circumspect in his deliberations on the US and China nexus in the region. Thus he posits 
that domestic politics and internal considerations are likely to shape China’s influence in the 
region. Consequently, he concludes by cautioning that, “U.S. policymakers should be skeptical of 
the threat-based narrative that China is competing with or excluding U.S. influence from the 
region.”  
 
Furthermore, while the ties between the region and China are growing significantly, relations can 
be conflictual at the domestic level especially when accounting for the economic asymmetries in 
the relationship. As will be examined in chapters 5 and 7, China as a possible competitive threat 
to the region and China’s modus operandi in development assistance as it pertains to labour can 
engender unfavourable responses at the domestic level.  Such issues suggest that there are domestic 
challenges in engaging China. Kurlantzick (2006:34) draws on these possible impediments to 
China’s rise in the region versus US influence by noting, “Yet, as China expands its presence in 
Latin America, many of its policies could risk a backlash, lessening its ability to threaten U.S. 
interests in the region.”   
 
The engagement between the Caribbean, Latin America and China is becoming increasingly more 
multi-faceted and complex. This signals the importance of facilitating a more nuanced assessment 
of the region’s relations with China by taking into account how and why developing states in the 
Americas hemisphere have expanded their relations with China.  
 
2.2.2 US policy, think tanks and media in Sino Latin America Caribbean literature 
The predominant focus on the US and China in the literature rather than developing states 
perspectives, is further enabled by broader set of policy discourses influenced by US policy 
documents, think tanks and the media on China’s rise in the Americas hemisphere. These will be 
discussed below as they constitute important strands of Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature 
together with the scholarly works examined above. While such sources often focus on western 
powers interests in the region’s relationship with China, they nonetheless indicate important 
existing and unfolding trends in the interactions. They also highlight particular debates that shape 
the Latin America and Caribbean region’s relationship with China. 
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(1) US Government policy 
 It may be worth acknowledging from the onset that US policy documents on China’s presence in 
the Latin America Caribbean region rather than raising alarm, appear to be quite measured in their 
analysis of China’s rise in the region. Between 2005 and 2016, under the Bush and Obama 
administrations, there was a similar policy 1 of concentrating on complementarities in the Chinese 
engagement with developing states of the Americas hemisphere. As such, there seemed limited 
efforts to cast China’s relations with the region in competitive terms.  While there is seeming 
evidence of a shift in rhetoric, pertaining to China’s growing economic influence in the region 
under the Trump Administration post 2016, much of the formal policy on the region, depart from 
the more central idea of the “China threat thesis” in the Latin America Caribbean region. 
 
US policy documents concerning China’s rise in the LAC region appear to coincide with China’s 
more outward economic turn to the Caribbean and Latin America starting in 2005. Although one 
might concentrate on this period, it may be asserted that China’s presence in the region has been 
of continuous interest to the US prior. According to Myers, a Latin American specialist, “The U.S. 
government has been taking stock of Chinese interests in Latin America and the Caribbean since 
the 1990s when concerns surfaced about Hong Kong firm Hutchinson Whampoa running the ports 
on either end of the Panama Canal.”2 Ports within the Anglophone Caribbean (The Bahamas) was 
part of that acquisition by the Hong Kong based firm.  
 
By 2005 Chinese President, Hu Jintao, had undertaken four visits to Latin America.  This was 
followed by China’s Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, who paid a visit to the Anglophone 
Caribbean in February 2005. The purpose of the visit was to attend the first China and Caribbean 
Economic Cooperation and Trade forum in Jamaica. Shortly thereafter, on April 6th, 2005, the US 
Government held formal hearings on China’s growing involvement  in Latin America, through the 
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee. According 
to Dumbaugh and Sullivan (2005:5) the said committee concluded that  despite China’s growing 
role in Latin America and the Caribbean, “ the United States has been and will continue to be the 
long-term partner of preference.” The hearing was then followed by a formal report to the US 
Congress on April 20th, 2005, entitled, “ China’s Growing Interest in Latin America.”  The U.S.-
 
1 CRS Report, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress,” Oct. 2018, p. 8 
2 https://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/does-china-understand-latin-america-better-than-the-us 
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China Economic and Security Review Commission, created to monitor US and Chinese interests, 
also engaged with China’s rise in the region.  In its annual report to Congress in 2006, the report 
cited China’s interactions with Latin America as one partly related to China seeking to increase its 
status as that of an emerging power.3  
 
Moreover, the US government, under the Bush and Obama administrations, convened directly with 
Chinese officials on China’s presence in the Latin America Caribbean region. Consequently, on 
April 14th, 2006, the first ever US and China talks on the Latin America Caribbean region was held 
in Beijing. The aim of the talk was to avoid possible miscalculations and conflicts as the two 
economic powers pursued their interests within the Latin American Caribbean region. 4 The timing 
of the talks noted above, appeared to be of significance as it took place a few days prior to the 
arrival of Chinese President Hu Jintao on his first visit to Washington D.C on April 20th, 2006. 
These talks continued under the Obama administration (see Paz 2012: 3).   
 
As already indicated, Trump’s rhetoric points to concerns about China’s rise in the region. The 
Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy cited China as a main challenge in the 
contest for power and declared it to be “a revisionist power.”5 This is in line with the “China threat” 
thesis permeating part of the scholarly discourse. Regarding China’s rising economic profile in the 
Latin America Caribbean region, the said document proposes that China “seeks to pull the region 
into its orbit through state-led investments and loans.”6 As to whether this has any long-term 
implications for broader concerns regarding China in the region, remains unclear. 
 
At the time of writing of the thesis, significant coverage by the U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission to China’s rise in the hemisphere was provided in an October 2018 report 
entitled, “China’s Engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.” China’s rise as a creditor 
to the region and its increasing trading profile has been seen as having cemented to some extent, 
China’s influence in the region. The said report also notes that China had thus far, provided $150.4 
billion to Caribbean and Latin American governments from 2005-2016 (p.201). However, while 
 
3 https://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2006-annual-report-congress 
4 Representing the US side, was Thomas Shannon, Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the US State 
Department. Zeng Gang, Director General of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 




the figures just quoted, appear impressive, it is important to maintain a sense of balance when it 
comes to analysing lending by China to both the Caribbean and Latin America.  As will be 
discussed in chapter 4, while China has become a substantial lender, there is a sizeable but not so 
often quoted difference between loan commitments and actual disbursement of funds by China to 
the Caribbean. Also, not all projects where billions have been slated for investment have come to 
fruition thus far.  This is due partly to a range of domestic issues ranging from environmental 
standards to other constraints. For instance, while China committed more than US $1 billion to 
port infrastructure in Jamaica, as will be discussed in chapter 7, this project has not materialised.   
 
Overall, it is likely that US policy documents will continue to shape debates pertaining to China’s 
rise in the Caribbean and Latin America while also simultaneously informing the Sino-Latin 
America Caribbean literature. 
 
(2) Think tanks 
The role of think tanks in shaping debates and influencing policy has been extensively discussed 
by Diane Stone. Higgott and Stone (1994: 30) argue that the role of think tanks in foreign policy 
should not necessarily be overlooked. They posit that such institutions play a legitimising role in 
government policies. The link between think tanks and government policy is also made clear by 
Weaver (1989). 
 
Several leading think tanks in the US have postulated on the Latin America and China dynamic as 
well as the tandem US role in the region. These include, inter alia, Brookings Institution, Inter-
American Dialogue, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Heritage Foundation. 
However, think tanks have yet to escape the more singular focus on China’s interests and the US 
and China nexus in the region. Consequently, much of the research minimises the role of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the fast-evolving relations between the region and China. 
 
The Brooking Institute, a long-standing think tank in the US, has examined the evolving relations 
between China and the region fairly extensively. While largely concerned with the US, such 
accounts to some extent, unpack the growing dynamic between the region and China.  In efforts 
to gain a better understanding of the unfolding phenomena of China’s rise in the Americas 
hemisphere, Brooking have periodically gathered experts to discuss China’s emergence and its 
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implications. One such gathering on May 31st-June 3rd, 2014, resulted in a compilation document 
entitled, “Enter the Dragon: Risks from China to Latin America.” China’s role as significant 
financier in the region was highlighted in this report.  Increasing the IMF’s position within the 
region as a lender of last resort was a key recommendation within the report. Implicit in this 
recommendation was the need to reinforce traditional western influence in lending vis-à-vis 
China’s growing influence in the region. 
 
The Brooking Institute continue to concern itself with providing insights on a number of issues 
impacting the US in the Latin America and China relationship. In 2016, it put forward a series of 
publications dedicated to understanding the possible implications of China’ emergence in the 
hemisphere. In the main, these articles largely provide descriptive information on China’s evolving 
influence in the region, without necessarily devoting much attention to interrogating the Caribbean 
or Latin American side of the equation. One such article by Piccone is entitled, “The Geopolitics 
of China’s rise in Latin America.” This article focuses more so on describing the economic trends 
in the relations and possible implications for the US. David Dollar also authored the article, 
“China’s Investments in Latin America.” Dollar examines the increasing role of China as a leading 
lender to the Latin America Caribbean region as part of China’s development aid and assistance.  
Thus, placing more attention on what China wants rather than why developing states are engaging 
China. 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has made a concerted attempt to pursue more 
critical engagement of Latin American states relations with China. Thus, highlighting the 
challenges and opportunities in the interactions in various studies of China’s economic relations 
with Latin America. One such study is; “Ten Years After the Take-off-Taking Stock of China LAC 
Relations.” The IADB has also made some preliminary attempts to examine how Latin America 
can position itself to benefit from China’s emergence through its study; “LAC Investment in China: 
A New Chapter in LAC and China Relations.” Although the latter, does not extensively expand on 
how the region might seek to enhance gains in the interactions by targeting the Chinese side, this 
study does highlight the need for a broader perspective taking into account developing states 
interests in engaging China.  
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Think Tanks like Carnegie, have for a period of time, sought to provide somewhat balanced reports 
on the unfolding patterns in the Latin America Caribbean region’s relations with China. In 2012, 
it examined China’s economic diplomacy in the region in an article entitled, “China’ Rise in Latin 
America, A Global Long Term perspective.” The Inter-American Dialogue, has also consistently 
sought to assess China’s rise within the Latin America Caribbean region and highlighted broader 
debates and issues surrounding the evolving ties. However, for others, such as the Heritage 
Foundation, discussions can be less nuanced in relation to the China and US factor in the region.  
For instance, coinciding with the increased influence of China in Latin America and the Caribbean 
in 2005, the Heritage Foundation, known for advocating for national defense agendas, called for 
the US to balance Chinese influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
 
Given the significant development role that China is playing in the Caribbean and Latin America, 
an issue which will be explored in chapter 4 with regards the Caribbean, it is urgent that a better 
understanding of such developing states goals in the interactions be examined to facilitate more 
critical assessments of the relationship with China beyond the current discourse. 
 
(3) Media 
In engaging with the US and China nexus, journalistic accounts may not necessarily incorporate 
developing states concerns in their coverage of the triangular relationship. Moreover, in examining 
the relations, such sources may at times, prove to be a lot less reticent about the supposed China 
challenge to US interests in the region.  
 
Forbes Magazine carried an opinion piece on January 31st, 2016, entitled; “Undermining America 
While Washington Sleeps: China in Latin America.”  Other more attention-grabbing headlines 
have also found its way in the New York Times. On April 7th, 2012, in an article entitled, “China 
buying inroads in the Caribbean” it was claimed that China “planting a flag so close to the United 
States has generated intense vetting - and raised some eyebrows (in US government circles).”  In 
gauging China’s increasing economic role in the Caribbean, the Economist on March 10th, 2012, 
headlined an article as; “The Caribbean: Chinese Beachhead?” In favouring more selective 
viewpoints, such press articles reinforce US interests in the dynamic while not always reflecting 
on how and why such developing states are engaging China. 
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It is then imperative that the discourse accounts for more critical assessments of China’s rise in the 
region. Drawing from the perspectives of Caribbean and Latin American states facilitates a more 
nuanced understanding of the ongoing dynamic by enabling more rigorous and empirically based 
analysis of economic patterns between such states and China. This can facilitate more informed 
debates that go beyond possible misperceptions on the triangular relations between the Caribbean, 
Latin America, the US and China.  
 
3. Method and Sources 
This section explains the methods of the study. The section also focuses on justifying the use of 
particular cases within the study. It also further explicates on the data collection methods used in 
the study.  
 
3.1 The Process Tracing Method  
The thesis ultilises the process tracing method, bearing in mind the significance of the causal 
factors in determining Caribbean states foreign policy behavior towards China. Bennett and 
Checkel (2014: 5) acknowledge, “the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening 
causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable.” Mahoney (2015: 200) suggests that this 
method can be used as a means of theory testing as well as theory development.  
 
As such, the thesis employs process tracing as a distinctive methodological tool that can be used 
to analyse the causal mechanisms in explaining a particular outcome. Thus, given that the thesis is 
more broadly concerned with examining the structural and intervening variables in Caribbean 
states foreign policy behavior towards China, the process tracing method serves as a means of 
examining both empirically and conceptually, how and why these variables inform Caribbean 
states decision making vis-à-vis China.  
 
Nonetheless, there are various drawbacks to this research method. One relates to the complexity 
involved in defining and obtaining the precise parameters for applying this method to research 
questions and hypotheses considered in various studies. As Bennett and Checkel (2014: 15) 
acknowledge, “the persuasiveness and probative value of each single causal-process observation 
is nonetheless debatable.”  
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However, the use of process tracing as a research method does rely on the use of good knowledge 
of a particular case or unit of study. It also assumes a more thorough understanding of the issues 
to be examined by the researcher. As acknowledged by Mahoney (2015: 217), this 
“conceptualisation works well when one has knowledge of general causal patterns across a large 
population, allowing one to use this cross-case knowledge as a basis for judging the weight of the 
cause in the specific case under analysis.” In interrogating the variables argued to be influential in 
Caribbean states relations with China, the researcher has made extensive use of the scholarly 
literature on China’s relations with Latin America and other developing states.  But also, 
illuminating the significance of such variables have been the author’s participation in the foreign 
policy process based on extensive engagement within the field.   
 
The participatory process allowed for an in-depth and first hand encounter with the methods, 
rationale, actions and responses in foreign policy behaviour in relation to various agents. It also 
facilitated a familiarity with the environments that constrain as well as provide opportunities for 
actors in foreign policy. In allowing one to be fully immersed in the phenomena, the insights drawn 
from participant observation provided more valid and reliable analyses that may not necessarily 
be accessible through other very viable methods of research.  
 
However, there are possible setbacks to the process of participation. Immersion has its own 
potential pitfalls in that the researcher being an “ordinary participant” (Spradley 1980:61), do have 
certain biases that may result in an increased level of subjectivity stemming from an insider 
perspective (see McCall and Simmons 1969:19). Conscious of this tendency, the researcher has 
relied on empirical evidence as well as triangulation of information from various sources to 
determine the significance of the causal factors which influence Caribbean states foreign policy 
behavior towards China.  
 
3.2 Data and sources 
The thesis utilises a mixed method approach to data collection and analysis. Thus, the thesis draws 
from documentary analysis, official government reports, the media and the broader scholarly 
literature on China’s engagement with the developing world. The use of a mixed method approach 
to research strategies have been examined extensively (see Axinn and Pearce, 2006; Bergman, 
2008; Collins et al., 2006; Denscombe, 2010).  For Axinn and Pearce (2006: 2) the method, “afford 
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special opportunities to use multiple sources of information from (several) approaches to gain new 
insights.” They note further, that apart from aiding in a triangulation of sources in an effort to 
provide a more reliable portrayal of the phenomena under observation, the mixed method approach 
is a “valuable strategy for producing a comprehensive empirical record about a topic.”  
 
The mixed method approach to data collection is especially relevant to the study of Caribbean 
states relations with China. The issue which confronts many researchers on China’s development 
assistance to the developing world is that unlike traditional actors to some extent, there appears to 
be a lack of centralised official data for Chinese aid and technical assistance in the developing 
world, including in the Caribbean region.  
 
Given these difficulties, data gathering relied on official government reports from the Caribbean 
which was triangulated across various media and institutional reports especially those emanating 
from ECLAC and the IADB. Information has also been sourced from China’s embassies in the 
Caribbean.  Such triangulation methods for Chinese economic activities especially as it relates to 
lending have been utilized by Vivien Foster et al 2009 who published a World Bank report on 
Chinese Financing in Sub-Saharan Africa. Similar means have been utilised by US institutions in 
assessing China’s aid to the developing world (Aid Data).  Gallagher et al (2012; 2015) also 
consulted a cross section of sources to triangulate data for Chinese financing in Latin America to 
determine the scope and nature of Chinese lending in the region. Concerns regarding a lack of 
clarity in terms of how China’s financial engagement is pursued on the ground persists thus far. 
However, it is perhaps important to view China’s aid as unique in scope in relation to the 
predominant global architecture within which aid and other technical assistance flows are defined 
(Brautigam 2011:753).  
 
Additionally, for the purposes of this study, Chinese lending to the Caribbean is inclusive of both 
zero interest loans and those termed concessional loans given their respective interests rates. As 
will be discussed in chapter 4, the interest rates appear to be an average of 2-3 percent. 
Concessional loans generally come from the China Exim Bank and China Development Bank.  
 
Moreover, to evaluate the trade dimension of the engagement, the thesis utilises data sets based on 
UN Comtrade data and World Bank- WITS data. These data sets are used to determine the trends 
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in the trade relationship between the Caribbean and China. The thesis also makes use of these data 
sets as a means of comparing China’s growing trade influence in the Caribbean with that of the 
traditional actors like the US. 
 
3.3 Justifying the case studies 
Central to the research are two empirically based case studies which center on the economic 
dimension of Caribbean states engagement with China; financing and trade. Yin (2014: 19) 
concludes that case studies are a distinct form of empirical enquiry. George and Bennet (2004: 21), 
concludes that among the advantages of case study method is the examination of intervening 
variables to enable inferences on causal mechanisms. Likewise, Gerring (2004: 349) posits that 
enabling an analysis of causal factors is a key advantage of the case study approach.  
 
The use of case studies is particularly relevant in analysing Caribbean states economic interaction 
with China given that it provides in-depth information on what may be regarded as bounded 
phenomena. In analyzing the case studies of interest in the thesis, two main economic phenomena 
observed on the ground in Caribbean and China relations have been considered. One is the increase 
in Chinese financing for infrastructure investments across the various Anglophone Caribbean 
states with which it has diplomatic relations. This has been a common theme across the region. 
Trade is the other observable economic trend which has defined Caribbean states economic 
interaction with China.  
 
Rather than utilising a country specific case study, the research found it more useful to tackle the 
issue of Chinese financing and trade in the Caribbean as bounded phenomena generalisable across 
the Anglophone Caribbean region. These cases aid in discerning why Caribbean states have made 
the economic turn to China. These cases also serve as a means through which to examine the 
impacts of the economic relations, its implications in relation to the US role inside the region as 
well as Caribbean states responses to China’s economic practices at the ground level.  
 
4.Thesis structure  
In examining Caribbean states relations with China, the thesis is underpinned largely by a Neo-
Classical Realist and Foreign Policy approach. These approaches have dictated the organisation 
of the chapters. Hence the thesis is organised thematically.   
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Chapter 1 lays the theoretical groundwork for understanding Caribbean states foreign policy 
behavior vis-à-vis China. The thesis opts for a middle ground approach whereby it utilises the 
tenets of Neo Classical Realism together with insights drawn from Foreign Policy Analysis to 
analyse the relations. In drawing from such frameworks, the thesis accounts for the systemic 
variable, unit level processes and ideational factors that influence Caribbean states relations with 
China.  
  
Chapter 2 seeks to examine how and why the geopolitical variable is significant in understanding 
Caribbean states foreign policy behavior towards China. It is important to establish the Caribbean’s 
geopolitical structure as a key starting point for understanding its relations with external actors like 
China. The Caribbean region together with Latin America lies strategically within the American 
hegemonic sphere.  
 
The neighbourhood within which such states dwell provides significant insights as to why their 
relations with China matters within the broader discourse on China’s rise in developing states. This 
results in Caribbean and China relations and that of Latin America being regarded as a triangular 
dynamic whereby it is difficult to postulate on the region’s rising engagement with China without 
reflecting on the fundamental US role in the region. Minus such a setting, it is invariably more 
difficult to appreciate the Caribbean region’s diplomacy with China, its economic engagement and 
the perceptions that ensue in the region’s interaction with China.  
 
Chapter 3 examines how and why diplomacy is argued to be a key intervening factor in relations 
with China. The chapter illuminates how policymaking through bilateral and multilateral contexts, 
has been influential in shaping Caribbean states decision-making vis a vis China through Cold War 
and Post-Cold War phase of relations. During the former phase, policymaking rested strongly on 
ideological considerations while in the Post-Cold war phase of the relations, diplomacy became 
driven largely by pragmatic economic concerns.  
 
Moreover, given that the economic variable is argued to be a principal intervening factor in the 
relations between the Caribbean and China, four (4) substantive chapters are dedicated to 
examining the how and why economic considerations have shaped the relations. Chapters 4 and 5 
provide in-depth case studies that investigate Caribbean states economic engagement with China 
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via the lending and trade pathways.  The said chapters also consider the impact of the domestic 
economic engagement at the domestic level. The findings suggest that the relationship involves 
both economic opportunities and threat, leading to a level of ambiguity in the economic 
interactions between the Caribbean and China.  
 
Chapter 6 focuses on the broader implications of Caribbean states rising domestic economic 
engagement with China in relation to the US, a traditional economic actor inside the region. It 
therefore considers the extent to which Caribbean states increased commercial ties with China has 
impacted on US influence in the region in the realm of lending and trade, the two areas where 
Caribbean states have increased domestic economic ties with China. The findings problematise 
claims of US decline in the Caribbean and Latin America region amidst China’s rise in the region. 
The findings suggest that that not only is the US economic role predominant in the region, China 
and the US are playing complementary rather than competitive roles in the region.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the responses of Caribbean states to China’s economic practices within the 
domestic context. This is done particularly in relation to China’s trade and investment practices 
with respect to labour and environmental norms, two very relevant issues within the local context 
of Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China. The findings reveal that the 
engagement  may be mediated based on calculations of costs, benefits and risks in the commercial 
interaction.  
 
Chapter 8 examines why perceptions are integral to assessing Caribbean states relations with China 
in the Post-Cold War context of engagement and the extent to which perceptions of threat in 
particular, are overstated in the relations.  In a sense, chapter 8, goes back to where the thesis 
started by considering the geostrategic significance of the Caribbean, while also interrogating the 
perceptions often attributed to the region’s engagement with China. The findings suggest that the 
relationship is largely driven by economic imperatives. It also shows that the region has to be 
considered as an area where western power influences are deeply entrenched. This then presents 
its own constraints to the rise of alternative powers in the region, including China.  
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The conclusion chapter seeks to reassess the main hypothesis of the thesis and reiterates the major 
findings of the study. It also sets out the limitations of the research and provides implications for 
further research.  
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
The chapter sets out the theoretical premise underpinning this research. The chapter first examines 
why theories of Realism, Constructivism and the Liberal framework of Complex Interdependence 
have been argued to provide insufficient explanations for Caribbean states foreign policy towards 
China.  Doing so somewhat extensively as the preceding discussions will show, aims to shed light 
on the inherent inadequacies of more mainstream IR theories to effectively explain the foreign 
policy behaviour of developing states. The examination of such theories also implicitly highlight 
why the thesis argues for the utility of other conceptual frameworks such as Foreign Policy 
Analysis (FPA) and Neo Classical Realism (NCR) in analysing Caribbean states foreign policy 
towards China.  The chapter then goes on to make the case for a combined approach of FPA and 
NCR in evaluating Caribbean states relations with China (see subsection 3.0).  
 
As numerous as developing states are in the international system, they are often relegated to 
subordinate status in theorising in the broader field of International Relations. Recent works by 
Gvalia et al (2013: 98) and Doeser (2011: 222) suggest that despite the proliferation of small states 
in the international system, the factors that account for patterns of continuity and change in their 
foreign relations have received little systemic treatment in the literature. Although Braveboy 
(2003) examines to some extent, the statist and individual factors that influence Caribbean states 
foreign policy behaviour, the significant effects of systemic constraints are generally overlooked. 
Moreover, Hey (1998: 106) notes in reference to developing regions such as Latin America that, 
“little scholarly consensus has emerged regarding the driving forces behind the region’s foreign 
policy behaviour.” The status of the scholarly literature some years on, have not drastically shifted 
for the broader region.  
 
The study of Sino-Latin America Caribbean relations has been construed as highly atheoretical by 
various scholars. In a review of Ellis’s book, China in Latin America, Feinberg (2011:222), 
acknowledges the tendency to neglect theory within academic studies on the region and China. 
Feinberg opines, “Frustratingly, Ellis does not offer a theory of international relations or power 
transitions to give shape to his voluminous ...observations of Chinese activities, and hence he does 
not provide a framework for predicting future behavior.” Blanchard (2016:553) also acknowledges 
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the relative dearth of research on China and Latin America’s relations within more theoretically 
centered frameworks such as IPE scholarship.  
 
The limited use of theoretical constructs to aid with a more systematic evaluation of Caribbean 
and Latin American states foreign policy towards China have partly led Wise and Myers (2016: 6) 
to observe that, “at least from the standpoint of China–LAC relations, we are still operating mainly 
at the level of stylized facts.” The significance of situating the Latin America Caribbean and China 
relationship within IR scholarship has not been entirely lost on Strauss and Armony (2012). These 
authors advocated for a preliminary research agenda to move the discussions forward on China 
and Latin America relations. 
 
In interrogating Caribbean states relations with China, the thesis examines the extent to which 
structural and intervening variables influence the relations. NCR proponents, theorise on the 
relevance of such factors for understanding foreign policy behaviour. However, in light of the 
significance of delving into the domestic “black box” to understand how unit level issues drive 
external relations, the thesis also utilises the FPA approach. In focusing on these conceptual 
constructs, the thesis concomitantly draws from various levels of analysis; whether systemic, 
statist or more individual and ideational aspects, to explain the Caribbean region’s relations with 
China. Hence, the thesis does not depart from the perceived wisdom that the international system 
is an underlying determinant of Caribbean states foreign policy behaviour, but also seeks to show 
that intervening factors both material and ideational are essential to understanding the patterns of 
continuity and change in Caribbean states relations with China. Such elements have thus far 
escaped coherent scrutiny in the literature with regards to the Caribbean’s interaction with China. 
Furthermore, they have not been investigated systematically in accordance with particular theories 
of International Relations or a theory of foreign policy.  
 
2. Inadequacy of Realism, Constructivism and Liberal theory in explaining developing states 
foreign policies 
Prior to critically assessing FPA and NCR which are the conceptual frameworks on which the 
analysis rests, this subsection examines Realist, Constructivist and Liberal assumptions in an effort 
to demarcate their various limitations in examining the issues of interest in the thesis.  Examining 
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the insufficiency of these particular approaches further illuminate why the NCR and FPA approach 
are assumed to be better suited for examining the research questions guiding the dissertation.  
 
2.1 Realism’s limits 
While Realism is an established theory of International Relations, Realism is unable to account 
fully for the foreign policy behaviour of developing states for various reasons. More broadly, the 
theory is geared towards explaining and predicting the behaviour of powerful states in the 
international system. Embedded in Realism is the focus on power. Developing states generally 
lack the commonly understood attributes of power including significant military and economic 
capabilities relative to other states in the international system. The focus on power is evident in 
the variants of Realism. Morgenthau (1985) argues that states interests has to be defined in terms 
of power. Waltz’s (1979) influential work on Neorealism views the balance of power as providing 
its own imperative to state behavior across the international system.  
 
In viewing inter-state relations through such lens, the outcome is that Realism has squarely placed 
its focus on largely powerful state actors in the international system. This ensures that the theory 
is able to selectively explain particular states behaviour under specific circumstances, rather than 
that of varied states in the international system. In instances where smaller or less powerful states 
may be of concern within Realism, such states often form part of adjunct explanations for the 
behaviour of more powerful states. Thus, from such a vantage point, developing states of the Latin 
America Caribbean region remains an aspect of power structures, not necessarily on their own 
accord, but as result of these states physical positioning vis-à-vis the US.  
 
Further, the variants of Realism theory, appear to pursue more unit and systems level explanations 
in analysing International Relations. Consequently, this theoretical framework may not always 
account for the significance of ideational elements in inter-state relations. For instance, Waltz 
(1990:34) posits “Neorealism contends that international politics can be understood only if the 
effects of structure are added to traditional realism's unit-level explanations.” However, such 
underlying contentions mean that the relevance of perceptual or more individual factors are not 
effectively examined under Neorealism.  
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Moreover, in failing to account for the foreign policy of secondary states, the theory of Realism 
obscures the extent to which developing states can attempt to become active agents in their external 
relations. Although small states are deficient in hard power capabilities, they do display a level of 
agency in inter-state relations. As Cooper and Shaw (2009:3) argue, “continuing bias towards re-
ordering imposed by the big states …should not hide the impact that small states have in rethinking 
and reconfiguring practices…. What small states lack in structural clout they can make up through 
creative agency.”  
 
In pursuit of foreign policy aims, small states use a variety of instruments at their disposal to 
promote a level of agency in inter-state affairs. Thus, such states may utilise their natural resources, 
geographical positioning, public diplomacy and other assets to pursue their national interests in 
the foreign policy realm (Vital, 1967; Keohane, 1969). As Long (2017:14-16) observes, small 
states use utilise varying strategies to transcend the resource based understandings of power and 
this may have its own productive effects. Developing states then seek to leverage their interests in 
foreign policy despite internal or structural constraints. 
 
Given its underlying tenets, Realism offers limited scope for evaluating the research questions 
posed. The issues of concern in the thesis are better situated and analysed within the NCR 
framework coupled with that of FPA. These conceptual frameworks pay substantial attention to 
how and why systemic and intervening factors shape states foreign policy decision-making.  
 
2.2 Constructivism’s promises and problems 
Conventional Constructivists tend to view themselves as a bridge between two main rationalist 
approaches to International Relations, namely; Neorealism and Neoliberal Institutionalism. Wendt 
(1992:396- 403) proposes that in accordance with the principles of Constructivism, international 
and institutional structures are social creations and that persons act towards them in accordance 
with particular meanings derived from interactions. Adler (1997:323) argues that similar 
interlinking processes based on inter-subjective understandings of the social world are key to 
understanding state behavior.  
 
On the surface, the Constructivist approach does hold some promise for analysing a variety of 
states foreign policy behaviour across the international system by taking into account the structural 
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and ideational elements that impact on foreign policy behaviour.  Constructivism may then 
demonstrate how Caribbean states perceptions of China as an emerging economic power 
subsequently shaped decision-making vis-à-vis China.  As Wendt (1992) acknowledges, states 
have shared interpretations of their environment which are constitutive of subjective 
understandings that shape actors interests.  Thus, the emerging power configurations in the 
international system, influenced how and why ties between the Caribbean region and China rapidly 
evolved in the Post-Cold War period.  
The Constructivist framework can also be a fairly good tool for understanding actors’ perceptions 
of China within the Latin America Caribbean region given the geopolitical significance of the area 
in relation to the US. Caribbean states foreign policy behavior is guided by perceptions of the 
external and internal environment within which they operate. As such, perceptions are critical to 
an understanding of Caribbean states foreign policies. As Laffey and Weldes (1997: 193) posit, 
ideas allow for symbolisms which “enable the production of representations.” These ideas can 
range from perceptions of threat to perceptions of opportunity. Thus, Constructivism shows some 
promise in terms of explaining how Caribbean states and other actors might interpret the region’s 
engagement with China.  
 
Employing the Constructivist approach as a theoretical device for understanding state behaviour 
can also shed light on how and why particular foreign policy decisions are made regarding China 
versus other possible alternatives.  However, in analysing Caribbean states relations with China, 
perceptions are only part of the concern, and does not necessarily constitute the key driver of 
Caribbean states decision-making vis-à-vis China.  
 
It then appears that the very ideational foundations through which the Constructivist approach 
obtains its explanatory and emancipatory power, especially when accounting for more critical 
versions of the approach, also succeed in limiting its application to various issues and research 
questions.  Issues in inter-state relations are more complicated than the Constructivist approach 
suggests. Thus, there can be can be difficulty in examining certain factors in accordance with the 
more limited constructs imposed by Constructivism. Kratochwil (2000:88) highlight such 
concerns and argues that the Constructivist approach does raise a legitimate question regarding 
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“whether problems of political practice can be reduced to questions of reflective appraisal, 
altercasting or identification, or whether an interactionist perspective might be too narrow.”   
 
In assuming that a causal chain of factors have influenced Caribbean states foreign policy behavior 
towards China, means having to apply a theory both as an explanatory and investigative tool.  The 
extent to which Constructivism can effectively account for material considerations, engage with 
an operationalisation of the structural and intervening variables is arguably less so, than 
approaches such as FPA and NCR.  
 
However, Constructivists have firmly and even admirably defended the applicability of their 
approach to a variety of research agendas. Klotz and Lynch (2014) suggests that Constructivists 
can broaden their research programme by drawing from a range of methods in Social Science 
research including ethnography and participant observation in an effort to align their research with 
existing methods. But this suggestion also implicitly recognises the difficulty of applying such 
research across a broad range of areas where issues are not centrally bounded by normative 
interpretations. Adler (2013:112) makes the persuasive argument that Constructivism has moved 
away from the many debates occupying the theory earlier on regarding its suitability for 
undertaking various research. Nonetheless, such contentions are quite subjective. While there may 
be wider agreement on Constructivist views such as the construction of social reality, it may be 
counter-argued that the approach has still not effectively transcended the conceptual, empirical 
and methodological debates that are still likely to occupy scholars when subjecting this theory to 
critical scrutiny and testing.  These major concerns regarding Constructivism have been examined 
by Hopf (1998:171) who argues that there has been a “miscasting of Constructivism” on these 
grounds.  However as will be examined below, research approached through Constructivists lens 
may still have to weigh those very issues carefully.  
 
While agreeing to social construction of institutions or power structures, Constructivists place 
varying levels of emphasis on material aspects of relations in states interactions. Arguably, 
material interests may not necessarily be on par with ideas but instead are seen as intrinsically 
bounded by them. Onuf (2001: 240) goes as far as arguing that Constructivists have a well-known 
“distaste for material considerations and theories of rational choice.” On the other hand, Adler 
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(1997:322) is of the view that material issues inform our understanding of the world and 
conversely, ideas and interactions shape the material world. 
 
 However, rather than having a primary focus on the practical outcomes of states interactions, 
Constructivists pay a great deal of attention to normative interpretations of the material world. As 
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 391) suggest, “Constructivism is an approach to social analysis that 
deals with the role of human consciousness in social life. It asserts that human interaction is shaped 
primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones.” Thus, in examining Constructivism’s 
attempts to interrogate the intersection of ideas and structures, debatably, the main focus of the 
theory is not necessarily on the significance of material conditions. The latter, is a key area of 
concern in the thesis. 
 
 The above issues are indicative of the debates that still underlie the Constructivist approach. A 
main concern of the thesis is to examine economic considerations as a key driver in shaping 
Caribbean states relations with China. There is then need to interrogate how and why economic 
factors are critical to understanding the relationship between the Caribbean region and China. It is 
then necessary to explain the nature of the economic engagement, its tangible impacts, its 
implications and the responses to the engagement. Thus, material issues are central to unpacking 
the Caribbean and China dynamic. The ongoing debates within Constructivism especially when 
accounting for more critical versions of theory, suggests the need for the research to utilise 
theoretical frameworks that more effectively bridge structural, material and ideational concerns.  
 
Moreover, Constructivism may present methodological challenges in terms of investigating 
variables in an empirical manner in an effort to discern patterns and anomalies in order to postulate 
on likely outcomes based on data. In taking structures as socially constructed, this can impact how 
variables are measured and whether or not they can be effectively operationalised. While not 
entirely overlooking the applicability of Constructivism in enabling more rigorous empirical 
research, Finnemore and Sikkink (2002: 399), does acknowledge the theory’s continued problems 
in researching concepts empirically. They posit that operationalising fundamental ideas within 
Constructivism such as identity still presents difficulties based on its more ideational connotations. 
Coupled with this issue, the concept of identity varies dependent on time and context. Checkel 
(1998:339) contends that there is need for Constructivists to pay greater heed to research design. 
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The underlying problem of a socially constructed theory of the world, is also acknowledged by 
Fearon and Wendt (2002:56) and both admit that Constructivism does generate stronger levels of 
contention more so than mainstream approaches. 
 
The methodological difficulties which can underlie the Constructivist approach, illustrate the 
possible limitations of the approach to particular aspects of the research. There is need to gauge 
the Caribbean and China interaction in reliable terms and so the thesis focuses on an empirically 
based analysis of the economic considerations in the relationship. The focus has been on 
operationalising the economic relationship into measurable outputs focused on Chinese financing 
and trade in the region. Doing so facilitates a more critical assessment of the economic relationship 
while also aiding with arriving at generalisations pertaining to the interaction (see chapters 4 and 
5). The methodological difficulty apparent in Constructivism is more effectively overcomed by an 
application of NRC theory and FPA insights as examined in subsection 3.3. 
 
2.3 Insufficiency of Complex Interdependence 
In examining how complex interdependence shapes states foreign relations, Keohane and Nye 
(1977) in their seminal work, Power and Interdependence, provide a centrally systemic 
perspective to inter-state relations. Consequently, they emphasise states linkages with power 
structures. Keohane and Nye propose that there are three interacting elements through which 
complex interdependence may be understood. They argue that this particular ideal type of 
international system is connected through multiple channels of communication. Within this 
system, there is an absence of hierarchy on issues and very significantly, military force is highly 
irrelevant in this overarching structure.  
 
In merging power politics with the structural foundations of Liberalism, Keohane and Nye (1977) 
have offered persuasive lens through which to view Caribbean states relations with China, 
especially when considering the economic variables in the interaction. Complex interdependence 
illustrates the salience of global economic structures in influencing the Caribbean and China 
relationship while at the same time signifying its potential pitfalls as result of the vulnerabilities 
inherent in the structure. Within this broader construct of Complex Interdependence Keohane and 
Nye (1977:13) examined at some length the concept of vulnerability and defined vulnerability as 
a “liability to suffer costs imposed by external events.”  Vulnerability can be ascribed to small 
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states economies 7  which are often closely intertwined with that of larger states due to historical, 
sociopolitical and economic factors.  As Keohane and Nye (1977: 18) rightly argue, 
interdependence can breed asymmetrical power relations as more dependent actors can be more 
susceptible to the manipulation of power structures. Interdependence then results in not only 
cooperative relations but also has the potential to give rise to conflictual outcomes. Such issues are 
quite relevant when contemplating the relations between the Caribbean and China given their 
weaker bargaining positions as developing states with more limited resource capacities. Such 
issues are addressed in chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
 
However, in emphasising the existing power configuration through which states interact, issues of 
actors agency, domestic concerns and ideational factors are given cursory treatment under the 
framework of Complex interdependence. This then undermines its suitability for examining the 
underlying research question within the thesis. In critiquing the work of Keohane and Nye, K.J 
Holsti (1978:523) argues “Since they examine their subject primarily from a systems perspective, 
the role of domestic politics and personalities is not covered thoroughly. These variables, of course, 
would be essential components of a formal theory.” 
 
Despite its promise as a relevant conceptual framework through which to analyse the Caribbean 
and China relationship, one has to bear in mind the shortcoming mentioned. This strand of Liberal 
theory leaves open the question of ideational factors in foreign policy especially when juxtaposed 
against more convincing explanations such as Constructivism. The latter dissects more effectively 
how identities, ideas and interests shape relations among actors (see Wendt 1992). Therefore, 
while there is sufficient merit in inserting the Caribbean and China dynamic within a more Liberal 
framework, doing so does not necessarily capture the issue of perceptions and how and why it is 
important in understanding Caribbean states decision-making vis-à-vis China.  
 
 Moreover, structural elements while undoubtedly relevant, can obscure the level of agency 
deriving from domestic actors and other internal processes. Consequently, the framework of 
 
7 The issue of vulnerability is an important one for small states economies and subsequently foreign relations. While outside the 
scope of the discussions undertaken above, there are relevant scholarly works which explore the subject in some detail. These 




Complex Interdependence illustrates more readily how less developed states are acted upon by 
emerging and established powers in the international system, rather than how developing states 
can be active agents in responding to and enabling particular processes and outcomes in the 
interactions.  
 
As will be seen below, the FPA approach utilised in the thesis together with NCR draws more 
effectively from the assumption that actors have a central role to play in foreign policy. Hence, 
Hudson (2005:1), suggests, “all that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in 
human decision makers acting singly or in groups.” Grasping such a position suggests that a more 
comprehensive framing of states foreign policy behavior has to account for a level agency by 
various actors in the dynamic. Elite decision-makers may seek to derive opportunities from 
structure while also being constrained by such. In the Caribbean and China relationship, diplomacy 
as evidenced by elite decision-making has influenced the deepening of the relations between the 
Caribbean region and China. States have utilised their agency in helping to facilitate the 
development of new cooperation structures in the dynamic. Consequently, the Latin America 
Caribbean region and China have created various bilateral and multilateral fora in an effort to 
further mutual interests as will be seen in chapter 3.  
While Complex Interdependence highlights the salience of structures, by accounting for states 
agency, domestic processes and the perceptions that ensue from Caribbean states interactions, the 
FPA and NCR approach, enable a more critical assessment of the factors argued to be influential 
in the Caribbean and China relationship.  
3. FPA and NCR frameworks for evaluating foreign policy  
Having discussed the inadequacy of Realism, Constructivism and Complex Interdependence in 
relation to the underlying research question, this subsection discusses FPA and NCR as suitable 
frameworks for understanding the evolution of Caribbean and China relations.  
 
3.1 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) framework for evaluating foreign policy 
 The field of FPA although not quite attributable to a theory of foreign policy, has made significant 
inroads in showing the importance of opening the “black box” of foreign policy to analyse the 
decision-makers, perceptions and the systemic issues that may provide insights into states foreign 
policy behaviour. Early work in FPA proposed by Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1954) looked at 
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decision-makers acting on behalf of states as an important factor in understanding foreign policy. 
Snyder et al (2002: 5) acknowledged that “by emphasizing decision-making as a central focus we 
have provided a way of organizing the determinants of action around those officials who act for 
the political society.” 
 
The impact of decision-makers on foreign policy-making has also been examined in Graham T. 
Allison’s seminal work, Essence of Decision-Making: The Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). Allison 
(1971:44) first looked at individual decision making through the rational actor model and argued 
that the historical, cultural and perceptual lens of individuals can have an impact on the decision-
making process. A second model focused on organizational bureaucracies, institutional cultures 
and protocols which can influence particular foreign policy outcomes. The third model of decision-
making examined government actions which are coordinated by a group of people with common 
aims although “leaders are not always monolithic.”. Allison acknowledged that the latter shows 
that foreign policy decision-making is not simply based on rational choice or bureaucracies, but a 
complex set of push and pull factors inherent in politics itself and expressed in the mode of 
government decision-making.  
 
The salience of   decision makers in the foreign policy process is still very much recognised within 
the current wave of scholarship on FPA. Valerie M Hudson (2005:5) contends that among the 
hallmarks of foreign policy analysis are the view that explanations of foreign policy decision- 
making are indeed multifactorial.  Explanatory variables from all levels of analysis including the 
most micro and macro, are of interest to the extent to which these affect the decision-making 
process.   
 
 In determining Caribbean states foreign policy behaviour towards China, groups, individuals and 
bureaucracies, do have an impact on foreign policy. Actors such as government officials, the public 
realm, and China’s state-owned enterprises, are all significant players in the Caribbean and China 
relationship. These might be regarded as the domestic conduit for decision making and 
implementation in relations with China. It is then important to evaluate the role of state decision 
making in an effort to situate how and why significant elements like diplomacy shape Caribbean 
relations with China.  
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The field of FPA also stresses the significance of analysing available data, economic or otherwise, 
relating to particular issues that can be of relevance in examining foreign policy behaviour. In 
instances where foreign policy decisions are not necessarily part of the public domain, some like 
Hudson (2013:5), advocate for evaluating “artefacts of decisions – the traces that decisions to act 
leave in newspapers or chronologies, and which are eventually concatenated into histories.” The 
significance of doing so lies in the fact that foreign policy can involve negotiations, terms and 
conditions that may not readily be available in the public realm.  
 
 One of the criticisms pertaining to China’s engagement with developing countries is that on the 
Chinese side, information pertaining to elements such as aid and technical assistance is not always 
clear cut and forthcoming (see Brautigam, 2012). As such, a more nuanced and approach has to be 
undertaken in order to more effectively investigate and gauge developing states interaction with 
China. However, decisions pertaining to foreign policy not being part of the public domain is not 
unique to China, but can be attributed to states across the international system to some extent.  
 
Thus, in seeking to analyse the Caribbean’s foreign policy behaviour towards China, “events data” 
finding itself within various mediums of public discourse such as the media can be an indirect but 
nonetheless important means of investigating the Caribbean’s interaction with China. These 
sources illustrate implicitly and explicitly what the likely responses have been to Chinese 
engagement and how the interactions are perceived at the ground level in terms of the challenges 
and opportunities involved in Caribbean states domestic economic relationship with China.  
   
Furthermore, FPA recognises that in certain instances, foreign policy behaviour cannot necessarily 
be rigidly confined to the state, system or individual levels as inter-mestic considerations based on 
an interaction of various levels of analysis, can influence the decision-making process. Carlsnaes 
(1992:263) acknowledges that it is important to “analyse foreign policy actions in terms of a 
dynamic account of the ways in which such actions are continually being constrained and enabled 
by contextually defined structures, and …in turn are affected by human agency.” Putnam in his 
work, The Logic of Two Level Games, argues for the systemic and domestic to be conciliated in 
order to truly grasp foreign policy. Hence, Putnam (1988:427) posits, “It is fruitless to debate 
whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse. The answer to 
that question is clearly both.” For Caribbean states, perceptions based on structural factors such as 
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the US role in the region as well as domestic ideas pertaining to China’s role in the region, can 
impact on decision making in relations with China.   
 
3.1.1 Criticism of FPA approach 
However, notwithstanding the strengths of FPA as a viable tool for evaluating foreign policy, a 
general concern with the FPA approach has been that while focusing on multi-causal analysis is a 
laudable goal, it can give rise to a multi-faceted focus on several variables which can be crucial or 
even epiphenomenal to foreign policy behaviour. Thus, what can be FPA’s strength in helping to 
look at and below nation states, in analysing foreign policy behaviour, can also be a handicap. 
McCloskey (1962:201) argued succinctly that “the inordinate complexity of [FPA] as it has so far 
been outlined, is unquestionably its greatest shortcoming.”8 Within the present wave of FPA, 
Valerie Hudson (2014) makes allowances for much the same critique.  
 
 In the Caribbean and China relationship, foreign policy is constrained not only by internal 
processes but also by China’s own domestic interests at various points in the relationship. The 
dynamic is also impacted by a host of other factors including these small states inherent 
vulnerability to various structural economic processes given their interdependence and dependence 
on traditional and established actors like the US, UK, and EU. Within this multiplicity of factors, 
it is important to consider those that actually drive the Caribbean and China dynamic, while also 
being mindful of the subjectivity in doing so. Thus, a singular focus on FPA, may not necessarily 
be sufficient for evaluating the Caribbean and China relationship.  
 
It may be asserted that FPA has attempted to deal with these concerns stemming from the multi-
causal nature of foreign policy.  From the initial wave of the scholarship dating back to the 1950’s 
and 60’s, FPA scholars have sought to systemise their analyses into a more explanatory and 
predictive framework. Therefore, to address those apparent weaknesses, a more theoretical 
approach to foreign policy analysis was initially advocated by James Rosenau (1968). Rosenau 
made an early case for the use of independent, intervening and dependent variables in analysing 
foreign policy behaviour. Rosenau’s view of independent variables for instance was not only 
conceptualised as elements external or independent of state actors but also as processes which can 
 
8	Quoted in Hudson Valerie (2007: 5)	
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be internal to the state. The latter aspect is a proposition that can be regarded as problematic given 
that internal variables can often be relegated to the domestic realm.  
 
In specifying intervening variables, Rosenau (1968:314) looks at attitudes and policymakers views 
as an integral part of foreign policy. The dependent variable, was described as the “responsive 
stage” of these various interactions. But even with the more behavioural model proposed by 
Rosenau, a theory of foreign policy has long escaped the field of FPA. However, Rosenau’s earlier 
conceptualisations would provide a means of mapping the significance of a more methodological 
approach to foreign policy analysis.  The interaction of independent, intervening and dependent 
variables which could provide more explanatory and predictive force to FPA was more 
successfully integrated under Neoclassical Realism as a school of foreign policy. 
 
3.2 Neoclassical Realism: A Theory of Foreign Policy  
The theory of Neoclassical Realism (NCR) was first proposed by Gideon Rose in 1998 as a “school 
of foreign policy.” Rose undertook a review of works by Michael E. Brown, Thomas J. 
Christensen, Randall L. Schweller, William Wohlforth and Fareed Zakaria. Rose (1998:153) 
argues that “what sets the authors under discussion apart as a distinct school worthy of recognition 
is both the common nature of their quest to develop an explicit and generalizable theory of foreign 
policy.”  
 
NCR’s links to Classical Realism as well as Neorealism has been much deliberated upon the 
literature and for good reason, after all Gideon Rose considered the theory as “updating and 
systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist thought.” However, equal attention has 
not been paid to the methodological aspect which lends this school of foreign policy added 
theoretical rigour.  Gideon Rose (1998:146) argues that within NCR is a “distinct methodological 
perspective (which) flows from Neoclassical Realism’s theoretical arguments.” Ripsman, 
Taliaferro, Lobell (2016:114) made a very recent effort to look at the methodological approach 
that has so far defined Neoclassical Realism and note that the “value-added of any neoclassical 
realist theory, therefore, lies in its ability to predict and explain political behaviour.”  
 
It may then be posited that the level of methodological abstraction imbued in NCR, makes 
generalisations across states possible.  Gideon Rose: (1998:166) makes the case that “the theory’s 
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basic concepts are simple and generalisable across cultures and political systems.” In examining 
the applicability of NCR for understanding the foreign policy of both developing and developed 
states, Lobell et al (2009:43) goes further and states: 
Given Neoclassical Realism's central task of looking at how unit level processes, including, power capabilities, leaders 
perceptions and national priorities interact with transnational processes to influence foreign policy, it can be used to 
explain, the foreign and security policy of great powers, but can also account for the distinctive characteristics of 
regional and small powers, developing countries, or divided, warring, or failed states to mention a few other types of 
states.  
 
The methodological framework of NCR focuses on “how” we understand, evaluate and analyse 
foreign policy processes in much the same manner employed by International Relations theorists 
for interpreting inter-state interaction. Thus, the three main levels of analysis; the international 
system, the state and individual factors all serve as means through which to analyse foreign policy 
and International Relations more broadly. Neoclassical Realism employs a method of evaluating 
foreign policy through independent, intervening and dependent variables (see Gideon Rose 
1998:167).  
 
The independent variable provides the autonomous structure through which foreign policy takes 
place and consequently, rest on inputs based on the international system, making it possible to 
equate the independent variable under NCR to the international system.  As pointed out by Rose 
(1998:152) the intervening variables are the factors through which “states interpret and respond to 
their external environment, ….one must analyse how systemic pressures are translated through 
unit level intervening variables such as decision-makers' perceptions and domestic state structure.” 
The dependent variable is regarded by NCR as the foreign policy choice or outcome. 
 
It might then be posited that the success of NCR as a theory of foreign policy applicable across 
various types of states in the international system can be said to lay in part in the theoretical 
framework’s ability to transcend the theoretical limitations of Classical Realism. The 
methodological approach also increases its theoretical rigour in terms of its validity and reliability. 
It also enhances the theory’s explanatory and predictive capacity in analysing foreign policy 
behaviour.  
 
While relatively “young” as far as theories go, having put forward its core tenets in the 1990’s, it’s 
become a viable framework to evaluate foreign policy.  In accordance with NCR, it is not enough 
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to see foreign policy as subjected wholly to international system variables. It is also important to 
look at the state factors that interact with systemic elements to determine foreign policy behaviour.  
 
Therefore, the thesis has argued for focusing on a core structural factor that shape Caribbean 
relations with China and that includes the geostrategic significance of the region in relation to the 
United States. The thesis also asserts that key intervening material and ideational factors in the 
Caribbean and China dynamic are essential to understanding the relations between the two. In 
doing so, there has been a focus on policymaking, economic interests as well as the perceptions 
underlying the engagement between the Caribbean and China.  
 
3.3 Combining NCR and FPA  
Having provided an analysis of the FPA and NCR framework, the discussion now turns to the 
reasons for a hybrid approach of NCR and FPA. Generally, in utilising the two approaches, the 
thesis attempts to bring together the varying strengths of each framework to help analyse 
Caribbean foreign policy behaviour towards China. As succinctly argued by Wholforth (2008: 40), 
“(NCR) make it easier to perform the key mental experiments that lie at the core of FPA by helping 
analysts frame their assessment of the external constraints and incentives states face.”  
 
NCR’s methodological framework provides a meaningful way of harnessing what critiques have 
found to be FPA’s tendency to gravitate towards a multi- causal approach to foreign policy analysis 
which can open up the possibility for epiphenomenal explanations of particular issues under 
evaluation. Therefore, the thesis has argued for focusing on a core structural factor that shape 
Caribbean relations with China and that includes the geostrategic significance of the region in 
relation to the United States.  While FPA does not discount systemic factors, an important point to 
bear mind, is FPA’s insistence that to truly understand foreign policy, one needs to engage with 
the “black box” of state decision-making.  According to Hudson (2005:6), in taking into account 
the groups, bureaucracies as well as the psychological and societal milieu of foreign policy 
decision-making, FPA shows the significance of going at the level of and below the state, to gain 
a more in-depth and valid evaluation of foreign policy.   
 
The Caribbean’s relationship with China does not only take place within the context of a structural 
geopolitical framework which provides constraints and opportunity and neither is it purely driven 
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by domestic economic interests, despite the salience of this underlying factor. The relations also 
occur within a perceptual environment where social construction of the world based on a mixture 
of norms and ideas may create particular outcomes and decisions in Caribbean states foreign policy 
formulation and implementation.  
 
Moreover, the recognition of states agency in foreign policy does not necessarily escape 
consideration by either FPA or NCR, therefore enhancing the relevance of these frameworks for 
analysing the concerns of the thesis.  In merging NCR insights with FPA, due attention is given to 
internal processes and key decision-makers in foreign policy. In analysing actors as part of unit 
level processes, FPA implicitly recognises states agency. Hudson and Vore (1995:209) that there 
is need to account for “human political choice,” in interpretation of inter-state relations. 
 
As discussed, the role of decision-makers in inter-state relations has been a core concern within 
FPA. Earlier works such as Allison (1971) and Frankel (1963), have highlighted the significance 
of actors as key aspects of policymaking. Byman and Pollack (2001) also point to the significance 
of individual leaders in the foreign policy process in their article, “Lets Praise Great Men.”  Aside 
from the subjectivity apparent in such a title, the consensus is that individuals do play a significant 
role in inter-state relations and this may not necessarily be overlooked entirely in foreign policy.   
 
NCR also does not necessarily shy away from issues of states agency even while recognising the 
salience of internal and external constraints in state foreign policies. In highlighting the 
significance of policymakers in interpreting not only power structures but structural constraints, 
NCR adherents such as Rose (1998: 168-169) recognises actors as an integral part of the foreign 
policy process. Likewise, Zakaria (1998:24) views government decision-makers as having a key 
role in external relations. In recognition of the salience of decision-makers, the thesis examines 
policymaking as a key intervening factor in Caribbean states relations with China.  
 
Within the context of developing states relations with China, decision-makers acting via bilateral 
and multilateral channels often have a key role to play in the evolution of the relationship. As will 
be seen in chapter 3, leadership interests carried out within the confines of structural frameworks 
and systemic economic changes, have influenced how and why Caribbean states relations with 
China further intensified. 
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Both FPA and NCR account for the foreign policies of varying states and this further strengthen 
their applicability for the research question. Thus, as mentioned previously in subsection 2.2, NCR 
proponents like Lobell et al (2009) find the theory particularly relevant for analysing the foreign 
policies of varying states. In drawing on the relative material power capabilities of states as an 
important indicator of its foreign policy behaviour, NCR theory suggests those states with less or 
limited power as ordinarily understood, are affected in the pursuit of key foreign policy goals (see 
Rose 1998: 150). In terms of FPA, its focus on unit level processes allows for an analysis of both 
developing and developed states foreign policies. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The chapter first sought to examine the inadequacies of prevailing theoretical frameworks within 
IR for addressing the research problem. The chapter then proposed the use of a “hybrid approach” 
based on NCR and FPA to analyse Caribbean states foreign policy behaviour towards China.  As 
discussed, while theories such as Realism, Constructivism and Complex Interdependence, a strand 
of Liberalism, had particular merits in terms of analysing the research question, overall these 
theories were ill-equipped to deal comprehensively with the issues of interest in the thesis. 
 
Realism’s inordinate focus on power and leading actors in the international system, suggested that 
it does not necessarily treat developing states as subjects to be theorised upon in International 
Relations and neither does it account for developing states agency in the foreign policy process. 
Although power is an implicit aspect of Caribbean states behavior towards China, due to the critical 
US factor in the region, Realism is unable to fully account for the causal factors in such states 
relations with China.   
 
As discussed, while Complex Interdependence illustrates the significance of power structures and 
vulnerability, both of which are important concepts through which to view developing states 
interactions in the international system, domestic processes and agency in small states foreign 
policy behaviour, remain largely unaccounted for. In examining the Constructivist approach, it 
was shown that while it may more effectively account for ideational variables given its focus on 
ideas, the various conceptual and methodological debates inherent within Constructivism hinders 
its suitability for operationalising key economic and political variables in the thesis. 
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As stated, the thesis has utilised a combined approach of FPA and NCR to examine the Caribbean 
and China relationship. An important contribution of NCR is its distinct methodological preference 
for evaluating the causal variables influencing states foreign policies (see Rose; 1998 and Lobell 
et al; 2009). In integrating structural effects, unit level variables and that of intervening ideas, NCR 
is able to systemise the causal factors in states foreign policy.  
 
This systematic approach also allows for an interrogation of the specific variables of interest to the 
researcher. It is then important to see NCR not only as an explanatory and predictive mechanism 
for analysing foreign policy, but also a methodological approach. This methodological rigour is an 
element that is often seen as lacking in FPA despite the latter’s effectiveness in examining unit 
level processes which inform foreign policy behaviour as discussed. NCR then is a particularly 
useful theoretical and empirical tool for analysing how and why particular political, ideational and 
economic variables influence the Caribbean ad China dynamic. 
 
Moreover, as discussed, NCR like FPA, allows for the relevance of actors preferences and 
decision-making at the state level through its concentration on intervening ideas and domestic 
processes. In doing so, both frameworks provide insight into states agency in the foreign policy 
process.  The thesis is chiefly examined from the perspective of Caribbean states rather than the 
more China-facing approach, evident in much of Sino-Latin America Caribbean literature. 
Therefore, enabling a view into the aims of these developing states in relations with China as well 
as their external and internal constraints.   
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The Caribbean region’s geostrategic position is construed as a key structural variable in Caribbean 
states relations with China. To understand the systemic structure within which Caribbean states 
foreign policy-making occurs, the neighbourhood within which such states dwell, provides a 
starting point through which to gauge the foreign policy behaviour of those states vis-à-vis China. 
Thus, the thesis starts with a basic perhaps even self-evident premise that given the Caribbean 
region’s geographical proximity to the United States, the US matters in Caribbean states 
relationships with China.  Conversely, Caribbean states rising interactions with China do have 
economic implications for the traditional US role inside the region.  
 
This geostrategic significance is what differentiates the Caribbean and Latin American region from 
other developing areas where China pursues its economic statecraft, as none others lie directly in 
the US hegemonic sphere. Therefore, incorporating the US role as a systemic variable enables a 
better appreciation for and understanding of why the Caribbean region’s relationship with China 
matters not only within the domestic sphere of engagement but also within the international 
context. Such a structural factor also sheds light on how Caribbean states relations with China has 
evolved, the nature of the relationship, its impacts and the implications of the growing ties with 
China. An analysis of the Caribbean region’s geopolitical structure also makes it possible to later 
interrogate the accompanying diplomatic, economic and perceptual dynamics which ensue 
between Caribbean states and China as examined in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
The chapter examines the question; to what extent has the geopolitical significance of Caribbean 
states in relation to the US shaped the region’s foreign policy decision-making towards China? 
The chapter argues that while Caribbean states relations with China occurs within an overarching 
geopolitical framework, and the resulting power structure tacitly influences foreign policy 
behaviour towards China as an emerging economic power, Caribbean states have secured 
relatively autonomous spaces for decision-making regarding China based on mutual political and 
economic interests.  Nonetheless, there is an inherent logic which guides Caribbean states foreign 
relations with China. Such logic is based on an understanding of the systemic advantages and 
constraints that come with such strategic positioning.  
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The chapter aims to further an understanding of the space in geopolitical terms in an effort to 
examine why geopolitics cannot be entirely discounted from the engagement between Caribbean 
states and China. The chapter seeks to reveal that the Caribbean region’s geopolitical salience is 
embedded in material considerations which derive from the region’s proximity to the US and the 
significance of the Caribbean Sea in global commercial processes. Thus, economic utility and 
geographical location make the Caribbean region a strategic space in relation to US interests. Such 
underlying elements have prompted the US to express a range of foreign policy pronouncements 
on the space centered on ideas relating to its pre-eminence in the region.  The chapter also seeks 
to place in perspective, the triangular relations resulting from the triad of interests in the space, 
including that of Caribbean states, China and the US.  
  
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section asserts that material conditions as 
well as practices embedded within a framework of ideas have promoted the Caribbean region’s 
geopolitical significance in relation to the US. This then gives rise to a three-fold dynamic 
involving not only Caribbean states interests in cooperating with China, or even China’s aims in 
engaging Caribbean states, but also, the implications of those interactions for the US role in the 
region. The second section contends that while Caribbean states relations with China occurs within 
an overarching geopolitical structure, Caribbean states engagement with China is motivated 
primarily by domestic economic interests. 
 
The chapter not only sheds light on the US role in the region. Critically, it concurrently illuminates 
the significance of the Caribbean region in broader debates on China’s rise in the Americas 
hemisphere. The chapter contributes to providing significant insights into the particular power 
configuration which impinges on Caribbean states decision-making vis-à-vis China. It does so by 
examining the more precise features within the Caribbean region that makes it such a geopolitically 
sensitive area.  
 
The chapter also contributes to highlighting why the Caribbean region’s relationship with China 
matters within the broader context of China’s engagement in the developing world, 
notwithstanding the limited scholarly attention paid to the Caribbean region in discussions on 




2. Setting the context: the triangular relations between Caribbean states, China and the US 
The Caribbean and Latin American region is suis generis a strategic area inextricably linked to US 
interests. The rise of China in the region is not only of internal significance but is also relevant at 
the structural level in terms of the US role in the region. The Caribbean region has at times been 
referred to as the “US backyard.” This phrase signifies the interconnection between the US and 
the region while also connoting the power imbalances which exist in the relationship. Thus, 
Maingot and Lozano (2005: 1) suggests; “no other region of the world has had a relationship with 
the US similar to that of the Caribbean. For one, the dramatic asymmetry in power, accompanied 
by geographic proximity, made the region easily accessible to a variety of US designs, because the 
two factors, power and proximity, have not changed, there has been a substantial degree of 
continuity in the fundamental nature of US Caribbean relations.”  
 
 But despite the underlying inequities between Caribbean states and the US, the relationship is also 
one that is fundamentally interdependent. This leads to the US incorporating the Caribbean and 
Latin American region as key points of concern in its relations with emerging state actors in the 
international sphere, including China. Although the more benign role of China in the Caribbean 
region does not appear to conflict with US interests, China’s emergence in Latin America and the 
Caribbean region, has not necessarily escaped attention in US government circles. As far back as 
2008, US Officials at a Hearing of the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, proposed that 
China’s rise in the Latin America Caribbean region could prompt the US to reorder its priorities 
in such a strategic area.9  Likewise, the US factor also becomes a significant element in the region’s 
foreign decision-making, particularly in relation to non-traditional powers like China.  
 
In conceptualising the China and Latin America Caribbean relationship, some scholars tend to 
view it as necessarily triangular (see Ellis,2012; Peters et al, 2013; Denoon, 2017). Ellis (2012:1) 
acknowledges this three-way dynamic and notes: 
“It is difficult to talk about the PRC’s significant expansion in the region without reflexively thinking of the reaction 
of US policymakers or the possible impacts on US corporations and interests. Ironically, China’s own political 
traditions and strategic interests also lead it to pay particular attention to the United States as it engages with Latin 





Consequently, Caribbean states and China are acting within embedded power structures informed 
by the fundamental US role in the region. Their relations are invariably regulated by that systemic 
variable even when not necessarily wholly defined by it. As acknowledged by Ross (1993:4), “A 
state's position in a particular international structure creates characteristic behavior. In the case of 
the strategic triangle, a central issue concerns how each state, due to its position vis-à-vis its 
counterparts, develop a unique response to triangular pressures.”  
 
Small states then focus on means of maximizing the advantages of the structure while also seeking 
to minimise possibly adverse effects from it. As such, Caribbean states relations with emerging 
actors like China have been focused on augmenting China’s role in areas that promote economic 
development goals, while seemingly largely sidestepping cooperation strategies that may have 
residual strategic effects.  Likewise, the same may be attributed to China with respect to its 
engagement with the Anglophone Caribbean.  
 
2.1 The US role and China’s rising role in the Caribbean region 
Given the region’s geopolitical significance, there are two scholarly camps within which the 
Caribbean and Latin America’s rising interaction with China may be construed. On one hand, the 
debate on China’s rise in the Caribbean and Latin America focuses on China as a benevolent and 
commercially driven actor (Creutzfeldt, 2015; Spanakos and Xiao, 2010; Chai and Yue, 2019).   
 
The opposing view relates to the “China threat thesis.” In accordance with this view, there is a risk 
of China’s engagement in the Caribbean and broader Latin American region slowly mushrooming 
into more strategic endeavors that go beyond economic engagement. According to such 
conceptualisations, China’s role could either serve as a means of reducing American influence in 
the hemisphere or even later serve as a counterweight to its traditional influence (see Dreyer, 2006; 
Ellis, 2009; Hsiang, 2006). Certain scholars have called for China’s foreign policy abroad to pay 
attention to states which are geopolitically significant.  Thus, Boon and Ardy (2017: 121) argue 
that small states with certain “property power” should figure more prominently in Chinese 
strategies abroad. Consequently, they assert that such power may relate to natural resources or a 
“propitious geographical position” relating to either proximity to leading powers or location at key 
points of the global system. The Caribbean region is geopolitically significant in accordance with 
the criteria outlined.  
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The geopolitical nature of the space has partly led to claims by scholars and pundits alike, that 
China’s interests may have strategic connotations. However much of the claims are not supported 
empirically or interrogated critically. Aside from paying inadequate attention to the actual 
overarching power structure within which the Caribbean and Latin American region exists, these 
assumptions generally fail to closely interrogate internal norms and values as well as the domestic 
considerations that can impinge on third actors foreign policy aims in the space. Thus, many of the 
claims appear to be somewhat un-critical in their assessments of the three-way interaction between 
the Latin America Caribbean region, China and the US.  For instance, Lanxin (2008: 44) argues, 
“China’s success in expanding its influence in Latin America is changing the geopolitical 
dynamics of the Western Hemisphere.” Likewise, Lei Yu (2015: 1047) posits that President Xi 
Jinping has propelled an “economic and geopolitical orientation towards Latin America (and the 
Caribbean).” Yu opines that doing so is a means of creating a sphere of influence in the US 
backyard as a way of reshaping the present global order. This turn to Latin America, according to 
Yu, can be used to counter US encirclement of China in Asia.  However, Yu fails to expand on the 
likely internal and external limits to such an approach.  
 
Closely tied to the discourse on the triangular relationship, is an underlying debate pertaining to 
the possibility of a decline in US influence in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Consequently, 
China’s rise is at times perceived to have an adverse and more competitive impact on the US role 
in the region. Toro Hardy (2013:115) argues that China’s ascent has already profoundly shifted 
the economic dynamics in Latin America. Thus Hardy dedicates a substantial portion of his book 
to the notion of US decline as opposed to China’s rise. Urdinez et al (2016) devote some attention 
to Chinese economic statecraft in Latin America and the possibility of US decline. Employing 
statistical methods, the authors attempt to illustrate that the possibility of China’s increasing 
economic influence in the region vis-à-vis the US, may not be whole-heartedly dismissed. In 
examining China’s geo-economic impact on Latin America Denoon (2017) asserts that China’s 
economic clout in the region have already dispersed US influence in respective Latin American 
states. But while this might as well be the case for certain states in Latin America, in relation to 
specific product structures like that of agricultural goods in Brazil (soy) and oil in Peru, one still 
needs to retain a sense of perspective regarding the still unfolding dynamics. The variegated 
influence of China in the region as opposed to the US, should be given more careful consideration 
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in an effort to draw a generalised portrayal of Chinese economic engagement across the region 
(see chapter 5). Studies that seek to do so, are still few and far between.  
 
The arguments relating to the displacement of traditional US economic influence in the region, 
although premature, do obtain a level of purchase in the writings of observers and pundits alike. 
The SCMP, part of Chinese media, although by no means consistent in such assertions, does at 
particular points in time, insert more competitive rhetoric in the triangular dynamics. Hence, in 
examining the relations it states, “China is also using its economic clout to win diplomatic allies 
and challenge US supremacy and its dominance in the region. Beijing is intent on making friends 
in the US historical sphere of influence to match America’s allies in East and Southeast Asia.”10 
Prior to this assertion, the SCMP, also claimed similar intentions by Beijing in a commentary, 
entitled; “China maps new road to Latin America to rival and check US influence.”11  
 
A more nuanced approach to China’s rising involvement in the Caribbean region is called for in 
an effort to attain a more critical assessment of the underlying triangular relationship. Conflictual 
notions arising from the Caribbean region’s geostrategic position may not necessarily be over-
emphasised in the relations between the Caribbean and China. Chinese officials, despite the 
rhetoric of particular scholars and selective media, are seemingly disinterested in articulating a 
hegemonic agenda in the region, preferring instead to focus largely on south - south economic and 
social cooperation tied to the Caribbean region’s development needs. 
 
 As explained by Breslin (2009 :819), “Official Chinese statements constantly reiterate the line 
that China does not and will never seek hegemony, either in Asia or elsewhere.” This has been 
evident in much of the engagement undertaken between the Caribbean region and China. As will 
be seen in chapters 4 and 5, the emphasis has largely been on commercial partnerships.  Thus far, 
there appears to be scant evidence that geopolitical considerations are behind China’s drive into 
the Caribbean. Rather, China’s emergence within the region has been closely correlated with a 






Moreover, while there may be evidence that the Latin America and Caribbean region may not be 
a central priority in US foreign policy and the focus appears to be on regions where there are more 
immediate security concerns, to equate this with a decline in US influence is misleading. US 
influence is deeply embedded in socio-economic structures within the Caribbean and broader Latin 
American region. The geopolitical significance of the Caribbean region is made quite clear in a 
more recent report put forward by the US Congress on February 8th, 2017. Thus within the said 
report, Meyer (2017:i)  notes; “geographic proximity has forged strong linkages between the 
United States and the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, with U.S. interests 
encompassing economic, political, and security concerns.”  
 
Further, the Caribbean and Latin America is also regarded as a region largely secured from 
immediate threats to US interests, although this is not to be equated with the absence of concerns 
in the hemisphere. Despite China’s rapidly evolving role in the space, US influence is fairly well 
consolidated in the region as compared to other regions which might be viewed as threats to US 
security or are more prone to conflicts.  As will be seen in chapter 6, debates pertaining to China’s 
rise as opposed to US decline are repudiated to a certain extent when examining China’s growing 
economic influence in the Caribbean compared to the US.  
 
3. The geopolitical significance of the Caribbean and the US Role 
In setting the context, the previous subsection sought to more generally highlight the significance 
of the triangular relationship between the Caribbean, China and the US. It also sought to situate 
the Caribbean and Latin American region in the debates that underscore this trilateral relationship.  
Within this subsection, the focus shifts to examining more specifically, why the Caribbean region 
is a geopolitically significant space in relation to the US.   
 
The subsection will then continue to draw attention as to why the US role is an essential factor in 
the Caribbean and China engagement. It also sheds light on the external environment through 
which Caribbean states seek to exercise agency and the constraints inherent in that structure. 
Moreover, in illuminating the geopolitical character of the space within which Caribbean states 
and China are interacting, the subsection seeks to show why it is important to consider the systemic 
structure through which Caribbean states undertake decision-making in relation to China.  
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The unique geopolitical milieu within which the Caribbean and Latin America exists is for the 
most part taken for granted in the literature without necessarily expanding on why it is that the 
Caribbean and Latin American region is such a geopolitically significant space (see Ellis: 2009; 
Roett and Paz: 2008; Armony and Strauss: 2012). To place the geopolitical significance of the 
Caribbean region in perspective, there is need to analyse the underlying elements which contribute 
to the geostrategic significance of the region.  Hence, the assertion is made that there are ideational 
and material elements which has to be understood when examining the geopolitical significance 
of the Caribbean region in relation to the US.  
 
For one, the geopolitical significance of the region emanates from more critically held assumptions 
regarding why certain geographical spaces are to be considered significant and how these are 
interpreted by various states. O’Tuathail's (1992d: 439), looks at the more critical aspect of 
geopolitics as carrying in part; the power to input certain ideologies that are closely linked to 
representations of national security interests in order to legitimise positions through which various 
national security elites understand and act towards particular spaces.  According to Weber 
(1994:547) such ideas in effect generate “scripts (which) then become part of the means by which 
hegemony is exercised." The Caribbean region’s strategic significance then stems from ideas that 
the region is a salient geopolitical space. Therefore, US foreign policy statements have almost 
consistently expressed ideological assumptions pertaining to its hegemonic role in the Caribbean 
and Latin America. 
 
 Two, the geopolitical significance of the Caribbean lies in more materially derived understanding 
of geopolitics which accounts for the role of geography in external and internal decision making 
of states in the hemisphere. The Caribbean region’s geopolitical significance derives not only from 
its territorial proximity to the US but such salience is also based on the presence of the strategic 
Caribbean Sea which is fundamental to US security interests. The Caribbean Sea hosts strategic 
areas like the Panama Canal and several sea lanes of communication (SLOCS) fundamental to US 
security. The Anglophone Caribbean in particular, is surrounded by key maritime straits 
considered fundamental to international navigation. Consequently, there are practical economic 




3.1 The Caribbean region’s geopolitical significance in early US foreign policy initiatives 
The rise of the US was closely correlated with first achieving hegemony in the Americas 
hemisphere. It was important to gain access to strategic maritime routes and other resources in the 
region to further its commercial interests. Therefore, ingrained within US strategic thought as 
evidenced by its various foreign policy proclamations on the Caribbean and broader Latin 
American region, is the view that this area needs to be secured from penetration by unfriendly or 
hostile powers that can eventually challenge US interests.  
 
To this end, several edicts came forth purporting the rise of the US in relation to other powers 
acting within the Americas hemisphere.  As the US ascended into a rising power that was 
increasingly seeking to contend with European influence in the Caribbean and Latin America in 
the nineteenth century, then President Monroe, issued the Monroe doctrine in 1823. The said 
doctrine declared; “we should consider any attempt on the part of European governments to extend 
their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” (Charles 
1924:37). The aim of this policy was to establish US preeminence in the region over any other 
power. Other ideas such as “Manifest destiny,” was also designed to further consolidate US 
hegemony in the region. The idea was first expressed by US democratic leader, John O’ Sullivan 
in 1845 who stated; “the right of our manifest destiny (is) to over spread and to possess the whole 
of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of 
liberty and federative development of self -government entrusted to us.”12  
 
These early ideas imbued into the consciousness of American leaders that there was an innate right 
to control the hemisphere, including the Caribbean. While US policy shifts within the region has 
to be accounted for, the significance of the region to the US is consistently expressed in various 
foreign policy statements and actions within the Post-Cold War era. 
 
3.2 The Caribbean region’s geopolitical significance in US foreign policy pronouncements: 
contemporary context 
 
The Caribbean region as a strategic point of interest in US security calculations has been evident 





Administration in 2001 to the Trump Administration in 2017. In highlighting the region’s 
significance in US foreign policy, Colin Powell,  US Secretary of State acknowledged in 2002, 
“Neither President Bush nor his administration has lost sight of our commitment to America’s 
third border which connects us to the Caribbean.”13  The notion that the Caribbean is inextricably 
linked to the US as a “third border” had already been proclaimed by President Ronald Reagan in 
1982.14 Various US administrations revive this concept periodically in order to suit their foreign 
policy objectives in the Caribbean.  
 
In line with the geopolitical significance of the space, it appears that China’s increasing activities 
and more visible engagement with the Latin America Caribbean region has garnered attention at 
the official level within the US. As already noted, the then Bush administration held formal talks 
with China on its role in the region in 2006. The Bush Administration dispatched US Assistant 
Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Thomas Shannon, to hold discussions with Beijing.15 
The aim of the meeting was to better understand American and Chinese policies in the region.16 
These talks at the very least, indicated a need to ensure adequate dialogue between China and the 
United States in this significant geostrategic space.  Moreover, in 2008, concerns with China’s rise 
in the Caribbean and Latin America was raised in a US Congress report which stated;  
  The PRC presence in Latin America and the Caribbean has particularly worrisome implications. It could help strengthen anti-U.S. 
political leaders and actors in some countries; in the event of a possible U.S. military conflict with China, PRC human and 
commercial infrastructure in Latin America would be well placed to disrupt and distract the United States in the hemisphere.17  
 
This preoccupation by the US with the Caribbean as being important to its security, while not 
always at the forefront of its foreign policy considerations, is often expressed most visibly when 
its national security interests are considered threatened.  Such an observation led Pastor (1994: 21) 
to point out, “the threat that moves the United States is that more powerful adversaries from Europe 
or Asia could forge a relationship with one of the small nations that would permit the more 
powerful one to use it as a base to attack or harass the United States.”  
 
There is evidence that the priority of US foreign policy is not always focused on the Caribbean 
even with China’s economic rise. But even so, it would be misleading to assume US decline in the 
 
13 Quoted in Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly (2007: 323) 
14 http://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/04/05/The-Caribbean-Americas-diverse-third-border/7048386830800/ 
15 Shannon met with Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo and Zeng Gang, head of the Department of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs in 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
16. http://www.gov.cn/misc/2006-04/15/content_254755.htm 
17 http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a484838.pdf , p. 27 
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region. The end of the Monroe doctrine was the subject of a speech by John Kerry, former US 
Secretary of State under the Obama Administration, to the OAS General Assembly in November 
2013.18 It may be said that the individual level of analysis serves as an important indicator of 
foreign policy for some states more so than others. In certain states, foreign policy decision-making 
may reside at the individual level rather than bureaucratic factors or even the public. Thus, 
individuals serve as important barometers through which to gauge a nation’s foreign policy 
behaviour.  
 
However, with great powers such as the United States, foreign policy is deeply entrenched within 
institutions and sustained ideological structures that can attempt to transcend, confront, adapt or 
act contrary to individual decision-making. Statements like the “end of the Monroe doctrine”, was 
perhaps meant to reassure the region that the more coercive aspects of US hegemonic assertion 
over the region was perhaps not part of the Obama administration’s agenda.  But such an assertion 
by Kerry, may not be taken as a yardstick through which to determine that the very factual realities 
of the region which prompted the Monroe doctrine in the first place, is no longer applicable to the 
present.  
 
More recently, under the Donald Trump Administration, in June 2017, the US released its 2020 
multi-year strategy for the Caribbean. The very first sentence of that strategy sought to reinforce 
that the Caribbean region is part of the US third border and thus stated, “The Caribbean region is 
the United States’ third border, characterized by common interests and societal ties that yield daily, 
tangible benefits for U.S. citizens.”19  The above-mentioned strategy was a continuation of an 
initiative undertaken by President Barack Obama, whereby the US Government passed the United 
States -Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016. The act declares in part:  
“(it is) U.S. policy to increase engagement with the governments of the Caribbean region, including the private sector, and with 
civil society in both the United States and the Caribbean and that the Department of State shall submit to Congress a multi-year 
strategy for U.S. engagement to support the Caribbean region.”20 
 
Despite the more benign interactions between the Caribbean region and China, the region’s 






hemisphere and perhaps in the broader global system. As pointed out by Christopher Coker (2014: 
89), “the grand strategies of the great powers..involve a geopolitical vision”.  
 
US practices and attitudes towards the Caribbean as a region of uncontested supremacy meant not 
only direct and indirect confrontations with other powers in that space, but also interventions in 
the region either overtly or covertly to promote its interests. As a result, US response to the rise of 
other powers in the Caribbean region has resulted in outright conflict as evident by the 1983 War 
on Grenada and the Cuban Missile Crisis. While these interventions took place during the Cold 
War years and events in the hemisphere has thus far, not unfolded to give the US sufficient cause 
for concern, the strategic significance of the Caribbean has not been lost on US policymakers. As 
pointed out by Joseph Nye et al (1988:171):  
 We should be wary of hastily dismissing this event (Cuban Missile Crisis) as irrelevant to the present; certain crucial factors have 
not changed since 1962, or have become all the more important because of the changes in the strategic balance: ….But we should 
also be wary of drawing generalizations that ignore important ways in which the world has changed, that cannot be supported by 
evidence from a single crisis, and that are insensitive to the fact that diplomatic or strategic successes can rarely be repeated in 
quite the same way.  
 
While such events do not suggest an eventually conflictual relationship between the US and China, 
such occurrences can serve as roadmaps for strategic decision-making for Caribbean states in 
relations with alternative powers.  These also illustrate more cautionary instances of US power in 
the Caribbean region which may inform Caribbean states foreign policy practices.  At present, the 
US is the dominant power in the international system. The US has not fundamentally departed 
from this notion that it is the pre-eminent power in the Caribbean and Latin American region. Thus 
the Caribbean’s relationship with China matters within the broader context of the US role in the 
region and in terms of China’s broader outreach to the developing world. 
 
3.3 The Caribbean Sea and strategic US interests 
Having focused on the more ideational aspects of the Caribbean’s geopolitical significance by 
examining the Caribbean region in US foreign policy pronouncements, this subsection, discusses 
the material basis for such salience. As argued by Schoultz (2014:203) any understanding of the 
Caribbean region’s strategic significance has to be tied to its economic utility. The US Department 
of Defense considers the Caribbean Sea transiting the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico as 




is home to many of the US designated strategic sea lines of communication (SLOC).  These, transit 
many states in the Caribbean region. With the majority of global trade being seaborne, the 
Caribbean Sea serve as an important maritime trade route between the US, Europe, Asia and Latin 
America and Caribbean region through the strategic Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is an 
important circum-equatorial route that lessens geographical distances around the globe for matters 
of trade.22   
 
The significance of Caribbean waterways had long been recognised by the British even prior to 
US ascendancy. The strategic utility of the Caribbean Sea in relation to the US has led Robert 
Kaplan to observe: 
 Of all the European powers, the British, with the world's greatest navy and bases in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, 
British Honduras, and the Lesser Antilles …. (although) best positioned to challenge the United States in the Caribbean 
at the turn of the 20th century…. did not challenge the Americans, because they knew the latter would fight hard to 
defend the maritime extension of their own North American continent.23  
 
3.3.1 The Anglophone Caribbean: key international maritime straits   
The English-speaking Caribbean region traverses significant international waterways that are 
deemed as strategic to US interests. A number of those international straits are designated as world 
trade routes of direct importance to the United States.  According to Alexander M. Lewis 
(2017:132), of the twenty-six (26) strategic international straits designated as fundamental for 
commercial purposes located in the Third World, ten (10) of those are situated in the Caribbean 
region. These are found in the maritime territory of the Bahamas, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Mexico, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela (See Michael 
A. Morris 1987; 464).  
 
The Anglophone Caribbean is a region overwhelmingly represented in the 16 “straits of major 
importance” as designated by the United States (see Burke and DeLeo, 1983: 400). The 
significance of these maritime pathways within the English-speaking Caribbean for naval purposes 
has also been observed by the British Naval Chart of World Ocean Routes (No. 5307). These 
waterways are given primacy alongside the Dover and Gibraltar straits for international navigation 
 
22 The Panama Canal was a long realised dream that enabled the US control of primary trade routes. The successful completion of 
the Panama Canal by the Americans, a feat that had already been unsuccessfully attempted by France, heralded to the US itself 
and the globe, the arrival of American power. Thus, the role of the Panama Canal is much about practical geopolitics where 
economic considerations were at the heart of the endeavor. 
23 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/beijings-caribbean-logic-10120 
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(see Bing Bing Jia; 1998: 2).  The significance of Caribbean straits to international navigation has 
also been expounded upon by other authors (Lars Schoultz, 2014; Griffith, 2015).  
 
Among the international waterways within the Anglophone Caribbean are the Windward passage, 
the Mona passage and St. Vincent Channel.  Table 2, provides information on international straits 
in the Caribbean. These straits are considered fundamental to international navigation for states 
across the globe. These are important as parts of global trade routes especially to and from the US.  
According to Griffith (2015), of the sixty-four standard US maritime trade routes, thirty-three of 
those routes traverse the Caribbean.  
 
Table 2: International Maritime Straits in the Caribbean 
Passage Sovereignty on Either Side 
Florida Passage US, Cuba 
Yucatan Channel Cuba, Mexico 
Windward Passage Cuba, Haiti 
Mona Passage US, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic 
St Vincent Passage St Lucia, St Vincent 
Dominica Channel Dominica, Guadeloupe  
St Lucia Channel St. Lucia, Martinique 
Virgin Islands Passage US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico 
Guadeloupe Passage Montserrat and Guadeloupe  
Source; CEPAL, https://repositorio.cepal.org 
 
Caribbean Sea lanes are heavily navigated and considered essential to US security.  Much of the 
traffic in the Caribbean Sea is due to the region’s proximity to the US, the world’s leading 
economic power. For instance, with respect to the Anglophone Caribbean, port terminals like 
Kingston Habour in Jamaica only, saw an annual traffic of 2.2 million containers, much of it 
headed towards the US mainland in 2014.24 The Caribbean Sea is also a strategic trade route 
between the US and the Far East, including China.25 In 2017, the US was designated as 
representing a quarter of the world’s economy (24.3%) and China the second leading economy 







Thus, attempts to assert dominance of the Caribbean Sea for commercial interests has not been 
lost on Chinese observers. Certain authors have also gone as far as arguing that China is keenly 
aware of the US strategy in acquiring its hegemonic role through control of the   sea and its strategic 
sea lanes.  Holmes and Yoshihara (2012: 52) put forward that the “South China Sea is China’s 
Caribbean Sea.”  Robert D. Kaplan (2015) essentially makes a similar claim, “The South China 
Sea is to China what the Greater Caribbean was to the United States in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. The United States became a great power, geopolitically, by dominating the 
Caribbean.”27  
 
However, those strategic ideas are not to viewed as confined to the past, but is very much present 
under various guises in US strategy in the Caribbean. The strategic sea lanes in the Caribbean 
region is still vital to US commercial interests and will continue to be so in the future. For instance, 
with the expansion of the Panama Canal which was completed in 2016, it is anticipated that 
increased trade between US and East Asia will be facilitated through the Caribbean.  
 
The geographical realities within the Caribbean region are likely to promote continuities in US 
foreign policy towards the Caribbean region, notwithstanding China’s increasing engagement in 
the Caribbean. Coker (2015:11) expresses the following in relation to the US and China and 
perhaps it bears being paraphrased unto the relations between the Caribbean, the US and China.  
 The only way to ‘earn’ the past is to learn the lessons it has to impart. If the right lessons are learned by studying the 
most suitable analogies, then there is at least a reasonable chance of preparing for unanticipated events in the future. 
Analogies lend themselves to logical thinking. They are central to inductive reasoning, which assumes that the same 
regularities and correlations that have held in the past will continue to hold in the future.   
 
The Caribbean has endured a series of learning experiences from the past and present through 
which to discern its geopolitical significance in US calculations based on confrontational events 
of the Cold War era as well as direct diplomatic pressures which are part of the toolkit of American 
foreign policy in the Caribbean region to date. The asymmetrical power relations between the 







Thus, while China’s rise is very much economic and benign thus far, the US factor does to some 
extent guide foreign policy formulation and implementation in relations with China. But while the 
geopolitical structure based on the US role in the region is vital, it is not always the sole 
determining factor in Caribbean states foreign policy towards China. As will be seen in chapter 3, 
this essential geopolitical character did not necessarily dampen respective Caribbean states 
commitment to China even during the Cold War period, where underlying rivalries promoted more 
neutrality in Caribbean states foreign policies. Thus this highlights more broadly why it is 
important to consider developing states interests and agency in relations with China despite the 
region’s systemic constraints. Hence, the subsection below delves into motives in the Caribbean 
and China relationship. 
 
4. Situating motives in Caribbean states engagement with China 
 
The previous section sought to evaluate why the Caribbean matters within the discourse of China’s 
relations with the developing world. In doing so, the subsection attempted to show why the 
Caribbean’s evolving relationship with China would be of interest to key geopolitical actors such 
as the United States. This section now turns to examining Caribbean states motivations in engaging 
China. It also aims to situate the Caribbean region in China’s economic and political objectives in 
the Americas hemisphere.  
 
Much of the accounts considering the US role and that of China’s in the region do not necessarily 
address how the Caribbean fit into those wider debates (see Ellis, 2014; Paz, 2008; Nolte, 2013). 
Neither do such narratives pay sufficient attention to how Caribbean or Latin American states own 
aims and interests are likely to impact the US and China nexus within the region.  Thus, the 
objectives of such states in the interaction are not necessarily treated as salient.   
 
 Examining Caribbean states motives and that of China’s in the engagement, are not necessarily 
straight forward tasks in the absence of expressed intentions. But having said so, the discussion 
draws from the literature on China’s engagement with the developing world as well as the literature 
pertaining to its relations with Latin America in an effort to posit motivations in the relationship. 
The motivations driving the engagement relate more centrally to mutual economic and political 
interests between Caribbean states and China, despite the geopolitical character of the space and 
the perceptions attributed to such significance.  
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Furthering economic development assistance by increasing cooperation partnerships with China 
as a key global actor is an essential objective in the dynamic for Caribbean states. In terms of 
China, the Caribbean region while part of its political interests in relation to Taiwan, is more 
fundamentally a means of accessing new markets in line with its broader going out-strategy to 
various parts of the developing world. The Caribbean region is also essential to China’s global 
financial flows in terms of its ODI. 
 
4.1 Situating China in Caribbean states motives 
 
For the Caribbean region, China’s emergence alongside traditional western powers perpetuated a 
global economic shift which represented opportunities to further mutual interests. China’s 
economic rise was brought about by a period of opening - up and reform instituted by Deng in 
1978. This led to a series of economic changes to China in the 1980’s. By the 1990’s, China 
received an influx of FDI that succeeded in enabling rapid growth and development. According to 
Chen et al, (1995: 693) between 1991-1993, $41.1 billion had been invested inside China.  
 
Thus, in the 1990’s, for the first time since its founding, the PRC was able to articulate a more 
coherent framework for economic statecraft whereby a country is able to use the economic 
instruments at its disposal to facilitate its foreign policy interests. As will be seen in chapter 3, in 
the 1990’s, China began reinforcing its ties with traditional partners in the Anglophone Caribbean 
while also expanding its economic and political ties with new partners in the region.  
 
Commercial considerations have been at the core of Caribbean states foreign policy decision 
making vis-à-vis China. Two empirical chapters of the thesis, chapters 4 and 5, point 
overwhelmingly to the economic motives behind Caribbean states interactions with China.  As 
will be seen in the analyses in both chapters, Caribbean states have sought to position themselves 
to benefit from China’s commercial engagement by seeking to increase access to financing for 
infrastructure investments. Caribbean states have also attempted to engage in a broader 
diversification of trade partnerships in order to access more competitive markets while seeking 
possible penetration into non-traditional markets. However, the latter presents significant 
difficulties in relation to China for a host of reasons. As will be discussed in chapter 5, a more 
obvious issue is the lack of competitiveness which define small states commercial partnerships. 
But another issue is also related more broadly to China being a non-traditional actor in the space. 
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As such, the more enhanced interconnections and linkages with more established markets have yet 
to sufficiently unfold in commercial ties with China, at least for the Anglophone Caribbean region. 
 
Moreover, Caribbean states motives in engaging China has also been in line with that of many 
other states in the developing world. China’s role as a significant economic actor alongside the 
traditional actors, meant that Caribbean states were motivated to accommodate China as part of 
the “new economic normal,” in the post 1990, global economic landscape. For Caribbean states 
like other developing states, China’s emergence increased maneuvering space for furtherance of 
mutual interests in relation to external actors.  
 
4.2 Situating Caribbean states in China’s motives 
A recurring theme in China’s motives in the developing world is the scramble for resources. Within 
the Caribbean region, China’s financial input in resource endowed states such as Jamaica, Guyana 
and Trinidad have been remarkable as will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. However, to unpack 
China’s motives in the Caribbean region, one has to go beyond more resource based 
understandings of China’s objectives in the developing world especially given that most states in 
the Anglophone Caribbean are not particularly well endowed with resources. Thus, various 
commercial issues are considered key to situating the Caribbean region in China’s commercial 
motives.  
 
The Caribbean region may be linked to China’s commercialisation strategies in the developing 
world, much like any other region where China furthers its economic statecraft. By the millennium, 
China begun to promote its “going out strategy.” The latter was formalised in China’s 10th five-
year plan (2001-2005). The aim was to aid its state-owned institutions in playing a wider role in 
the global economy (see Kitissou 2007: 110). As such, China embarked on an internationalisation 
of indigenous commercial institutions, namely its state-owned enterprises as well as financial 
firms. This meant expanding the role of these institutions across various economic regions, 
including the Caribbean and Latin America.  
 
China’s going out strategy enabled the Chinese government to improve China’s economic 
competitiveness alongside other international actors through engagement in diverse economic 
environments. This led to Chinese companies becoming involving in a broad range of sectors in 
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the Caribbean region, including infrastructure development, tourism and natural resource 
investments. Further, the Anglophone Caribbean like other developing states, represented 
expanded market opportunities in both lending and trade for China.  
 
Given the geostrategic significance of the Caribbean, Chinese companies saw opportunities not 
only within Caribbean states but also from the Caribbean states proximity to the world’s leading 
market; the United States.  As noted by Bernal (2015: 5), regional trading arrangements with 
leading actors such US, EU and Canada appear to have garnered Chinese companies interests in 
the region. Commercial maritime developments in the Caribbean have also been regarded as a key 
means of expanding China’s economic role in the Caribbean with a view to benefiting from larger 
North American markets (Canada and US). Such investments also facilitate entry into markets 
within the broader Caribbean and Latin America. As will be seen in chapter 4, China’s FDI has 
targeted maritime services for transshipment purposes across key strategic maritime trade routes 
in the Caribbean.  For instance, the Bahamas has benefited significantly from maritime 
development by Chinese private entrepreneurs as well as state actors, as will be seen in Chapter 4, 
given its close proximity to the US mainland.  These geographical linkages contribute to 
positioning Caribbean states in China’s commercial motives in the region. 
 
Another reason for the Caribbean region’s significance in China’s commercial interests relates to 
the fundamental role that the Anglophone Caribbean plays in China’s overseas FDI. The 
Anglophone Caribbean is considered a major conduit for the flow of Chinese financing overseas.  
As pointed out by Daniel Erikson (2009: 1) “China’s overall strategy for the Caribbean has been 
driven by a desire to ensure the security of Chinese offshore financial holdings.” The region has 
played a key role in China’s foreign direct investment flows post 1990, notwithstanding the limited 
literature on the Caribbean’s economic engagement with China.  
 
The Anglophone Caribbean region has been consistently among the top destinations for China’s 
outward foreign direct investment flows, according to the China Statistical Bulletin of Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment 2015. The Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands have been 
among the leading destination for those financial flows. The Cayman Islands registered the third 
highest destination for China’s FDI outflows in 2015, comprising 7% of those outflows. In terms 
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of FDI stock, the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands comprise among the highest 
destination outside Hong Kong, making up more than 10% of China’s FDI stock abroad.28 
 
 These Caribbean territories often serve as offshore intermediaries for further dissemination of 
finance across the Caribbean and the rest of globe. According to Chinese sources, in 2016, 
US$6.87 billion in Chinese investments flowed to the Caribbean and Latin America, with much 
of that amount going to the Caribbean- the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. It is 
perhaps worth noting that this outflow into the region was more than that into the ASEAN region 
for the same period according to Chinese sources. The latter saw $ 1.24 billion in overseas FDI.29 
But one might add that the final destination of much of those financial flows remains somewhat 
murky. Although these Caribbean territories have been significant destinations for Chinese FDI, 
much of it also makes its way back into China. As such in some instances, these territories are 
considered tax havens. Despite these issues, the Caribbean remains important to China as it is a 
key part of Chinese financing overseas. 
 
Moreover, in gauging China’s motives, intertwined with economic aims are also political 
considerations in the engagement. Thus, there are political goals to be considered in China’s 
engagement with the Caribbean region, especially as it relates to China’s broader foreign policy 
aims in relation to Taiwan.  The Caribbean region is still an area where Taiwan has the most 
diplomatic allies. Consequently, pursuing the “one China” policy is still part of China’s overall 
foreign policy aims in the Caribbean.  
 
More broadly, the Caribbean like other developing regions, also have a role to play in promoting 
China’s international status as a significant economic actor alongside traditional powers such as 
the US and western European states. As will be seen in chapter 3, with increased bilateral and 
multilateral engagement between the Caribbean and China from 2005- 2016, the Caribbean and 
Latin American states have aided China in promoting its influence regionally through bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation.   
 
 
28 Quoted in, “China Takes Global Number Two Outward FDI Slot,”www.hktdc.com/Research  
29 http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/policyreleasing/201603/20160301276949.shtml 
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Given the Caribbean region’s geostrategic significance, the question of China’s strategic intentions 
in the Caribbean is not absent from the broader considerations on China’s rising role in the region. 
While economic dynamics are bound to bring about complementarity in the interaction between 
the Caribbean, China and the United States, possibly strategic motives relating to competing with 
traditional US influence in the Caribbean and broader Latin American region is often a 
consideration in the debates on the rising role of China in the Caribbean.  
 
However, China’s actual commercial engagement in the region does not appear to act counter to 
traditional US interests, as will be seen in chapter 6. Rather, China is playing a complementary 
role in the region alongside traditional actors. For instance, as will be seen in chapter 6, China 
appears to be filling a void in infrastructure financing, an area that has not necessarily been 
prioritised in the Caribbean region’s engagement with traditional partners like the US.  
 
It is important to understand China’s rise within the Latin America Caribbean region as a benign 
power that does not seek to contend with US hegemony in this significant geopolitical area. Zakaria 
(2008:31) observes that China does not necessarily seek a reversal of the established order as have 
other rising powers prior, but rather, China seeks to attain success within it. Therefore, it may be 
shortsighted to assume that China’s intentions in the Caribbean region are strategically motivated 
and that it is a geopolitical challenge to US dominance in the Caribbean and Latin America. Apart 
from the region being a space where American interests is deeply entrenched, as argued, 
commercial considerations have been a central driving force in the interactions  between Caribbean 
states and China.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The geopolitical element in the Caribbean and China relationship was construed as a constant 
variable in Caribbean and Latin American states foreign policy behaviour towards specific actors, 
including China. Thus, the chapter started with the essential premise that given the geopolitical 
structure of the Caribbean region, the US factor impinges on Caribbean states foreign policy 
behaviour.  
 
The chapter first highlighted why Caribbean states interactions with China is often considered to 
involve a triad of interests. It is not necessarily sufficient to focus on Caribbean states aims  and 
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that of China’s in the relations, without implicitly considering the implications for the US role in 
the region. The chapter then focused on examining why the Caribbean region in particular, is 
considered to be of geopolitical significance in relation to the US. In doing so, it was asserted that 
both material and ideological elements are essential to understanding the Caribbean region’s 
geopolitical significance. Consequently, various ideas continually evident in US foreign 
pronouncements on the Caribbean and Latin American region, dating back to the Monroe doctrine, 
were examined. Moreover, the salience of the Caribbean Sea to US commercial interests was also 
examined.  
 
In examining these issues, the discussions highlighted why Caribbean states matter in the discourse 
on China’s rise in the Americas hemisphere. The Caribbean region’s significance is not only linked 
to its direct proximity to the US mainland. But also results from the presence of the Caribbean Sea. 
The latter is integral to global commerce and is a strategic maritime space that links parts of the 
Americas hemisphere to various maritime trade routes across the globe including, Asia. Thus 
notwithstanding the tendency to overlook the Caribbean region in ongoing debates on China’s 
emergence within the Sino-LAC literature, the research attempted to shed light on the salience of 
the Caribbean region within the broader context of China’s rise within the space.  
 
The chapter then went on to assert that notwithstanding the Caribbean region’s strategic position 
in the American hegemonic sphere and the underlying concerns pertaining to China’s intentions 
in the space, the interactions between Caribbean states and China has been largely motivated by 
mutual political and economic interests.  
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Chapter 3:  Caribbean States Policymaking in Relations with China: role of diplomacy 
 
 Introduction 
The previous chapter attempted to set the stage for understanding why the Caribbean region’s 
relations with China mattered within the broader context China’s engagement in the Americas 
hemisphere and in relation to China’s emergence in the developing world. It also sought to examine 
why Caribbean states relations with China and indeed that of the Latin American region, is 
frequently viewed as a triangular dynamic given the underlying geopolitical structure within which 
the region exists.  
 
 However, a focus solely on the hegemonic structure of the region does not adequately explain 
Caribbean states foreign policy towards China. It is then important to examine how specific 
intervening variables have influenced the patterns of continuity and change in Caribbean states 
relations with China. As Gyngell and Wesley (2007:18) argue, reconciling the logic of a structural 
environment with unit level variables are key to any account of foreign policy. Notwithstanding 
the constraints often associated with Caribbean states overarching geopolitical structure and the 
limitations often attributed to small states in global affairs, Caribbean states have actively utilised 
diplomacy to promote mutual interests in relations with China.  
 
The chapter examines how diplomacy between the Caribbean region and China unfolded and why 
it evolved the way it did. The chapter argues that while the ideological underpinnings of the Cold 
War era prompted Caribbean states diplomacy with China on the basis of Third World solidarity, 
specific economic conditions impacting the Caribbean region provided the impetus for states to 
undertake a more pragmatic approach to policymaking vis-à-vis China in the Post-Cold War 
period. Consequently, acting within the context of broader structural economic changes which 
coincided with China’s rise, elite decision-makers emphasised extended commercial and political 
interactions between the Caribbean region and China.  
  
Diplomacy is then examined as a facet of policymaking from the vantage point of elite decision-
makers interacting through key circumstances and events. The analysis draws from official reports 
of their various interactions while also relying on an analysis of the specific contexts that prompted 
the interaction through various phases of the relationship. This chapter also engages more directly 
with the Caribbean and China relationship. 
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State decision-making as a significant factor in evaluating foreign policy behavior has been 
examined by a substantial number of scholars within FPA and NCR. Gideon Rose (1998: 161) 
emphasises that for NCR adherents, “bringing the state back in” is a key intervening variable, 
through which to understand foreign policy. Zakaria (1998:39), an NCR proponent, acknowledges 
that the state apparatus, inclusive of its policy-making capacity, is vital to understanding foreign 
policy behavior. Likewise, Lobell et al (2009: 28) opines, “elite calculations and interests” as part 
of state-led policymaking processes, are given primacy as an intervening factor in examining 
foreign policy under NCR. Moreover, the FPA approach discussed in chapter 1, also underscores 
the salience of decision-making by state actors in explaining foreign policy behaviour (see Allison; 
1971, Frankel 1963, Carlsnaes; 1992, Synder et al; 2002, Hudson; 2012). 
 
 However, the chapter is not simply concerned with state actors in policymaking. Crucially, it 
concomitantly highlights the political and economic conditions as well as the key circumstances 
and events through which decision-makers negotiate interests, navigate constraints and pursue 
opportunities.  
 
While much of Caribbean states diplomacy vis-à-vis China remains unexplored, policymaking 
occurred through very distinct contexts. The findings suggest that whereas in the Cold War period, 
diplomacy was largely linked to the ideological underpinnings of that era, starting in the 1990’s, a 
series of economic changes influenced Caribbean states decision-making vis-à-vis China. These 
included, inter alia, a loss of preferential access to established markets for exports and a reduction 
in aid from traditional partners (see subsection 4.1). Such events prompted a turn to an 
economically rising China in the global economic order. These economic circumstances also 
coincided with the promotion of China’s own foreign policy interests in relation to Taiwan within 
the Caribbean region. The changes precipitated by China’s rise not only enabled China to assert 
its diplomatic interests in the Caribbean region, its emergence also allowed Caribbean states to 
pursue their own economic and political goals in the relations.  
 
Moreover, a latter phase of diplomacy in the Post-Cold War era (2008-2016) became apparent. 
Caribbean states sought to position their interests vis-à-vis China through a burgeoning phase of 
“strategic economic diplomacy” for that period. This phase involved a subtle shift towards more 
extensive economic engagement and deepening of political and cultural links. President Xi 
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Jinping’s role as a key decision-maker during this more strategic phase merits consideration. Xi 
undertook a more visible diplomatic pivot to the Commonwealth Caribbean unlike any of his 
predecessors.  
 
The chapter contributes to generating novel insights into the Caribbean and China dynamic by 
examining the salience of diplomacy in the evolution of the relations between Caribbean states 
and China. The chapter not only fills a gap in the Sino- Latin America Caribbean literature. The 
analysis also prompts a rethinking of the Caribbean and China relationship. In doing so, it reveals 
the underlying ideological contexts that prompted Anglophone Caribbean states decision-making 
vis-à-vis China in the Cold War period and highlights the economic pragmatism that thus far 
drives policymaking in the Post-Cold War era. The chapter also shows that established perceptions 
of a “disengaged” China in Caribbean and Latin America affairs, prior to the Post-Cold war era, 
is misleading. Instead, it illustrates a more sustained Caribbean and China relationship through 
high level visits in the Mao to Deng era and continuing through-out the Post-Cold War period 
under survey in the thesis.   
 
2. Caribbean Relations with China: the historical period (1854-1959) 
It may be said that there is a tendency in the literature to view the Latin America Caribbean region’s 
relations with China more as a Post-Cold War phenomena. Such views largely fail to consider the 
longstanding relations between the Caribbean region and China. For instance, Mora (1997: 35) 
notes, “the region has traditionally been out of Beijing’s scope of interest.” Jiang Shixue (2008:2) 
also asks; “why, all of a sudden, is China interested in Latin America, a region which is so far 
away from Asia?” The idea of Caribbean China relations is perhaps even more understated in the 
broader discourse on Latin America Caribbean relations with China.  
 
Despite the tendency within the Sino Latin America Caribbean literature to concentrate almost 
exclusively on the region’s ties with China within a Post-Cold war context, China’s ties with the 
Caribbean region may go as far back as the 16th century or even earlier, according to some sources.  
Hearn et al (2011: 6) points out that that by 1565, Spanish sailors had already found ocean streams 
of the Caribbean Sea to be favourable for trans-Pacific shipping to China. Other accounts suggest 
that China’s contact with the Caribbean region date back even further. Gavin Menzies (2012: 292) 
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in his book, “1421:  The Year China Discovered America,” postulates that expeditions of Chinese 
seafarer, Zheng He, (1371–1433) reached the Caribbean. 
 
Although these initial contacts are less definitive, and even perhaps debatable, the Caribbean 
region’s relationship with China is rooted in historical connections which predate the founding of 
the PRC in 1949. Relations between the Caribbean region and China can be traced to the 19th 
century. The Chinese presence was facilitated in the Caribbean region through various waves 
immigration. In Guyana, between the period of 1853 to 1879, a total of 13,541 Chinese nationals 
settled in the country.30  In tracing the arrival of the Chinese into Jamaica, Bryan (2004: 25) 
acknowledges that by 1854, an initial 600 Chinese nationals had landed in Jamaica. Other Chinese 
immigrants followed that period. Trinidad also had various waves of Chinese immigration. The 
first was in 1806 when 192 Chinese immigrants arrived in Trinidad. The second wave followed 
from China’s Guangdong province between 1853 and 1866.  A third wave continued through-out 
the 1920’s, 1940’s and into the 1970’s. These were largely immigrants engaged in petty trading 
and other businesses.31  
 
The Chinese diaspora in the Caribbean facilitated early diplomatic interventions by the Qing 
dynasty within the region. Thus, the Caribbean region, namely Cuba, has been cited as among the 
Qing’s dynasty’s first emigration foreign policy concerns in its diplomacy abroad (Benton, 2010: 
178). On March 17th, 1874, a commission sent by China convened in Cuba to look into the 
conditions of Chinese workers on the island. Formal diplomatic relations by China within the 
Caribbean region was undertaken soon after. Cuba and China established formal diplomatic 
relations in 1875 under the Qing dynasty. In 1902, after the Cuban Republic was founded, China 
and Cuba later re-established diplomatic relations with the newly formed republic. The first 
Chinese ambassador, Wu Tingfang, was then dispatched to Cuba in 1906 (Zuo, 2010:195).  
 
These inter-cultural and economic linkages facilitated the creation of various transnational 
networks which further sought to enhance cooperation between the Caribbean region and China. 
This was illustrated in Cuba in the wake of the successful communist revolution on mainland China 
 
30 http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter55.html 




in 1949.  Soon after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the Chinese diaspora called 
on Cuba to recognise the PRC. According to Kathleen Lopez (2010: 215-216), the Cuban 
Government also put in place policies for Chinese nationals to be allowed in Cuba in the wake of 
the Civil War. Lopez notes further that in the period, 1950-1959, 3000 Chinese nationals entered 
Cuba.  
 
These early interconnections examined above, would set an initial foundation for not only an 
awareness of China, but also a commitment to it within the Caribbean region’s policymaking in 
the Cold War period.  
 
3. Caribbean states diplomacy with China during Cold War period:  ideological phase 
(1960-1989) 
In order to understand how and why Caribbean states policymaking in relation to China revolved 
around Third World solidarity, one has to recall the historical links identified earlier between the 
Anglophone Caribbean and China. This promoted a level of familiarity and affinity with China 
within the Caribbean context. One also needs to bear in mind that the more ideational 
underpinnings of the Cold War era acted as its own pull factor in helping developing states solidify 
relations among themselves. Ideologies rested not only on the seemingly opposing ideals between 
East and West as part of hegemonic power struggles. Developing states were also forging common 
alliances based on shared experiences of colonisation, under-development and other perceived 
inequities. Such experiences fostered a solidarity with China on the part of the Caribbean. 
Moreover, the Cuban leadership was also significant in furthering the causes of China within the 
Caribbean region and externally, based on Third World solidarity. Cuba’s role will be 
intermittently referenced in the discussions below. But although important, the Cuba and China 
nexus within the Caribbean region is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
 
While it maybe be acknowledged that the geopolitical underpinnings of the Caribbean region in 
relation to the US together with such states own foreign policy interests often promoted a level of 
neutrality and non-alignment in foreign policy during the Cold War era, this does not suggest a 
lack of agency in inter-state relations with China. Caribbean states converged with other 
developing countries to support China’s aims in the international sphere. Therefore, through 
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various bilateral contacts and multilateral engagements, elite decision-makers sought to maintain 
a common alliance with China as part of the then Third world. 
 
Moreover, much of the literature emphasises how and why Chinese elites facilitated a policy 
designed to incorporate the Third World in its broader foreign policy interests, rather than 
underscoring the pertinent role that developing states also played in the interactions (see 
Shambaugh, 2009; Kim, 1984; Taylor, 1998). Thus, overlooking to some extent, their agency and 
interests in the engagement with China. In their policymaking, Caribbean states aligned with China 
based on shared commonalities as developing states.  Such affinities aided in facilitating mutual 
interests in the global realm. 
 
3.1 Caribbean states multilateral diplomacy and China 
The Latin America and Caribbean region’s decision-making vis-à-vis China within the ideational 
context of the Cold War period, has been under-examined in the literature. Authors have largely 
concentrated on African region when examining developing states diplomacy with China (see 
Alden; 2005, Taylor; 1998, Tull; 2006). 
 
Caribbean states, while deficient in the commonly understood attributes of state power such as 
military and economic strength, both independently and by means of alliances with other Third 
World states, articulated their commitment to China on the basis of Third World solidarity. As the 
1960’s unfolded, a more active foreign policy on the part of Caribbean states developed. By then, 
Caribbean states were either self - governing or had achieved independence from Britain. As stated 
by Morgenthau (1948:32) sovereignty imbued such countries with “legitimate power” based on 
“legal and moral authority.” This favoured China as it allowed for more independent decision-
making to be undertaken by the Caribbean region with regards to furthering the causes of the latter 
in the international arena.  
 
Likewise, the then newly self-determining status of Caribbean states, enabled China to reaffirm 
ties with the region. For instance, the independence of Guyana in 1966 saw the Chinese leadership 
reaching out to Guyana. China’s Premier Chou Enlai, sent congratulatory messages to Guyana’s 
Prime Minister, Forbes Burnham. Chinese officials acknowledged that Guyana’s independence 
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was welcomed by China and represented successful colonial struggles. 32 Such interactions were 
designed to reaffirm the bounds of Third World solidarity between the Caribbean leadership and 
that of China’s. 
 
Caribbean states actively utilised multilateral frameworks which provided enhanced policy space 
for decision-making regarding China. In examining the significance of such structures in 
facilitating the interests of small states, Keohane (1969: 291) posits, “Using the United Nations as 
a forum and a force and claiming "nonalignment" as an important diplomatic innovation, small 
states rose to prominence if not power.”  The tendency by small states to at times creatively assess 
and utilise the power embedded within institutional frameworks to enhance leverage in terms of 
foreign policy interests, have also been examined by Cooper and Shaw (2009).  
 
Multilateral mechanisms enabled Caribbean elites to subtly express ideological preferences in 
states decision-making vis-à-vis China. Such fora also allowed Caribbean states to band-wagon 
with other developing states to further alliances with China to facilitate common causes in the 
international sphere. This was evident when the Caribbean region became the site for the “First 
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples’ Solidarity Conference.”33  The said conference was hosted 
by Cuba in 1966. The tri-continental conference was aimed at furthering solidarity among states 
in the developing world against imperialism. China’s participation in the Conference in the 
Caribbean was particularly relevant. The Chinese delegate reaffirmed that the main aim of the 
conference was the “unity of the peoples of the three continents in the struggle against 
imperialism.”34 There were at least 500 delegates from 82 countries, including the then newly 
independent states of the Anglophone Caribbean. 35 
 
The location of such a conference in the Caribbean and in principally Cuba, could be seen to have 
accomplished two representative goals. One, the Caribbean was squarely within the strategic 
sphere of the US hegemonic influence. Two, Cuba was the area for successful revolution against 
perceived US imperialism. At the closing of the Conference, Cuban President Fidel Castro, 







geographic location, the fact that the Conference was held there was a victory in itself.36   Soon 
after the tri-continental conference, China’s publication, the Peking Review in its January 1966 
edition, went on to focus on the Caribbean by underscoring the ideological affinities between the 
region and China. Hence, it noted the struggle against US imperialism in Caribbean states such as 
the Dominican Republic and the wider Latin American region. 37 
 
Caribbean states ideological commitment to China continued to be expressed across various 
regional and global institutions in the 1970’s. Caribbean states sought to support China’s aim 
within multilateral forums such as the Commonwealth of Nations, the United Nations and the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM).  Consequently, in January 1971, at the first Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers Meeting in Singapore, the English-speaking Caribbean states and other states discussed 
China’s representation at the UN.38 As Zhou and Xiong (2016:302) states, in line with the 
ideological commitment to China, Forbes Burnham, Guyana’s Prime Minister, acknowledged that 
the “world should extensively recognize China even at the loss of Taiwan.”  
 
The UN General Assembly proved to be an indispensable forum for the Third World’s 
identification of itself as a force for change. It assured such states of a space to negotiate for 
legitimisation and confront the politics of deligitimisation (Samuel Kim 1994:135). While the 
Third World was not economically powerful, they were large in number and galvanizing their 
support wrought key political changes in the international system for China. 39 Independent 
English- speaking Caribbean states like other developing countries pushed for China’s 
participation in the UN framework. 40 Thus Cuba, Guyana and Trinidad were among the 76 
countries which voted “Yes” 41 to UN Resolution 2758 (XXVI) on October 25th, 1971 which led 




38 Final Communique, Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting , Singapore, 1971, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.14217/9781848594333-20-en  
39 The ability to participate in the UN and its constituent organisations was once denied to China prior to 1971 due to US support 
of Taiwan as the legitimate representative for the PRC and Taiwan. 
40 The role of Africa in this regard is well documented compared to other developing regions such as Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Taylor; 2006 provided fairly wide coverage of Africa’s relations with China starting in 1949. Ashan; 2007, has also 




Anglophone Caribbean states as Jamaica and Barbados, decided to abstain from the vote.43 
Abstention was not necessarily a diplomatic signal of neutrality on the issue of China’s 
recognition, but one of measured caution. These countries were fully ideologically committed to 
the quest by China for recognition as part of its fight against imperialism and interference by 
western powers, causes with which they identified. The fact that all Anglophone Caribbean states 
which had achieved self-determination during that period, threw their support behind China at this 
crucial moment, demonstrated a level of solidarity with China.  
 
In line with the ideational underpinnings of the Cold War era, China also promoted a rhetoric of 
Third World solidarity with the Caribbean region. This was expressed in multilateral fora and in 
China’s foreign policy pronouncements on the Caribbean region. For instance, while the NAM’s 
commitment to China’s causes at the global level had been reinforced consistently,44 China’s 
actual participation within various NAM summits appear to have been somewhat limited in 
accordance with the official records pertaining to state attendees.45 
 
 However, when the NAM Foreign Ministers Conference took place in the Caribbean, China’s 
interest was apparent. To this end, the 1972 edition of the Peking Review, gave fairly good 
coverage to the NAM Conference in Guyana. The publication noted, “The Chinese Government 
and people attached great importance to the conference.” Kochan (1972) highlights China’s keen 
interest in the Caribbean region during the conference. According to Kochan (1972:501), China’s 
attention to the Caribbean was not lost on British Government officials. This signifies a concern 
and a more sustained interest in political and economic developments within the Caribbean region 
that has thus far been understated in the literature on the broader Latin America Caribbean and 






44 The declaration pertaining to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was first declared in Belgrade on September 6th, 1961, based 
on a First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries. Out of the 28 countries which spanned Africa, 
Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, four Caribbean and Latin American countries were present. These were, Cuba, 
Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia. By the Second NAM Conference in Cairo Egypt in 1964, representatives from the English-Speaking 
Caribbean region, namely; Jamaica and Trinidad were present at the Conference together with states from Latin America. The 
declaration that emanated from the Conference reiterated the call at Belgrade to restore China’s seat at the United Nations and 
recognise it as the only legitimate representative of China (see list of state attendees to the respective conferences). 
45 For list of attendees see, “Resolutions of the Third Conference of Non-Aligned States,” Lusaka September 1970, p.iv 
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The Commonwealth Caribbean did not escape consideration by China contrary to the dearth of 
silence surrounding the Caribbean region in the discourse on China’s relations with Latin America 
more broadly. In 1974, the Peking Review dedicated a segment of its publication to the 
Commonwealth Caribbean. The region being a critical geopolitical area for the US and the 
subsequent encroachment by the former Soviet Union, appear to have also garnered China’s 
attention. The following proclamation with regards to the Caribbean was made; 
 The people of the Commonwealth Caribbean have in recent years undergone a new awakening and their struggle 
against colonialism …is making new progress. The dependencies in that region are fighting for independence, while 
the states which have already gained independence are striving to consolidate it. The old order and decadent systems 
dominant there for many years are being violently battered… the Soviet Union in its pursuit of world hegemony, is 
also taking pains to make inroads into this area of strategic importance.46  
 
The Caribbean and China readily identified on the basis of Third World solidarity and displayed a 
level of commitment to each other during the Cold War period. This contrasts with the discourse 
that often expresses China as aloof from developments in the Latin Caribbean region prior to the 
Post-Cold War period. Caribbean states policymakers and respective elites were also concerned 
with political developments in China. For instance, noted political activists like CRL James of 
Trinidad, was focused on the Chinese Revolution and its attempt to bring about reform through 
the rise of the proletariat in China.47  In a 1980 interview he said this of Maoist China, “I was 
always very sympathetic to the Cultural Revolution. Mao was trying to get the masses to play a 
greater role in state building.”48  Similar political sympathies based on Third World solidarity 
prompted a wider commitment to China by independent Caribbean states during the Cold War 
period. 
 
3.2 Caribbean states bilateral diplomacy with China 
The bilateral diplomatic engagements which is the subject of this section, illuminate how the 
values and ideas which underscored the Cold War era played a key role in Caribbean states policy-
making vis-à-vis China.  It is important to examine these bilateral diplomatic contacts as elite 
decision-making provide insights on how Caribbean states enacted a foreign policy towards China 
largely based on Third world solidarity during the Cold War period. Official visits often serve as 






classes of events” through which actors seek to inform narratives and shape rhetoric. These events 
can also be used to devise stratagems and implement plans in accordance with actors specific goals 
in the dynamic (Manheim, 1994: 61). 
 
In examining decision-making as part of a broader understanding of foreign policy behaviour, 
Hudson and Vore (1995: 214-215) opine that knowledge of key events and actors are pertinent to 
foreign policy analysis. When focusing on diplomacy from the vantage point of the leaders that 
facilitated the Caribbean and China dynamic, based on official records of their various interactions, 
it becomes evident that ideas of mutual solidarity as developing states were foremost in Caribbean 
states interactions with China. Connections were also forged on the basis of increasing south-south 
economic cooperation. Therefore, by the mid 1970’s and 1980’s, several high-level visits between 
the Caribbean and Chinese officials to reaffirm solidarity were undertaken. 
 
Despite the relative silence in the literature on Caribbean states relations with China, diplomatic 
contacts are further evidence of a more sustained Caribbean and China relationship which  has yet 
to be fully examined when accounting for China’s engagement in the Americas hemisphere during 
the Cold War era.  In detailing the bilateral interactions, it is revealed that even in the midst of the 
Cold war years, small Caribbean states tacitly supported China’s causes. This occurred during a 
period whereby hegemonic power rivalries meant that Caribbean states would have been subjected 
to intermittent external pressures to align specifically with the West. This would have been 
especially so, given their geostrategic position in relation to the US, the world’s hegemonic power.  
 
Caribbean states decision-making illustrate that such states readily identified with China on the 
basis of anti-colonial struggles in the Third World. These interactions shed light on Caribbean 
states ideological commitment to China notwithstanding the sharp divisions between East and 
West during the Cold War period.  Moreover, these initial bilateral diplomatic engagements 
between the Caribbean states and China (see table 3.1 and 3.2), all occurred prior to the United 
States recognising China as the legitimate government of China in 1979. 49  
 
The first Head of Government to visit China from the Anglophone Caribbean was Trinidad and 




Williams identified with developing states like China and was instrumental in anti-colonial 
movements in the Caribbean region himself (see Pierre; 2015, Palmer, 2006). During the visit, 
Williams met with Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou Enlai and China’s Vice Premier, Li Xiannian. 
The latter acknowledged the role of the Caribbean and Latin America in promoting various ideals 
of solidarity among developing states within the international order.50 The vice premier highlighted 
Third World solidarity as part of the commonalities between the two countries in his official speech 
and noted: “Since independence…., the Government of Trinidad and Tobago has pursued a policy 
of independence and non-alignment, supported the just struggles of Third World countries against 
imperialism and colonialism.”51 
 
In an effort to further strengthen ties, Trinidad and China undertook their first Economic and 
Technical Cooperation Agreement, to facilitate mutually beneficial relations between the two 
states.  Later in 1975, based on the new technical and economic agreement, three Trinidadian 
students undertook Linguistic Studies at China’s universities. 52  A reciprocal visit was undertaken 
by China to Trinidad. Thus China’s Vice-Minister of Fuel Chemical Industry, Tang Ke, led the 
first official delegation from China to Trinidad. Of interest during the visit was Trinidad’s 
experiences in oil technology.53 The Chinese visit did not escape US notice and was covered by 
US officials in a 1975 document entitled; Peking now seeking oil technology from the Third 
World.54  
 
Similar patterns of engagement whereby bilateral diplomacy emphasised the ideational aspects of 
the period while also taking into account practical economic concerns, were evident in other 
Caribbean states interactions with China. Guyana’s President Forbes Burnham undertook his first 
official trip to China in March 1975. Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhou Enlai 
reaffirmed the solidarity between the Caribbean and China.  
 
The bid to reaffirm solidarity as part of the Third World was also evident through much of the 
engagements undertaken between Jamaica and China. For instance, on September 23-29, 1976, 
 
50 In the 1970’s the Caribbean and Latin America were convening at the UN to extend legal dominion over surrounding maritime 
spaces and were calling for control over its economic and seabed resources to counter hegemony in the region. This later came to 






Jamaica’s Deputy Prime Minister, David Coore, led Jamaica’s first official delegation to China. 
The two countries utilised the occasion to conclude trade agreements including a commodity loan 
agreement and a protocol on polyester cotton mill with Chinese assistance.55  China also dispatched 
a high-level delegation to Jamaica headed by Vice Premier, Geng Biao of the State Council in 
1978.  The vice premier held talks with Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley on the 
international situation as it related to the Third World’s relations with hegemonic powers like the 
US.56   
 
Evidence of sustained relations between the Caribbean and China carried well into the 1980’s with 
several bilateral visits between the region and China as seen in tables 3.1 and 3.2.  Such visits 
contrast sharply with more readily available assumptions that Caribbean states engagement with 
China is more of a Post-Cold War phenomena. For instance, Guyana’s president, Forbes Burnham 
returned to China in June 1984 and met with Chairman Deng Xiaoping. During the second visit, 
the two sides signed various agreements encompassing economic and cultural cooperation.57  
 
The facilitation of closer bilateral ties between Caribbean and Chinese elite decision-makers was 
also evident in the case of Barbados. Barbados’s then Prime Minister, John Adams, paid an official 
visit to China on June 11-18th, 1980 and met with Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping.58 Adams 
highlighted the significance of Chinese foreign policy to the Third World and its cognizance to the 
Caribbean region and noted in his official address to China’s State Council; “The relations of 
Barbados and other Caribbean countries with China are different. China has never interfered in 
any way in the internal affairs of Barbados and other countries, and never has it disrupted peace of 
Barbados and the Caribbean region.” 59 
 
These bilateral engagements symbolized an opportunity for acting on the shared ideals of 
developing states in the international system. Thus increased cooperation in areas of mutual 
interests signaled their commitment to facilitating ties among like-minded states. It may be noted 
that Caribbean leaders given the traditional historical ties with China and based on their individual 
 
55 China’s Embassy, Kingston, Jamaica 
56 China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bilateral Cooperation with Jamaica, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ 
57 http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/guyana-review/06/24/diplomacy-china%E2%80%99s-asymetric-diplomacy/ 
58 China’s Embassy, Barbados 
59 Ibid 
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persuasions as well as the systemic influences at play during the Cold War, utilised diplomacy 
during the Cold War era, to forge relations with China.  
 
The foreign policy decision-makers of the Caribbean region determined that Third World 
solidarity framed by a commitment to equality, sovereignty and non-interference by western 
powers in the affairs of Third World states, were worthwhile goals to be pursued at the height of 
the Cold War period. Thus, the ideological themes and persuasions that defined the Cold War era, 
made it possible for Caribbean leaders to decide the direction of their country’s foreign policy 
relations vis-à-vis China. China for its part, maintained a commitment to the Caribbean region 
even during that period, although this has been insufficiently explored in the literature.  
 
Table 3.0: English -Speaking Caribbean States Diplomatic Relations with China in the Cold War Period 
 
Country Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations with China  
Year China’s Embassy opened 
in the Caribbean  
Guyana June 27, 1972 1972 
Jamaica November 21, 1972 1973 
Trinidad June 20, 1974 1975 
Barbados May 30, 1977 1979 
 Source: compiled by author  
 
 
Table 3.1:  Selected Caribbean Heads of Government visits to China (1974-1989)  
 
1970’s TRINIDAD Prime Minister Eric Williams, Chairman Mao 
Zedong 
November 6th, 1974 
  Prime Minister Eric William, Chairman Mao 
Zedong Premier Zhou Enlai  
 January 31st- February 6th 
1975 
 
 GUYANA President Forbes Burnham Deng Xiaoping 
and Premier Zhou Enlai 
March 1975 
 JAMAICA Deputy Prime Minister David Coore, 
Premier Hua Guofeng 
September 23-29th, 1976 
1980’s BARBADOS Prime Minister Hon. JMG Adams, Chinese 
Vice Premier of the State Council, Deng 
Xiaoping 
June 11th-18th, 1980 
 Guyana Prime Minster Forbes Burnham President Li 
Xiannian, Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang,  
 
June 11th, 1984 
 TRINIDAD Prime Minister George Chambers met with 
Chairman Deng Xiaoping  
July 13- 15, 1985 
Source: compiled by author; China’s Caribbean Embassies 
 
Table 3.2: Selected Chinese High Level Government Official Visits to Caribbean (1974-1989) 
 
1970’s TRINIDAD Vice Minister of Fuel Chemical 
Industry Tang Ke, PM Eric Williams 
January 10-17, 1975, 
  Vice Premier Geng Biao, Prime 
Minister Eric William  
 July 12- 16, 1978, 
 
 JAMAICA Deputy Prime Minister David 
Coore, Premier Hua Guofeng 
September 23- 29, 1976 
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1980’s BARBADOS Vice Chairman Ngapoi Ngawang 
Jigme; National People's Congress 
(NPC), PM Adams 
March 1981, 
  Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen, 
PM Sandiford 
October 1987 
 TRINIDAD Vice Chairman Ngapoi Ngawang 
Jigme, NPC, PM Williams  
March 4-9, 1981 
  Vice Foreign Minister Zhu Qizhen July 3-5, 1986 
 JAMAICA  Vice Minister of Foreign Trade, Lu 
Xuejian  
May 24th-28th, 1986 
Source: compiled by author; China’s Caribbean embassies 
	
4. Caribbean states diplomacy with China Post-Cold War: rising economic pragmatism 
(1990-2007) 
	
In the previous section, a discussion based on Caribbean states diplomacy with China in the Cold 
War period was undertaken. The findings contrasted with the literature on China Latin America 
Caribbean relations more broadly. In effect, it demonstrated a deeper multilateral and bilateral 
relationship that has remained under-explored in the literature on China’s rise in the Latin America 
Caribbean region during the Cold War period. This section now turns to the Post-Cold War phase 
of Caribbean states diplomatic engagement with China. This phase has been distinctly driven by 
economic concerns and is in sharp contrast to the more ideological phase of the Cold War period. 
Caribbean states sought to align economic considerations with foreign policy decision-making. 
Thus, resulting in a more pragmatic approach to relations with China in the Post-Cold War period 
under survey. 
 
In an effort to illuminate how and why diplomacy became largely steeped in economic 
considerations, this subsection first examines the broader economic processes that influenced 
policymaking between Caribbean states and China in the Post-Cold War period.  As already 
examined in chapter 2, when discussing China’s role in the Caribbean, China’s economic 
emergence in the international system enabled a “going out policy” to the developing world 
including the Caribbean region.  
 
Coinciding with China’s rise were key structural economic constraints which influenced Caribbean 
states policymaking vis-à-vis China. Among these were inter alia a decline in aid from traditional 
partners like the US and loss of preferential markets for Caribbean states agricultural trade on 
the EU market in the Post-Cold War period (1990-2007). Such economic conditions created an 
environment conducive to the expansion of ties between the Caribbean region and China. Given 
the economic circumstances which motivated Caribbean states decision-making towards China, it 
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is important to conceptualise Caribbean states policymaking regarding China beyond the more 
familiar notions of “dollar diplomacy” often attributed to small states diplomatic engagement with 
China. 
 
The roles of decision-makers are essential to understanding the economically pragmatic turn in 
Caribbean states diplomacy with China in the Post-Cold War era. Policymakers in the Caribbean 
and China convened to articulate a framework of cooperation with China through various 
multilateral and bilateral fora to determine terms of engagement between the two sides.  
 
Moreover, China utilised its economic rise to facilitate a more active foreign policy in relation to 
its political interests. Thus, a fundamental foreign policy goal for China has been diplomatic 
recognition through the “one China policy” in relation to Taiwan.60 China has long enunciated its 
foreign policy through the “Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,” which seeks to protect inter 
alia, its sovereignty.61  On the Taiwan question, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
acknowledges, “Taiwan is a sacred and inseparable part of China's territory...…the Communist 
Party of China and the Chinese government take the completion of the grand cause of China's 
peaceful reunification as their historical mission.”62 China’s ascent and its perceived ability to 
influence the development trajectory within developing states, enabled China to pursue its political 
interests in the Caribbean. For the latter, China also became a viable economic partner in the Post-
Cold War period.   
 
4.1 Structural economic constraints versus dollar diplomacy   
 
The major structural economic conditions impacting Caribbean states in the 1990’s, made 
Caribbean states amenable to deepening existing relations with China or facilitating China’s 
foreign policy aims through the establishment of new diplomatic ties. Thus, while small states 
engagement with China, has at times been characterized as “cheque-book diplomacy”, this can 
give rise to an inadequate portrayal of such states engagement with China. For instance, Erikson 
(2009:6) dismissed the China versus Taiwan issue in the Caribbean as one of “economic 
 
60 States who enter diplomatic relations with China have to forgo diplomatic ties with Taiwan on the basis of “One China” 
principle. 
61 These are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. 
62 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18027.shtml 
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opportunism”. Taylor (2002:134) also viewed African states relations with China within a similar 
prism. Pacific Islands relations with China have also been subjected to similar views (Hanson; 
2008: 8).  However, concentrating simply on economic inducements in Caribbean states diplomacy 
with China, overlooks Caribbean states heightened economic vulnerability to various economic 
constraints. It was against a backdrop of complex economic conditions that Anglophone Caribbean 
states embarked on diplomacy with China in the Post-Cold War period.  
	
Firstly, in the aftermath of the Cold war period, Caribbean states faced dwindling economic aid 
and technical assistance like many states in the developing world that had sought to facilitate 
economic interests within the bipolar structure of the Cold War era. After the collapse of the 
bipolar international order, by 1991, Caribbean states such as Cuba lost at least US$ 2.3 billion in 
annual economic assistance in accordance with IMF estimates.63  Soviet assistance had amounted 
to about 15% of Cuba’s GDP by 1990. 64 This resulted in a substantial economic loss for Cuba.65   
 
Soon after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, in 1991, the Cuban Government dispatched a 
delegation to China to meet with Chinese leader, Jiang Zemin, to discuss the economic and 
political situation in Cuba. According to Mesa-lago (1993: 199), Cuba and China then signed a 
five - year trade agreement for US$500 million on an annual basis. In line with China’s reinforced 
economic commitment to the Caribbean region, in 1993, Jiang Zemin embarked on his first visit 
to the Caribbean region and met with Cuban leader, Fidel Castro. Such high level bilateral 
diplomacy was economically significant but also highly symbolic. It marked the first visit of a 
Chinese President to Cuba and showed a strengthened commitment by China to old diplomatic 
allies in the Caribbean region. 
 
The Anglophone Caribbean was also facing a situation of declining aid and technical assistance 
from the United States. By the 1990’s, US aid and technical assistance to the Latin America 
Caribbean region declined by almost half the amount it was in the 1980’s. According to figures 
from the US Agency for International Development, annual average foreign assistance to the 




64  https://www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/the-cuban-economic-crisis-of-the-1990s-and-the-external-sector/ 
65 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/comandante-cold-war/ 
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billion across the region.66 Such substantial cuts in foreign assistance impacted on the economies 
of many Caribbean states. According to Richard Bernal (2015: 197) the Caribbean was targeted 
for significant reductions in aid by the US Congress through-out the 1990’s as United States 
foreign policy shifted towards rebuilding Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the decline in US economic assistance coincided with 
the reinforcement of ties between the English - speaking Caribbean and China. Thus, in February 
1990, China dispatched an official delegation to Barbados headed by China’s Vice Foreign 
Minister, Liu Huaqiu, to discuss the international economic and political situation. In an effort to 
provide financial assistance to Barbados, the two countries signed an agreement on providing 
gratuitous assistance. Later in May 1990, Barbados’s Prime Minister, Erskine Sandiford headed a 
delegation to China. Sandiford met with Jiang Zemin. In order to further financial cooperation, an 
agreement on Economic and Technological Cooperation was signed. Moreover, the first Prime 
Ministerial visit to China by Jamaica was undertaken in 1991. In June 1991, Jamaica’s Prime 
Minister Michael Manley met with Jiang Zemin. The subject of the talks was the international 
economic situation.  Jamaica and China signed three cooperation agreements.67  
 
Secondly, the decline in aid was further exacerbated by the continuing impacts of structural 
adjustment programmes promoted by international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
World Bank in respective English- speaking Caribbean states. Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and 
Jamaica all faced adjustment programmes during that period. In line with Washington Consensus 
policies, liberalisation of various economic sectors were promoted. There was a move to decrease 
state owned enterprises in the resource states of Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana.   
 
The tightening of fiscal policies, including tax reform and cutback to public sector spending, were 
also part of structural adjustment policies undertaken in the various Caribbean states mentioned.  
These policies were promoted by these IFI’s to engender changes in the domestic economies of 
states to promote efficiencies and economic growth in line with more capitalist liberal principles.  
 
 
66 US foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2006, p.13 
67One was an economic cooperation agreement, another was a loans agreement and the third one was a cultural and technical 
cooperation agreement.		
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However, while promising on the surface, Washington Consensus policies meant that Caribbean 
states had to put in place economic policies that were largely externally driven. Doing so meant a 
period of adjustment by Caribbean economies which left many struggling to adjust to the tighter 
fiscal policies promoted by the IMF. For instance, as shown by Downes (1994: 71) in 1991, lending 
by Barbados from international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank meant the 
imposition of an 8% wage cut across the public sector which inevitably squeezed private spending 
for specific sectors of the work force. Structural adjustment policies in Jamaica had a negative 
impact on the poor, according to Potter et al (2015: 216).  Tax regimes were also being overhauled 
in various English speaking Caribbean states for greater revenue collection. Between 1992- 1997, 
Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Guyana had to revamp their tax systems in order to increase 
collection of revenue across various sectors (see Hilaire, 2000). The increased tax burdens 
impacted on the buying power of households across those states in the English - speaking 
Caribbean region.  
	
Thirdly, the impact of the WTO’s ruling on removal of preferential treatment by the EU on 
bananas, the main agricultural crop in the smaller Anglophone Caribbean states such as Dominica, 
Saint Lucia and Grenada, also impacted negatively on Caribbean states economies. These states 
faced tremendous financial difficulties in relation to the challenge posed by the WTO’s ruling on 
the EU’s preferential regime for Caribbean bananas. The case was brought to the WTO by Latin 
American producers and backed by the United States.68  The ruling against the EU’s preferential 
regime for bananas from the Caribbean in 1997, meant that revenues from the crop not only 
declined considerably but also impacted on the GDP of those states. Saint Lucia faced a 
deteriorating economic situation due to a loss of trade preferences through-out that period. 
According to Josling and Taylor (2003: 129) in Saint Lucia, banana exports to the EU worth US $ 
73.9 million in 1990, dwindled to 32.2 million by 1999. This was less than half the figure for 1990, 
two years after the WTO ruling. In the 1990’s, GDP growth declined to an average 3.01 per cent 
in relation to Saint Lucia. Countries like The Bahamas was also experiencing negative growth, and 
per capita GDP growth was -0.20 in that period.69   
 
68 US multinationals were operating in the banana industry in Latin America. It was increasingly clear as the 1990’s unfolded that 
the EU was unable to guarantee preferential treatment for the crop at the expense of their own economic interests vis-à-vis the 
United States. This had a huge impact on the economies of respective Caribbean states. 
69 Quoted in Caribbean Center for Money and Finance, February 2012 
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4.2 Caribbean states policymakers reinforce ties with China amidst economic constraints 
Acting within the context of substantial economic changes at the international level, Caribbean 
states reassessed their foreign policy relations with China and sought to accommodate China’s 
ascent in the global sphere in their policymaking. Some sought to either reconfigure their long-
established ties with China along highly commercial lines, while for some others, officials became 
more amenable to facilitating diplomatic relations. In tandem with structural economic constraints, 
high level visits between Caribbean states and China were particularly intense through-out the 
1990’s.  
 
The high level diplomatic engagements were often predicated on an increase in aid, investments 
and technical assistance from China to facilitate economic interests. Annual visits between high 
level Chinese state officials and Jamaica were undertaken through-out 1990-1999, except in 
1997.70  In the case of Barbados, through-out the 1990’s, more than twelve official engagements 
occurred between Barbados and China for the period 1990-1999.71 Trinidad’s diplomatic 
engagement with China was also quite active, resulting in at least seven high level official visits 
between Trinidad and China for the same period.72  
 
Concomitantly in the 1990’s, Caribbean states such as Saint Lucia and the Bahamas were 
undergoing their own foreign policy shifts.  These states had yet to recognise China and had 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Both states convened closely with Chinese officials to discuss 
the pursuit of diplomatic relations based on mutual interests. In 1995, Bahamian Foreign Minister 
Janet Bostwick met with China’s Vice- Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in Beijing.73 Bilateral 
processes are often a means of highlighting matters of mutual interests to the parties concerned. 
As such, the question of the recognition of the PRC by the Bahamas would have likely been 
implied in the talks between the parties.  
 
 In 1995, Saint Lucia was also engaging closely with Chinese officials in the United Nations 
through Ambassador George Odlum who sought to further interests between Saint Lucia and 
 
70 China’s Embassy, Jamaica, Official visits to Jamaica.	
71China’s Embassy Barbados, Official Visits of China to Barbados.  
72 China sent a delegation to Trinidad in February 1990 headed by China’s Vice Foreign Minister, Liu Huaqiu. The latter held 
talks Prime Minister Arthur Robinson on the international economic and political situation.  This was followed by a 1992 visit by 
China’s Secretary General of the State Council, Luo Gan, to Trinidad (China’s Embassy, Trinidad). 
73 http://bs.china-embassy.org/eng/sbgx/t268059.htm 
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China.  The formal diplomatic recognition China would come two years later, when Odlum 
became Foreign Minister under the Kenny Anthony administration in 1997. Upon the 
establishment of diplomatic ties, Odlum noted that the occasion underscored the need for St. Lucia 
to observe its own sovereignty in order to promote development goals.74 Saint Lucia received 
millions in aid assistance from China after brokering a closer relationship with Beijing up to 
2006.75 The Bahamas and the PRC also formally established diplomatic relations in 1997. 
Bahamian Prime Minister, Hubert Ingrahm, made an official visit to China soon after, and 
undertook an agreement with China on the provision of aid gratis.76  
 
By the millennium, economic constraints also facilitated the turn to a rising China. Dominica, 
another Anglophone Caribbean state, faced with stagnating economic growth, saw China as an 
increasingly reliable economic partner in the pursuit of its national economic interests. Thus, its 
foreign policy shifted towards embracing China instead of Taiwan. 
 
 In establishing relations with China and severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan, Dominica’s Prime 
Minister, Roosevelt Skerrit, highlighted China’s emergence in international affairs as prompting a 
broader consideration of the country’s foreign policy.  In an address to the nation on March 29th, 
2004, Skerrit declared, “My government became convinced that it was necessary in light of 
changes in world conditions to begin to overhaul our foreign policy as a matter of urgency.”77  
Prime Minister Skerrit further noted; “We reassessed the and re-evaluated our foreign policy and 
felt that it was in Dominica's domestic interest that we establish relationship with the People's 
Republic of China ...We could not continue ignoring the existence of China.”78  The Skerrit 
Government received US$100 million in grant aid in over six years from China. The funds were 
geared towards infrastructure investments in Dominica.79 In line with the strategic foreign policy 
shift, Dominica’s leader acknowledged that resolving the Taiwan or China issue would likely 
involve long term considerations that would need to be addressed by the territory of Taiwan and 
China and that national priorities dictated the decision to recognise the “one-China policy.”  
 
74 http://archive.stlucia.gov.lc/pr1997/saint_lucia_establishes_diplomatic_relations_with_china.htm 
75 Relations with China was broken when in 2006 when the Anthony Administration lost the general election in 2006. Relations 






The pragmatic economic decision in diplomacy did not only occur in Dominica but also with 
regards to Grenada. The impacts of economic constraints meant an economic turn to China in the 
case of the latter. In December 2004, Grenada’s Prime Minister, Keith Mitchel, embarked on a 
visit to China to seek financial relief in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan. The financial cost of 
rebuilding Grenada after the disaster was estimated at nearly US $1 billion, according to World 
Bank estimates.80   
 
Later, on January 20th, 2005, Grenadian Foreign Minister, Elvin Nimrod, met with China’s Foreign 
Minister, Li Zhaoxing, in Beijing where they signed a joint Communiqué on the resumption of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. 81  The occasion was used to reaffirm China’s own 
foreign policy in the external realm while also enhancing increased economic cooperation. 
Therefore, China’s Foreign Minister acknowledged that, “The normalization of relations between 
China and Grenada is in the basic and long-term interest of the two peoples and once again shows 
to the world that the one-China principle is widely recognized by the international community.”82 
After the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, various infrastructure investments were 
undertaken in Grenada by China. A grant of US$ 6 million was provided to assist with building 
2000 housing units in Grenada.  A cricket stadium costing US$ 40 million was also built by 
China.83   
 
With the deepening of relations between the Anglophone Caribbean and China, the two sides 
convened the first China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Jamaica in 
February 2005. The overall aim of the forum was to act as an initial catalyst for deepening 
economic cooperation between the Caribbean and China. The forum aided tremendously in 
expanding China’s commercial activities in the Caribbean. It preceded an increased level of 
concessional lending and trade (see chapters 4 and 5). The high-level forum was attended by 
officials of Anglophone Caribbean states with diplomatic relations with China. Officials from 
Cuba also attended (see table 3.3). The host of the inaugural forum, Prime Minister, P. J Patterson 






83 Great Britain House of Commons Report Vol. II, East Asia, 2005-2006 
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increasing number of Caribbean countries had become committed to the ‘One China Policy’84 and 
were active participants in mutually beneficial cooperation programmes with China. 85  
 
In light of the issues just discussed, overly concentrating on the quid pro quo basis for diplomatic 
recognition of either Taiwan or China, obscures how economic conditions prompted a broader 
shift in Caribbean states foreign policy regarding China.  The significance of a rising China to 
decision-makers in the Caribbean coincided with a period of much economic uncertainty at the 
domestic and international level for Caribbean states. Doing so also overlooks China’s own 
emphasis on expanding its economic role in the Caribbean region as part of the developing world.  
 
Caribbean states and China gave new impetus to their relations through diplomatic engagements 
through-out the initial phase of the Post-Cold War era. For China, the Caribbean region represented 
a means of expanding its economic influence in the developing world through strengthening 
economic relations with old diplomatic allies in the Cold War period and intensifying its 
diplomatic outreach to other states within the Caribbean region. For the region, China was fast 
becoming a global economic player that the region could not afford to overlook.  
 
In accounting for the economic constraints which coincided with the turn to China, a more 
generalised portrayal of Caribbean states diplomacy may be put forward. Therefore, it is important 
to go beyond the more narrowly based conceptions of “dollar diplomacy,” often attributed to small 
states in relations with China, notwithstanding the possible financial inducements attached to the 
“China versus Taiwan” diplomatic tussle. 
 
Table 3.3: List of Delegates First China Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum, 2005  
Country High Level Official 
Antigua Prime Minister; Baldwin Spencer 
Dominica Prime Minister; Roosevelt Skerrit 
Jamaica Prime Minister; Percival James Patterson 
Cuba Vice President; Carlos Lage Davila 
Bahamas Minister of Trade and Industry; Leslie O. Miller  
Barbados Minister of Industry and International Business; Dale D. 
Marshall  
Grenada Minister for Foreign Affairs; Elvin Nimrod  
Saint Lucia Minister for External Affairs; Petrus Compton 
Guyana Advisor to the President; Manniram Prashad  
China Vice President; Zeng Qinghong 
Source: author compilation; China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, News Release 2005 
 
 
84 In 2005, China had consolidated diplomatic relations with eleven (11) Caribbean countries out of fifteen (15).  
85 http://jis.gov.jm/pm-opens-china-caribbean-trade-forum/	
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 5. The Anglophone Caribbean and China’s new strategic economic diplomacy (2008-2016) 
 
Having attempted show that Caribbean region’s diplomatic engagement with China in the early 
Post-Cold War phase, was influenced in a large part by economic constraints and the concomitant 
rise of China in the global economic order, this section now turns to the second phase of what has 
been conceptualised as a “new strategic economic diplomacy” between Caribbean states and 
China.  
 
As already acknowledged, Chinese elites like Xi Jinping has played a key role in this phase of 
relations by forging a more visible and strategic approach to China’s high level diplomacy in the 
Anglophone Caribbean region. Xi’s decision-making has been indicative of a more obvious 
expansion of Chinese foreign policy interests in the developing states of the Americas hemisphere.   
The role of decision-makers in influencing foreign policy have long been given salience in FPA.  
As Snyder et al (2003: 59) argues “to focus on individual actors who are state decision-
makers…requires of course that a central place be given to the analysis of the behaviour of these 
officials.”  
 
 Evident under Xi Jinping’s stewardship, were four significant foreign policy developments which 
marked the beginning of new strategic economic diplomacy in the Caribbean and China 
relationship from 2008 to 2016. Firstly, China released its initial foreign policy paper on Latin 
America and the Caribbean in November 2008. This led to Xi Jinping’s first visit to the 
Anglophone Caribbean as China’s Vice President to discuss the new foreign policy approach by 
China towards the region. Secondly, soon after Xi assumed China’s Presidency in March 2013, he 
undertook the first official visit by a Chinese president to the Commonwealth Caribbean in June 
2013. Thirdly, under Xi’s leadership, the Caribbean and China expanded diplomatic engagement 
through a multilateral three- pronged strategy encompassing the Caribbean, Latin America and 
China. This resulted in the inaugural China - CELAC forum in 2015. Fourthly, in 2016, China 
unveiled its second policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. This coincided with the first 
China and Latin America Caribbean Cultural year in 2016.  These various foreign policy decisions 
promoted a new blue print for China’s relations with the Caribbean region under Xi Jinping. This 
section then pays particular attention to Xi’s role in diplomacy in relation to the English- speaking 
Caribbean region.   
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Nonetheless, while officials may formulate policies to express preferences and interests in ongoing 
interactions, how such policies are implemented on the ground by a disparate set of actors may not 
necessarily lead to an effective dispersion of ideals in practice. As will be seen in chapter 7, 
responses to Chinese economic engagement suggest concerns pertaining to particular economic 
practices by Chinese SOE’s.  China’s government policies pertaining to the use of Chinese labour 
in investments in the region have also elicited unfavourable responses in the engagement despite 
the deepening ties.  
 
Moreover, China’s broadening engagement with the region is also occurring within the context of 
traditional US economic dominance in the region as will be seen in chapter 6. Notwithstanding 
such issues, it is still useful to examine Xi’s decision-making in the region as the policies 
articulated under his tenure, do at least, act as a barometer to gauge how the parties wish for 
relations to move forward.  
 
5.1 China’s Policymaking: Xi Jinping’s Diplomatic Pivot to the Anglophone Caribbean  
 
In examining the trajectory of diplomatic engagement with the Anglophone Caribbean under Xi, 
it becomes evident that a new phase of strategic economic diplomacy initially formalised through 
the First LAC paper in 2008, was unfolding with a focus on the Caribbean. While China’s 
diplomacy has long been directed at the developing world, with a view to increasing China’s global 
stature, the landmark policy saw the entrance of a more visible foreign policy by China towards 
the Caribbean and Latin American region. Ardy and Boon (2017:116) argue that under Xi, 
“Chinese strategic narratives and policy actions draw certain categorical distinctions among states 
(with certain states considered as strategic).” 
 
The timing of the diplomatic move by China was seen by some to be significant.  The Council of 
Hemispheric Affairs, an American think tank, posited that such a diplomatic initiative served as a 
signal that Chinese engagement was entrenched in the traditional sphere of US influence and that 
China’s saw the region as critical to its long term strategic interests.86 Jiang (2008:1) characterised 
this development as part of creating renewed momentum in the relationship between the Latin 




Shortly after the release of China’s first policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, in 
February 2009, then Vice President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials, embarked on a tour of 
the Caribbean (see table 3.4). The aim was to share China’s foreign policy aspirations among 
Heads of Government in the region. For instance, during Xi’s visit to Jamaica, his meeting with 
Jamaica’s former Prime Minister, Golding, underscored that China’s foreign policy paper was the 
“new blue print for the development of relations emphasized by Hu Jintao for the Caribbean and 
broader Latin American region. ”87  China’s economic interests in the region was also of foremost 
consideration. During the 2009 visit, Xi, broke ground on a multi-million-dollar infrastructure 
investment project in Jamaica which included the building of Jamaica’s Montego Bay Convention 
Center.88  The new engagement signified the growing significance of the Caribbean in China’s 
new strategic economic diplomacy.  
 






Jamaica Prime Minister 
Bruce Golding 
Vice President Xi 
Jinping 
February 12th, 2009 Kingston 
Barbados Prime Minister 
David Thompson 





Bahamas Prime Minister 
Hubert Ingraham 
Vice Premier Hui 
Liangyu 
February 17th, 2009 Nassau 
Source: compiled by author based on Caribbean government reports 
 
Moreover, these foreign policy decisions by China illustrate that engagement was not just merely 
symbolic but grounded in pragmatic economic concerns.  The increasing commercial relationship 
between the Caribbean region and China highlighted the need for China to further deepen its 
engagement with the region. In 2008, bilateral trade between China and the Latin America 
Caribbean region was already well over $120 billion. China’s stock of direct investment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean had reached $25 billion by the end of 2007, accounting for 21% of 
China’s total FDI abroad (Jiang 2008:1). As seen in chapter 2 (subsection 4.2), the region is 
significant in terms of China’s global financial flows. As such, there are practical economic 
reasons for reaffirming China’s foreign policy in the Anglophone Caribbean. Thus, China’s 







5.1.1 Re-engaging the Anglophone Caribbean under Xi Jinping’s Presidency 
 
After Xi’s transition to China’s presidency, Xi was able to signal the presence of the Caribbean in 
Chinese foreign policy both domestically and externally. While Xi has increasingly been recognised 
as overseeing a more assertive foreign policy by China, how this assertiveness has translated into 
seeking a more entrenched economic and political foothold in the Latin America and Caribbean 
region has been less examined.  Lam (2015: 192) acknowledges that under Xi, China has had a 
more outward foreign policy.  Similar sentiments pertaining to increased assertiveness in China’s 
orientation towards the outside world under Xi has also been echoed by Tsang and Men (2016:7).  
 
In marking a visible turn to the Caribbean region, Xi made the Anglophone Caribbean region a 
priority in China’s diplomacy abroad and embarked on an official visit to Trinidad in 2013. During 
Xi’s inaugural visit as President, he met with seven Heads of Government from the Caribbean 
region as well as representatives from Cuba as seen in table 3.5.  
 
Table 3.5: Caribbean Heads of Government Meeting with China President Xi Jinping in Trinidad, 2013  
 
COUNTRY HEAD OF GOVERNMENT 
Trinidad Prime Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar 
Guyana President Donald Ramotar 
Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Baldwin Spencer 
Jamaica Prime Minister Portia Simpson 
Grenada Prime Minister Keith Mitchell 
Dominica Prime Minister Roosevelt Skerrit 
Bahamas Prime Minister Perry Christie 
Source:  compiled by author  
 
Xi utilised the occasion to highlight the role that the Anglophone Caribbean played in China’s 
recognition at the United Nations. Xi acknowledged, “The Chinese people will never forget that 
Trinidad and Tobago cast its vote in favour of restoring the lawful seat of the People's Republic of 
China in the United Nations in 1971.”89 Very significantly, the visit also illustrated China’s 
growing economic role in the Caribbean.  Consequently, Xi committed to providing Caribbean 
states with more than US $3 billion in loans.90 The majority of the loans were focused on 
infrastructure investments across various economic sectors within the Anglophone Caribbean.  
The significance of Xi’s visit to the English-speaking Caribbean region was also seen by observers 





rhetoric that China’s status had risen in the Americas hemisphere. Straus (2009: 777) sees rhetoric 
as a significant part of Chinese foreign policy.  Rhetoric can be used as a tool for framing its 
ascendance to a domestic audience while also conveying its interests in the external realm.  
 
Thus, at the home front, Xi’s expanded diplomacy within the Caribbean was seen as a means of 
further signaling China’s elevated status in the Latin America and the Caribbean region. Xinhua 
News Agency noted that Xi had ushered in a new chapter in the relationship.91 China’s Daily 
declared that China’s relationship with the Caribbean under Xi would result in a profound impact 
on the China and Caribbean relationship in the long run.”92  Others viewed Xi’s interests in line 
with strategic commercial aims.  The SCMP pointed out, “Beijing likely views the Caribbean as 
strategically important by virtue of its proximity to the US and major maritime trade routes such 
as the Panama Canal.” 93 The region’s ports were also seen to be of interests. 
 
The new strategic economic diplomacy has not been lost on US government policy makers and 
pundits. Notwithstanding the economic significance of the Chinese engagement in the Caribbean, 
the strategic position of the region invariably gives rise to geopolitical considerations, a point 
already examined in chapter 2. Occurring almost in tandem with Xi’s official visit, was US Vice 
President Joe Biden’s visit to Trinidad. Biden was dispatched by the Obama Administration to 
meet with Caribbean leaders in Trinidad. In his address  to Caribbean Heads of Government, he 
acknowledged, “I'm here because President Obama wanted me to have an opportunity to dialogue 
with all of you and because our country is deeply invested and wants to become more deeply 
invested in a partnership with all the nations of the Caribbean.”94 In covering the visit, US media, 
Bloomberg news, acknowledged that the US Vice President, Joe Biden, underscored the 
competition for influence in the Latin America Caribbean region by the world’s two biggest 
economies.95 The US Center for Strategic Studies, captioned the visit as: Why does it matter? and 












However, even with geopolitics considered, underlying economic considerations as a broader part 
of China’s new strategic diplomacy in the Caribbean is not to be discounted. While the Caribbean 
region is small in terms of population, there are economic opportunities for China’s state owned 
enterprises as well as its lending institutions.  The region is also a market for China. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, China is a significant lender to Caribbean states for infrastructure 
investments. Therefore, the Caribbean is part of China’s broader economic thrust in terms of 
expansion of capital investments in the developing world. As will be examined in Chapter 5, 
Chinese companies have invested at the very least, hundreds of millions of dollars in the resource 
sector in Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana.  Thus, there is a commercial rationale behind Chinese 
engagement in the developing world as explained by Breslin (2012). China’s SOE’s are very much 
driven by profit motives and consequently, China’s increasing engagement with the Anglophone 
Caribbean is very much tied to economic interests. 
 
Moreover, China’s new strategic economic diplomacy under Xi has also been facilitated by 
Caribbean leaders decision-making. For Caribbean states, China is considered an important part 
of their diverging foreign policy interests in the external realm.  Economic cooperation with China 
is seen as a means of reinforcing ties with emerging actors in the international system. This is not 
to counterbalance the influence of traditional actors. Rather, the intent is to increase economic 
maneuvering space to further economic interests, much like any other state in the international 
system. As such, the leadership within the Caribbean region has increasingly sought to engage 
with China on strengthening economic ties (see table 3.6).  
 
 Inevitably, policymaking by state decision-makers in the Caribbean has led to China playing a 
broader role in the Caribbean region. For instance, soon after Xi’s visit to the Caribbean, in August 
2013, Jamaica’s Prime Minister met with Xi Jinping in Beijing.  A key aspect of the bilateral 
engagement was the promotion of Jamaica’s economic interests with China.97 Trinidad Prime 
Minister Kamla Persad-Bissessar also met with Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2014.  The focus of the 




investments for Trinidad was provided. 98  During these bilateral engagements, Xi indicated that 
relations between the Caribbean and China would be taken to a new stage. 99  
	
Table 3.6: Selected diplomatic engagement with Caribbean Heads of Government and China’s 2008-2016  
 
Caribbean Country Head of Government Chinese President Date Place 
Jamaica  Prime Minister Portia 
Simpson Miller 
Xi Jinping August 22, 2013 Beijing 
Trinidad Prime Minister 
Kamla Persad-
Bissessar 
Xi Jinping February 26, 2014 Beijing 
Bahamas  Prime Minister Perry 
Christie 
Xi Jinping January 7th, 2015 Beijing 
Antigua  Prime Minister 
Gaston Browne 
Xi Jinping  August 27th, 2014 Brasilia 
	
Further, Caribbean states relations with China under Xi, has been marked by continued levels of 
public diplomacy involving “people to people” exchanges. Such increased interactions involve the 
strengthening of socio-economic and cultural ties between the region and China. This can be seen 
in various education initiatives. For instance, during Xi’s visit to the Caribbean in 2013, Xi 
indicated that China would provide scholarships for 1,000 students from the Caribbean region.100  
As at 2016, there were at least 150 Bahamian students studying in China.101  
 
Various Confucius institutes in the Caribbean have also been established to facilitate educational 
exchanges. Since 2009, there has been increased financial assistance for the creation of Confucius 
Institutes in various Anglophone Caribbean states. The countries which host these institutes are 
Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana.  
 
During Xi’ s first diplomatic engagement with Jamaica in 2009, as Vice President, Xi attended the 
opening ceremony of the first Confucius Institute in Jamaica.102 While in Trinidad, Xi also signed 
an agreement for the first Confucius Institute. In May 2014, Guyana opened its first Confucius 
Institute dedicated to Chinese language learning and culture. 103 This was followed by an opening 
of Confucius Institute in Barbados in July 2014. According to China’s Ambassador to Barbados, 
Wang Ke, such institutes serve as a means of fostering cultural and educational exchanges between 










These educational exchanges have been an important part of forging closer links between the two 
sides through increased public exchanges.  Such exchanges are often designed to promote China’s 
influence globally and can positively impact Caribbean states perceptions of China and its role in 
the world. Thereby promoting China’s soft power in the region. Short terms training programmes 
that expose Caribbean nationals to Chinese culture and influence has also been integrated into 
“people to people diplomacy.” For instance, between 2012-2016, the total number of Chinese 
sponsored short-term training seminars offered to Dominica was 545.105  
 
5.1.2 President Xi Jinping: Broadening Caribbean and China Diplomacy to Latin America  
 
Under Xi Jinping’s stewardship, there has been a broader diplomatic initiative to expand the 
Caribbean and China relationship to encompass the broader Latin American region within a 
framework of intensified multilateral diplomacy. This three-pronged approach serves to further 
solidify China’s ties with the developing states in the Americas hemisphere.   
 
To aid its diplomatic foray into the broader region, China tagged on to regional organisations such 
as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) to further cooperation. 106 
Thus, in July 2014, Xi met with various CELAC leaders who had convened in Brazil for the China 
Latin America and Caribbean Summit, 107 to discuss China’s relations with the region.  The three 
sides, then issued a joint declaration aimed at promoting south-south cooperation.108 By 2015, the 
LAC region and China convened the inaugural CELAC forum in Beijing. Xi Jinping stressed the 
significance of the growing partnership and delivered a speech entitled "Jointly Writing a New 
Chapter of the China-CELAC Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership.”109  
 
The said forum was undertaken with a view to intensifying economic, social and political 
cooperation in a wide range of areas.  A four-year cooperation plan was agreed upon for 2015-
2019.110 Key decisions were undertaken. One regarded the facilitation of trade between China and 
 
105 http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/international-relations/dominica-receives-new-chinese-ambassador/ 
106 CELAC is a 33-member bloc made up of South American, Central American, and Caribbean states - the US and Canada are 
not members. The grouping serves as an inter-governmental mechanism for promoting political, economic and social interests 
and was first launched in 2011. 
107 Argentina, Antigua, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 





the CELAC to 500 billion USD. The other pertained to an increase in investment levels in the 
region to 250 billion USD within ten years.111If such projections hold, this would cement China’s 
position as the second-largest trading partner for the region, after the United States.112 
 
The continued significance of the Caribbean and Latin America under Xi’s tenure, was again 
reinforced through the release of China’s 2016 foreign policy paper on the region. The pillars of 
cooperation centered on political and economic cooperation, military assistance and promoting 
cultural links. The said policy initiative also coincided with the first China Latin America 
Caribbean Cultural Year declared by Beijing in 2016. The latter initiative was initially proposed 
by Xi during the 2014 China LAC Summit in Brasilia to expand the contours of Caribbean Latin 
America China relations. During the opening ceremony of the “Year of Culture” Xi noted that 
“China and Latin America and Caribbean countries share similar historical experiences and had 
aligned against hegemonism in the international system.113 Thus, the strategic significance of the 
region to China has been reinforced by Xi who has played a leading role in expanding China’s 
diplomatic outreach to the region. As stated by Men and Tsang (2016: 14), “The decade under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership is and will be an important and eventful one with the leadership making 
strategic decisions (to further Chinese interests within and without.)”   
 
Although Caribbean and China relations have been longstanding, Xi’s focus on expanding China’s 
diplomacy more visibly to the Anglophone Caribbean, illustrated that China was intent on playing 
a more decisive economic role in the region alongside traditional actors. Xi’s emphasis on the 
Caribbean region in China’s diplomacy has brought about an increase in China’s economic 
influence in the region as well as a renewal and revival of China’s cultural and social ties across 
the region. As pointed out by Zhu Qingqiao, the Director General of the Department for Latin 
American and Caribbean Affairs at MOFA, “China’s objective in the Americas was to move its 
relationship to a higher level, through closer co-operation…China’s President, Xi Jinping, had 
issued instructions to build comprehensive but mutually beneficial multilateral ties with the 
region.”114 Thus, policymakers have played a key role  in shaping and reinforcing foreign policy, 
thereby influencing the scope and depth of the  Caribbean and China relationship to some extent. 
 
111 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1227318.shtml 






The task in this chapter was to examine how and why diplomacy has been a significant intervening 
factor in shaping the Caribbean and China relationship. Drawing from state decision-making 
within specific contexts and through key events, the chapter evaluated Caribbean states policy-
making towards China through the Cold War and Post-Cold War phase of relations.  
 
The findings contrasted with the underlying assumption in the literature that the Latin America 
Caribbean region, had been less engaged with China especially given the bipolar structure of the 
international system at the time. Despite the tensions between East and West and Caribbean states 
strategic position within the American hegemonic sphere, the two sides conducted ongoing high 
level diplomatic engagements. For Anglophone Caribbean states and Cuba, the ideational basis of 
the Cold War period, acted as a pull factor in determining a committed foreign policy towards 
China in the international system. This further highlighted such developing states agency in 
relations with China despite their significant vulnerabilities and power deficiencies as commonly 
understood.  
 
It was also shown that diplomacy between the Caribbean region and China has been defined by a 
level of economic pragmatism exhibited by both the Caribbean region and China in their 
interactions (1990-2007). This phase was spurred on by Caribbean states domestic economic 
interests and China’s concomitant rise in the international economic system. Thus, policymaking 
was undertaken with a view towards enhancing economic ties between the region and China. 
Moreover, evidence of a burgeoning third phase of strategic economic diplomacy from 2008-2016 
was examined. This phase involved a subtle shift towards more extensive economic engagement 
as well as enhancing political and cultural links between the region and China.   
 
The chapter illustrated the role of key decision-makers in shaping preferences in the Caribbean 
and China relationship. In doing so, it showed that diplomacy through elite state actors allowed 
for direct economic and political exchanges to take place to facilitate mutual interests. As 
discussed, Xi undertook a more visible diplomatic pivot to the Commonwealth Caribbean through 
close bilateral and multilateral diplomacy unlike his predecessors. Decision-makers within 
Caribbean states also sought to promote policies to expand relations with China. In examining 
diplomacy through policymaking, the chapter sought to engage more directly with the Caribbean 
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and China relationship. Thus, the chapter sought to illuminate how and why policymaking has to 




Chapter 4: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China: lending   
         dimension 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how and why diplomacy is seen as an essential intervening factor 
in the Caribbean states relations with China. The focus was not only on state actors in the 
policymaking process, but very significantly, on the particular political and economic conditions 
which often acted as pull factors to solidify relations between the Caribbean region and China 
within bilateral and multilateral contexts.  
 
This chapter examines the role of intervening economic variables in Caribbean states foreign 
policy behaviour. NCR and FPA approaches both share an underlying assumption that foreign 
policy is best understood through the study of internal dynamics that shape preferences and 
influence decision-making in tandem with the mediating effects of structure. Consequently, how 
domestic economic factors determine states behaviour towards others outside their borders are 
critical intervening elements to be considered when examining foreign policy (Rose 1998:148).  
 
The unit level economic issues which influence Caribbean states decision-making and the 
concomitant opportunities and challenges involved in pursuing domestic economic interests vis-
à-vis China, point to the importance of going at the state level, to critically assess the unfolding 
economic interaction between the Caribbean region and China.  
 
The chapter examines how domestic economic considerations have influenced Caribbean states 
decision-making towards China in the Post-Cold War period under scrutiny in the study (2005-
2015). The focus is on an in-depth case study of Caribbean states lending from China for 
infrastructure investments. This case was selected as it was evident of a general pattern in 
Caribbean states interaction with China at the domestic level. While there have been increasing 
efforts to focus on China’s infrastructure financing in Latin America, much of the literature often 
overlook the Caribbean region as part of the analyses (see Gallagher and Irwin, 2015; Cui and 
Garcia, 2016; Roet and Paz, 2009; Ellis; 2009; Devlin et al., 2006). As Bernal (2015: 1409) 
acknowledges, “studies give little or no data; nor do they make comments specifically on the 
Caribbean.”   
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Added to this lack of systematic analysis into China’s engagement with the Caribbean region is 
the overall tendency in the literature for developing states objectives and constraints to be 
marginalised in the engagements, with a seeming preference for delving into China’s interests in 
the dynamic. However, developing states play an essential role in accommodating China’s 
economic agenda and facilitating its deployment inside such states. Thus, playing a critical role in 
China’s economic expansion overseas. Developing states also actively seek to shape China’s 
economic activity to promote their national interests. 
 
The chapter argues that Caribbean states domestic economic interests in expanding access to 
financing for infrastructure investments resulted in a strategic shift to China, due in part to China’s 
economic emergence in the international system alongside traditional actors, as a source of 
development assistance. However, despite the tremendous opportunities proffered on the basis of 
China’s economic emergence within the global context, for Caribbean states there appears to be 
an inherent tension within those ongoing dynamics.  
The findings suggest that although Caribbean states have been able to utilise China’s economic 
assistance to address key infrastructure deficits at the domestic level, the extent to which financing 
arrangements between the region and China impacts the more familiar debt and development 
patterns within the region may not necessarily be overlooked. This issue is especially relevant 
within the Caribbean context. The region is already impacted by high debt to GDP ratios. Previous 
experiences with debt in relation to external actors have also had adverse impacts on the region 
(see subsection 3). Therefore, the extent to which lending from China may evade preceding 
patterns of debt and dependency is left open for consideration. 
But having said this, the findings of the case study also suggests that China’s increased economic 
role in lending, has provided key economic opportunities for the region. China’s financing has 
partly targeted areas that have not necessarily been a priority in lending by traditional actors, 
thereby making a positive contribution to the realisation of national development goals in the 
region. While studies on China’s lending within the Caribbean are relatively scarce in the 
literature, preliminary assessments based on a cross section of official government reports in the 
Caribbean as well as from media sources, suggests that from 2005-2015, China has provided at 
the very least, close to US $1 billion in loans to the region. Much of that sum has been dedicated 
to infrastructure development in select Caribbean states (see subsection 2.3). Should present 
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economic trends continue, it is anticipated that China may likely play an even wider economic role 
across the Latin America Caribbean region alongside traditional actors. 
 
The chapter proceeds in two main sections. The first section aims to examine the significance of 
lending for infrastructure investments in the Caribbean and the resulting strategic shift towards 
China in the Post-Cold War period. The section then goes on to provide an empirically based 
portrayal of Caribbean states lending for infrastructure investments from China centered on a 
sectoral analysis of the areas targeted for investments. These sectors are namely; health, sports, 
tourism and maritime transport infrastructure sectors. It is important to do so because it is in 
examining the nature and scope of such investments that an understanding of why Caribbean states 
have expanded their engagement with China can emerge. The quantitative analyses also serve as 
a starting point for a more evidenced-based assessment of the impacts of the growing economic 
ties between the Caribbean and China at the ground level. 
The chapter contributes to providing a developing country perspective in the discourse on China’s 
rise in the Latin America Caribbean region. In doing so, it emphasises Caribbean states domestic 
economic interests, agency and constraints within a literature that has been largely China-facing. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence based on a sectoral analysis of Caribbean’s states lending for 
infrastructure investments, contributes to addressing the empirical gap in the literature on 
Caribbean states economic relations with China. Thus, adding to the broader literature on China’s 
relationship with developing states in the Americas hemisphere. In illuminating China’s increasing 
role in financing in the Anglophone Caribbean region, the chapter also provides insights as to why 
China has been able to successfully amplify its economic influence in the region alongside 
traditional actors in the period considered. The latter issue will be examined more thoroughly in 
chapter 6. 
Section 1 
2. Contextualising Caribbean states economic turn to China for infrastructure financing 
 
Despite the gap in the literature pertaining to the Caribbean’s economic engagement with China, 
in recent years there has been an effort to uncover the patterns of Chinese financing in the 
developing world. Scholars like Brautigam (2011) and Taylor (2007) have concentrated on China’s 
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oil and infrastructure financing arrangements in African states. Similar arrangements in Latin 
America have been examined by Brautigam and Gallagher (2014).  
Like many small developing states, the Caribbean region faces significant infrastructure deficits. 
Such shortfalls are related to economic and social welfare associated infrastructure. Caribbean 
states outreach the China has been tied to transportation, housing, health and sports infrastructures. 
Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015:335), posit that for such countries, infrastructure projects often 
“test government budgetary, technological and institutional capacity.” Thus, leading to the need 
for engagement with external actors for implementing capacity at the ground level.  
 
Infrastructure gaps in various areas have been seen to create significant limitations in development 
across the region. ECLAC estimates, that to bridge the infrastructural gap in the LAC region, at 
least, 6% of states GDP, must be invested in infrastructure between 2016 and 2020. Part of that 
lack within the region is related to welfare generating infrastructure development projects.115 
Similar conclusions have been arrived at by Trebilcock and Rosenstock (2015:336). The authors 
state, “meeting the infrastructure gap in Latin America and the Caribbean would require countries 
in the region to boost annual investment as a share of GDP from the current rate of 2 per cent to 
5.2 per cent.”  Likewise, the IMF in a paper entitled, Regional Outlook, Western Hemisphere 
(2016:79) notes that while infrastructure stocks have risen in LAC countries, the gains do not 
compare favorably with fast-growing regions like Asia. The glaring infrastructure deficits in 
developing states have not been lost on Chan et al (2017:14). They acknowledge that while 
infrastructure development is a tool for economic development in developing countries, it is 
“under-invested and undersupplied, (and this) poses a serious bottleneck for development.”  
 
Underlying the intensified economic engagement between the Anglophone Caribbean and China, 
has been a strategic economic shift by such states to pursue national development goals with 
Chinese financial and technical assistance in areas deemed to be of economic priority at the 
national level. The emphasis on financing for infrastructure investments has also been facilitated 
by China’s own economic strategy in the developing world. The focus has been on aiding with 
infrastructure financing to help expand development opportunities within less developed states.  
 
 
115 https://www.cepal.org/sites/default/files/infographic/files/infraestructura_ingles, p. 1 
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Western backed financial institutions have at times been considered as taking a top-down approach 
to development assistance whereby the priorities of institutions and the foreign policy goals of the 
leading member states within those institutions are seen as the chief motivator for development 
financing. This has led to concerns regarding whether such assistance is being tailored to the actual 
needs of developing countries (see Ramo 2004; Williamson 2012, 2014; Mckinnon 2010). China 
has been regarded as being particularly able to respond to developing states economic concerns 
through a south-south cooperation strategy whereby developing states aims are considered 
important to the lending process.  
The official rhetoric from developing states on financing from China illustrate that such states 
often view China as a rising economic actor that can be differentiated from other traditional actors 
given China’s particular modus operandi for development assistance. Thus, views from 
government officials encapsulate to a large extent the need to engage China at the domestic level 
in areas that are deemed to be of priority in the broader thrust for economic development in 
developing states.  
 
Within this broader construct of China’s differentiation from other actors, Caribbean Government 
leaders such as Dominica’s Prime Minister Skerrit has criticised institutions like the World Bank 
as failing to respond adequately to addressing Caribbean states economic needs.116 Other 
representatives within developing regions such as Africa have also expressed China’s receptivity 
to their economic needs versus other actors. The former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade 
noted, “China’s approach to our needs is simply better adapted…improvements in infrastructure 
have played important roles in stimulating economic growth.”117 Moreover, at a gathering of 
government representatives in London in November 2013, diplomats from developing 
Commonwealth states had this to say about China’s development assistance to the Caribbean and 
other developing states of the Commonwealth, “You ask the Chinese for help and it is a matter of 
how they can help and when. You ask the same of other institutions and the answer is never the 
same.” 118  Although such rhetoric points to a level of differentiation between China’s financing 
and that of traditional actors, as will be discussed later, China’s thrust in the developing world is 




118 Author’s participation in meeting of government representative, London, November, 2013 
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do come at significant costs, much like traditional actors engaged in securing profit-maximisation 
and other interests in economic engagement.  
 
Developing states engagement with China’s financing have not come without concerns. Crucially, 
how Chinese financing have played out at the ground level, have been subject to both scrutiny and 
debate in the literature. Developing countries outreach to China for lending has been seen by some 
as a challenge to the predominant aid architecture in the developing world. In examining Chinese 
lending for infrastructure investments to Africa, Naim (2007) concludes that China’s aid could be 
characterised as “rogue aid.” Taking up those debates, Dreyer and Fuchs (2016:988) based on 
empirical analysis of Chinese aid flows, argue that not only is China’s aid not linked with politics 
when compared to western actors, it is also independent of natural resource endowments within 
recipient states. This is especially so in the Caribbean context, as natural resource endowments 
vary significantly among states.  Yet, China has substantially extended its lending even to states 
devoid of significant economic resources. This suggests not simply altruism, but rather a targeted 
approach to facilitating developing states economic interests at the ground level with Chinese 
assistance. 
Many of the arguments pertaining to China as acting counter to pre-existing aid frameworks have 
been refuted by Brautigam (2011) who points to areas of convergence, but also differences, 
between traditional donors and China. Brautigam (2011: 760) asserts that while development aid 
at the ground level by traditional partners tend to reflect donors priorities more readily than that of 
recipient countries, China attempts to channel its aid through high level discussions with 
developing state partners. Such discussions are often aimed at reconciling developing states 
interests with China’s strategies.   
 
Moreover, in an attempt to formalise its lending practices within the context of its foreign aid to 
developing states, China released its first white paper on the subject in 2014. 119  It stipulated three 
main categories of financial flows; grant funding, zero interest loans and concessional lending. 
The said paper notes that grants are geared towards social welfare projects. Non-concessional 
lending is described as interest-free loans meant to aid recipient countries with constructing public 




5-year grace period prior to repayment. Concessional lending is pursued mainly by China’s 
domestic financial institutions, the China Exim Bank and China Development Bank. The paper 
notes that the annual interest rate of China's concessional loans is between 2 and 3 percent, with a 
repayment period of 15-20 years coupled with of 5-7 years period. 120 
 
However, even with these categories introduced by China to describe lending to developing 
countries, there is still a lack of clarity with regards to how these have been applied with the 
practical context of China’s financial engagement with developing states. For instance, the 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, describes grants as, “transfers made in cash, goods 
or services for which no repayment is required.”121  Therefore whether those loans carry a grant 
component or not, is not always clear.  
 
In the Caribbean region’s economic interaction with China, grant aid as described by the OECD 
is seen more readily in terms of equipment and technical training in the area of security assistance.  
The large majority of loans to the region appear to be based on concessional terms.  As will be 
seen below, the bulk of China’s financing within the Caribbean region has centered around 
financing from the China Exim Bank and China Development Bank with the involvement of 
China’s state owned enterprises. 
 
2.2 Cooperation framework for infrastructure financing  
Financing for development aims has been part of the Caribbean and China engagement from at 
least the 1970’s. It is possible to trace China’s lending to Barbados, Jamaica and Guyana in that 
period as these states have had long standing relations with China.  In 1975, China provided an 
interest free loan to Guyana and the latter exported bauxite to China. 122 In 1986, under an 
Economic Cooperation Agreement between Barbados and China, Barbados secured a loan to 
construct the Garfield Sobers Gymnasium.123 Jamaica for its part, entered loan agreements with 
China. As pointed out by Brautigam (2009) Jamaica was the first country to conduct a debt equity 
swap with China. In 1987 Jamaica agreed to having Shanghai No. 12 Cotton Mill take on the 




122 Leonard Thomas, Encyclopedia off the Developing World (2006; 1184) 
123 China’s Embassy, Bridgetown, Barbados  
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Within the Post-Cold war context of engagement, high level exchanges have been a prelude to 
deepening economic engagement between Caribbean states and China. The Caribbean’s lending 
for infrastructure investments increased in both scale and intensity in 2005 following the First 
China Caribbean Trade Cooperation Forum in Jamaica. The forum provided a favourable platform 
for Caribbean states to assert their own economic interests. The framework agreement focused on 
infrastructure financing for key projects within the Anglophone Caribbean.124 This then paved the 
way for increasing China’s commercial activities at the local level through its various state 
enterprises and financial institutions.  
The significance of infrastructure investments in the Caribbean region was further formalised in 
China’s first White Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008.125 China’s leadership has 
also articulated a commitment towards infrastructure financing within the Caribbean region. In 
2013, when China’s President Xi Jinping paid his first visit to the Caribbean as the President of 
China, Xi then promised more than $US 3 billion in loans to various governments within the 
Caribbean.126  The emphasis of financing for infrastructure financing was also part of the Third 
China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum. The said forum was held in Trinidad 
in 2011. China’s Vice Premier, Wang Qishan, in his address noted that the China Development 
Bank would dedicate US$1 billion to be used as special commercial loans for infrastructural 
development in the Caribbean.127  
 
Moreover, the Caribbean and Latin American region have continued to focus on China as a salient 
partner for infrastructure development. In line with their mutual interests, in 2015, the region and 
China convened the First China LAC forum in Beijing. The forum was dedicated to expanding 
engagement with the broader region. The forum proved to be an important avenue for widening 
Caribbean states access to lending for infrastructure development. At that forum, President Xi 
Jinping announced a new China-CELAC Cooperation Fund whereby loans would be made 
available to the region infrastructure development.128  An initial investment of US $ 5 billion was 
made by the China Exim Bank towards the fund. 129 Other funds with the aim of investing in the 
 





128 CELAC is a 33-member state bloc, known as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States  
129 http://www.chinacelacforum.org/eng/ltdt_1/t1269475.htm 
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Latin America Caribbean region were also instituted by China to enable states access to 
concessional financing for development of various sectors in their economy.  These funds have 
committed at least 35 billion USD to investments in the Latin America Caribbean region for the 
period 2015 (see table 4.0).  
Further, emanating from the First LAC forum in 2015, was a decision to hold an annual 
infrastructure forum under the 2015-2019 cooperation plan between China and the Latin America 
Caribbean region. Thus far, between 2015 and 2017, China and Latin America as well as Caribbean 
states have undertaken three Infrastructure forums held in Macao. These have dedicated to 
cooperation on financing infrastructure investments in the region. 
Table 4.0: Showing China’s Latin America Caribbean Region Funds for 2015 
NAME YEAR  AMOUNT ADMINISTRATOR 
China-LAC Industrial 
Cooperation Investment 
2015 10 billion USD China  
Development Bank 
Special Loan Programme 
China LAC Infrastructure 




2015 5 billion USD China Exim 
Source: author elaboration; Foro-China-CELAC 
 
Under the aegis of these various institutional frameworks, Caribbean states have sought to expand 
access to financing for infrastructure development projects. Chinese sources like the SCMP 
suggest that in two English-speaking Caribbean states; namely the Bahamas and Jamaica, between 
2005- 2012, both borrowed US$ 4 billion from the China Exim Bank and China Development 
Bank.130  
 
However, in the absence of official figures from China or the Caribbean region with respect to this 
significant sum quoted above for the period, there is the possibility that this figure may likely be 
an amalgamation of both slated and actual investments in the Caribbean region in the states 
mentioned. In accordance with official government sources from Guyana and Trinidad, millions 
have been loaned from China for infrastructure investments. In 2012, Guyana’s Minister of 
Finance, Dr. Ashni Singh and China’s ambassador, Zhang Limin, signed a cooperation agreement 
for US$4.8M.131 The loan was geared towards the implementation of bilateral co-operation 
projects to be agreed upon by the two Governments. In 2011, Trinidad also received concessional 
 
130 http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1533598/china-spends-billions-fund-caribbean-ambition 
131Ministry of Finance, Government of Guyana, “Bilateral Cooperation Projects,” December 20, 2012.  
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lending from China for the sum of US$ 100 million132 for building its National Academy of 
Performing Arts (NAPA).   
 
In borrowing from China, it is commonly claimed that the terms are less stringent than loans from 
other state actors and international financial institutions. Kevin Gallagher et al (2012:1), note that 
the China Exim Bank does offer more generous terms than for instance, the US Exim Bank in 
Latin America. Lending across many English- speaking states by the China Exim Bank carry an 
interest rate of between 2-3% per annum. At least 10 infrastructure projects in five (5) English -
speaking Caribbean states for the period 2007-2012 were based on concessional loans which 
carried an average of 2% interest rate (see Table 4.1). The loans were geared towards either 
building new public infrastructure or upgrading existing facilities. 
 
Table 4.1 Showing Terms for Concessional Lending for Investments in Select Caribbean States 
Year COUNTRY AMOUNT 
US$ 
PROJECT INTEREST 
RATE   
CHINA 
INSTITUTION 
2007 Jamaica 45 million Montego Bay 
Convention Center 
2% China Exim Bank 
2008 Dominica 40 million public facilities  2% China Exim Bank 
2009 Bahamas 58 million Airport Expressway 2% China Exim Bank 
2010 Jamaica 340 million Road Construction 3% China Exim Bank 
2011 Trinidad 100 million NAPA 2% China Exim Bank 
2012 Guyana 130 million Expand Cheddi 
Jagan Airport 
2% China Exim Bank 
 
Source: compiled by author (Ministry of Finance Barbados and Trinidad; and Caribbean newspapers) 
 
Caribbean states engagement with Chinese financing for development projects have meant a shift 
in the economic dynamics at the ground level within the region. Thereby, effectively leading to 
China’s increased economic influence within the region in terms of financing.  
 
2.3 Sectoral Analysis of Caribbean states lending for Infrastructure Investments  
This subsection focuses more specifically on how Chinese lending have been implemented at the 
ground level by Caribbean states with regards to particular sectors. These are namely, sports, health 
tourism and maritime sectors.  
The sectoral analysis contributes to filling a gap in the literature on the Caribbean region’s 
economic interaction with China. It provides empirical data which places within a more evidence-
based framework, Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China. The discussion 
 
132 Press Release, Trinidad Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 24th, 2014 
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also seeks to examine why Caribbean states have turned to China for lending for infrastructure 
investments in the economic sectors mentioned. Thus seeking to move beyond the common 
discourse pertaining to what China wants and why. In doing so, the subsection hopes to not only 
highlight the data, but in contingent with it, the agency and interests of Caribbean states in the 
interaction.  
China’s role as a significant creditor to the region began taking shape in the 1990’s, starting with 
a focus on financing sports infrastructure. Post 2005, the engagement mushroomed into other 
commercial endeavours. Crucially, for the Caribbean region, China’s role in infrastructure 
financing resulted in a diversification of the region’s economic partnerships to include non-
traditional economic actors.  The outcome has been a more substantial increase in the region’s 
maneuvering space for financing development goals.  
2.3.1 Lending: sports infrastructure  
The literature at times favours a more quid pro quo basis for viewing small developing states 
economic cooperation with China whereby such states are rewarded for giving up diplomatic 
recognition of Taiwan (Taylor; 2002, Henderson; 2001, Erikson et al; 2007). However, it is 
important to go beyond such debates and to examine developing states economic interests in 
shaping economic relations with China. This approach favours a more nuanced and balanced 
perspective on how and why developing regions such as the Caribbean, have expanded economic 
ties with China.  
 
While what has been dubbed “stadium diplomacy” by China has at times been discussed in relation 
to developing states, the underlying reasons for the necessity of such projects from the perspective 
of such countries are often overlooked. In the Caribbean region, sports is seen as an important tool 
for growth and economic development. Within the English-speaking Caribbean region, the vast 
majority of the population are young people. In terms of the CARICOM group of countries, 63% 
of the population are under the age of 30.133  For Caribbean states, encouraging investments by 
China in sporting facilities made sense from a national development perspective, notwithstanding 




Caribbean states saw investments in sports infrastructure as a strategic means of harnessing youth 
talent and entrepreneurship as well as encouraging synergies between various economic sectors to 
help foster economic growth and development. For instance, in a bid to facilitate the development 
of sports, in 2001, member states of CARICOM made sports promotion an integral part of the 
Revised Treaty establishing the organisation. 134 China has also been positioned as an area for 
facilitating broader sports cooperation endeavours. In 2012, at the CARICOM Sports Meeting of 
the Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD), Caribbean states considered China 
both as an investment partner and destination from which to draw sports visitors. 135  
Given the significance of sports development to the Caribbean, it might be telling that countries 
such as Barbados made sports a priority in cooperation with China. Thus in 1986, under an 
Economic Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, Barbados secured a grant from 
China for assistance with the construction of the Garfield Sobers Gymnasium.136 Further, in 1990, 
when Barbados Prime Minister, Erskine Sandiford, met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, 
sports development was among the economic cooperation endeavours agreed too.137  
More specifically, an analysis of data for the English-speaking Caribbean between 2005-2008, 
showed that sports infrastructure remained a priority in much of engagement between the region 
and China during that period. China invested more than US$ 100 million in sports infrastructure 
in select Caribbean states (see Table 4.2). These loans for stadium infrastructure generally carry 
generous repayment terms.   In the case of Barbados, its 2009 Approved Budget Estimates Report 
showed that the 50, 000, 000 RMB (US $ 7.3 million) came from China to finance gymnasiums. 







134 Article 17 of the 2001 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramus   recognises sports promotion as an integral part of human and social 
development in the CARICOM Community (CARICOM). The CARICOM grouping was first established in 1973 and the 
Member States were initially English-speaking Caribbean states and overseas British territories. These are; Antigua, Barbados, 
Bahamas, Trinidad, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, Grenada, Dominica, Montserrat, Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, Belize. The 
British territories are the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, Bermuda and Anguilla.  Non-English 




137 http://bb.china-embassy.org/eng/zbgxs/zzwl/. Bilateral Political Relations 
138  Barbados Approved Estimates of Expenditure, 2008/2009. 
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Table 4.2: Stadium Infrastructure Projects in Selected Caribbean States Financed by China 2005-2008 
 
YEAR COUNTRY PROJECT AMOUNT 
$US (M) 
2005 Dominica Windsor Park 
Stadium 
55 
2006 Jamaica Trelawney Stadium 30 
2007  Grenada Queen’s Park 
Stadium 
42.3 




2007 Antigua Sir Vivian Richard 
Stadium 
21 
2008 Barbados Gymnasium 
Refurbishment 
7.3 
Source: compiled by author (official government sources and newspaper reports) 
 
The Caribbean region has seen some returns on sports infrastructure investment projects by China. 
For instance, China’s lending for sports infrastructure investments was instrumental in helping the 
English- speaking Caribbean host the 2007 Cricket World Cup. Antigua’s Prime Minister, Baldwin 
Spencer, acknowledged that China’s assistance was critical in aiding such states to optimise the 
immediate gains and possible spillovers from such international activities.139 Thus, for Caribbean 
states, China is an important economic partner which seeks to take their national priorities into 
account in terms of lending. 
 
But while Caribbean states view investments in sporting infrastructure as a potential for growth 
and development, for some, the extent to which these are fully exploited needs to be considered. 
Thus, the concern is that these may serve as a symbolic highlight of China’s growing influence in 
the Caribbean without necessarily rendering a high level of tangible economic benefits at the 
domestic level.  For instance, the Jamaica Gleaner Newspaper on May 19th, 2013, lamented that 
although $248 million in loans had been used to construct a mini-stadium in Sligoville, Jamaica, 
the stadium laid in ruins.  However, despite such issues, sporting endeavours have continued to be 
of relevance in Caribbean government’s decision-making in relation to China. In 2016, Grenada 
opened a new National Athletic and Football stadium facility built by China at a cost of US $32.3 
million.140  Grenada’s Prime Minister, Keith Mitchel, noted that the new stadium would offer more 
job opportunities while also boosting the country’s tourism potential.141 China has been seen as a 
 
139 http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/print,0,53893.html 
140 Grenada’s Approved Budget Estimate Report of 2012, Government of Grenada, p.xvi 
141 http://thenewtoday.gd/local-news/2016/02/04/national-athletic-football-stadium-officially-opens/#gsc.tab=0 
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key partner to help further develop the sporting sector in the region through its assistance with the 
relevant infrastructure required for the promotion of sports.  
 
2.3.2 Lending: health infrastructure 
Underpinning lending for health infrastructure has been a deliberate strategy by Caribbean states 
to facilitate China’s role in the health care sector. This has also been aided by China’s own ethos 
in development aid.  China often views itself as a partner which seeks to increase south-south 
cooperation in a manner that it deems beneficial to recipient countries. 
 
The involvement of China in healthcare facilities have allowed Caribbean states to formulate 
cooperation around the targets that they deem to be relevant for growth and development.  Health 
care services have been recognised by Caribbean states as invariably affecting economic growth 
whether directly or indirectly given the need for a healthy and productive labour force.  In 2009, 
CARICOM promoted a “Regional Health Framework” for investment in health for economic 
development for 2010-2015.142 The Caribbean region has utilised lending from China to expand 
existing health infrastructure and to create new ones while also enlisting China’s technical 
assistance in terms of health services.  
 
The analysis of China’s economic engagement with developing states, often overlook the role of 
China in meeting the development goals of such states. In line with developing states needs, China 
has made healthcare a key pillar of cooperation in its first foreign policy paper on Latin America 
and the Caribbean in 2008.143 Caribbean leaders also made development of the healthcare sector a 
priority in during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Trinidad in 2013. Among the outcomes of that 
meeting with President Xi, was an agreement for healthcare cooperation. 144 Thus far, a number of 
healthcare initiatives have been undertaken between the region and China. In the five-year period 
between 2011-2016, three selected English- Speaking Caribbean states received more than US 
$800 million in loans from China for health infrastructure (see table 4.3). This figure takes into 
account a cross-section of health projects in Jamaica, Trinidad and Dominica but does not consider 






The concessional loans provided are usually for a period of 20 years, with an interest rate of 
between 2.5% and 2.9%.145  There can also be an initial grace period of five years attached to the 
funding. As seen in table 4.3, in 2013, a loan of US $140 million was provided by China to Trinidad 
to build the Arima Hospital. In 2012, Trinidad borrowed nearly 1 billion $ TT (US $ 950 million) 
from the China Exim Bank to provide funds for a Children’s Hospital in Cova, Trinidad. This 
concessional loan amounted to US $ 150 million and came with 2.5% interest rate per annum.146 
The repayment period of the loan is 20 years.147  
 
But although China’s involvement in the health sector suggests an explicit response to developing 
states development needs, China has asserted its interests quite readily in these commercial 
endeavours. The concessional loans may be contingent on certain concessions being made 
or may carry other conditionalities. For instance, materials and equipment for the project 
has to be imported from China.148 Likewise, the involvement of Chinese state owned 
enterprises has been a key aspect of those agreements (see table 4.3).   
 
Table 4.3 Showing Health Infrastructure Projects in Selected English-speaking Caribbean States 
YEAR COUNTRY Health Infrastructure  Concessional Loan 
Amount (US $) 
China State Owned  
Enterprise 
2011 Trinidad Couva Children Hospital 150 million Shanghai Construction 
Group 
2013 Trinidad Arima Hospital  140 million  China Railway 
Construction Corporation 
2015 Jamaica University Hospital  500 million China Harbour 
Engineering Company 
2016 Dominica National Hospital  US 40 million Hunan Construction 
Engineering Group 
Source; compiled by author (Trinidad Newsday, Dominica News online and Jamaica Gleaner newspapers) 
Caribbean states health cooperation with China is differentiated to some extent with that of 
traditional lenders. While international financial institutions such as the World Bank see healthcare 
as important to the Caribbean, lending is not necessarily focused on health infrastructure,149 but 
more so on the priorities of those lenders in the interaction. Debatably, this has given rise to top-










having little input in the lending processes which they ultimately finance in the medium to long 
term. China’s focus on health infrastructure has provided significant maneuvering space for 
Caribbean states to promote their national development strategies. 
Moreover, Caribbean states have increasingly undertaken capacity building with China through 
direct exchanges at the institutional level. Caribbean states have attempted to leverage their own 
capacities and interests in the ongoing healthcare cooperation with China, and often encourage 
exchanges in specific specialty areas where the region has limited expertise.150 For instance, under 
the terms of the Health Cooperation Agreement agreed to by Caribbean states and China during 
President Xi’s visit to Trinidad, China committed 100 medical professionals over a three-year 
period to the Caribbean in accordance with the region’s interests. 151 Chinese medical professionals 
have been dispatched to various islands in accordance with specialty needs. Trinidad’s San 
Fernando General Hospital hosted various medical practitioners from China on a six-month 
rotation for two years in 2015.152 In 2016, Barbados received 8 Chinese medical practitioners at 
the Queen Elizabeth Hospital under similar terms. 153  
But while the periodic deployment of medical professionals has been geared towards improving 
health services delivery in the Caribbean, at the same time, it has allowed Chinese medical 
professionals to facilitate learning in diverse health care settings. Thus helping to facilitate 
cooperation on mutually beneficial terms.  
2.3.3 Lending: tourism infrastructure  
Caribbean states have undertaken a two-pronged strategy aimed at enhancing China’s role in the 
vital tourism industry. Cooperation has been geared towards increasing access to financing beyond 
traditional actors within the industry, while seeking to simultaneously build the groundwork for 
expansion into China’s tourism market.  Decision-making by various states within the Caribbean 
region have illustrated the significance of these strategies to some extent.  However, there are 
limits to such cooperation thus far. Challenging prospects have been Caribbean states limited 







technical capacity issues especially in comparism to traditional actors.  Such issues may hinder the 
overall effectiveness of increased cooperation in this vital sector. 
Nonetheless, billions have been invested by Chinese companies in states like the Bahamas in the 
tourism industry. The tourism industry has been a major contributor towards the GDP of most 
Anglophone Caribbean states. Trinidad and Guyana have been the exceptions in this regard given 
the significant role that natural resources play in their economies. In 2015, tourism contributed 
almost 40% of Barbados’s GDP (39.5%). In Grenada, the sector made up 25.5% of GDP in that 
same year. In Dominica, tourism contributed 26.4% of GDP. The Bahamas is the most tourism 
dependent in the Anglophone Caribbean and the sector accounted for close to 50% of its GDP 
(46.7%) in that same period. In Jamaica, the sector makes up less than 10% of GDP (8.9%).154 
 
China’s involvement in tourism infrastructure in the Caribbean further represents the 
overwhelming commercial drive behind China’s economic activities in the region. Chinese actors 
view this industry as having immense potential for returns on investments. As early as 2011, the 
China-Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum in Trinidad, emphasised business and 
joint venture opportunities in the tourism sector. 155  Tourism was also among the key areas of 
economic cooperation cited by China in its 2008 white paper on Latin America and the Caribbean. 
The paper also acknowledged that tourism cooperation would involve an expansion of tourist 
market on the Chinese side.156 
 
Lending has been geared towards direct investments in the hotel industry. Caribbean states have 
also sought China’s financial assistance in undertaking key infrastructural upgrades to various 
airports to increase capacity at the ground level. For instance, in 2013, the Government of 
Dominica obtained US $300 million in financing from China’s State Owned Enterprise Anhui 
Shuian Construction Group (ASCG) towards construction of a new hotel and reconstruction of its 
international airport among other projects.157 Increased Chinese engagement in the tourism 
industry has also been seen in the case of Antigua. In 2015, a US $100 million airport extension 







part of the loan funds at a zero-interest rate while the China Exim Bank provided the rest of the 
funding on concessionary terms.158 In 2016, Grenada came to an agreement with China to build a 
US $ 2 billion resort complex which would link the main island territory to an offshore islet -Hog 
Island.159 
 
The figures pertaining to the Caribbean’s economic engagement with China in the tourism sector 
at the domestic level has been quite striking and shows the growing economic significance of 
China to the Caribbean region. Within a five-year period from 2010-2015, select English-speaking 
Caribbean states benefited from over US$ 3 billion in Chinese investments in the tourism industry 
(see table 4.4). The figure takes into account hotel projects as well as airport refurbishments to 
increase competitiveness in the sector. These overall figures from 2010-2015, only highlight 
specific investments in the tourism sector in select Caribbean states.  The figure stated does not 
account for all such projects mentioned in every English-speaking Caribbean state with which 
China has diplomatic relations. Thus, it likely means that the overall figure in investments in the 
tourism sector in such states may be well over the US$ 5 billion-dollar threshold.  
 
Table 4.4 Showing Selected Infrastructure for tourism in Caribbean States: 2010-2015 
YEAR Country Infrastructure Amount 
US$ 
2015 Barbados Sam Lord Castle Hotel 170 million 
 
2014 Bahamas Renovation - Hilton 
Colonial Hotel 
70 million 
2013 Dominica Int’l airport and hotel 300 million 
 
2012 Bahamas Baha Mar Resort 2.4 billion 
 
2011 Antigua  New Airport Terminal 100 million 
 
2010 Bahamas Lynden Pindling Int’l 
Airport expressway 
58 million 
Source: compiled by author (Dominica News, Nassau Guardian news, Antigua and Barbados Government Reports) 
 
 
Financing such projects also appear to be on competitive terms.  In the case of Barbados, the China 
Exim Bank provided 85% of a loan for the Sam Lord Castle Hotel project (US $170 million).160 




160 Loan Agreement, Preferential Buyer Credit Loan between the Government of Barbados and the Export-Import Bank of China 
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SOE.161 According to the Barbados Parliament, the funding procured from China for rehabilitating 
the property carried terms pertaining to repayment period of over 20 years at an interest rate of 
2.5%. This was also coupled with a moratorium period of 60 months.162  
 
Moreover, given the significance of the sector to the Caribbean, such states have formulated 
strategies to diversify this sector not only through lending. An important aim has been to expand 
tourism arrivals from China. For instance, in 2012, Barbados issued a White Paper on Tourism in 
which it cited China as one of the emerging economy markets where Barbados would seek to 
increase tourist arrivals. It has been asserted by publications like the Economist that China is poised 
to change the global tourism industry given its growing middleclass.  According to the said 
publication, in 2014, nearly one in ten international tourists worldwide were Chinese. Chinese 
tourists spent most in total-$129 billion in 2013, followed by Americans at $86 billion. 163  While 
it is still unclear whether this is part of an unfolding pattern that is likely to impact on tourism 
globally, the interests of Caribbean states are not only in direct Chinese investments in the sector, 
but also in the creation of more immediate linkages with the Chinese market through such 
investments.  
 
However, although Caribbean states cooperation with China in the tourism sector highlight the 
economic significance of China at the domestic level and illustrates the strategic economic shift to 
China to promote commercial goals, the engagement also points to ambiguities in the economic 
interaction.  The case of the Bahamas has been illustrative of the constraints in commercial ties 
with China. In the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, the Prime Minister of the 
Bahamas, Perry Christie, approached China to partly finance a multi- billion-dollar mega resort 
(Baha Mar).164 The China Exim Bank agreed to funnel at least US$ 2.4 billion in concessional 
loans towards the project in 2011. The project was promoted as China’s flagship investment in the 
 
161 The Chinese SOE involved in the tourism project (Sam Lord Castle rehabilitation in Barbados) was National Complete Plant 







Caribbean region’s tourism sector. Projections were made that it would contribute more than $1 
billion to the Bahamian economy and would boost GDP by more than 10%. 165  
 
However, by 2015, Bah Mar Ltd. run by Sarkis Izmirlian which had an original stake in the project, 
filed a claim against China’s SOE, China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) 
in US courts, amidst claims of mismanagement and alleges breaches of workers rights. 166 These 
internal management issues just discussed, highlight to some extent, ongoing concerns thus far, in 
Chinese economic practices at the national level, an issue that will be examined in chapter 7. It is 
also illustrative of China’s own challenges within diverse economic sectors and local contexts such 
as those of the Caribbean region. 
 
Along similar lines, concerns still linger in terms of tangible economic benefits from China based 
on China’s lack of significance as a market for tourism beyond lending and other forms of FDI.  
As a consequence, it is highly differentiated from traditional western economic partners (US, EU, 
UK and Canada). Jamaica has been among the few English-speaking Caribbean states that has 
managed to increase its Chinese arrivals. However, these arrivals are not comparable to arrivals 
from the traditional destinations just mentioned. According to the Jamaica Tourist Board, in 2016, 
there were 3,254 Chinese arrivals compared to a combined figure of 773,108 tourists to Jamaica. 
The majority came from the areas just mentioned. The figure for China, represented a 2.2 percent 
year-on-year increase in Chinese arrivals.  According to statistics from the Jamaica Tourist Board, 
from 2011-2015, an average of 2000 Chinese tourists have visited Jamaica. In 2015, there were 
3,744.167  
 
Caribbean states have taken steps to address some of these likely impediments to the growth of the 
tourism sector in relation to China. Consequently, in 2015, Bahamas signed an MOU with China 
which provides the legal framework to regulate air traffic services between the Bahamas and 
China.168 In 2015, Barbados signed an Air Services Agreement with Hong Kong. This was the 









Freundel Stuart, during his meeting with China's Premier Wen Jiabao, acknowledged that an Air 
Services Agreement with China would help to bolster ties in tourism and open up other possibilities 
for trade and commerce.169 While Barbados has concluded an Air Services Agreement, currently 
there are still no direct flights from the English-speaking Caribbean states to China. However, 
China has just started direct air services to Caribbean destinations such as Cuba in 2015. Given 
Jamaica’s closer proximity to Cuba in comparism to other English speaking states, it has shown 
itself more likely to benefit from increased Chinese tourist arrivals in the mean- time.  
 
Given the massive billion dollar investments by Chinese enterprises in tourism projects in the 
Caribbean, the engagement of China at the domestic level in terms of the tourism industry may 
likely build continued synergies between Caribbean states and China despite the underlying 
ambiguities involved in the interaction.  
 
2.3.4 Lending for maritime infrastructure investments  
The presence of the Caribbean Sea has been seen as a draw for investments especially for 
Caribbean states who wish to diversify their economies by taking advantage of the presence of key 
international shipping lanes of import to global commerce (see chapter 2). The geographical 
proximity of the Caribbean to the world’s leading economy, the US, has also meant that economic 
benefits could be accrued from expanding investments in maritime infrastructure. According to 
Wilmsmeier and Hoffman (2008: 130) the Caribbean region lies at the cross roads of major east-
west and north-south shipping routes. This makes the region an integral aspect of maritime 
commerce for the Americas hemisphere. Rodrigues et al (2013:100) noted that the Caribbean is 
among the most important transshipment markets through the Panama Canal. Such transshipment 
markets connect regional ports systems to transoceanic and circum-equatorial routes. Essentially, 
the Panama Canal, through the Caribbean Sea, is a shorter route to navigate the globe through the 
Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Given these natural advantages, China has regarded the Caribbean as 
a key area in its push for a 21st century maritime silk road.170  
 
The Caribbean region’s turn to China for lending to develop the maritime industry highlight the 





Caribbean states, the drive for investment in the maritime sector assumed pressing priority with 
the expansion of the Panama Canal. Caribbean states act as an intermediary route to and from the 
Panama Canal.  They are then poised to benefit from the annual $270 billion worth of cargo trade 
through the canal which links more than 140 maritime routes and over 80 countries.171 Expanding 
maritime infrastructure has been a key part of economic initiatives between China and the 
governments of the Bahamas, Trinidad and Jamaica. As shown in table 4.5, China has committed 
over US $ 2 billion in loans to the maritime sector in English speaking Caribbean states, an area 
with key strategic international maritime straits as seen in chapter 1.  
 
Table 4. 5: maritime infrastructure investments in select Caribbean states by China 
 
Year  Caribbean State  Maritime Project  Amount 
(US$) 
China’s Economic Actor   
2014 Jamaica Transshipment 
Facility 
1.5 billion China Exim Bank; CHEC 
2014 Trinidad La Brea Port  500 
million 
China Exim Bank; CHEC 
2012 Bahamas North Abaco Port 
Project 
40 million China Exim Bank; CHEC 
Source; compiled by author (Nassau Guardian, Trinidad Guardian, Jamaica Gleaner newspapers) 
 
Although Caribbean states economic engagement with China has resulted in various concerns 
pertaining to labour and environmental standards, as will be examined in chapter 7, China has 
played a significant role in addressing critical infrastructure gaps in economy.  In doing so, China 
has aided tremendously in contributing to development priorities in the Caribbean. 
 
Caribbean states have also leveraged their own capacities to further strengthen ties with China at 
the domestic level in accordance with their own aims in the engagement.  The maritime industry 
is especially significant for the Bahamas which is an archipelago of about seven hundred (700) 
islands. The Bahamas is also strategically located in relation to the US mainland and straddles 
major shipping lanes through to Europe, the Far East, North and South America, the Caribbean 
and Australia. One of its islands, Grand Bahama is just 55 miles away from the US mainland, 





in the world alongside states like Panama and Singapore.173 The maritime sector which comprise 
a range of services contribute between 14%-18% of the GDP of the Bahamas on an annual basis.174   
 
To further invest in the sector, The Bahamas turned to China’s Exim Bank for a loan of US$41 
million to develop port projects in the northern Abaco Islands. Moreover, the presence of private 
firm interests linked to Hong Kong, has been part of the Bahamas maritime industry since the early 
1990’s. In 1995, Hutchison Whampoa bought a 50 percent share of Freeport Harbor by entering a 
partnership with the private company, the Grand Bahama Development Company Limited. The 
acquisition resulted in US $850 million investment in Freeport Labour.175 In examining this initial 
deal, scholars like Myers (2018) notes that it has been indicative of broader interests in the 
Caribbean by non-traditional actors.176  
 
Trinidad has also utilized its own geostrategic position coupled with its oil resources to benefit 
from Chinese financing for development gains. Trinidad is a key maritime shipping route for oil 
and gas emanating not only from the island but from other significant oil producers like Venezuela. 
Oil and gas accounted for at least 40% of GDP, according to Trinidad’s Ministry of Finance in 
2014. Trinidad was also among the largest producers of liquefied natural gas in the world according 
to figures for 2015.177 With the expansion of the Panama Canal, Trinidad’s strategic position as a 
key transshipment point meant that maritime services had to be expanded to accommodate new 
developments in the canal.  One of the key challenges that have faced Trinidad in the realization 
of its various goals in the maritime industry has been the key infrastructural gaps within the 
industry, especially in terms of bigger ship accommodation and repair.  Thus, on a state visit to 
China on February 23rd - 28th, 2014, Trinidad’s Prime Minister, Persad-Bissessar, engaged with 
Chinese officials on the development of Trinidad’s maritime infrastructure. Consequently, an 
agreement with the China Habour Engineering Company (CHEC) followed for a transshipment 











The significance of developing the Jamaica maritime sector with the help of China to make it more 
competitive on a global scale can be traced at least to the mid -1990’s. In 1996, Jamaica’s former 
Prime Minister Edward Seaga, sought to engage with Chinese interests in promoting investments 
in the sector.179  Jamaica benefits from its proximity to the Panama Canal which is the major route 
for cargo from the Far East including China to the US East and West coast. Further, Jamaica’s 
Kingston Habour is only 32 miles from the main shipping lanes of North and South America. 180  
 
The maritime sector has been targeted by Jamaica’s Government as an area of re-development 
especially in light of the expansion of the Panama Canal. On a visit to China on August 2013, 
Jamaica’s Prime Minister, Portia Simpson Miller, highlighted the importance of this sector for 
investments. 181 Following the visit, in April 2014, the Government of Jamaica signed a framework 
agreement with China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) for the development of a trans-
shipment hub.182 The total cost of the project was US $ 1.5 billion. However, at the time of writing 
of the thesis, significant roadblocks to Chinese investments in this strategic sector remained. Thus, 
this issue will be taken up in chapter 7 on states domestic responses to China’s economic activities 
in the region. 
 
Section 2  
3. Impact of Caribbean States lending:  a new dependency on China? 
The section just concluded above, illuminated the key role of domestic economic considerations 
in shaping Caribbean states relations with China. Having examined how and why Caribbean states 
have sought to expand economic ties with China and highlighted their agency in the interactions, 
this section seeks to examine the impacts of deepened interactions with China in the realm of 
lending.   
In light of the increased lending from China, a critical issue which confronts Caribbean states is 
the extent to which China has become a new and alternative lender which reinforces previous 
patterns of debt and dependency in relation to external actors.  Hence, the underlying issue in this 
section is whether Caribbean states extended lending for infrastructure investments impact on debt 
 





levels, thereby reinforcing previous economic patterns of engagement. While Caribbean states 
lending for infrastructure investments have been closely tied to attaining national development 
goals, the economic impact of Chinese lending at the ground level in the region is still very much 
under-examined. Brautigam and Gallagher (2014) briefly examined policy implications of Chinese 
financing in Latin America and Africa. As such, they focused on how these developing regions 
might seek to benefit from Chinese financing. 
 However, the likely consequences of extended debt within developing states, remain very much 
under-explored in the Sino-LAC literature, despite the significant global shift created by China’s 
substantial role in infrastructure financing in the developing world. As Kaplan (2016:645), 
emphasises, China’s “impact on the (LAC) region’s renewed debt problem,” needs to be examined 
more closely in the literature on China’s rise in the region. 
China’s role in increasing levels of indebtedness for developing countries has been highlighted in 
the literature to some extent. Ngaire Woods (2008) focuses on claims by established donors that 
China may be inhibiting debt relief for lower income countries by increasing its lending to such 
countries. As Mattlin and Nojonen (2015:702) suggest, notwithstanding the perceived consensus 
of “no strings attached” development assistance, the issue of Chinese lending and the concomitant 
rise in developing states debt have a real impact on such states. The increasing levels of debt 
incurred by developing states in economic interaction with China has also been the focus of 
Reuters which claims that Chinese lending do present growing risks for increasing debt burdens.183   
The issue as to whether China’s lending builds a new dependency fuelled by extended debt is very 
much relevant in the Caribbean context. The Caribbean region has already been impacted by high 
debt levels in relation to external actors. Caribbean states have been among the middle-income 
economies with the highest debt to GDP ratios184- point which we will return too as the section 
unfolds. Organisations such as the Commonwealth have highlighted this issue as a potential and 
actual roadblock to development within small states of the Commonwealth, including the 
Caribbean region. In 2013, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Sri 
 
183 Zhang et al (2017), “Behind China’s Silk Road Vision, Cheap Funds, Heavy Debt, Growing Risks”, www.reuters.com 
184 Measures of debt to GDP ratios was put in place by the IMF and World Bank in 2005 to determine at what point debt is no 
longer sustainable and can have negative repercussions on economic development of countries involved. Most English-speaking 
Caribbean states have been considered as highly indebted middle income economies due to having a threshold of 60% and above. 
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Lanka, made small states debt an important part of the agenda. This issue was also of interest at 
CHOGM 2015 in Malta given the adverse economic effects of debt in small states. 
Moreover, the impact of increasing debt from multilateral and bilateral sources has been well 
documented in the literature. As Devlin (2014) argues, financial institutions have played a role in 
exacerbating the effects of debt crises through various lending practices with Latin America. Debt 
has posed significant constraints to development within the region given the substantial diversion 
of critical national resources to external debt servicing (see Bulmer-Thomas; 2003, Remmer;1991, 
Griffith-Jones and O Sunkel; 1986). The region is one that has been deeply impacted by the debt 
crisis of the 1980’s, and the global financial crisis of 2008. 
 The impact that debt has had on development in Latin America and the Caribbean have led 
observers and scholars alike to term the 1980’s for instance, “the lost decades” for economic 
growth in the region (see Ocampo, 2004; Stallings and Peres, 2010; Burki Perry, 1997). Within 
specific Caribbean states such as Jamaica and Guyana, the consequences of debt to their economic 
development has been fairly well examined by observers and scholars alike (see Sahay, 2005; 
Greenidge et al, 2010). Structural adjustment policies and debt restructuring programmes are still 
ongoing as a result of debt obligations to various external actors.  
Therefore, a more pragmatic view of the economic relationship needs to account for the possibly 
adverse effects of debt especially given Caribbean states previous experiences with this issue. 
China’s commercial interests have been a central motivating factor in lending to developing states 
and the focus is seemingly largely on economic returns on investments. Within the Latin America 
Caribbean region, loans have been based on commodity backed financing in line with China’s 
resource interests. This type of financing agreement has been particularly relevant for Venezuela, 
whose proven oil reserves is thought to be the largest in the world.185  
 
While this model of financing may not be attributed to most Anglophone Caribbean states, given 
the differentiated resource endowments across the region, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
lending is also integrally tied to opening up trade markets and accessing entry into those markets. 





within developing states with a focus on playing an essential economic role within such states even 
in the absence of significant resources (Sanderson and Forsythe 2013: ii).  
 
Moreover, Gallagher (2012) posits that China’s terms in terms of lending are not necessarily more 
generous than that of traditional actors on the market. Thus the extent to which engagement with 
China can be separated from more established actors who have also been commercially driven, 
may still be left open to debate. Thus making the issue of increased debt just as pressing in relations 
with China.  
 
3.1 Impact of Caribbean states Lending from China:  renewed debt? 
Within the Caribbean region, lending from China is occurring within a complex economic 
environment.  It is against a complicated backdrop of limited economic resources and inadequate 
access to international finance that Caribbean states have increasingly sought to engage with China 
for the implementation of commercial endeavours at the domestic level. For instance, Caribbean 
states face a peculiar situation with regards to financing whereby their designation as middle 
income countries not only limit debt relief but inhibit access to financial markets at preferential 
rates.  Added to this already intricate picture, have been donor priorities which affect how such 
states implement domestic economic agendas. As discussed earlier,  states may view donors as not 
always responsive to their preferences in the engagement.  Thus, in the main, China’s emergence 
has created significant maneuvering space for Caribbean states to assert economic interests.  
As discussed in section 1, China’s economic input in infrastructure investments has made a 
positive contribution to Caribbean states economic development goals. Chinese financing has 
enabled Caribbean states to fill critical gaps in infrastructure investments. Drawing from the 
broader literature, infrastructure investments overall have been shown to have favourable effects 
on the economy at both the macro and micro levels. Studies have concluded that infrastructure 
investments affect productivity and economic output (Ansar et al 2016; Krugman, 1991; Aschauer, 
1993; Munnell, 1992; Calderon and Serven, 2010; Jiang et al., 2017). Thus, the hundreds of 
millions in financing already provided by China to Caribbean states have aided such states in 
meeting various development goals.  
However, lending can invariably increase debt burdens with regards to China. This issue in relation 
to Chinese lending while still largely under-examined in the academic literature on China’s rise 
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within developing states, has been highlighted by World Bank officials. Former Head of the World 
Bank, Paul Wolfowitz, in 2006 talks with China indicated, “There is a real risk of seeing countries 
which have benefited from debt relief become heavily indebted once more.”186 This issue is not 
only relevant to highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) within Africa but also, within developing 
states such as the Caribbean. These states have faced significant challenges with debt but are not 
necessarily subject to debt relief through arrangements under HIPC initiatives.    
 
For the Anglophone Caribbean, the majority of China’s commercial activities have been linked to 
concessional lending. According to a 2013 study released by the Caribbean Development Bank, 
the growing presence of China is already shifting the debt dynamics in the Caribbean. 
Consequently, the study posits that “as lending from Western governments...declined, aid from 
China …increased (and), the growing presence of the Yuan renminbi in the currency composition 
of external debt portfolios (has changed) the character of foreign currency risk.”187 Within the 
broader Caribbean and Latin American region, the IADB estimates that between 2005-2016, the 
Chinese financing to the LAC region amounted to US$ 141 billion in loan commitments.188  
Gallagher, Irwin and Koleski (2012), conclude that China’s lending terms have not necessarily 
been more favourable than other western institutions like the World Bank. As seen in section 1, 
infrastructure loans to Caribbean states generally carry interest rates of 2-3%.  The extent to which 
such states may still be borrowing at regular market rates rather than on preferential terms with 
Chinese banking institutions, indicates that lending from China still comes at significant costs to 
the borrower, much like other actors.  
 
The issue of lending and debt may not necessarily be overlooked in Caribbean states economic 
interaction with China. The Caribbean region has been regarded as having the highest debt to GDP 
ratio of middle income countries based on standardization from the IMF and World Bank.189 In 
2005, both the IMF and World Bank sought to focus on thresholds to determine whether current 
and projected debt levels may lead to future difficulties in servicing debt (see Rustomjee, 2017:1). 
While these standardized thresholds of about 60% have been debated, the Caribbean has been 
 
186	https://www.ft.com/content/ea6cd650-62d8-11db-8faa-0000779e2340	





impacted adversely by external debt. For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010: 2012) note that in 
going above the 90% threshold with regards to the debt and GDP ratio, countries face significantly 
lower economic growth outcomes.   
 
With regards to the Caribbean, as debt levels approach the 55-56% of GDP, it becomes “a drag on 
growth”190  for the region and returns from debt diminishes rapidly. As shown in figure 4.0, the 
debt to GDP ratio of most Anglophone Caribbean state, was above 60% between 2010-2016. This 
is a pattern that dates back to 2005, a period coinciding with the rise in China’s economic 
engagement in the Caribbean.  As seen in figure 4.0, in all eight (8) Caribbean states, except 
Trinidad, debt is considered above the threshold for sustainability determined by the IMF and 
World Bank. Figures from UNDP suggests that many Anglophone Caribbean states (Dominica, 
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) have more than 18% of government 
revenues to public debt service over a stipulated period. 191   
 
 
Author elaboration based on IMF data 
(http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/GGXWDG_NGDP@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD) 
 
Debt servicing in Caribbean states have meant that critical resources have been diverted from 
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Minister Bruce Golding and former Guyanese President, Bharrat Jagdeo, both acknowledge that 
debt servicing creates pressures in the local economy.192 The continued debt burden in the 
Caribbean has affected government spending on public sector services. Former Caribbean 
Ambassador, Ronald Sanders acknowledges, “There is a real prospect that, in dealing with 
unsustainable debt, eleven of thirteen Caribbean small states will have lost the first three decades 
of the twenty-first century, and foregone opportunities for poverty reduction, transformation and 
growth.”193  
 
Moreover, debt obligations towards China, has already been a talking point by high level American 
officials in determining Chinese influence in the Caribbean. President’s Trump National Security 
Strategy (2017: 51) states “Competitors have found operating space in the hemisphere China seeks 
to pull the region  into its orbit through state-led investments and loans.” Similar sentiments on 
Chinese financing in the region have been echoed by US Secretary of State, Tillerson, who posits; 
“Chinese offers always come at a price and Chinese business projects almost always demand the 
use of imported Chinese labor, large loans, and unsustainable debt and ignore human and property 
rights.”194  Wenner and Clarke (2016: 21) in an IADB report on China’s rise in the Caribbean 
acknowledge that Caribbean officials need to strengthen their negotiating skills in interactions with 
China to obtain greater benefits in economic relations. These are relevant concerns within the 
dynamic. Further, as will be addressed in chapter 7, Chinese lending is also integrally tied to 
particular economic practices that have led to seemingly disadvantageous labour practices within 
the local context.  
 
The popular narrative surrounding Chinese lending in the Caribbean, perhaps more so at the 
official level, has been that China’s aid is not tied and that China has a different ethos to traditional 
actors in its development assistance. It is within the framework of contributing to development 
goals that officials in the Caribbean region frame increasing lending from China for infrastructure 
development. Caribbean leaders see China as a significant partner in meeting their development 
goals. For instance, Dominica’s Prime Minister, Skerrit, acknowledges that to continue the 
development trajectory, debt thus far, increases the chances of meeting national development 
 




goals.195 Along a similar vein, Chinese officials partake in a rhetoric of “win-win” in relation to 
cooperation agreements within Latin America and the Caribbean (see Alves, 2013; Bernal and 
Arias, 2016). 
 
As to whether lending from China for infrastructure development may in the long term, offset any 
disadvantages from increasing debt levels, remains to be seen. But arguably, the risks of a debt 
spiral impacting the Caribbean for years to come, in relation to actors engaged in lending might be 
a very real one.  The impact of China on debt in the Caribbean is still manifesting and as such will 
unfold more clearly with time.  Nonetheless, given the high debt burden of Caribbean states it was 
important to contextualise the impact of increased lending for infrastructure investments from 
China within the Caribbean context. 
  
4. Discussion of research findings and case summary 
For the Caribbean region, China has facilitated access to financing and provided considerable 
maneuvering space to achieve their development goals in accordance with their economic interests 
at the local level. This rise in lending from China has been in line with its leading economic role 
at the global level and its subsequent outreach to the developing world.  
 
The findings suggested that China’s investments in infrastructure projects in the sports sector in 
select Caribbean states amounted to more than US $ 200 million between 2005-2008. This is likely 
a conservative estimate given that much of the agreements and Chinese spending in developing 
states are not necessarily provided by China in the public realm in contrast to development 
assistance provided by traditional economic powers within the region. The Caribbean also 
benefited from over US$800 million in health infrastructure committed by China to select 
Caribbean states between 2011 and 2016.  
 
Caribbean states have further facilitated China’s growing role in tourism infrastructure. As already 
discussed, tourism is a vital sector within the economies of most states in the Anglophone 
Caribbean region. Between 2010 to 2015, select tourism projects within the region have attracted 
investments of well over US $3 billion from China. Additionally, China has committed well over 





The findings suggested that Caribbean states increasingly turned to China for investment in various 
infrastructure, particularly the areas which were not a priority for western actors. This correlates 
with findings from Brautigam 2011, who found that China was able to carve out substantial 
economic influence in areas that traditional donors did not necessarily prioritise in Africa.  
 
However, with this rise in lending by Caribbean states, two main issues at the domestic level have 
been highlighted. One is the extent to which the Caribbean is renewing dependency on China for 
financing much like in relation to other external actors. The second is the extent to which the 
increase in lending is increasing the growing debt burden of small Caribbean states which carry 
high debt to GDP ratios.   
 
While much research has not been undertaken with regards to increasing debt levels in relation to 
China and its impact on the developing world, debt has been known to adversely affect the 
development of the Caribbean and Latin America overall as already discussed. Therefore, the more 
pragmatic approach undertaken in relation to increased debt from China was that its impact may 
not necessarily differ significantly from that of previous actors, notwithstanding possible 
development gains in the interaction. It was then important to go beyond the rhetoric of “win-win” 
promoted by Chinese officials in south-south cooperation. Similar assumptions have also been 
reiterated within the political realm in the Caribbean region in an effort to justify the increased 
debt obligations undertaken. Despite China’s success in contributing to Caribbean states 
development, increased levels of dependency on China as an alternative actor, remains a distinct 
possibility. The findings also indicated the need for Caribbean states to consider how best to 
maximize benefits from China’s financing while seeking to limit possible pitfalls in engagement.  
 
The table (4.6), provides a case summary of Caribbean states lending from China.  The summary 
places in further perspective, Caribbean states aims in the engagement and the constituent impacts 
of the fast evolving ties with China in the economic realm. Thus highlighting more broadly, 









Issues and Debates Summary Findings 
 
 
Aims of Caribbean 
States in accessing 
financing from 
China  





gaps in economic 
sectors at the national 
level 
The resulting strategic economic shift towards China in the Post-Cold War period by Caribbean states is steeped in accessing 
financing for development. This has been aided in part by China’s economic rise in global affairs alongside traditional actors.  
 
Nature and Scope 
of Caribbean States 
lending from China 
Limited studies and 
scarcity of empirical 
data on Caribbean 
states lending from 
China. 
 
Caribbean states lending from China is a means of accessing development finance to pursue economic goals at the domestic 
level. Findings corroborates with that of China’s economic relations with other region’s in the developing world including Latin 
America and Africa. Much of Chinese financing has been dedicated to infrastructure projects in such states in the period under 
consideration in the thesis. 
Billions of US dollars committed by China based on loans in various infrastructure sectors in the Anglophone Caribbean 
between 2005-2015 including; sports, health tourism and maritime infrastructure. 
Caribbean states lending from China has enabled China to play a growing role in Caribbean region alongside traditional actors. 
Impact of 
Caribbean States 
lending from China 
Debate on whether 
Chinese financing is 
meeting Caribbean 
states development 
goals in infrastructure 
sectors. 
 
Debate on whether 




on China as a new and 
alternative lender. 
 
 Debate on whether 
lending impact   on 
Caribbean states   
already high debt 
burdens in relation to 
external actors. 
New dependency patterns possible 
 
China’s economic input has been largely beneficial in meeting Caribbean states development goals in infrastructure 
investments but at the same time, reliance on China as a source of funding can create the space for replicating previous 
economic patterns of the past in relation to external actors.  
The findings suggest the possible re-emergence of an old nexus of debt and development within Caribbean states with 
China now at the apex of these familiar relations. However, very few authors have dealt with this issue in depth even with 
respect to Latin America in the literature on the region’s economic interactions with China thus far.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The Caribbean region’s evolving relations with China has long been overlooked as part of the 
analyses of China’s rise in Latin America and the Caribbean. In examining Caribbean states 
economic interests as a principal intervening variable which shape the Caribbean China 
relationship, the chapter focused on an in-depth study of lending for infrastructure investments 
from China in the Anglophone Caribbean. It first sought to uncover the rationale for Caribbean 
states engagement with China in lending for infrastructure investments.  In the period between 
2005-2016, the intensified economic engagement between the Caribbean and China resulted in 
billions of US dollars in loan commitments to the Anglophone Caribbean by China for 
infrastructure investments in sports, tourism, maritime and health sectors.  Thereby promoting 
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investments in those economic sectors that have been regarded as part of Caribbean states national 
development priorities. 
 
 The chapter then went on examine the impacts of the increased lending for infrastructure 
investments by the Caribbean from China. In doing so, it examined whether the Caribbean’s 
intensified interaction with China in lending has created a new dependency on China as an 
alternative debtor, thereby increasing Caribbean states debt to external actors. While Caribbean 
states increased lending from China has expanded the region’s access to financing beyond 
traditional actors, invariably this results in increased debt to China.   This was quite relevant in the 
Caribbean context as it is among the middle-income economies with the highest debt to GDP ratios 
as determined by the IMF and World Bank.  
 
However, while there is increased debt to China because of increased lending for infrastructure 
investments, the role of China as a salient partner in Caribbean states economic development based 
on largely south- south cooperation should not be underestimated. China has shown a willingness 
to endure risks in various economic spaces including small states where traditional actors may not 
necessarily seek to expand lending. It would be problematic to bypass this commitment to south-
south cooperation within the analysis. China’s assistance has not only been rhetorical thus far, but 
have also resulted in practical development aid to developing states. Consequently, China has 
played a critical role in enabling Caribbean states to meet their economic development goals in the 




Chapter 5: Caribbean States Domestic Economic Engagement with China: trade dimension 
 
This chapter, like the preceding one, examines the extent to which economic factors have played 
an influential and determining role in the Caribbean and China relationship in the Post-Cold War 
context of engagement (2005-2015). The chapter investigates the trade relationship between 
Caribbean states and China through an empirically based case study of the commercial 
interactions. Trade and lending have been shown to be closely intertwined in China’s economic 
engagement in developing states (see Alden; 2008, Brautigam; 2009, Zafar; 2007). However, the 
Caribbean region’s trade interactions with China remains under-examined within the broader Sino 
Latin America Caribbean literature. The chapter aims to examine how Caribbean states trade 
relations with China has evolved in the Post-Cold War period and the consequent impacts of the 
trade relationship.  
 
This chapter also aligns with a theoretically informed approach in evaluating Caribbean states 
relations with China. Thus, it seeks to analyse domestic processes as a key driver in foreign policy 
articulation and implementation. In accordance with FPA and NCR, unit level issues are critical 
to unpacking state behaviour (Fearon, 1998; Holsti and Rosenau, 1988; Rose, 1998). 
 
The chapter argues that Caribbean states trade relationship with China have been predicated upon 
expanding access to markets and enhancing opportunities for FDI within the context of China’s 
global economic emergence in the Post-Cold War period.  Such interests have also converged with 
China’s own resource drives and search for new markets.  These interacting dynamics have 
invariably led to a more diversified trading environment within the Caribbean region whereby 
China’s role as an economic partner has been on the rise thus far.  
But despite the substantive economic gains procured especially in relation to China’s extensive 
input in infrastructure financing, the reinvigorated trade partnership has been steeped in 
challenges. For Caribbean states, it is fair to say that the trade relationship with China has two 
contrasting aspects. On one hand, China’s emergence has brought about new opportunities for 
Caribbean countries in terms of China’s overall significance as an alternative partner for 
commercial partnerships. On the other hand, the overarching power asymmetry between the 
Caribbean region and China in trade has been further reinforced with the increasing ties.  
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Previous studies on Latin America and the Caribbean have not dealt adequately with the growing 
trade relationship between the Caribbean region and China (see Gallagher and Porzecanski; 2010, 
Gallagher; 2016, Cui and Garcia; 2016).  Although ECLAC (2015) makes an initial effort to 
include the fast-growing trade ties between the Caribbean and China in a study which explores the 
trends in trade between the broader LAC region and China, the trade relationship between the 
Anglophone Caribbean and China is not treated in much detail.  
 
The very limited studies on the Caribbean and China, suggest that there is need for more systematic 
research into the growing trade dynamic in order to help situate the interests of developing states 
in the interaction while concomitantly providing a broader perspective on China’s rise in the 
region. 
 
Drawing from the broader literature on Latin America’s trade relations with China, there are two 
main concerns regarding the impact of the rising trade relations. One relates to China’s role in 
reinstituting a new form of dependency which reinstates the concentrated commodities structure 
in Latin America’s trade while also allowing for increased intakes of high-end manufactures from 
China (see Cui and Garcia, 2016; Casanova et al, 2015; Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010). The 
second debate pertains to the impact of China’s rise in the manufacturing sector and whether it has 
resulted in a competitive threat to the Caribbean and Latin America (see Lall et al, 2005; Jenkins, 
2010, 2012; Moreira, 2007; Calderon, 2009; Li Xing, 2016)  
The chapter is divided into two (2) sections.  The first section focuses on an examination of the 
trends which underpin the bilateral trade relationship between Caribbean states and China, based 
on UNComtrade data for the period 2005-2015.  The empirical evidence serves as an important 
starting point to determine the asymmetries which exist in the Caribbean and China trade 
relationship. The second section focuses on the impacts of the Caribbean’s increased trade 
relationship with China. It examines the extent to which the Caribbean’s trade with China is 
indicative of the dependency patterns of the past whereby the Caribbean region is a site for primary 
goods and commodities while acting as a destination for higher valued manufactures from China.  
Crucially, consideration is given to whether China’s rise in manufacturing has resulted in a 
competitive threat to the Caribbean region like it has been debated in the literature in relation to 
Latin America. To examine such debates within the Caribbean context, there is an examination of 
	 150	
the actual composition of bilateral trade with China for Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana based on 
WITS: World Bank data (2005-2015). The data allows one to evaluate within an evidenced-based 
framework the broader debates of China’s impact on the Caribbean. 
The findings suggest that there are mutual interests in the trade relationship between the Caribbean 
region and China. China’s rise has presented significant opportunities to expand Caribbean states 
access to goods on the global market and China’s emergence have also aided developing states 
like those of the Caribbean to pursue economic development goals. However, despite the 
opportunities in engaging China, there are conflicting elements which point to a level of imbalance 
in economic relations with China. The findings suggest that among them is the high level of trade 
deficits for the region in trade with China for the period considered. The findings also appear to 
point to familiar patterns of dependency emerging in the region’s trade relationship with China. 
However, attributing competitive effects to China as it relates to its trade with Caribbean states 
may not necessarily be a clear-cut process. This is partly due to China’s comparative advantage as 
well as internal factors within the region which may impact on its competitiveness in relation to 
trade powers like China. 
The chapter contributes to addressing the knowledge gap on Caribbean states trade with China. In 
doing so, it adds to the growing literature on the Latin America Caribbean region’s relations with 
China more broadly. Addressing the empirical gap provides an opportunity for generalisations 
pertaining China’s rise to be applicable to not only Latin America which is the focus of most 
studies purporting to study the region, but also to the Caribbean.  
Moreover, the chapter offers an analysis centrally from the standpoint of Caribbean states in the 
dynamic, rather than the more conventional China-facing analysis present in much of the discourse 
on China’s relations with developing states. It sheds light on Caribbean states interests in the 
dynamic and the broader impacts to the trade relationship between a more economically powerful 
China and small developing states in the Caribbean. Thus such states constraints and agency are 
highlighted in the process.  
Section 1 
This section seeks to examine the aims of the Caribbean in the trade relations with China and 
likewise the commercial objectives of China in the Caribbean region. It also intends to pay 
particular attention to the deliberative bilateral processes implemented by both the Caribbean and 
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China to further their economic engagement. This is then followed by a discussion on the actual 
nature and scope of the trade relationship in accordance with UN Comtrade data for the period 
2005-2015.  
The discussion then proceeds to examine the major caveats that may be borne in mind when 
evaluating the imbalanced trade relationship between the Caribbean region and China. Among the 
major provisos are not only the more direct issue of China’s comparative advantage in trade but 
also what the data does not readily reveal and that is; the growing significance of China as an 
export market for Caribbean states with commodities, a trend seen for Trinidad, Jamaica and 
Guyana. Further, China has increased its FDI in resource sectors in those states. This points to the 
possibility of increasing trade ties with the region, which can in the long term, benefit the region 
economically. Moreover, China’s growing trade links with the broader Latin American Caribbean 
region is differentiated in that despite the deficits, certain states in Latin America have benefited 
significantly from China’s rise in the region.  
2. Cooperation framework: consolidating the trade agenda  
In the Post-Cold War period (2005-2015), the trade relationship was partly facilitated through a 
multilateral diplomatic process which encompassed Caribbean and Chinese state actors, 
entrepreneurs and China’s state owned enterprises. These interactive processes initially acted as a 
springboard to encourage trade between the Caribbean region and China. Chinese entrepreneurs 
also sought to promote their own individual trade agendas within the Caribbean region by either 
tagging on to these more formal mechanisms or seeking to engage in an outreach to the region on 
their own terms.  
The trade relationship first took a turn in 2005, after the First China-Caribbean Economic and 
Trade Cooperation Forum which took place in Jamaica. The forum was designed to initiate a new 
framework for strengthening economic ties between the Anglophone Caribbean region and China. 
To mark the new phase in the Caribbean’s economic engagement with China, China’s Vice 
President, Zeng Qinghong, delivered a speech perhaps fittingly under the theme, "Jointly Writing 
a New Historic Chapter on the Reciprocal China-Caribbean Cooperation."196 The forum enabled 




level. For instance, prior to the formal opening of the forum, Barbados hosted a 50-member 
delegation of entrepreneurs from China from January 27 to 31, 2005. The delegation was headed 
by Vice Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade Mr. Yu Ping. 197 
The meeting provided an avenue through which Barbados could seek to expand trade and 
investment opportunities with China.  
 
The inaugural forum increased the visibility of the Caribbean market to Chinese entrepreneurs and 
served as a means of introducing various Caribbean states to trade opportunities with China. 
According to China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 110 Chinese enterprises participated 
in the inaugural forum in the Caribbean.  Caribbean countries and Chinese enterprises also signed 
economic and trade cooperative agreements of over US$ 50 million at the 2005 forum.198  
 
Trade appeared to have flourished immediately after the 2005 forum in the Caribbean region. As 
shown in table 5.0, in 2005, two-way trade between Jamaica and China was US $325 million. By 
2006, after the inaugural forum, bilateral trade between Jamaica and China had grown to US$538 
million. This figure shows an increase of over US$ 2 million in the span of one year. In 2005, 
Trinidad’s bilateral trade with China was US$119 million.  By 2006, two-way trade had increased 
to US $175 million, an increase of 56 million dollars in a year. Dominica which is a smaller 
Caribbean state relative to Trinidad or Jamaica, had bilateral trade with China which amounted to 
US$ 50 million in 2005. By 2006, bilateral trade between the Dominica and China had grown to 
US $ 69 million, therefore increasing by $US10 million in a one year period. 
 
The Caribbean region and China continued to facilitate increased trade through the Second China 
Caribbean Economic Trade Cooperation which took place in 2007 in Xiamen, China. As part of 
the forum, a series of loans were made available to Chinese entrepreneurs for undertaking business 
endeavours in the Caribbean. Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi, noted that 4 billion yuan of low-
interest loans was provided by the Government of China to Chinese firms to encourage investment 






In an effort to increase economic opportunities with China, Anglophone Caribbean states such as 
Jamaica signed four agreements with Chinese representatives at the 2007 forum. Two of the 
agreements were aimed specifically at increasing business opportunities for Chinese entrepreneurs 
in Jamaica. Therefore, Jamaica Trade and Invest, which is an agency of the Government of 
Jamaica, signed an MOU with the Investment Promotion Agency of China. The China-Caribbean 
Joint Business Council, also signed a declaration aimed at strengthening and promoting business 
between the two countries.200 Moreover, in 2011, when the Third China Caribbean Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Forum was convened in Trinidad, more than 80 Chinese companies 
participated, in order to pursue business interests across the Caribbean.  
The trade agenda has expanded since then and Caribbean and Latin American states have joined 
forces with China to articulate a broader economic cooperation framework. Thus in 2015, 
enhancing the trading relationship between the region and China was among the aims of the 
inaugural China-CELAC forum. An outcome of the forum was the “2015-2019 Cooperation Plan.” 
In that plan, the broader region and China pledged to, “increase trade in both directions and in a 
balanced and mutually beneficial way between China and CELAC countries to 500 billion US 
dollars (by 2019).”201   
There is reason to surmise that this increase in trade between the Caribbean, Latin America and 
China in accordance with the projected figure is somewhat feasible. In accordance with UN trade 
based calculations for select English- speaking states in 2015 (see table 5.0), bilateral trade 
between the Caribbean and China was over US$ 3 billion. In the Bahamas alone, two-way trade 
amounted to US$ 1.6 billion and with Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, Barbados and Dominica, the 
total figure for 2015, was over US $1.5 billion. 
Table 5.0 Selected Caribbean Countries Bilateral Trade in Goods with China (US$M): 2004-2015 
COUNTRY 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Jamaica 396 325.1 538.4 286.0 294.3 218.6 239.3 374.9 816.8 630.9 561 661 
Trinidad 79.6 119.1 175.0 284.0 373.8 347.4 399.1 626.7 451.8 440.9 528.7 521 
Guyana 22.4 34.8 99.2 84.0 88.3 69.8 100.7 147.2 225.6 181.3 207.5 210 
Bahamas 99.4 155.6 164.6 180.9 385.9 422.7 628.0 613.0 709.0 336.8 743.0 1.6 
billion  
Barbados 10.6 19.4 75.9 35.9 29.4 93.8 75.2 150.6 106.6 82.9 86.9 84  






These forums have reflected the role of the Caribbean region in China’s broader going out strategy 
for its domestic firms to invest abroad. Moreover, the region’s place in China’s commercial 
strategy has been further cemented through its first foreign policy paper on Latin America and the 
Caribbean in 2008 and subsequently, in 2016. According to the said foreign policy instruments, 
the region is a land of vitality and hope where mutual economic benefits could be procured. 202 
 
2.1 Trends in Caribbean states’ trade relationship with China 
The Caribbean region’s trade with China has increased steadily for the period under consideration, 
albeit along highly asymmetrical lines. Trade between the region and China has been marked by 
increasing trade deficits. An analysis of UN Comtrade data for the period 2005-2015, shows that 
there has been an almost consistent decline in the terms of trade for the Caribbean in the ten-year 
period. Imports from China has almost consistently outstripped exports from the English-Speaking 
Caribbean (see table 5.1, and table 5.2).  
Table 5.1 Showing the Value of Selected Caribbean Countries Exports to China from 2005-2015 (US$) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Trinidad 19M 10M 20M 24M 103M 108M 340M 140M 120M 101M 39M 
Jamaica 220M 359M 39M 6M 22M 3.7M 4M 31M 3.8M 38M 31M 
Guyana 8M 18M 18M 17M 11M 17M 15M 26M 21M 40M 49M 
Barbados >1M >1M 1.1M 1.4M 2.2M 3.8M 6.7M 10.4M 12.6M 15M 19M 
Bahamas >1M >1M 18M >1M  >1M  >1M 62M 116M >1M >1M 24M 
Dominica 1M 8.1M 4.1M 2M 1.2M 2.5M 4M 1M 1M 1M 1M 
Source: compiled by author based on UN Comtrade data 
Table 5.2 Showing the Value of Caribbean Imports from China from 2005-2015 (US$) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Trinidad 100M 165M 263M 350M 244M 291M 287M 312M 321M 428M 482M 
Jamaica 104M 178M 247M 289M 197M 236M 371M 786M 627M 523M 630M 
Guyana 27M 82M 66M 71M 59M 83M 133M 200M 160M 167M 161M 
Barbados 19M 76M 35M 28M 92M 71M 144M 96M 70M 71M 65M 
Bahamas 155M 125M 163M 385M  423M  628M 550M 592M 337M 743M 1.6 
billion 
Dominica 49M 61M 74M 76M 22M 41M 26M 25M 23M 37M 34M 
Source: compiled by author based on UN Comtrade data 
The trade deficit is particularly striking in the case of the Bahamas. While China exported goods 
worth several million dollars to the Bahamas, Bahamian exports to China was only worth a few 
hundred thousand dollars. Between 2011 and 2012, it reached a high of US $ 62 million and $ 117 
million respectively, but by 2014, it had declined to 138 thousand dollars. In the case of Guyana, 




review. One Caribbean state, Barbados, has consistently managed to increase its exports to China 
for the ten-year period. But even such an increase in exports on the part of Barbados, has not been 
enough to offset the trade deficit with China. 
In contrast to the patterns exhibited above, individual Caribbean states have not always had a trade 
deficit with China. The figures for Jamaica show that while Jamaica exported US$ 220 million 
worth of goods to China in 2005, it imported US $ 104 million. In 2006, Jamaica exported US $ 
359 worth of commodities to China and only imported US $178 million.  This shows a positive 
trade balance with China for Jamaica. Jamaica’s positive trade balance with China goes back even 
further, based on an analysis of WITS UN Comtrade data for 2001-2015 (see table 5.3).  From 
2001-2006, Jamaica enjoyed a positive balance of trade with China.  The favourable trade balance 
enjoyed by Jamaica with China resulted from China’s increased demands for commodities such as 
metals, an important part of the alumina sector in Jamaica.  As acknowledged by Goldstein et al 
(2006: 11) from the year 2000, increased demand from Asian drivers of the global economy such 
as China had a positive impact on the international price in commodities. 
 Essentially, for much of the first five years of the millennium, Jamaica was exporting more to 
China than it was importing. While Jamaica benefited from that demand, the pattern of trade 
became marked by deficit from 2007-2015. Jamaica ran a consistent trade deficit with China based 
on decreasing exports and increasing imports (see table 5.3). According to the Statistical Institute 
of Jamaica, the total volume of China-Jamaica trade reached US$427 million in 2014, an increase 
of 25.6 % over 2013, and 78.7 % over 2010. By 2012, Jamaica had become China's top trading 
partner in the Caribbean. According to the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, the total volume of 
China-Jamaica trade reached US$427 million in 2014, an increase of 25.6 per cent over 2013, and 
78.7 per cent over 2010. As seen in table 5.3, by 2015, Jamaica imported US $ 630 million in 
goods from China and exported only US $ 31 million to China. 
Table 5.3 showing Jamaica’s and balance of trade with China for 2001-2015 
 
Year Imports Exports Jamaica’s Trade 
Balance with China  
2001 1.83% 2.85% Positive  
2002 1.7% 3.96% Positive 
2003 2.3% 8.09% Positive  
2004 2.94% 12.08% Positive 
2005 2.9% 7.10% Positive 
2006 4.10% 15.11% Positive 
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2007 3.37% 3.13% Negative 
2008 3.77% 0.06% Negative 
2009 4.51% 1.3% Negative 
2010 4.65% 0.14% Negative 
2011 4.39% 1.32% Negative 
2012 4.72% 0.67% Negative 
2013 5.35% 0.96% Negative 
2014 6.75% 2.63% Negative 
2015 8.19% 2.27% Negative 
Source: author elaboration: WITS World Bank data: UN Comtrade 
 
2.2 Placing the Caribbean’s asymmetrical trade relationship with China in context 
While the Caribbean’s trade with China is highly asymmetrical, there is need to go beyond the 
data to more effectively place these highly imbalanced relations in perspective. The Caribbean’s 
trade deficit with China comes with at least three major caveats, each of which will be discussed 
subsequently.  One is that it needs to be viewed within the broader context of the asymmetries that 
exist between small state economies and an emerging economic trade giant like China. China is 
playing a leading economic role in the international system as compared to various developing 
regions where China has undertaken its commercial drives, including Latin America.  
 
Another major proviso in the apparently imbalanced trade relations between the Caribbean and 
China is what the data does not readily reveal and that is, the increased significance of China as an 
export market for the Anglophone Caribbean. In some instances, like in Trinidad, exports to China 
grew by over 80% between 2004 and 2014 as will be seen in figure 5.1. This is in line with the 
Caribbean’s increased economic turn to China in the Post-Cold war period.  
 
The third caveat is that China’s increasing investments in the Caribbean region in resource sectors 
as well as investments in infrastructure do have the potential to create further economic synergies 
between the region and China. Such economic endeavours can benefit Caribbean domestic markets 
in the medium to long term.  
 
2.2.1 China’s comparative advantage in trade  
The Caribbean region’s trade deficit with China needs to be considered in light of China’s 
comparative advantages. China is a significant competitor not only for small states within the 
Caribbean region but also for other developing and developed states. According to the World Trade 
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Organisation, China was the leading merchandise exporter in the world in 2015.203  Its role as a 
manufacturing powerhouse has been well recognised in the literature (see KH Zhang 2006; P. 
Ngai, 2005; Huang and Khanna 2003). This leads to inherent disparities in trade between an 
economic giant like China and small economies that lack the capital, human resource and 
technology that China possess. Therefore, leading to economies of scale that enable China to 
produce competitive goods for the global market.  
In general terms, China’s comparative advantages has meant growing imports to the Latin America 
Caribbean region. ECLAC (2015), suggests that from 2000-2014, the Caribbean and Latin 
American states imports from China far exceeded the region’s exports to China. Therefore, 
resulting in a negative trade balance for the region. According to ECLAC, in the period 2000-
2014, China’s contribution to the region’s imports grew from 2% to 16%, while its export share 
rose from 1% to 9%.  By 2014, both China and the EU accounted for similar shares in the broader 
region’s global trade (12.4% and 12.5%) respectively. 204  
To date, many Caribbean states have steadily expanded their intake of cheaper goods from China 
such as clothing, household items and manufactures such as car parts and electronics. This has 
been fuelled in part by the cheaper availability of Chinese products on the market. According to 
ECLAC, the majority of the region’s trade with China (91%) is in manufactures that are of low, 
medium or high technology. 205 China’s comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector based 
on cheap labour and enhanced technology has meant that it is able to produce these items at a much 
cheaper rate, thus making it a favourable alternative market for consumers. 
However, the generalised picture is somewhat distorted by the variations which exists in Latin 
America’s trade with China, as certain states have been able to benefit from trade with China. In 
accordance with WITS: World Bank data, from at least 2010 and up to 2017, Brazil has carried a 
trade surplus with China. This outcome also invariably points to the ability of certain states in 








and does not illustrate the norm in the ongoing commercial interactions. In general, the trade 
relations have been highly asymmetrical for both Caribbean and Latin American states. 
2.2.2 What the trade data obscures: rising significance of China for Caribbean states exports 
While on the surface, China’s trade with the Caribbean appears highly asymmetrical, the data itself 
suggests that an important trend is unfolding in the dynamic and that is; the increased significance 
of China as an export market for Caribbean states such as Trinidad and Guyana. Although the trade 
balance continues to favour China, both Trinidad and Guyana are Caribbean states which have 
increased exports to China between the period 2004-2015 (see figures 5.1 and 5.2). For Trinidad 
with a relatively well-developed oil sector, which contributes at least 40% of its GDP on an annual 
basis, while trade is still in deficit, exports to China grew by more than 80% from 2004 to 2015. 
In 2004, it was merely US $ 4 million worth of products being exported to China but by 2014 it 
had grown to just over US $100 million worth of exports to China (figure 5.1).   
 The same pattern of increasing significance of China as an export market can also be seen in the 
Guyana where exports to China have grown by more than 70% from 2004 -2015 (figure 5.2). 
While forestry products were still the leading part of Guyana’s exports to China, in 2015 minerals 
was the second highest export to China in accordance with WITS World Bank data. This is in line 
with China’s investments in the minerals sector in Guyana (see subsection 2.2.3).  
 The case of Jamaica is quite an interesting one as shown in figure 5.3.  It illustrates that small 
states like Jamaica did not always carry trade deficits with China. The situation of trade deficits 
with China contrasts with previous trade trends whereby Jamaica carried a positive balance of 
trade with China prior to 2005. Based on bilateral exports, Jamaica had a competitive edge over 
China whereby it exported far more to China than it imported. This is due to Jamaica’s competitive 
bauxite sector, as it is among the leading producers of the mineral. In 2016 was the 7th biggest 
producer of bauxite in the world.206 However, both internal and constraints have impacted 
Jamaica’s trade balance with China as seen in figure 5.3.  In 2008, during the global financial 
crisis, Jamaica’s exports to China nose-dived. Exports showed little recovery in the immediate 
aftermath of the crisis. |However, between 2014-2015 as illustrated in figure 5.3, Jamaica made a 







































As the Caribbean deepens its relations with China, there is the possibility that despite the 
asymmetries that exist, the Caribbean’s trade with China may mimic the same patterns between 
Latin America and China and that is; select Anglophone Caribbean states may benefit from 
China’s commercial drive in the hemisphere.  It may then be that China’s resource quest might 
benefit Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad given their mineral resources. While market size and other 
means of comparative advantage may likely continue to favour China, the data has shown an 
increasing level of Caribbean states exports going to China (see figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3). 
2.2.3 Caribbean States and China’s FDI to secure natural resources 
Given the presence of natural resources in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, China has been playing 
an increasing role in FDI in those countries. Chinese companies have sought joint ventures with 
mining companies in all three Caribbean states mentioned despite challenges in the fast-evolving 
commercial ties. 
 Trinidad’s Ministry of Energy in 2013, noted that major companies from China operate in the 
energy sector in Trinidad. These include Chaoyang Petroleum (Trinidad), which is so far owned 
50/50 by the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). China also has stakes in other 
oil and gas companies in Trinidad including, Gas Antilles Limited.207   
In the case of Guyana, given its natural resource position, Chinese companies have invested 
heavily in the logging industry as well as the minerals sector. The company, China’s Bosai 
Minerals, has made substantial investments in Guyana. ECLAC credits the increase in China’s 
FDI in Guyana’s mineral sector for overall growth in the country’s extractive industry for 2014. 
According to estimates by ECLAC 2015, FDI in Guyana increased by 19% in 2014 to US$ 255 
million. This contributed to a lower balance-of-payments deficit for Guyana, partly as a result the 
investments from Bosai Minerals. The latter invested several hundred million (USD) in the sector 
together with Russia’s company, RUSAL.208 With significant oil discoveries in Guyana in 2016, 
Chinese companies links to the Caribbean have the potential to create further synergies between 
Caribbean states and China.  
With regards to Jamaica, Chinese FDI has been allocated to in the bauxite sector. In 2009, China’s 
Min-Metals spent US$1 million on bauxite resources exploration in Jamaica as part of its 
 
207 Government of Republic of Trinidad and Tobago; Ministry of Energy, Media Release, May 21st, 2013 
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feasibility studies. In 2016, another Chinese company, Jiuquan Iron and Steel (Group) partnered 
with Russian mining company Rusal, in Jamaica to enter into an agreement for ownership transfer 
of Alumina Partners of Jamaica (Alpart).209 
However, while Caribbean countries with commodities can attract foreign investments from 
China, commodity exports are also subject to broader market volatility in terms of both price and 
demand. Thus, impacting on states which are heavily dependent on the sector as a primary source 
of foreign exchange. In a parliamentary report issued by Trinidad’s Senate in December 2015, it 
was acknowledged that the decline in commodity prices in 2015, had an adverse effect on the 
commodities trade on which Trinidad depended heavily for foreign exchange earnings. The sector 
comprises of oil and gas exports as well as iron, steel and urea. It accounts for approximately 90 
per cent of foreign exchange earnings in Trinidad according to that same report. The Trinidad 
government report cited a continuing decline in demand by China for commodities in that year.210  
There are also other challenges in the natural resource sectors of the Caribbean in relation to China. 
In the case of Guyana, in an effort to fuel the demand for primary products in China, China’s state-
owned companies have been accused of circumventing environmental rules and regulations. Their 
activities have also led to concerns pertaining over-exploitation in the forestry sector. A Chinese 
logging company, Bai Shan Lin, part of a group of companies linked to China, operating in the 
logging industry in Guyana, has been criticised for failing to operate within the confines of 
environmental regulations. There have also been charges that the company has attempted to bypass 
safeguards, thereby contributing to the depletion of forest reserves in Guyana.211 Such issues will 
be examined further in chapter 7. 
Moreover, in the case of Jamaica, there has been difficulty in moving beyond a primary producer 
in the minerals sector in order to leverage its competitive advantage in terms of more finished 
products. Jamaica’s interest has been in building a smelter to compensate for this shortcoming. 
But while China has been engaged with the Jamaican government on this issue, it is still unclear 
whether China’s role in the sector will move beyond its interests in extractive commodities, used 
to fuel its own development.  In 2010, when Jamaica entered discussions with a Chinese company 
 
209 http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/business/JISCO-to-invest-US-2-billion-in-Alpart_67646 
210 Trinidad Hansard, Senate Report, December 8th, 2015, p. 278 
211 http://dialogochino.net/bai-shan-lin-the-chinese-logger-with-multiple-interests-in-guyana/ 
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Zhuhai Hongfan for sale of its 45% stake in the bauxite and alumina industry (Clarendon Alumina 
Production Limited),212  a key requirement insisted by Jamaica in the negotiations was for the 
company to build a smelting plant in Jamaica in order to increase the export value of the mineral. 
China’s interest was largely on export of the raw product. Media sources in February 2016 
indicated that China is interested in building a value-added industry which would mean refining 
aluminium in Jamaica.213 However, such an indication has not translated into practical decision-
making at the ground level. Some have even argued that China’s interests in Jamaica’s alumina 
sector is not likely to move beyond securing access to the raw material. Hendrix (2014: 9) noted 
that promises to invest in further processing capacity would likely be hindered by “democratic 
political institutions, Jamaica’s comparatively strong civil society, and its location in the Caribbean 
basin.” Hendrix further asserted that geopolitical considerations are likely to hinder China’s role 
in the bauxite industry in Jamaica.   
Notwithstanding the challenges, with the increasing FDI in the commodities sector in Caribbean 
states by China, such states trade with China are likely to increase. But should the trade patterns 
continue along similar trajectories of the past, the underlying implication is that such an increase 
is likely to be along the familiar patterns of core and peripheral relations where such states serve 
as a source of commodities with little higher value exports to China. But China’s role in the region 
does suggest that governance issues need to be addressed and that policymakers must take concrete 
steps to address deficiencies in management of resources and private sectors within the region 
must also encourage competitiveness.    
Section 2    
3. The Impacts of Caribbean and Latin American states trade with China 
This section aims to examine the debates on China’s impact on the Latin America Caribbean 
region. It seeks to determine how the Caribbean region fit into those wider concerns, given both 
the empirical and broader knowledge gap on the Caribbean’s trade relationship with China.  
The section first provides an overview of the debates on China’s impact in the Latin America 
Caribbean region. It is important to first draw from the broader issues in the literature in relation 
 
212 Reuters News Agency, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/21/bauxite-jamaica-china-idUSN2118643520100421 
213  Jamaica Observer Newspaper, “China Wants a Part of Noranda Too?” February 15, 2016 
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to Latin America as this discussion illuminates the conflicting impacts that trade with China has 
had on the region. As already stated, the Latin America Caribbean region’s deepening economic 
relations with China in terms of the trade relationship has brought about two main debates 
pertaining to the impact of the bilateral relations with China on the region. One concern is the 
extent to which the trade relationship between China and the region is based on familiar patterns 
of dependency already exhibited in economic ties with economic powers acting within the region. 
The next concern is whether China can be considered a competitive threat to the Caribbean and 
Latin America in light of China’s rise in manufactures and consequently, its increased import 
penetration in such states economies.  
 The impacts have prompted concerns relating to the region’s economic development in relation 
to China as a rising economic power. Such issues also indicate the tensions at the ground level 
which can in turn, shape responses to China. As will be seen in subsection 3.3.3, China’s 
competitive threat to the region has brought about subsequent concerns relating to antidumping 
practices by Chinese companies in the region. This has resulted in several actions taken by the 
Latin America Caribbean region against China at the WTO. 
The section then goes on to evaluate more specifically, how the Caribbean region fits within those 
wider debates by drawing on empirical data based on WITS: World Bank trade data for the period 
2005-2015. There are thus far, limited discussions on whether Caribbean states trade ties with 
China is indicative of the dependency patterns of the past whereby the Caribbean is a site for 
primary goods and commodities while acting as a destination for higher valued manufactures from 
China. In an effort to examine how dependency patterns have emerged in the Caribbean and China 
trade relationship, the actual composition of the trade relationship based on WITS- World Bank 
data for 2005-2015 between respective Anglophone Caribbean states and China will be examined. 
These states are Trinidad, Jamaica and Guyana.  The empirical data provide insights into the 
products and resources involved in the growing trade relationship. The quantitative analysis also 
enables an evidenced-based assessment of the type of trade relationship that is being pursued by 
China within the Caribbean. 
Crucially, there also has to be a consideration as to whether the impact of China’s rise in 
manufacturing has resulted in a competitive threat to the Caribbean like it has been debated in the 
literature in relation to Latin America. While the discussion in this subsection suggests that 
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significant caveats preclude the formulation of generalisations pertaining to China as a competitive 
threat to the Caribbean region in particular, China’s rise as competitive threat to Latin America 
cannot be entirely dismissed. Thus, it is likely that the debate on this issue will continue within the 
literature on China’s rise in the broader region.  
3.1 Contextualising the debates on China’s impact on the Caribbean and Latin America  
In examining the Latin America Caribbean region’s engagement with China, an underlying 
contention in the literature is that the region is being confined to the same trade patterns of the past 
whereby the region plays a role in China’s growing demand for extractive resources while acting 
as a market for higher valued manufactures (Dominguez, 2006; Gallagher, 2010; Jenkins, 2012; 
Ellis, 2009, 2014; Casanova et al.,2015). The Council of Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), a think 
tank geared towards research on relations in the American hemisphere, notes that region’s trade 
with China has meant a “return to the classic dependency patterns where the region ships raw 
materials to China”214 and with much of the consumption related to manufactured products. Rhys 
Jenkins (2012:2), ponders on similar concerns relating to the asymmetric relationship between the 
region and China in trade and acknowledges “it shows many of the characteristics of center-
periphery relations.”  Casanova et al (2015:1) examines Latin America’s growing dependency on 
China and notes that commodities exports formed the bulk of China’s trade with Latin America, 
given China’s resource quest in the region (at least 80%). Such familiar patterns of trade, question 
the extent to which Latin American countries can move into the more technologically and high 
value based production chains which can result in more benefits to the economy in the medium to 
long term.  
The other key argument centers around the idea that China is a competitive threat to Latin America 
and the Caribbean region given the impact of China’s import penetration, that is, the rising share 
of Chinese goods in domestic consumption. Consequently, this gives rise to concerns about the 
effects of China on the possible “de-industrialisation” of the Latin America Caribbean region in 
light of China’s rise in the manufacturing sector. 
The extent to which similar export product structures have been affected and the degree to which 




debate pertaining to de-industrialisation (see Jenkins and Peters, 2006).  Moreover, the rise in trade 
disputes on alleged anti-dumping practices initiated by the Latin America Caribbean region against 
China at the WTO also points to concerns about the competitive threat of Chinese manufactures 
to markets in the region. 
While studies draw contrasting views on the issue of China as a competitive threat to region, a 
major caveat to much of those debates is that such studies do not necessarily examine at length, 
the competitive turn to China by developing states. China’s rise as an important source market 
alongside other competing actors on the global market in the area of manufactures, have afforded 
increased opportunities to developing states. Essentially, China’s economic rise at the global level 
in manufactures allowed Caribbean states to diversify their trading partnerships to include 
emerging actors in their bilateral trade partnerships. China’s extensive capital, technological and 
human resource endowments have also meant that it has been able to use its trading position to 
penetrate new markets such as those of the Caribbean and Latin America.  
Moreover, the discussions generally pay scant attention to internal constraints that impact Latin 
American states competitiveness. Moreira (2007) made a fairly good attempt at examining this 
issue more extensively. The said author cited internal inefficiencies as well as governance issues 
as possible inhibitors to Latin America’s rise in the manufacturing sector. 
Moreover, in empirical studies focusing on whether China’s rise in manufacturing have 
presumably diverted FDI from the LAC region, or whether trade in similar export structures have 
been affected, studies obtain very mixed results. The IADB has commissioned various studies 
which examines inter alia, the impact of China on the Caribbean and Latin America (2016, 2007, 
2011, 2017). An earlier 2007 study entitled; Should Latin America Fear China? published by the 
IADB, attributed China’s rise to losses in Mexico’s manufacturing sectors between 2001 and 2003. 
The study suggested that a shift in FDI from Mexico was evident in that same period.  An OECD 
(2007) study entitled; The Visible Hand of China in Latin America found that between 1984 and 
2001, there was hardly an FDI dislocation from Latin America to China. However, between 1995 
-2001, some dislocation of FDI was observed for specific LAC countries namely, Colombia and 
Mexico. Although specific efforts were made to control for variables that may impact on the 
region’s competitiveness with China, the 2007 OECD study concluded that the results were at best, 
mixed.  
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Conflicting results on China’s competitive threat to the LAC region was also highlighted by Lall 
and Weiss (2005). The authors, using trade data, examined whether LAC countries have been 
impacted by China’s rise. Again, the result of the empirical analysis was fairly nuanced. Certain 
LAC countries such as El Salvador was seen to experience a direct and partial threat in the textile 
industry from China. Hanson and Robertson (2008) using trade data, applied an empirical model 
to examine the impact of China’s rise in specific exports and found that the issue was highly 
differentiated across the region. Their study found that Mexico appeared to have been impacted 
by China in specific export products to the US market. However, other countries within the Latin 
America Caribbean region appear to have been less impacted by China’s rise. Thus, in examining 
specific export products as well as more general trade patterns, there are still no clear-cut 
conclusions emerging with respect to China as a competitive threat to the region. Hence, studies 
generally fail to show a clear correlation between Latin America’s presumed decline in 
manufactures and China’s role in this area.  
 
Nonetheless, one may also acknowledge that the debate on China’s competitive threat appear to 
be far from settled judging from recent works on this issue. Strauss and Armony (2016:66) have 
questioned what they term as the optimism of these earlier studies on China as a competitive threat 
to the region. They instead suggest that indeed a competitive threat can be observed in relation to 
Latin America’s manufacturing sector. This is in line with the argument proposed by Gallagher’s 
and Porzecanski (2008:186) that China’s emergence may “contribute to the persistent issues of 
current account deficits in LAC, and put LAC further behind in the race to catch up to other 
developing countries in establishing competitive high-value-added manufacturing capabilities.”  
Furthermore, trade remedies215 sought by Latin America and the Caribbean against China at the 
international level through anti-dumping cases are also indicative of the challenges faced in the 
rising trade relationship (Feinberg, 2010; Velasquez, 2015; Fernandez,2016; Dominguez, 2006; 
Dumbaugh; 2005). Recently, Zhang (2017) in an IADB Working Paper series examined Latin 
America and the Caribbean’s anti-dumping cases against China’s exports to the region.  The region 
thus far, is among those that have led anti-dumping cases against China, making up about 20% of 
such cases against China, more so than the EU or US that are leading trade partners for China 
 
215 Trade remedies are trade policy tools which allow affected governments to take remedial action against imports which have 
been deemed to cause material injury to a domestic industry. 
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(Zhang 2017:3).  In such cases, the region views China’s import penetration as a threat to the 
manufacturing sector.  It is alleged that China has been able to bring in similar products on the 
market at a cheaper rate which then undercuts local or existing manufacturers.  
While the outcome appears to be good for the consumer in the short term given the availability of 
goods at cheaper prices, the adverse effects of such a practice may not be entirely discounted. In 
the long term, there can be an impact on employment, technology transfer and profitability in the 
manufacturing sectors within respective Latin American and Caribbean states.  
Despite the lack of a clear-cut answer as to whether China is a competitive threat to Latin America 
and the Caribbean region, the underlying impact of China’s industrialisation on the region’s 
competitiveness, may likely engender future debates. 
3.2 Impact of Caribbean states increased trade with China:  a new dependency 
While the broader literature examines dependency patterns in relation to Latin America and China, 
much is not said about the Caribbean per se. In order to examine the extent that Caribbean states 
trade with China follows the same pattern whereby commodities and primary products are the 
main aspects of the trade relations, an examination of the Caribbean’s trade with China is 
undertaken. The analysis is based on WITS World Bank data for the period 2005-2015. The 
evaluation takes into account three Anglophone Caribbean states with natural resources; Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Guyana.  
Although there has been a lack of in-depth studies on the Caribbean, the increasing turn to the 
Caribbean by China for commodities in 2005, coincided with the first China-Caribbean Trade and 
Economic Cooperation Forum. Increasing trade and investment opportunities between the 
Caribbean and China were among the main aims of the first high level forum between the two 
sides.  
Whereas the role of the Caribbean as a source of commodities for China is small in comparism to 
the broader Latin American region, it may be acknowledged that China’s role has substantially 
increased in resource states in the Caribbean. Main exports to China by the three Caribbean states 
mentioned, revolved largely around commodities and primary goods. As seen in table 5.4, the main 
exports by the English -speaking Caribbean region were mainly products such as fuel, chemicals, 
minerals and timber. These exports reflected each Caribbean state comparative advantage in 
	 168	
resources. Trinidad is a major oil exporting country in the Caribbean and thus exports fuels and 
chemicals to China. Jamaica has bauxite resources and has been able to export metals and 
chemicals to China. Guyana has ample natural resources such as timber, gold and other minerals 
and as such, this has been reflected in its main exports to China.  
Therefore, in light of the commodities trade, the relationship between the English-speaking 
Caribbean region and China did not differ markedly from that of the developing states within the 
Americas region. However, this conclusion also needs to be placed in perspective as China is 
playing an increased role in foreign direct investments in the resource sectors within those states, 
as already discussed. 
Table 5.4 showing Caribbean states main exports to China 2005-2015  







Source: author elaboration; WITS: World Bank data 
 
(1) Jamaica’s export trade with China 
Given Jamaica’s position as a leading bauxite producer, its commodities has been in increasing 
demand in China. The United States Geological Survey for 2014, showed that Jamaica and Guyana 
ranked second and third in terms of countries with export potential based on significant reserves 
of bauxites. In line with its bauxite resources, an analysis of Jamaica’s trade patterns with China 
for the period 2005-2015, based on WITS- UN World Bank data, illustrates that commodities such 
as chemicals and metals, have been Jamaica’s most significant exports to China. At least 80% or 
more of Jamaica’s exports to China between 2005 and 2015, were in those two commodities (table 
5.5).  While China is not a significant market for Jamaica’s exports, making up about 2-3% of 
Jamaica’s global export trade for the period (WITS World Bank data), most of Jamaica’s exports 






Table 5.5 Jamaica’s main exports (%) to China (2005-2015) 
Year Chemicals Metals 
2015 80.72% 15.61% 
2014 53.57% 29.13% 
2013 na 41.0% 
2012 81.27% 6.38% 
2011 45.2% 47.5% 
2010 na 42.84% 
2009 92.05% 4.79% 
2008 na 83.18% 
2007 11.99% 87.49% 
2006 69.58% 30.30% 
2005 95.11% 4.73% 
Source; author elaboration; WITS: World Bank data 
 
The export pattern for Jamaica illustrated that a main trade interest for China in the English-
speaking Caribbean region is that of commodities, even taking into account the limited export 
trade with China. According to WITS World Bank data, by 2009, China had become Jamaica’s 
ninth-largest export destination and by 2012, China's top trading partner in the Caribbean. 
According to the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, the total volume of China-Jamaica trade reached 
US$427 million in 2014, an increase of 25.6 per cent over 2013, and 78.7 per cent over 2010.” 
Given the prevalence of commodities in Jamaica’s exports to China, its export pattern does not 
deviate significantly from that of being a producer of commodities and an importer of more 
finished products.  
(2) Guyana’s export trade with China 
Similar trends relating to the Caribbean being a source of commodities and primary products for 
China obtained in Guyana. The latter is the English -speaking Caribbean country with the most 
diverse set of natural resources. This includes substantial oil reserves, other minerals and forestry 
products. Mining is a major economic sector in Guyana and include gold, quarry stones and 
diamonds. In 2015, natural resources including the extractive industries made up about 30% of 
Guyana’s GDP. 216 The leading mineral commodity exports in 2015 were, in order of value, gold 
(US$501.1 million), bauxite (US$104.6 million), and diamond (US$16.7 million).217 In the period, 
January to May 2014, gold alone accounted for 44.8% of Guyana’s export earnings.218 Guyana’s 
 
216 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guyana/overview 
217 Szczesniak Philip A. 2015 Minerals Yearbook, US Department of the Interior and US Geological Survey, p. 12 
218 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/exporting-to-guyana/doing-business-in-guyana-guyana-trade-and-export-guide 
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vast forest reserves along the Amazon rain forest also makes it a leading exporter of timber in the 
Anglophone Caribbean. 
An analysis of WITS UN World Bank data for a ten-year period (2005-2015), in terms of Guyana’s 
exports to China, further reinforces the claim that the Anglophone Caribbean region’s trade 
relations with China is one based largely on natural resource exports (see table 5.6). This again 
points to familiar trends in relation to previous actors. Thus, the English-speaking Caribbean’s 
trade with China does not differ from traditional dependency patterns of the past where the region 
is an exporter of primary products rather than that of higher value-finished goods. As shown in 
table 5.6, primary products such as wood have been the bulk of Guyana’s exports to China for the 
ten-year period and accounted for over 80% of exports between 2005 and 2015. Exports of 
commodities such as minerals reached a high of 50.66% in Guyana’s exports to China in 2012. By 
2015, mineral exports formed 20% of Guyana’s exports to China. It is left to be seen whether 
increased mineral exports from Guyana to China will be indicative of a continued trend of 
commodities exports especially in light of the significant investments made by China in the sector.   
Table 5.6 showing Guyana’s exports to China 2005-2015 
YEAR WOOD MINERALS 
2005 91.91% 0% 
2006 87.74% 0.18% 
2007 93.36% 0% 
2008 96.23% 0% 
2009 82.50% 0% 
2010 93.46% 0.24% 
2011 88.96% 0.73% 
2012 42.25% 50.66% 
2013 92.76% 0% 
2014 85.46% 6.69% 
2015 71.11% 22.03% 
 
Source: author elaboration: WITS: World Bank data 
 
(3) Trinidad’s export trade with China  
In the case of Trinidad which is the Anglophone Caribbean’s leading oil producer, the majority of 
its exports to China are commodities based. Data for 2005-2015, shows that about half of its 
exports to China have comprised of fuels (see table 5.7).  This is followed by metals which made 
up the majority of Trinidad’s exports to China for that period. Thus, the pattern whereby the 
Caribbean serves as a source of raw material rather than that of the higher valued finished products 
in trade with China is seen also in Trinidad’s trading relationship with China. The overall analysis 
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suggests that much of the ongoing trade with China thus far, mimic the center-periphery relations 
that the region has been particularly familiar with in their trade globally.  
 
Table 5.7 showing Trinidad’s exports to China: 2005-2015 
 
YEAR FUELS METALS 
2015 44.74% 0.59% 
2014 26.29% 3.46 
2013 41.58% 32.15% 
2012 46.97% 33.28% 
2011 61.55% 17.33% 
2010 31.22% 19.34% 
2009 68.18% 4.12% 
2008 34.58% 28.4% 
2007 44% 11.88% 
2006 59.17% 19.20% 
2005 47.53% 34.54% 
Source: author elaboration: WITS: World Bank data 
 
3.3 China a competitive threat in manufacturing in the Caribbean region? 
The issue of China as a competitive threat to the Caribbean brings to the fore key considerations 
pertaining to the extent that China’s rise in manufactures has had an effect on FDI in manufactures 
in the region and whether there is a level of competitiveness between the two with regards to 
exports of similar products. Jenkins and Peters (2007: 7) argue that China is not only seen as a 
competitor for similar goods in third markets especially in relation to labour intensive 
manufactures, but also with regards to the interrelated inflow of FDI. These are no doubt 
complicated issues well beyond the scope of this subsection on the impacts of the Caribbean and 
China trade relationship.  Thus, the focus is on analysing the trade patterns based on UN World 
Bank data from 2000-2015, to determine the extent to which the region has been impacted by 
China’s rise in manufactures. In doing so, the subsection aims to examine why attributions 
regarding China as competitive threat to the Caribbean is not necessarily clear cut.  
FDI diversion from the Caribbean region is a rather multi-faceted and complex issue on its own 
terms. Thus trying to situate China into that nexus with regards to particular product structures, 
does not necessarily lead to firm conclusions. FDI diversion in particular industries, namely the 
garment industry within the Caribbean, witnessed a substantial shift in the 1990’s and in the early 
part of the millennium.  
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While this period appears to coincide with the rise of other markets, in similar product structures, 
this provides insufficient basis for evidence-based conclusions that the Anglophone Caribbean 
faced competitive threats in this area from other actors including China. The factors that may have 
impacted such a shift includes the issue of the region’s competitiveness as opposed to others with 
similar or better factor endowments relating to cheap labour and more extensive technological 
capacity. These are among the contributing elements that may have to be accounted for in the 
debates regarding FDI diversion. Internal issues within the Caribbean region can also adversely 
affect its competitiveness to some degree.  
Notwithstanding the above issues, it is still important to acknowledge that FDI in lower end 
manufactures has been an important area of economic activity for the Caribbean and Latin 
America. Specialisation in labour intensive manufactures has been part of the Caribbean and Latin 
America economic landscape at least from the 1980’s. These often rely on cheap labour and meet 
the goal of attracting investments within developing states while also favourably influencing 
employment levels among the lower skilled in such states. 
 However, starting in the 1990’s, the region witnessed a substantial shift in FDI  in those areas. By 
2004, the Economist, looking at the impact of China on Mexico’s manufacturing noted; “there is 
now another side to the Mexican economy, one of quiet desperation at the continuing haemorrhage 
of jobs and factories…it has now become painfully clear that China is the favourite destination for 
the labour-intensive manufacturing that Mexico specialised in for the past three decades.”219 
 Such events also played out in the Anglophone Caribbean in the case of Saint Lucia with regards 
to garments manufacturing. The export processing zones located in the south of Saint Lucia, once 
reserved for garment manufacturing and other light assembly, have not been in use for decades 
now, displaced by increased competition from presumably more competitive markets.  
While FDI diversion in the Caribbean’s garment manufacturing industries for instance, coincided 
with China’s rise in the industry in the 1990’s, this does not necessarily lead to firm conclusions 
that this can be attributed to China’s increasing outputs in this area. In this regard, correlation does 
not necessarily imply causation. There are other external and internal factors at play which may 




established labour standards within the region when compared to other developing state in other 
regions. A lack of economies of scale is also readily seen in the Caribbean, thereby increasing the 
vulnerability of such states in wider global economic processes.  
Although studies regarding the effect of China’s rise as a manufacturing powerhouse with respect 
to the Anglophone Caribbean are not readily available in the literature, early studies conducted by 
ECLAC in the initial phase of the Post-Cold War era, showed the significance of the garment 
manufacturing sector and light electronics to Saint Lucia’s economic development between the 
1980’s and 1990’s.  The 1993 study highlighted the significance of the sector to Saint Lucia’s 
economic development in terms of employment and technology transfer.  In 1993, Saint Lucia had 
17 export processing plants that employed a total of 2,820 persons, 72% of that employment was 
in garment manufacturing and 30% in other light manufacturing (see ECLAC; Larry Wilmore 
1993). 
 However, production lessened in Caribbean states such as Saint Lucia and by the year 2000, many 
factories had closed down due to external competition. This affected much of the lower skilled 
labour employed in the economic zones. The Caribbean’s significance as part of apparel 
commodity chains linked to the US market lessened considerably in that period which also 
coincided with the rise of Asia. Hale (2002) focuses on China as among the significant winners in 
the shifts in the garment industry globally in that period. Green (1998) also provides a fairly 
comprehensive assessment of the intersection between the Caribbean, the US and Asia in the 
garment industry. Overall, markets in Asia with presumably more advantageous labour costs and 
less regulated environments, coupled with strong expertise in the sector, may have proven 
favourable for such investments.  
 
But while one may allow there was a shift in the 1990’s in FDI in manufacturing in the garment 
industry in Anglophone Caribbean countries like Saint Lucia, this may not necessarily be attributed 
to the rise of China in similar product structures during the same period. The rise of globally 
competitive MNC’s means that firms do seek to maximize their profit in different areas of the 
globe. This can mean shifting production processes away from regions where economies of scale 
or other factors may be seen to impact on profit maximization. The rise of China meant that China 
benefited from not only a huge influx of FDI from such MNC’s as has been established by Stiglitz 
and Yusuf (2001), but China’s huge cheap labour supply and internally driven policies to expand 
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its manufacturing base, played a role in its global competitiveness.  This meant that other region’s 
with less comparative advantages would ultimately be impacted.  
 
Given the complex interplay of issues just discussed, possible assertions that China may be a 
competitive threat in terms of FDI diversion away from the region is somewhat problematic. 
Nonetheless, one might conclude that while the rise of China in manufacturing in the garment 
industry have been shown in the literature to impact certain Latin American countries with similar 
products, including Mexico (Peters, 2005, Jenkins et al., 2008, Gallagher et al., 2008), there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude the same with respect to the Anglophone Caribbean. 
 
3.3.1 Caribbean states competitive turn to China 
The notion of China as a competitive threat is further undermined by Caribbean states own turn to 
China as an arguably competitive market in manufactures. China’s emergence in trade has resulted 
more so in a diversification of Caribbean states markets for manufactured imports at the global 
level. There is a presumed benefit to the consumer based on the availability of what has been 
considered cheaper products from China. Thus, Caribbean states have expanded their access to 
China’s seemingly more competitive market given the latter’s role as a leading manufactures 
exporter. China’s position as a manufacturing power house was cemented in 2014.  Chinese 
manufacturing output became the highest in the world and was worth $1.9 trillion, followed by the 
US with an output worth $1.8 trillion.220 This at least suggests that China’s rise and subsequent 
ability to compete economically with other nations in various economic sectors made China an 
important trading partner to developing states on the world market.  
 
China’s market presented an economic opportunity for the Caribbean alongside traditional actors. 
China’s rise not only changed the economic landscape for developing countries but also developed 
states. It meant that Anglophone Caribbean countries could then diverge from other leading 
developed states markets which offered similar products. In taking into account the massive 
differentials in capital and technological endowments that exists between the Latin America 
Caribbean region and China, much of the imports center on items where the region lacks 
 
220 UK House of Commons Briefing Paper, Manufacturing, August 2016	
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competitive advantage in terms of labour or technology. Instead, the region relies on world markets 
for such goods.  
 
More specifically, a close examination of data from the WITS: UN World Bank data for a fifteen-
year period (2000-2015) illustrates the effects of a “rising China” on manufactures sector in the 
English - speaking Caribbean (see figure 5.4). An analysis of trade patterns for Trinidad, Jamaica 
and Guyana with respect to manufactures, shows that China played an increasing role in 
manufactures exports to the Caribbean especially between 2005-2015, where previously, its 
presence was quite limited.  
 
As seen above, from 2000-2015, Trinidad import of manufactures from China increased steadily 
for the period. Starting with insignificant levels of imports of manufactures from China for the 
period 2000-2002, by 2005, levels of manufacture imports reached 5%.  Between 2010-2015, more 
than 10% of Trinidad’s manufactured imports came from China. Thus, it may be concluded that 
Trinidad expanded its market outreach to China in that period.  
Guyana’s imports of manufactures from China increased steadily from 2000-2007. Manufactured 
imports from China doubled in 2007 and reached a high of almost 20% of Guyana’s import of 
manufactures in 2012. This showed the growing significance of China as an import market for the 
Anglophone Caribbean by 2005.  
In the case of Jamaica, China’s import penetration into Jamaica has been significant as shown in 
an analysis of data from 2000-2015 (WITS World Bank). As seen in figure 5.4, for a 15 year period 











enabling China’s import penetration into Jamaica based on internal demand. Starting with lower 
levels of trade in manufactures from China, at least below 5% from 2000-2004, the shift in 2005 
towards China was quite noticeable. By 2006, trade in manufactures had grown to almost 10% and 
went up almost steadily, thereafter. By 2015, almost 20% of Jamaica’s trade in manufactures came 
from China.  
These findings suggest that Caribbean states import patterns have shifted to include China as an 
important market for manufactured products, resulting in higher import penetration by China 
inside the region.  As pointed out by Jenkins (2007: 281) “there is a presumed benefit to the 
importing economy from the increased supply of cheap Chinese manufactures.”   
In the Caribbean, Chinese manufacture imports can be fuelled by demand for cheaper alternative 
products.  Thus, traders attempt to source products from China with a view to maximising their 
profit margins. Local entrepreneurs may team up with manufacturers from China to source goods 
at cheaper prices. Private Chinese entrepreneurs can also utilise their own networks to set up retail 
businesses in the Caribbean. This trend has been observed by Ellis (2014) with respect to Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Similar trends have been acknowledged by Mc Kaplinksy (2009) who 
note that petty-trading by Chinese immigrants is widespread within African economies. Even when 
Chinese products may not be perceived to have the same quality as that of other manufacturers, it 
does promote some perception of affordability for the consumer. 
But while it might be posited that cheaper products from China can lower costs for consumers, it 
is not clear that it helps improve employment prospects or technology transfer in the medium to 
long term. These are important for facilitating development within Caribbean states. Such salient 
issues cannot be entirely overlooked despite China’s role as a competitive market for Caribbean 
states. 
3.3.2 Trade and financing nexus: aiding the competitive turn to China 
Further facilitating Caribbean states competitive turn to the Chinese market has been the inter-
connection between trade and lending in China’s development assistance to developing states. As 
Easterly and Pfutze (2008:45) succinctly argue, “tied aid comes with the requirement that a certain 
percentage of it has to be spent on goods from the donor country ...(and) increases the market 
power of the donor country’s firms and often amounts to little more than ill-disguised export 
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promotion.” Along a similar vein, Davies et al (2008: 7) acknowledge, “Concessional loans offered 
to developing states are usually tied to Chinese exports (and) are contingent on a certain percentage 
of Chinese goods and services being procured with that loan.” The loan may be used for equipment, 
technology, materials or service purchases. However, at least 50 percent has to come from China. 
Davies emphasises that the methodology is similar to that of traditional donors. Such loans then 
allow Chinese companies to gain an advantageous entry point into new markets.  
The increase in Caribbean states concessional lending from China for the development of 
infrastructure in various economic sectors within those states, has coincided with an increase in 
the trade relationship with China. As already noted, this in itself is not unique to China as an 
emerging economic power.  
 However, the consistent practice of tying lending to market access, does increase the opportunity 
cost of engaging China within the Latin America Caribbean region. Concerns regarding China’s 
modus operandi have been raised by scholars. Moreira (2006:15) suggests, “from the LAC 
manufacturers point of view, the omnipresence and generosity of the Chinese state has a very 
practical and immediate implication, that is, to tilt the playing field in favour of their Chinese 
(counterparts).” 
Thus, the turn to Chinese imports on the part of Caribbean states has been aided in part, by the 
conditions imposed by China on Caribbean states for access to lending for investment projects. 
Lending can be tied to not only having a Chinese labour component but also involves the purchase 
of goods and services from Chinese firms. These policies make it easier for Caribbean states to 
source products from China. As reported by Jamaica’s Parliament, among the conditions for 
lending by China to Jamaica, was that 40% of the work had to be carried out by Chinese 
contractors. 221 Such conditions can determine sources of both material and labour. It can also 
impact on Caribbean states overall terms of trade with China by increasing their inputs from the 
Chinese market.  
In line with China’s involvement in infrastructure investments, a substantial share of Caribbean 
states imports from China are not only consumer goods where it has been shown to have an 
advantage in cheap consumer items. Increased intakes are also tied to machinery and electronics. 
 
221 Jamaica Hansard;  Parliamentary Proceedings, April 24th- July, 19, 2011, Session 2011-2012,Vol. 37 No. 1, p. 157 
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As seen in table 5.8 for Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, there was an almost steady increase in such 
products from China from 2005-2015. This correlates with the period of strategic bilateral 
processes undertaken between the region and China to strengthen trade and lending. Therefore, 
while increasingly engaging Caribbean states in concessional lending, China simultaneously 
strengthened its trade position in the region. 
 














2000 12.40 14.03 24.08 
2001 16.16 13.20 21.22 
2002 17.76 12.96 17.81 
2003 18.61 24.85 17.09 
2004 18.20 24.11 16.95 
2005 18.43 19.29 19.10 
2006 17.47 19.49 41.32 
2007 22.56 21.96 39.87 
2008 19.20 25.15 26.49 
2009 29.77 24.65 22.04 
2010 31.94 27.86 21.73 
2011 31.85 26.16 30.94 
2012 32.53 26.93 53.57 
2013 30.22 31.80 32.77 
2014 30.77 35.57 30.307 
2015 33.80 32.54 27.2 
 
China’s rising role in imports in Trinidad has been partly fuelled by Trinidad’s increasing lending 
from China for infrastructure investments. Media sources within Trinidad in focusing on the 
unfolding trade relationship suggests that between 2004 - 2009, Trinidad imported US $1.6 billion 
worth of manufactured goods from China. These included diesel buses, bricks and pipes from 
China.222 In 2011, Trinidad’s demand from China was much the same in terms of higher value 
manufactured products.223 Much of the imported commodities mentioned are utilised in the 
construction industry.  
 The high concentration of imports in machinery and technology reflects the type of investments 
China engages in with the Caribbean and that is; infrastructure investments. As stated by Renard 
(2011:16) “machinery and transport equipment imports are linked to the strong presence of 
Chinese firms in the infrastructure sector.” For instance, as shown in table 5.8, almost 40% of 
Jamaica’s imports from China were for machinery and electronics in 2014. In the case of Jamaica’s 





imports of such products as China deepened its infrastructure investments in Jamaica. In 2003, 
Jamaica signed a technical and cooperation agreement with China for an interest free loan of US 
$ 2.5 million for infrastructure works to be carried out by Jamaica’s National Water 
Commission.224 In that same period, there was a significant rise in such imports from China. In 
2003, Jamaica’s imports doubled from 12% to 25%.  A key condition for the interest free loan was 
the sourcing of pipes and other materials from China. 225  Overall, access to Chinese products have 
been significantly aided by China’s financing and involvement in infrastructure projects in the 
region. Thus, indicating that the turn to China has been partly facilitated by China’s modus 
operandi in development assistance in the Caribbean region. 
3.3.3 Concern with anti-dumping in manufactures trade with China  
Given China’s increased import penetration in terms of manufactured products in the region, a 
concern for Latin America and the Caribbean states have been the inability of their local 
manufacturing industries to compete effectively with cheaper products from China.  Essentially, 
the region is concerned that China is able to offer products at a price below production cost, thus 
making such products cheaper in domestic markets to which they are sent. Hence, resulting in 
unfair competition in the existing market. On the surface, this might benefit the consumer in the 
short term, but it does have an impact on local manufacturing sectors given the possible loss of 
productive and technical capacity. 
Such concerns have led to a record number of actions against China at the WTO for anti-dumping 
practices within the Latin America and the Caribbean.  According to Zhang (2017:3) in a study for 
the Inter-American Development Bank, “LAC accounted for approximately 20 percent of the cases 
led between 1995 and 2014 (against China), a share higher than that of the U.S. or the EU, which 
are among China's largest trade partners.” Feinberg (2010) found much the same results and noted 
that between 2005 and 2008, Latin America Caribbean countries, filed 156 cases at the WTO with 
regards to anti-dumping.  Almost half of those cases were filed against China. The items involved 





The “dumping”226 of products on domestic markets drive down the prices for similar products, 
thus leading to local or regional businesses being unable to compete.  According to Jenkins (2013: 
10), “in the face of growing competition from cheaper imports, domestic firms are forced to lower 
their price-cost mark-ups.”  This results in substantial losses that affect companies abilities to 
remain competitive and functioning. The downward pressure on domestic prices works through 
various channels. As explained by (Kamin et al., 2004: 5), “Low-cost countries (such as China) 
depress prices in a domestic market by replacing more expensive imports from other trading 
partners, or by inducing a lowering of the prices of imports from these partners.” In the Caribbean, 
Chinese products are known for their affordability to the consumer, and this can influence the turn 
to Chinese products. 
With import penetration comes losses at the domestic level for local firms specialising in similar 
products. Enabling Chinese products to “flood” the market in these economies while having a 
positive effect on consumption in the short term, can create longer term effects such as loss of 
employment. It can also stymie efforts to build local manufacturing capacity within respective 
states. Therefore, in an effort to minimise the perceived and practical disadvantages from China’s 
low cost production, the Caribbean and Latin America have resorted to the WTO in a bid to limit 
losses to their domestic industries in relation to trade practices that may not necessarily be 
compatible with WTO rules.  
While direct challenge of China at the WTO level can be more attributable to respective Latin 
American states such as Brazil and Argentina, the Caribbean is nonetheless impacted by China’s 
rise in manufactured products. The lack of “offensive actions” against China is partly due to lack 
of financial and technical resources. Caribbean states often lack adequate technical and diplomatic 
capacity which would be required to engage in the search for trade remedies in relation to dumping 
of products by a WTO member state such as China.  Anglophone Caribbean states such as Trinidad 
has been directly impacted by the rise of China’s domestic production in areas such as steel. The 
dumping of steel by China on the global market was blamed for retrenchment in Trinidad. In 2015, 
China’s dumping of cheap steel on the global market was seen as a reason for the shutdown of 
Trinidad- based company, ArcelorMittal. At least 800 workers were laid off.   Cheap steel from 
 
226 “dumping” of a product on a domestic market by an external producer occurs when an exporter sells its products at a lower 
price than the average price under which it is ordinarily sold in the domestic market. Article VI of GATT 1994, allows action 
against imports from countries are alleged to be in breach of the applicable rule.			
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China had driven down global prices. The company, noted that its Trinidad operations had to be 
scaled back “due to an over-supply of steel in the global market and a decrease in orders of it direct 
reduced iron and steel products.”227 ECLAC (2011: 17) also acknowledges the significant market 
penetration of Chinese imports in this sector, from 3% in 2005 to nearly 30% in 2010. 228 Thus, 
the Caribbean has been impacted by China’s rise in manufacturing to some extent. The concern 
from the Latin America and the Caribbean region has been the inability of their local 
manufacturing industries to compete effectively with cheaper products from China.  
More broadly, the underlying issue pertaining to de-industrialisation of Latin America and the 
Caribbean region due to competition from China in terms of manufactured products, is not entirely 
without merit.  A 2016 study by Guajardo et al, for the think tank, Atlantic Council, concludes that 
China has contributed to the region’s de-industrialisation by diminishing the region’s ability to 
engage in higher value-added complex goods and industries. It has also had impact on the 
consequent training and jobs that accompany such FDI activities. Further, as noted by the 
Economist, the Caribbean and Latin America’s “trade with China generated 17% fewer jobs per 
dollar’s-worth of exports than did trade with other countries.”229  
 
The role of China in deindustrialisation of the Caribbean and Latin America while debatable, can 
be said to have some degree of impact on the Caribbean region. It can be acknowledged that 
China’s rise in terms of manufactured exports and the resulting trade deficit in the Caribbean is 
not necessarily a spurious correlation. The deficit carried by the Caribbean in trade with China is 
partly due to the high import of manufactures from China. The vast majority of Anglophone 
Caribbean states imports from China is in the category of machinery and electronics as per analysis 
based on UN Comtrade data for 2005- 2015 (see table 5.8).   
However, the Caribbean’s internal market itself is also facilitating a turn towards China based on 
the presumed benefits of cheaper imports to meet consumption demands and enable profit 
maximisation by merchants, at least in the short term. In the long term, the technological capacity, 
technical skills and higher value added exports may diminish. According to Gallagher (2010:1) 
“Chinese manufactured goods are more competitive than those from Latin America in both home 
 
227 http://www.guardian.co.tt/business/2015-12-09/china-steel-takes-toll-arcelormittal	
228 ECLAC Report 2011, China and Latin America and the Caribbean p.17 
229 http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21710307-chinas-president-ventures-donald-trumps-backyard-golden-opportunity	
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and world markets. These twin trends may jeopardize (the region’s) prospects for long-term 
growth.” Thus, the competitive threat thesis promoted by Gallagher (2010) and Lall et al (2005), 
among others, in terms of China’s increased market penetration within the region, may not be 
entirely discounted across the region.  
4. Discussion of research findings and case summary 
The findings highlight both the complexity and ambiguity of the trading relationship.  More 
broadly, small Caribbean states are acting within the context of their own vulnerability and fragility 
in broader economic processes while concomitantly seeking to assert their own interests and 
agency in the relationship. Thus seeking to extract opportunities in the presence of underlying 
constraints.  
 
Firstly, the findings suggested that Caribbean states have made a competitive turn to China for 
manufactured goods while seeking to increase China’s role in FDI across resource sectors and in 
infrastructure financing. Thus, the pursuit of opportunities have been integral to the economic 
relationship. However, it was also found that trade with China has been highly asymmetrical, with 
increased trade deficits for the region. The highly imbalanced trade patterns between the Caribbean 
and China corroborates with findings relating to China’s trade with Latin America but within a 
somewhat differentiated context. In Latin America, China’s rise on the surface, has meant winners 
and losers with certain states like Brazil instance, enjoying positive trade balances with China as 
discussed. But this has been more the exception rather than the rule as Latin America and the 
Caribbean’s increased trade with China overall, has resulted in significant imbalances for the 
region (see ECLAC, 2015). For the Caribbean region in particular, the terms of trade has been in 
consistent decline for Anglophone Caribbean states as evident by the research findings from 2005-
2015.  
 
The negative outcome is not simply due to power asymmetries between China as a trade power 
and the Caribbean as developing states. As will be seen in chapter 6, the Caribbean’s trade relations 
with traditional actors such as the US and UK, do not necessarily mimic such decisive deficits 
given the role of traditional partners as export destinations. Respective Caribbean states like 
Trinidad have also had a more consistently positive trade balance with leading economic actors 
like the US (see chapter 6).   
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Such outcomes do raise pertinent issues regarding whether Caribbean or Latin American states 
have been able to leverage their trade interests effectively in interactions with China, 
notwithstanding the advantages garnered by China in global trade. Respective governments in the 
Caribbean region have not managed expand exports beyond the commodities structure that 
currently exists in the territorially larger and resource endowed states of the Caribbean (Trinidad, 
Guyana and Jamaica). The need for the region to enhance its interests in economic relations with 
China has been raised by ECLAC (2011, 2015). Peters (2015) and Wenner and Clarke (2016) also 
conclude that Caribbean and Latin American countries should look to negotiating more favourable 
agreements with China.  
 
But despite the imbalance, Caribbean states have made efforts aimed at countering the underlying 
asymmetries in the relations. There has been an attempt to diversify trade with China in areas 
where such states have a level of competitiveness.  For instance, to benefit from China’s huge 
market potential in terms of tourism, Anglophone Caribbean states such as Jamaica, Barbados and 
the Bahamas have made concerted efforts to increase China’s FDI in the sector. Such states have 
also sought avenues for penetration into China’s market through the implementation of various 
initial policies, including concluding Air Service Agreements with China.  
 
Secondly, the findings suggested that emerging in the wider economic processes are distinct 
center-periphery trade patterns which are reminiscent of previous trade relationships with other 
economic powers. Based on the strong commodities export structure of Caribbean states and 
increased levels of imports from China as evident in an analysis of WITS UN Comtrade data for 
the period 2005-2015, it was shown that there is ample space for a new dependency on China to 
materialise within the current context of the unfolding relations. Thus, promoting the familiar 
trends of core and periphery relations whereby the region is an exporter of primary products rather 
than higher value- added production. 
 
Thirdly, the findings revealed that in examining concerns regarding China as a competitive threat 
to the region, the issue was somewhat more nuanced. While substantive conclusions may not 
necessarily be drawn that China is a competitive threat to the region, there is need for a balanced 
approach when assessing those claims. On one hand, manufacturing industries in the Anglophone 
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Caribbean, more specifically, garment manufacturing, was negatively impacted in the 1990’s. This 
period coincided with the rise of Asia in similar product structures.   
 
However, correlation does not necessarily imply causation. Consequently, several other factors 
could have influenced the downturn for specific Anglophone Caribbean states in such industries. 
Thus, based on the findings, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that China has been a 
competitive threat to the Caribbean. Rather, China’s rise has presented significant opportunities to 
expand Caribbean states access to goods on the global market. China’s emergence has also aided 
developing states like those of the Caribbean region to pursue economic development goals. 
 
On the other hand, while debatable, the rise of China in manufactures can be said to have some 
degree of impact on the Caribbean region. It can be acknowledged that China’s rise in terms of 
manufactured exports, its subsequent import penetration and the resulting trade deficit in the 
Caribbean is not necessarily a spurious correlation.  
The deficit carried by the Caribbean in trade with China is partly due to the high import of 
manufactures from China. The research findings revealed that a vast majority Anglophone 
Caribbean states imports from China has been in the category of machinery and electronics as per 
analysis based on WITS: World Bank data for 2000-2015.  This pattern was evident for Trinidad, 
Guyana and Jamaica. Other Caribbean states interactions with China did not significantly deviate 
from this general trend as much of their imports from China were similar.  
 The Caribbean region’s internal market has also facilitated a turn towards China based on the 
presumed benefits of cheaper imports to meet consumption demands and enable profit 
maximisation by merchants and retailers, at least in the short term. In the long term, the 
technological capacity and technical skills that can be generated from higher value exports can be 
diminished. Thus, the competitive threat thesis promoted by Lall et al since 2005, cannot be 
entirely discounted in relation to the Caribbean. But neither can it be conclusively attributed to the 
trade relationship between the Caribbean region and China.  Hence the need for a more nuanced 
assessment regarding China’s possibly competitive effects in the region.  
Fourthly, despite the tensions in the trade relations between the Caribbean region and China, there 
are significant caveats to be borne in mind as it relates to opportunities derived from China’s 
emergence in the international system. As already discussed, China’s foreign direct investment in 
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various natural resource sectors in respective states in the Anglophone Caribbean region has 
promised to revitalise industries in those states. In 2016, Chinese state owned enterprise, JISCO 
entered into an agreement for US$299m to buy struggling bauxite company, Alpart Alumina, in 
Jamaica. 230 Thus, setting the stage for increased competitiveness in the sector.  
Further, as examined in Chapter 4, China has played a significant and leading role in infrastructure 
investments in the Caribbean. The positive aspect of infrastructure investments by China into the 
Caribbean is that it does create potential for growth. The modernisation of infrastructure within 
respective Caribbean states can have a direct impact on economic development. For instance, 
Trinidadian government officials expressed the hope that the signature port project undertaken 
with China’s financial assistance would enable Trinidad to fill the gap in international shipping 
logistics to further economic development goals.231 Thus creating the potential for expanded 
economic activity in Trinidad. Infrastructure investments in Bahamas also promised to contribute 
positively to the economy. In the case of Baha Mar Resort in the Bahamas financed from a US$ 
2.4 billion loan from the China Exim Bank,232 the resort was set to provide about 5,000 full-time 
jobs according to estimates. Thus the hope was that it would have a positive effect on the Bahamas 
unemployment rate, which stood at 14.3 percent in 2014.233  
Moreover, consideration should also be given to the fact that although relations between the 
Caribbean region and China are longstanding, the deepened economic ties with China are fairly 
recent.  The magnitude and scope of the economic engagement only increased starting around 
2005, when China increasingly consolidated its economic presence in the Caribbean region. Thus, 
China is a relatively new comer in terms of trade within the Caribbean.  China is still attempting 
to further its relationship with the region, unlike traditional western actors that have been part of 
the economic development of the Caribbean for several decades. Thus far, within a relatively short 
period of time (2005-2015), China has substantially increased investments in the region. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, China has expended hundreds of millions in infrastructure investments for 
the period under survey in the thesis. It has also committed millions to natural resource sectors in 







needed capital within the Caribbean region for economic development. One might assert that 
should the growth trajectory in China continue, there can be an opportunity for the Caribbean 
region’s trading relationship to diversify with China being considered an important market, for 
trade whether in services or goods. 
Table 5.9: Case Summary of Caribbean States Trade Relationship with China 
Caribbean States 
Trade with China 
Issues and Debates Summary Finding 
Aims in Caribbean 
States in Trade with 
China 
Expand trade to new markets 
Access Chinese FDI in resource 
and services sectors 
The Anglophone Caribbean and China have promoted trade relations as a new and alternative market for access to competitive 
manufactures on the world market. Caribbean states have also aimed to increase Chinese access to Chinese FDI in resource 
sectors to build trade synergies. This pattern of encouraging Chinese FDI in resource sectors is seen in the three natural resource 
states of the Anglophone Caribbean; Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad.  These findings appear to further reinforce Chinese 
commercial motives in the Caribbean region, notwithstanding the knowledge gap on China’s aims in the Caribbean.  




The main trends in the trade 
relationship between Caribbean 
and China 
Findings indicate highly asymmetrical trade relations between the Caribbean and China for 2005-2015 for Anglophone Caribbean 
states based on UN Comtrade data. This corroborates with findings on China’s trade relations with Latin America. 
A major caveat notwithstanding the negative trade balance, is that Caribbean states with resources do have the potential to derive 
benefits from the trade relationship. Hence, Trinidad, Guyana and Jamaica, have increasingly reached out to China both as a 
market and a means of investments in resource sectors to invest in their resource sectors which can auger well for expanding the 
trade given China’s resource drive.  
Further, despite the highly imbalanced trade relationship between the Caribbean and China expanding access to China’s market 
in other economic areas where the Caribbean region has competitive advantage in services sectors like tourism offers a possibility 
for offsetting the trade imbalance 
Impact of Caribbean 
States Trade with 
China 
Debate on whether Caribbean 
states trade with China is giving 
rise to new patterns of dependency 
whereby trade is largely based on 
commodities and primary products 
coupled with higher valued 
manufactured imports from China 
 
Debate on China as competitive 
threat to manufacturing in Latin 
America Caribbean region 
New dependency patterns emerge 
The trade patterns suggest a new dependency pattern in the Caribbean and China trade dynamic is emerging and that mirrors 
similar findings for Latin America in the broader literature.  The UN Comtrade WITS data for the period 2005-2015 suggests that 
the Caribbean has become a site for commodity and primary products exports for China while at the same time importing higher 
valued manufactures from China. The trade between Jamaica and China is concentrated in mineral products for Guyana, it is highly 
concentrated in forestry products 
The findings indicate that while Caribbean states trade with China are based on primary exports, manufactured imports from China 
has risen significantly across the Anglophone Caribbean.  Such outcomes suggest that the Caribbean and China trade dynamic is 
not significantly differentiated from the region’s previous trade relations with other economic powers. 
China competitive threat to Caribbean? 
The findings based on WITS: UN Comtrade data for 2000-2015, suggests that China as competitive threat to the Caribbean is not 
a clear-cut issue based on lack of evidence of similar export product structures and FDI diversion from the region. While initial 
evidence does suggest some FDI diversion in manufacturing in the garments industry in the 1990’s in select Anglophone 
Caribbean states coincided with rise of manufactures in garments in China in the initial period, this offers limited scope to suggest 
that China’s rise impacted negatively on the Anglophone Caribbean.  The findings suggest that rather than being a competitive 
threat, China presented an opportunity for the Caribbean to benefit from cheaper manufactures on the world market, thus creating 
micro benefits to consumers.  
The limited competitive threat seen with regards to China in the Caribbean does not corroborate with findings in relation to Latin 
America. The latter’s trade with China does suggest that China’s rise in manufactured products have adversely impacted on Latin 
America’s manufacturing sector. Latin America and China have had various trade conflicts based on dumping of manufactures on 
Latin America Caribbean markets. Such practices have been alleged to adversely affect local producers.  Within the Latin American 
context, this can be seen to create broader concerns pertaining to a loss of opportunity to further industrialise based on exports of 
higher valued manufactures.  Should trade imbalances continue, the issue of China as a competitive threat may likely be concern 
for the region.    
 
5. Conclusion  
The chapter focused on illuminating the various interaction processes through which Caribbean 
states sought to consolidate trade ties with China. It also shed light on the Caribbean region’s 
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broader role in China’s going out strategy to the developing world. The Latin America Caribbean 
region was found to be an area of significant market opportunities for Chinese enterprises, thus 
leading to China’s significant foreign policy outreach to the region.   
The chapter also addressed the significant empirical gap in Anglophone Caribbean states trade 
relationship with China within the broader Sino-LAC literature. While previous studies have not 
investigated the Caribbean’s economic relationship with China in any substantial detail, this 
chapter sought to situate developing states of the Caribbean region within those broader debates 
pertaining to China’s rise in Latin America. Thus it sought to move past the more China-facing 
analysis evident in much of the literature by highlighting Caribbean states agency, interests and 
constraints in the commercial interactions.  
For Caribbean states acting within a global economic structure, China’s emergence presented 
significant opportunities for the pursuit of mutual economic interests. However, there have been 
concerns relating to the impact of China on developing states in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
This has led to debates pertaining to new dependency patterns emerging in the region’s economic 
relationship with China. There have also been concerns relating to the extent to which China may 
be considered a competitive threat to Latin America and the Caribbean either through FDI 
diversion away from the area or through direct competition in similar product structures. In light 
of the highly asymmetrical trade relationship between Caribbean states and China, dependency 
patterns were very much evident. The region was primarily a site for primary products exports but 
more so, an area of consumption for manufactured goods from the Chinese market.  Notions of 
competitive threat while debatable, could not be conclusively ruled out as a possible impact of the 
commercial ties on the broader Caribbean and Latin American region.  However, these broader 
concerns have also been tempered by China’s favourable commercial role in the region especially 
in relation to promoting the region’s interests in areas such as financing whilst also increasing its 
FDI in the trade and services sectors within the region  
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Chapter 6: Caribbean States Domestic Economic engagement with China:  implications for 
US role in lending and trade in the Caribbean 
 
Introduction 
The previous case studies focused on how and why economic processes have been a central 
determining factor in Caribbean states foreign policy decision-making regarding China in the Post-
Cold War context of engagement. This chapter goes a step further, and examines the implications 
of those unit level interactions for the US role inside the region.  The chapter implicitly addresses 
how Caribbean states decision-making has influenced not only China’s expanding role in the 
region, but also how such states interactions with emerging economic powers, do carry 
implications for other traditional actors within those states. Thereby, highlighting how developing 
states agency, vulnerabilities and constraints invariably shape patterns of economic relations at the 
domestic level in relation to external actors.  
 
In evaluating the implications of Caribbean states economic engagement with China in relation to 
the US, the question is asked; have Caribbean states rising domestic economic engagement with 
China resulted in an increase in China’s economic influence in the Caribbean relative to that of the 
United States?  The question of whether China’s growing influence in the region rivals that of the 
US within the economic realm is an important question to consider. Doing so not only illustrates 
the extent of Chinese economic influence in the Caribbean region vis-à-vis traditional actors like 
the US, but also enables one to place within an empirically informed perspective, China’s evolving 
economic ties with the region. Moreover, given the strategic significance of the region in relation 
to the US as seen in chapter 1, there is need to consider and examine the broader implications of 
China’s emergence in the region as opposed to traditional powers. While it is beyond the scope of 
the thesis to engage extensively with the EU role in the Caribbean vis-à-vis China’s rising role, it 
does provide implication for further research in terms of whether the rise of China in the Caribbean 
has impacted on the EU as a traditional actor and if so, why.   
 
The chapter argues that while the Caribbean’s increased economic relationship with China has 
provided significant maneuvering space for trade and financing within the region, China’s 
economic ascendance has not resulted in a tandem decline in US economic dominance in the 
Caribbean region.  
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While China’s economic influence does not necessarily displace the fundamental US role, China 
has to a certain extent challenged the notion that the US and the EU are the dominant economic 
actors in the international system and within developing states.  Consequently, China has played a 
growing role in Caribbean states economies in the period 2005-2015 and its influence in financing 
and trade has risen exponentially in the Latin America Caribbean region, albeit within a highly 
asymmetrical context in terms of the latter. 
 
 Overall, China has succeeded in impacting development aid in the Caribbean region but China’s 
rise in the region has not altered the economic landscape in the region when it comes to the 
dominance of the US. While the scale and intensity of Chinese economic activity in the Caribbean 
region have grown significantly, its rise within the region is differentiated among states. This 
contrasts with the traditional US influence whereby the latter plays a leading role across states in 
the hemisphere. China is also contributing in areas that are not necessarily a priority for traditional 
actors like the US. Such considerations do not necessarily undermine generalisations pertaining to 
China’s rising economic influence in the Caribbean region, but it does point to the need for a level 
of caution pertaining to overstated claims of US decline in the hemisphere amidst China’s rise. 
 
 Thus, while China’s economic ascent and US purported decline in the region have attracted some 
attention in the literature, there is need to retain considerable perspective with respect to the 
contentions made. At times, assertions are made with limited empirical data to substantiate them. 
Kassab (2015:23) declares that the rise of actors such as China is a benchmark of US decline in 
Latin America. However, insufficient empirical data is provided to support such contentions. 
Likewise, Fornés and Butt Phillip (2012: 1) suggest, “China has become a powerful contestant to 
the United States (in Latin America) and is set to replace the EU as the largest foreign investor in 
the region in the next few years.” However, these assertions are not necessarily fully interrogated 
in qualitative and quantitative terms. Others such as Francisco De Santibañes (2009: 24) favours 
similar rhetoric and argues, “Since the end of the Cold War the US has lost much of its influence 
over Latin America.” However there appears limited efforts to examine such arguments within an 
empirical framework.  
 
In instances where evidence is brought forth to support claims of US decline in the region, the 
focus is on states whose economic relations with China in the region does not necessarily follow 
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the norm or indicate general patterns of trade for the Latin America Caribbean region. As already 
noted, there is a paucity of empirical data to support respective claims of US decline. There is also 
inadequate comparative analysis of general trade or financing patterns in the region in relation to 
both China and the US.  
 
Other critical areas are also left out in the debates on purported US decline in the region. For 
instance, the overwhelming role of the US and EU in FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
more so than non-traditional actors, have not necessarily been given adequate consideration. A 
2017 study by ECLAC on FDI flows to the region shows that the US leads in investments to the 
area. The second leading player is the EU, including the UK and Spain.234 
 
This chapter does not simply fill an empirical gap by engaging in a comparative analysis of 
Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China vis-à-vis the US, although this is an 
important contribution in itself. It also provides extensive and compelling evidence which indicates 
that debates regarding China’s rise versus US decline in the Caribbean and Latin America region 
requires more robust qualitative and empirical analysis.  
 
The chapter proceeds in two main sections. In section 1, the chapter assesses the extent to which 
Caribbean states increased turn to China for lending for infrastructure investments has eclipsed US 
influence in lending in the Anglophone Caribbean. It does so by utilising economic data from 
official Caribbean government reports. In section 2, the chapter analyses the extent to which 
Caribbean states increased trade ties with China has affected the US role in trade within the 
Caribbean region. The discussion draws from trade patterns based on UN Comtrade data for 2000-
2015.   
 
The findings suggest that China’s economic influence in lending and trade is operating within 
already established cleavages of western economic dominance in the region. As a new donor to 
the developing world, China has made significant strides in lending not only in the Anglophone 
Caribbean but also the broader Latin American region. But when evaluating the dynamic, between 
LAC states and China, entrenched western economic dominance, cannot be readily discounted in 
 
234 Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean ECLAC 2017 report, p.13. 
https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/42024/4/S1700815_en.pdf 
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the unfolding commercial ties.  This problematises claims that the region’s engagement with China 
has impacted negatively on US influence in the region. 
 
Section 1 
2. Caribbean States lending from China and implications for the US role 
In seeking to evaluate the implications of the Caribbean region’s rising domestic engagement with 
China for the US role within Caribbean states, this section examines the lending dimension of the 
interaction. The question addressed in this section is as follows; have Caribbean states lending 
from China resulted in an increase in China’s economic influence in the Caribbean relative to that 
of the United States? It is argued that China is playing a major role in lending in the Anglophone 
Caribbean vis-à-vis traditional economic actors while not displacing the dominant role of the US 
in Caribbean states.  
 
There have been various factors at play which support the view that China’s increased role in the 
Caribbean has not eclipsed that of traditional economic actors such as the United States. One factor 
which has been considered is that Caribbean states increased lending from China takes place within 
a global economic order still dominated by United States and other western interests, 
notwithstanding the increasing role of China. Coupled with that, the Caribbean region’s 
geographical location in terms of its proximity to the US, has further enhanced the role of the US 
in the economy of Caribbean states. This has led to the design and implementation of deliberate 
policies that facilitates the presence of the US in financing in the Caribbean and Latin America. 
Therefore, respective regional financial institutions such as the IADB plays an integral role in 
developing states of the Americas together with global financial institutions like the World Bank 
led by the US.  
 
Two, China has played an increasing role in economic areas that have not necessarily been 
considered a priority for significant economic actors within the English-speaking Caribbean such 
as the Inter-American Development Bank. Thus, China has invested largely in infrastructure 
financing in the Anglophone Caribbean, an area that is not necessarily a leading concern for 
financing within institutions linked to or led by the US. 
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Three, China’s lending in the Caribbean region has been differentiated across various Caribbean 
states. Thus, while Chinese financing is playing an increasing role in Jamaica, the same may not 
be said for Barbados, based on an analysis of official government sources. These are Jamaica 
Government Information Service (2005-2015) and Barbados annual budget reports (2009-2016).  
 
Four, China’s lending practices have been linked to economic conditionalities pertaining to the use 
of its state-owned enterprises and its own labour. These have led to various criticisms in the 
engagement when compared to development assistance from traditional actors like the US. These 
factors all indicate that while China’s economic influence has risen in the Caribbean at an 
unprecedented rate, China has not displaced the fundamental role of the US in Caribbean states 
economies.  
 
However, it is fair to say that China’s economic influence in the English-speaking Caribbean has 
certainly increased tremendously in the period under review in the thesis.  For instance, after 
consolidating diplomatic relations with Dominica in 2005, by 2010, it became a leading lender to 
Dominica. According to an IMF Debt Sustainability Report on Dominica on April 27th, 2010, 
concessional lending for various economic projects represented most of the external debt of 
Dominica, with the chief sources of finance being China. Other key actors were Venezuela and the 
Caribbean Development Bank. 235  For 2014, China was the leading source of grants for Grenada 
according to the Grenada government’s budget report. Venezuela was the second leading source 
of grants (Petro-Caribe funds). The grant funds provided to Grenada were as follows; China 
(E.C$47.1 million), Petro-Caribe (E.C $23.3 million). 236   
 
To place China’s fairly immense role in further perspective, studies point to China’s tremendous 
role in the broader Latin American region, beyond the Caribbean. According to Gallagher et al 
(2012:27), with respect to Latin America, “by 2010, China’s loan commitments of $37 billion were 
more than those of the World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and United States Export-
Import Bank combined.” However, while China’s role in concessional lending for infrastructure 
investments in the Caribbean region has been quite significant, there are several caveats to this 
engagement to be borne in mind as indicated earlier. These in turn undermine potential 
 
235 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/dsacr10261.pdf 
236 Grenada Government Budget, 2015 
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generalisations that China’s economic influence has increased in the Caribbean vis-à-vis 
traditional economic actors like the United States.  
 
2.1 US pre-eminence in lending institutions in Caribbean states compared to China 
Firstly, coupled with its geostrategic location in the American sphere of influence which readily 
facilitates linkages to the US economy, the Caribbean’s concessional lending takes place within a 
global economic order still largely defined by western states. The key multilateral institutions 
which engage in lending in the Caribbean region are largely institutions which are strongly 
associated with promoting western interests. The key lenders in the Caribbean are the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and World Bank.237  
 
The majority of shares in the IADB is held by the United States. The United States maintained at 
least 30% of the votes in the in the IADB in 2016. Given the significance of the US as a major 
economic actor within the region, the IADB was designed to play an instrumental role in the 
development of the Caribbean and Latin America. This translates to direct and indirect influence 
in Caribbean states economies, thereby making the US a significant economic actor within the 
Anglophone Caribbean region. The IADB provides loans, grants and technical assistance across 
the region. China’s membership in the IADB came to fruition in January 2009, after 15 years of 
efforts to become a member. Upon its 2009 membership, China contributed US $340 million to 
IADB programmes in the region.238 Although China is among the members with the lowest number 
of shares in the IADB (0.004%),239 it substantially increased its contributions to the financial 
institution in 2013 and provided US$2 billion to the IADB.  The contribution was the first of its 
kind between China and a multilateral development bank. The funds were provided under the 
“Latin America Caribbean Co-Financing Fund”. The aim of the financing was to support private 
and public infrastructure projects in the region.240  
 
The IADB has continued to play a major role in lending in the Caribbean. The IADB has provided 
billions in funding on an annual basis to the Latin America Caribbean region. In 2005, the IADB 
reported that its lending to Latin America and the Caribbean had reached US $ 7 billion.241 In that 
 






same year (2005), China had just started making a turn to the Caribbean region and had yet to 
sufficiently increase its role in financing in the region. By 2006, still within the context of lessened 
Chinese economic activity in the Caribbean region, the IADB approved US $6.4 billion in loans.242 
Moreover, according to the IADB, its funding across the Caribbean and Latin American region for 
2015 amounted to US$11.3 billion with US$10.4 billion in disbursements to the region.243 In the 
previous year, in 2014, the IADB reported that it approved loans of more than US$13 billion to 
the broader LAC region, making it among the region’s leading financiers. 244 
 
More specifically, in terms of overall lending from the IADB to the Caribbean, as shown in figure 
6.0, in 2015 Trinidad received the majority of IADB loans (US$772.5 million). Jamaica received 
the second largest share of IADB funding - US$523 million.  Guyana received US $ 259 million. 
Caribbean states such as Bahamas and Barbados received US$273 and US$192 million 
respectively.  Across the five Anglophone Caribbean states over US$ 1. 5 billion in loans was 
provided by the IADB in 2015 for various projects.  
 
 
Source: adapted from IADB 
 
When one focuses on financing in the Anglophone Caribbean, the role of Canada which further 
facilitates North American interests, is crucial to understanding how deeply entrenched traditional 
actors are within the space. In terms of the CDB, Canada holds the majority of shares within the 
institution. The CDB was founded by Canada to enable the latter to play a significant role in 
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Figure 6.0 : IADB Loan to English-speaking to Caribbean
States 2015
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China became a contributing member to the CDB in 1998 and was the second largest shareholder 
within the institution in 2015. 245 Canada held 9.41 percent shares and the People’s Republic of 
China held 5.64 percent of the CDB’s total shares in 2015.246  According to Alexandroff and 
Cooper (2015:94) China began playing an increased role in the CDB in 2005. In that year, the 
value of China’s stake in the institution rose to US$ 56 million. More recently, China contributed 
US $7 million to the eighth replenishment of the Unified Special Development Fund in the CDB. 
This fund allows for low-interest loans and grants to be given to the poorest member states of the 
Caribbean.247 China has managed to gain increasing economic influence in the Caribbean region 
alongside traditional actors by enhancing its role in major financial organisations within the region. 
However, this substantial rise in China’s input in financial institutions within the Caribbean region 
does not equate to an eclipse of the fundamental US role in the region. 
 
 Moreover, the World Bank has played a significant role in the Caribbean. As at 2016, the World 
Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction arm) provided the majority of its lending to the 
Caribbean and Latin America. This suggested that for the period considered, even in the midst of 
China’s rise in the region, the World Bank led by the US, continued to be a leading actor in the 
region. As shown in the global distribution of its lending in figure 6.1 below, as much as 27% of 
its funding went to the Caribbean and Latin America. Although China has been a leading financial 
contributor in the World Bank,248 the institution is still dominated by the US which has 
traditionally carried the most voting power in the institution. This then provides the US with an 
avenue to shape the areas of priority of the institution. This can impact member states like those 
of the Caribbean where the World Bank plays an integral role. 
 Figure 6.1: World Bank Lending by Region (IBRD) for 2016 
 







As illustrated in table 6.0, by December 2016, the World Bank disbursed US$153 million in loans 
to Barbados and US$43million went to the Bahamas.  US $ 334 million was disbursed to Trinidad 
among other English speaking Caribbean states.249 This shows the significance of traditional actors 
in Caribbean states lending. In comparism, China provided billions in loans to respective 
Caribbean states to finance infrastructure investments. For instance, by 2012, US$ 4 billion had 
been invested in Jamaica and the Bahamas by China, according to Chinese sources.250   
 
However, it is difficult to ascertain actual flows even in light of such estimates just quoted above. 
The practices and norms under which China undertakes its overall financing, may not necessarily 
be equated to western actors (see Brautigam,2010). This further encourages more nuanced 
assessments of China’s financing in the region while even leaving open the possibility of perhaps 
under-estimating China’s overall financing within the Caribbean region. Thus, although China has 
played a substantial role in the region, the IADB, World Bank and other western- led financial 
institutions have also continued to play a significant and concurrent role in lending in the 
Caribbean. Thus indicating that the US is still playing a major role in lending in the region 
alongside China despite the latter’s increased input in financing.  
 
Table 6.0: Concessional Lending by World Bank to Selected Caribbean States by 2016 






Source: World Bank; Country Lending Summaries; http://web.worldbank.org 
 
2.2 Caribbean States lending from China in areas not prioritised in lending by traditional 
actors  
 
The second factor that illustrates that China has been playing a leading role in lending in the 
Caribbean alongside the United States is that it’s lending has been geared towards areas that have 
not necessarily been considered a priority for traditional lenders within the Caribbean region. As 
pointed out by Brautigam (2011:753), Chinese development assistance allows developing states 
to invest in infrastructure – an area that has been relatively neglected by other traditional economic 





infrastructure financing as seen in chapter 4. This contrasts with traditional actors like the World 
Bank where only 34% of loans go to similar sectors (Kwak 2013:46). In relation to its funding, the 
IADB notes, “We give priority for projects that promote regional and international integration and 
trade, the sustainable use of natural resources and greater social inclusion.”251  Thus lending from 
the IADB has been geared towards deepening engagement in differing areas of priority in 
Caribbean states economies when compared to China’s lending in the Caribbean. 
 
As illustrated in the figure 6.2 below, in 2015, the majority of IADB loans in five (5) Anglophone 
Caribbean states went to the water sanitation sector. These are namely; Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana, 
Bahamas and Barbados. Very few loans were given to the health sector across Caribbean states, 
although investments in health infrastructure has been regarded as a priority for the Caribbean in 
economic cooperation with China as detailed in chapter 4. By 2015, two Caribbean states had 
obtained loans from IADB in the health sector. Guyana received US $5 million and Trinidad 
received US$111.5 million in loans from the IADB for health projects.  This is in contrast to China 
which loaned more than US$ 3 billion to three Anglophone Caribbean states; Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Dominica. These loans were geared towards selected health projects for a five year period, 
between 2011-2016 as seen in chapter 4. This indicates that China’s loans have been very much 
targeted at sectors that have not been sufficiently addressed by key lending institutions such as the 
IADB or World Bank in the Caribbean.  
Figure 6.2: Sectors for IADB Loans  
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Furthermore, while China has been playing an increased role in infrastructure investments in the 
Caribbean region more so than traditional economic actors, it cannot be conclusively said that 
western economic interests in infrastructure investments are entirely absent in the region. Between 
2015-2016, loans were increasingly being made available to infrastructure sectors across 
Caribbean states, although infrastructure investments have been largely driven by lending from 
China.  
 
In five Caribbean states, namely; Guyana, Jamaica, Bahamas, Trinidad and Barbados, in 2015, one 
might surmise that infrastructure loans for transportation became an increasing part of the IADB’s 
loan portfolio in the region.  On November 18, 2016, Barbados received US$25 million in loans 
from the IADB for rehabilitation and improvement of main roads. In 2016, Bahamas received US 
$500,000 US.  In 2016, Guyana received US$ 68. 2 million in lending from the IADB. The projects 
were for road network upgrade and expansion. 252 In January 2017, US $35 million was provided 
to the Bahamas for airport infrastructure.253 This is an area that has already benefited from financial 
investments from China and have resulted in China’s management control of the Bahamian facility 
as discussed in chapter 4. In terms of maritime infrastructure in Jamaica for instance, western 
economic actors have played an active role alongside China in investments in that sector. On June 
29th, 2016, the IADB approved a loan of US$ 452 million for Kingston Cargo terminal. The World 
Bank committed US$80 million through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee in risk-mitigation 
guarantees to support development phases of the Kingston Container Terminal.254  
 
In the main, American influence, conferred by institutions such as the IADB or World Bank, 
cannot be said to be entirely absent from infrastructure investments across the Anglophone 
Caribbean region. Hence supporting the conclusion that while China’s engagement has increased 
tremendously, it is still doing so alongside traditional economic actors like the United States. 
 
2.3 Caribbean states lending from China differentiated unlike the US in the Caribbean 
The third element which suggests that China’s increased economic influence has not surpassed 
that of traditional economic actors such as the United States is that its economic engagement in 






increased role in lending versus traditional economic actors such as the United States.  
 
While China’s lending to Jamaica has grown spectacularly in the period under survey, even this 
particular situation does not readily promote the view that China’s role in lending has eclipsed that 
of traditional actors like the US and to some extent, the EU.  In the case of Jamaica, China’s lending 
has grown significantly alongside traditional actors. According to Economic and Social Survey of 
Jamaica (ESSJ), by 2015, US$ 777.4 million had been committed by China to Jamaica’s 
infrastructure sector. This figure surpassed that of any other single actor in Jamaica, including the 
Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, the EU and the US. Loans by the IADB 
amounted to US$591.9 million across 15 projects. The World Bank’s total loan financing was 
about half the amount committed by China (US$308.5 million). The loans were provided for nine 
projects. The European Union provided mainly grant aid to the tune of €242 million. The funds 
assisted 16 projects in Jamaica. The United States, through the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), its chief development agency by 2015, had provided US$125 
million.255 
 
Although China has made a significant contribution Jamaica, much of Jamaica’s funding from 
China period 2005-2015 has been concessional loans as illustrated in table 6.1. Therefore, while 
Jamaica’s economic engagement with China has been promoting important infrastructure 
investments, Jamaica’s level of indebtedness to China has grown significantly. In the case of 
Jamaica, it incurs debt in a similar manner to IADB and World Bank loans and some would argue 
at even higher costs, given the significant engagement of China’s state-owned enterprises and 
Chinese labour in the infrastructure sector. In 2015, Jamaica’s Minister for Finance, Dr Peter 
Phillips, indicated that the country’s debt stood at $53.9 billion (Jamaican dollars) with almost half 
owed to China ($24.7 billion ).256 In 2015, Jamaica’s Economic and Social Survey (ESSJ) 
estimated that development assistance from China amounted to US$880 million, more than 90% 
of which were loans.257   
 
Moreover, the role of the EU in financing in Jamaica, is very much differentiated from China’s. 
Thus prohibiting blanket generalisations regarding China’s economic influence in financing as 
 
255 Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, 2015, Jamaica Planning Institute 
256 http://jamaica-gleaner.com/article/lead-stories/20150603/china-owns-almost-half-jamaicas-debt-foreign-governments 
257 Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica, 2015, Jamaica Planning Institute 
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opposed to traditional actors. The EU for its part, made a concerted contribution to grants in the 
case of Jamaica. As already noted, the EU provided 242 million euros to Jamaica by 2015, the 
majority of which was grant funding. In looking at China’s financial input in Jamaica, it is difficult 
to ascertain the grant component of the funds being disbursed by China. The problem is 
compounded by China’s preferred practices in development assistance. China does not always 
share information on the specific nature of its disbursements to various developing countries. 
Figures based on data from Jamaica’s Government Information Service for the period 2005-2015 
(see table 6.1), shows that grant funding especially in relation to national security initiatives have 
been part of China’s development aid to Jamaica. But these have been a very small component of 
China’s overall funding in Jamaica. Although China’s economic role is significant in Jamaica, 
traditional economic actors have still played an important role.  Thus, undermining conclusions 
that China’s increasing economic influence is much more so than that of traditional actors like the 
US or EU in this instance. 
 
Table 6.1 Showing an Estimate of Selected Funds to Jamaica by China: 2005-2015 
 





2005 China Exim Bank US$ 12.5 m Projects Investments 
2006 China Exim Bank US$30 m Cricket World Cup/ Trelawney 
Stadium  
 China Exim Bank US$30.1 m Port Authority, Kingston Terminal 
2007 China Development Bank US $1.1 m Projects of choice 
 China Exim Bank US$45.2m Montego Bay Exhibition Center 
 China Exim Bank  US$71.2m Jamaica Economic Housing Project 
2008 China Ministry Defence US $ 0.261m JDF Equipment uniforms 
2009 China Development Bank US $10 m Financing Jamaica Development 
Bank 
 China Exim Bank US$100 m Jamaica Development Bank; Trade 
Financing 
 China National Bank US$7.3 m Mutually agreed projects 
2010 China Exim Bank US$421.5 m Jamaica Development 
Infrastructure Programme  
 China Exim Bank US$56 m Palisadoes Shoreline Protection 
Rehabilitation 
2011 China Exim Bank US$ 7.99 m Grants 
 
 People’s Liberation Army US 1.1 m Grant: Ministry of National Security 
2012 China Ministry Foreign Affairs US$1.1m Grant: Equipment JDF 
2013 China Development Bank US$16m Grant and Loan funding for 
mutually agreed projects 
2014 China Co Financing Fund for Latin 
America Caribbean 
US$11m Jamaica’s Public Sector Efficiency 
Fund Programme 
2015 China Development Bank US$170m Chinese Company Loan (Jiuquan 
Iron and Steel Co.) acquisition of 
shares Jamaica Alumina Co. 
(ALPART) 
Source: compiled by author from Jamaica Government Information Service  
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As already noted, China’s economic influence differs across the Caribbean. Notwithstanding the 
increased influence of China in Anglophone Caribbean states such as Jamaica, the centrality of the 
US led financial institutions such as the IADB and World Bank in project financing in Caribbean 
states such as Barbados is clearly demonstrated in accordance with government budget reports for 
the period 2009-2016. As early as 2012, the IADB noted that it accounted for 69% of Barbados 
debt to international financial institutions.258 In line with an analysis of Barbados’s annual budget 
report for the period 2009-2016, the IADB remained the leading lender to Barbados (see figure 
6.3). In addition to the IADB, the World Bank, the Caribbean Development Bank, and the 
European Union were all important sources of lending for Barbados up to 2016 (see table 6.2).  
Table 6.2: Showing Barbados Main Sources of Foreign Finance for Projects 2009-2016 
MAIN LENDERS MAIN FOREIGN STATE CONTRIBUTOR  
Inter-American Development Bank United States 
World Bank United State 
European Development Fund EU Member States 
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) Canada  
People’s Republic of China People’s Republic of China 
 
 Source: author compilation from Barbados government annual budget reports; 2010-2016 
 
The IADB was among the single biggest contributor to foreign finance in terms of selected projects 
in Barbados on an annual basis from 2009-2016, in accordance with Barbados annual budget 
reports for that period (see figure 6.3). In terms of selected projects, in 2009, it was anticipated 
that over BDs$34 million would have been contributed for that financial year. Between 2014 and 
2015, the IADB was slated to contribute over BDS $ 200 million in financing to Barbados. This 
was in contrast to China whose contributions were projected to be negligible from 2009-2014. The 
primacy of western backed finance in the case of Barbados was very much apparent, despite the 
increase of China’s role in the English-speaking Caribbean region.  
However, as shown in figure 6.3, by 2015, China had moved from a position of not being a net 
contributor to financing in Barbados to becoming one. Therefore, for the financial year 2015, funds 
amounting $ BDs 5,000,000 were committed to Barbados from China. But the amount was still 
insignificant compared to the IADB.  In that same financial year, the IADB aimed to contribute 
 
258 Country Program Evaluation-Barbados 2010-2013, Inter-American Development Bank, March 2014, p. 14 
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over $ BDs 100 million. But by the financial year 2016, for selected projects, China’s contribution 
was slated to be over 16 million more than that of the IADB to Barbados. The IADB contribution 
was slated at $ BDs 52,618,041 while it was anticipated that China’s contribution would be  $BDs 
68, 000, 000.  This indicates that China has been playing an increased role as a growing source of 
financing for Barbados. However, this may not necessarily be indicative of a trend, as various 
actors play a more dominant role in foreign financing in any given year. Thus, financial institutions 
whose main contributors are western states have still been central to lending in the Caribbean 
region, notwithstanding China’s increased input.  
 
Moreover, China’s economic engagement differs among states with which it has diplomatic 
relations and those that recognise Taiwan. Thus further undermining potential claims that it plays 
a leading role in lending compared to actors such the United States.  In an interview with the 
Deputy Permanent Secretary of Saint Lucia’s Ministry of Finance, Ms. J. Barnard, on December 
12th, 2016, it was acknowledged that the major sources of lending for Saint Lucia was not China, 
even when considering the period (1997-2006) during which the island shared diplomatic relations 
with China. Rather, EU funds and World Bank funding have been the major source of foreign 
assistance within this English-speaking Caribbean country. Likewise, for Caribbean states such as 
St. Kitts with ties to Taiwan, China does not figure prominently in its lending. Thus further 
undermining claims of traditional actors decline in financing amidst China’s rise. 
 














2.4 Caribbean states and conditionalities in lending from China and the US 
The fourth factor that may impact on China’s growing economic influence in Caribbean states is 
the specific nature of its concessional lending when compared to traditional economic actors like 
the United States. While China has promoted much of its lending as having “no strings attached,” 
the reality is that China’s lending is very much tied to economic concessions. This may then 
influence preferences at the domestic level.  It may be asserted that spillovers in terms of 
employment and skills transfer may be viewed as problematic given the predominant use of 
Chinese labour and contractors within Caribbean states economies. These issues will be examined 
more closely in chapter 7 given their significance in shaping responses to China’s economic 
engagement at the ground level within Caribbean states. 
 
A significant part of the Caribbean’s domestic engagement with China has been the increased 
influence of China’s state actors in the economy. All English- speaking Caribbean states which 
share diplomatic relations with China have seen an increase in China’s state-owned enterprises 
engaging in various sectors of the economy. These form an integral part of China’s concessional 
lending for infrastructure investments in the Caribbean. In Barbados for instance, the China 
National Complete Plant Import and Export Corporation Limited was awarded the contract for the 
Sam Lord Tourism Project based on a loan from the China Exim Bank in 2015 for the project.   
With respect to Trinidad, by 2014, China state-owned company, Shanghai Construction Group 
(SCG) Caribbean had completed 13 projects, including the National Academy for the Performing 
Arts, South terminal of Trinidad’s Piarco International Airport among other projects.259  
 
In critiquing China’s modus operandi for development assistance, a Trinidad parliamentary 
representative at a meeting of Trinidad’s Senate on December 8th, 2015, alluding to the China’s 
engagement in the economy had this to say: 
This is why IADB projects and projects financed by the multilateral agencies are so much better because when you get into these Government to 
Government contracts, you not only commit to foreign loans, but you also commit to foreign contractors. And what happens when you engage a 
foreign contractor? You have repatriation, because the foreigners are coming here, you are paying them but they are repatriating the funds. What 
about the local content? What about the local value added? What effect does it have on the local economy when you engage in a Government to 
Government arrangement with a foreign entity?260 
 
These sentiments express to some extent, the broader concerns related to China’s aid and technical 
assistance when compared to traditional economic actors within the Caribbean region. Chinese 
 
259 http://www.trinidadexpress.com/business-magazine/From-Shanghai-to-Trinidad-275387361.html 
260	Hansard document, Trinidad Parliamentary Office, Senate Meeting, December 8th, 2015	
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labour have also been a key part of the infrastructure investments in Caribbean states. The rise of 
such actors in Caribbean states economic engagement with China have not been without criticism. 
The thesis will return to labour issues in chapter 7, given its significance in unpacking the 
Caribbean and China domestic economic engagement.  
 
Despite China being an integral actor in the pursuit of Caribbean states domestic economic 
interests, the pre-eminence of traditional actors such as the United States cannot be entirely 
discounted. Overall, at the very least, China has played an increasing role alongside the United 
States in concessional lending and broader development aid within the Anglophone Caribbean.  
 
2.5. Continued EU significance in financing in the Caribbean 
The EU’s role in financing presents a bit of a conundrum if one were to compare it to China’s 
rising role in lending in the Caribbean. This is so because the two actors are differentiated in terms 
of how they have pursued overall development assistance in the Caribbean region in relation to 
financing.  While examining the EU role more fully in comparism to that of China’s is beyond the 
scope of the thesis, the EU and China dynamic in relation to lending does merit further 
investigation. This subsection, at the very least, seeks to offer a preliminary assessment regarding 
whether China’s influence in lending has impacted on the EU role in the Anglophone Caribbean.  
 
On the surface, Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China has meant that China 
has committed billions to Anglophone Caribbean states between 2005 and 2015. The EU’s 
financing commitment to the region has not been the same as China’s. Thus leading one to possibly 
surmise that China’s lending in the region appear to be greater than that of the EU. However, this 
is subject to major caveats.  
 
Much of the EU’s financial assistance to the region has been in the form of grant funding as 
opposed to China, a point referenced in relation to Jamaica in earlier discussions.  The large 
majority of China’s financing in the region has been based on concessional loans as already 
indicated. For instance, according to Jamaica’s Government Information Service, for a 43 year 
period up to 2018, Jamaica received 1.5 billion Euros from the EU. At first, this appears rather 
limited when compared to the billions in funds provided by China to Jamaica. But what 
	 205	
differentiates the two, is the substantial grant component in EU financing261  when compared to  
China’s assistance to Jamaica and indeed the broader Caribbean region. Thus, while the billion 
dollars worth of development assistance spanning a 40 year period pales in comparism to China’s 
overall financial assistance to Jamaica, the conditionalities placed by China on the Caribbean and 
the possibility of continued indebtedness to China as examined in chapter 4, is a very real 
possibility. As already indicated earlier, certain Caribbean officials mindful of the various 
conditionalities of China, have critiqued China’s modus operandi as opposed to traditional actors. 
 
Also, even while China’s influence in lending has risen significantly in relation to infrastructure 
investments, one may not necessarily conclude that the role of the EU has been largely absent in 
those areas.  In the case of the UK, in 2015, then Prime Minister David Cameron, announced a 
£300 million investment package for infrastructure in the Anglophone Caribbean. 262 Further, 
much like the case with the US role in financing, it is also important to see Chinese and EU 
financing as variegated among Caribbean states. While the EU plays a significant role across the 
Anglophone Caribbean, China’s financing has been largely limited to states where it has 
diplomatic recognition. Within those states that still recognise Taiwan, China does not play a 




3. Caribbean States trade relationship with China:  implications for the US role in trade 
 
At this juncture, this section takes a step back from the discussion on lending above.  The section 
aims to focus on the implications of the increased trade relations between Caribbean states and 
China in relation to the US role in the region. The Caribbean region’s rising interaction with China 
in trade constitutes China’s rising influence in the Caribbean. In an effort to provide a comparative 
assessment of the US economic influence in the Caribbean vis-à-vis China in terms of trade, the 
analysis draws from UN Comtrade data for the period 2005-2015.  This method is in line with the 
earlier evaluation of Caribbean states trade relations with China undertaken in chapter 5.  
The US role within the Caribbean and Latin American region has been subjected to contradictory 





Gallagher (2015) conclude that for South America in particular, China surpassed the US as a main 
trade partner. Similar findings are found in an ECLAC (2015) study on China and the Latin 
America Caribbean region. In accordance with the said study, for Peru and Brazil, China played 
an outsize role in trade compared to traditional actors. However, such conclusions do provide a 
partial picture with regards to the LAC region. China’s trade with the region is very much 
variegated when taking into account particular countries.263 Thus impeding generalisations that 
China’s rising influence in the region has surpassed the traditional US role.  
 
Therefore, it is argued that while the Caribbean’s increased trade relationship with China has 
expanded Caribbean states access to new markets, China’s rise in trade in the region has not 
resulted in a tandem decline in US economic pre-eminence in the Caribbean region. Rather, the 
Caribbean region has undertaken a diversification of their trade partnerships to take into account 
the Chinese market while also emphasising trade with traditional economic partners.  As seen in 
chapter 5, notwithstanding the heightened trade relations between the Caribbean and China, with 
the increased economic ties, comes concomitant concerns relating to the ambiguous impacts of 
China on the Caribbean region. 
 
 The formation of new dependency patterns as well as concerns pertaining to the extent that 
China’s ascendancy may constitute a competitive threat to the region are all constraints in the 
engagement thus far. As will be seen in chapter 7, there have also been concerns relating to China’s 
economic practices within the Caribbean region. Thus, China’s economic engagement comes with 
perceived challenges relating to labour and environmental standards. Such conflicting issues have 
not necessarily been readily attributed to US economic activities in the region.  But while the US 
retained its dominance in trade with the Anglophone Caribbean, an emerging trend across the 
Anglophone Caribbean, has been the rising share of Chinese imports in respective states trade. 
Therefore, while the US remained the Caribbean region’s leading trade partner, this trend may 
mask the rising significance of China in Caribbean states import trade.  This point will be returned 
to as the section unfolds.   
 
263 In relation to Latin America, Ray and Gallagher (2015) concluded that for South America in particular, China surpassed US as a main trade 
partner. The same was concluded by ECLAC in a 2015 study on the Latin America Caribbean and China with respect to the southern cone 
countries including Peru and Brazil (https://www.cepal.org/en/publications/38197-latin-america-and-caribbean-and-china-towards-new-era-
economic-cooperation.) Moreover,  Bloomberg using IMF trade data concludes that while China’s trade with the LAC region is below 300 billion 




3.1 Comparing Caribbean states import trade with the US and China  
The significance of the US for Caribbean states imports shows that in terms of trade, China has 
not competed with the US within the Caribbean region, instead, China has played a complementary 
role in trade in the region alongside the US. Thus, Caribbean states have utilised China as an 
additional source market for products, rather than diverting from their major import market which 
is the US, in favour of China. But this more general trade pattern for the region may obscure 
unfolding trends, and that is; the rising share of Caribbean states import trade with China. But such 
preliminary developments are not necessarily indicative of firm outcomes in the engagement. 
 
In examining Caribbean states import trade with China in accordance with UN Comtrade data for 
2015, although China moved to a place of prominence in trade in the Anglophone Caribbean, it 
has not displaced the US as the dominant import trade partner for the region. As shown in table 
6.3, the Bahamas imported from China and the US, an almost equivalent level of imports in 2015. 
For the Bahamas, imports amounted to US $ 2.4 billion from the US market while US $ 2 billion 
came from China in the same year. This suggests that China has been able to play a significant 
role in the Bahamas alongside the US. But the figure for the Bahamas needs to be differentiated 
from other states in the region.  
 
In terms of imports, the US is the leading economic actor across the Anglophone Caribbean region. 
The two biggest importers in the English-speaking Caribbean; Trinidad and Jamaica, imported 
between US$ 2-3 billion in products from the US for 2015. In that same year, these two states 
imported millions worth of goods from China (see table 6.3). Trinidad’s import of goods from the 
United States was worth US$3 billion while US$ 478 million in goods was imported from China. 
In the case of Jamaica, US $2.2 billion worth of goods came from the United States, its top trading 
partner, while US$446 million came from China. Thus, the US was still the most critical actor in 
terms of trade for the Caribbean for the period. The trend of US imports far outpacing that of 
imports from China for 2015, was much the same across the English-speaking Caribbean as shown 
in table 6.3. This suggests that in terms of import trade, the US influence in the Anglophone 





Table 6.3 Showing Caribbean States Imports from China and the United States for 2015 
Caribbean Country USA Import (US $) China Import (US $) 
Trinidad 3B 478M 
Jamaica 2B 625M 
Bahamas 2.4B 2B 
Guyana 368M 159M 
Barbados 596M 65M 
Grenada 90M 10M 
Antigua 667M 53M 
Dominica 67M 31M 
St. Vincent 82.6M 21M 
St. Kitts 138M 27M 
St. Lucia 311M 18M 
Source:  author elaboration from UNComtrade data 
 
Moreover, although for the most part, states with diplomatic relations with Taiwan import much 
less than from China, the latter still figures in imports across the region (see table 6.3). For instance, 
for three Caribbean states which share diplomatic relations with Taiwan; Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts 
and Saint Vincent, their imports from China for 2015, was an average of US $ 20 million, 
significantly less than the billion dollars worth of goods imported by the Bahamas, Jamaica and 
Trinidad which all have diplomatic relations with China. This itself suggests China’s increased 
significance in trade more broadly. But notwithstanding China’s overall strides in imports in the 
Caribbean, as illustrated in table 6.3, the US retains its significance as the leading import source 
for all Anglophone Caribbean states considered. This suggests the continued salience of the US 
for Caribbean states imports.  
 
More specifically, in accordance with UN Comtrade data for 2000-2015 (see table 6.4), for three 
select Anglophone Caribbean states; Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana, the US has remained the 
dominant import partner for such states when compared to China. This was so for the entire fifteen 
(15) year period under consideration. For the year, 2000, Jamaica imported only US $49 million 
worth of goods from China. Trinidad also imported a little over US $ 20 million from China in 
that same year. Between 2000-2004, Guyana’s import from China amounted to US $ 20 million 
or less on an annual basis for that period. When compared to imports from the US, Caribbean states 
such as Jamaica and Trinidad were already importing over US $ 1 billion in products on an annual 
basis between 2000-2004. While Trinidad for instance, imported more than US half a billion worth 
of goods from China in 2015 (US $660 million), it imported at least US $ 3 billion worth of 





Table 6.4 Showing Caribbean States import trends from China and the US for 2000-2015.  
 
Year Jamaica Trinidad Guyana 






US Imports China 
Imports 
2000 1B 49M 1B 27M 159M 10M 
2001 1B 85M 1B 35M 141M 12M 
2002 1B 66M 1B 42M 128M 14M 
2003 1B 102M 1B 59M 117M 18M 
2004 1B 126M 1B 76M 138M 21M 
2005 2B 142M 2B 168M 242M 32M 
2006 2B 207M 2B 242M 243M 46M 
2007 3B 228M 2B 356M 259M 87M 
2008 3B 320M 2B 487M 377M 76M 
2009 2B 228M 2B 352M 342M 59M 
2010 2B 243M 2B 373M 402M 84M 
2011 2B 282M 3B 445M 445M 107M 
2012 2B 310M 4B 550M 458M 194M 
2013 2B 332M 3B 553M 406M 165M 
2014 2B 394M 3B 635M 427M 133M 
2015 2B 409M 3B 660M 429M 113M 
Source: author calculations based on UN comtrade data 
 
One of the more obvious reasons for the US dominance in trade with the Caribbean is the 
Caribbean’s geographical proximity in relation to the US. This geostrategic advantage means that 
much of the trade between the Caribbean and the US has been facilitated through traditional ties 
to US markets. Non-traditional actors like China are likely to face impediments in new regional 
markets like the Caribbean, given the already dominant trade partnership with the US.  
 
Moreover, there is a less quantifiable but nonetheless important issue, which has implications for 
the US role in trade in the region, and that is; the seeming preference for US imports. A sizable 
amount of the Caribbean’s import trade with the US tends to be consumer goods. As such, this can 
foster a preference for traditional markets over non-traditional markets such as China’s 
notwithstanding the perception of more competitively priced products.  
 
However, notwithstanding this more obvious trend in terms of the US being the leading import 
market for the region, the data itself reveals an unfolding pattern in the Caribbean’s trade 
relationship with China in the period considered; the increasing significance of China in Caribbean 







3.2 Caribbean states increasing imports from China   
 
The inroads that China has made in import trade in the Anglophone Caribbean alongside the US 
in the region has been quite remarkable based on UN Comtrade data from 2005-2015. This rise in 
trade with China in relation to traditional actors like the US is a pattern being seen for the first time 
in the region’s trade relationship with China. While the US has retained its significant leading role 
in Caribbean states imports, the region’s intake from the US has been relatively stable when 
compared to China. The latter appears to have steadily increased its market share in the 
Anglophone Caribbean in relation to imports.  
 
As seen in figure 6.4, for three Anglophone Caribbean states, Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana, 
China’s market share in imports have steadily increased while imports from the US has not 
undergone any substantial shifts in the same period. Thus it remained relatively stable for the most 
part. For Jamaica, no significant shifts materialised in terms of its imports from the US for the six 
year (6) period between 2009-2015 (see figure 6.4). Jamaica imported an average of US $ 2 billion 
worth of goods per annum. However in contrast, imports from China rose in that same period. In 
2009, it was US $ 228 million and by 2015, it was almost twice that figure, amounting to US$409 
million.   
 
A similar trend obtained for Trinidad whereby its US imports remained fairly constant while 
China’s share of import trade increased for the period under survey.  As illustrated in figure 6.4, 
from 2009-2015, the level of imports from the US remained almost constant. Trinidad imported 
an average of US $3 billion worth of goods from the United States during the period mentioned. 
In 2009, the amount imported from China amounted US $ 356 million, but by 2015, this figure 
was almost doubled. Trinidad imported US $ 660 million worth of products from China.  
 
In the case of Guyana as seen in figure 6.4, its imports from the US for the period 2009-2015, was 
an average of US $400 million. In 2009, Guyana’s imports from China amounted to US$59 
million. By 2015, Guyana had imported twice this amount from China. Again, China managed to 






Figure 6.4: US and China import trade for Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica 
 
 
Source:  author calculation UNComtrade data 2005-2015 
 
Highlighting the steady increase in China’s role in imports in the Caribbean in no way seeks to 
mask the outsize role that the US has played in terms of Caribbean states imports as seen in figure 
6.4. However, it does suggest that China’s economic role in the Caribbean has increased 
significantly alongside traditionally dominant actors for the period considered.  
 
The Caribbean region has increased its imports from China not only in relation to its competitive 
advantage in the global market, but also given the concerted policies undertaken by the region and 
China. As discussed in chapter 5, to benefit from China’s aid and investment, Caribbean states 
entered into agreements tied to enhancing market access to Chinese actors. In becoming a major 
lender to Caribbean states and increasing FDI in respective sectors, China has been able to develop 
a more favourable environment for Chinese exports to the region.  
 
Whereas it may appear that the Caribbean and much of the broader Latin American region may 
benefit from a more coherent trade strategy for China, perhaps the same may not be said for the 
latter, as evident by its rapid import penetration in the region. There have been various transmission 
modes through which China has sought to strengthen its trade links with the Caribbean, thus 
resulting in China’s increased role in Caribbean states import trade. As discussed in chapter 5, 
Caribbean states and China have implemented a deliberative set of cohesive policies aimed at 













cooperation strategies. Fostering such links have allowed relevant actors an initial platform for 
promoting trade interests. This also enabled Chinese entrepreneurs and companies to further ties 
with local actors, thereby creating synergies between Chinese and Caribbean commercial interests. 
Such strategies have served as an important avenue for China’s state owned enterprises to break 
new ground in pursuit of commercial opportunities in various Caribbean states.  
 
Another means through which import trade with China has been facilitated is through local sources 
seeking more competitive products elsewhere on the global market. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, as merchants within the Caribbean region sought more competitive markets, they looked 
to China to provide low technology manufactures at competitive prices.  
 
Furthermore, the entry of private Chinese entrepreneurs within the Caribbean has been another 
stream for promoting trade ties. Historically, as seen in chapter 3, this type of business activity has 
long been part of Caribbean states engagement with China. Within more recent contexts, Dominica 
for instance, has witnessed an influx of Chinese petty traders into the island and much of the retail 
trade in the capital Roseau, have been conducted by such entrepreneurs. Such business activities 
while creating competitive spaces for local businesses, also facilitate competition in low cost 
manufactures and products for consumers. Thus enhancing Chinese entry into the region.  
 
 Should the trend of increasing imports from China continue, China is expected to continue playing 
a broader role in Caribbean states trade. As China becomes more competitive in trade, and seeks 
to broaden its economic engagement with the Caribbean region, that may mean an even bigger 
share of the Caribbean’s import trade. This then has implications for China’s increased economic 
role in the region alongside traditional actors like the US and EU.  
 
3.3 China’s rise in Caribbean states import trade - EU’s decline? 
 
While the data on the Caribbean region’s trade with China points to the dominant economic role 
of the US in the Caribbean region, the data points to a somewhat differentiated picture when taking 
into account the traditional EU role in imports in the Caribbean. The Caribbean region’s patterns 
of trade with China and the EU in terms of imports, suggest more competitive effects.  
There has been a marked decline in imports from the EU as trade intake from the Chinese market 
increased for the Caribbean region, between 2005-2015, based on UN Comtrade data. This 
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particular outcome appears to suggest that for the Caribbean, China has become an alternative 
partner to the EU in imports given China’s global rise in trade and the concerted effort by both 
parties to deepen their economic relations in the period considered. 
 
The decline of the EU relative to China, appears to be quite stark in accordance with an 
examination of the trade patterns for Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana based on UNComtrade data 
for 2005-2015.  This trend can be seen as part of a broader pattern identified by ECLAC (2015) in 
China’s trade with the Caribbean and Latin America when compared to the EU region.	According 
to ECLAC, since 2010, China has overtaken the EU as the region’s second largest import source.264	  
 
In specifically examining the UK’s import share in three Caribbean states, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Guyana, based on UN Comtrade data for 2005-2015, it appears that China’s market share in 
Caribbean states imports have far outweighed traditional actors like the UK. However, this also 
needs to be considered in light of China’s comparative advantage in relation to the UK in trade in 
goods more generally. One possibility for the decline in the EU position in the Caribbean relative 
to China is that China has been able to out-compete the EU in manufactures production. Caribbean 
states like other developing states, have turned to China as a means of accessing more 
competitively priced manufactures on the global market, a point already discussed in chapter 5. 
	
But nonetheless, the rise of China as opposed to traditional actors like the UK in the Anglophone 
Caribbean bears closer examination. In examining Jamaica’s import trade with China and the UK, 
as seen in figure 6.5, Jamaica has consistently managed to increase its level of imports from China, 
but the same may not be said for the UK where levels of imports appear to be on the decline. As 
Caribbean states expanded their market intake from China, there was a tandem decline in imports 
from traditional EU actors such as the UK. As such, it appears that while the US role in trade in 
the Caribbean region has remained steady, China has been able to edge out the EU in terms of 
market share in Caribbean states like Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana.  
 
As seen in figure 6.5, in the case of Jamaica, in 2005 its imports from the UK amounted to US 
$110 million in 2005. However, by 2015, it was less than half this amount at US$ 66 million. 
Between 2005 and 2015, there was a consistent decline in Jamaica’s imports from the UK as 
 
264 Latin America and the Caribbean and China, ECLAC, May 2015, p.37 
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opposed to China. In 2005, Trinidad imports from the UK outweighed its imports from China. 
Trinidad imported US $225 million worth of goods from the UK and imported only US $168 
million from China. But this advantage in trade in imports by the UK into Trinidad was erased 
from 2006. In the case of Guyana, US $ 33 million in goods was imported from the UK, a million 
more than from China. But the trend of increased Chinese imports by Guyana, is seen from 2006 




But, while the EU’s position in Caribbean states imports have declined relative to China’s rise, 
there is still need to retain a sense of perspective when considering the dynamic. Notwithstanding 
China’s crucial role in imports, a more holistic measure of Caribbean states bilateral trade 
relationship, taking into account exports, suggests that the EU is still a leading market for the 
Caribbean.  
3.4 Comparing Caribbean states export trade with the US and China  
While China has increased its economic influence in the Caribbean region by expanding its market 
share in imports, alongside traditional actors like the US, the export patterns of the Caribbean 
region have not shown significant orientation towards the Chinese market.  This matters because 
in evaluating China’s economic influence in the region vis-à-vis traditional actors like the US, a 
more holistic portrayal of the region’s trade pattern is required in an effort to arrive at more valid 












Moreover, the Caribbean’s export trade with the US does not appear to follow the highly 
asymmetrical trade relationship between the Caribbean region and China. As will be examined 
later, based on an examination of UN Comtrade data for Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana for 2000-
2015, the latter two states have had a positive trade balance with the US. In Trinidad’s case, it has 
been almost consistent in accordance with the trade data. In instances where Caribbean states do 
have a trade deficit with the US, the US is still their most significant export market as opposed to 
China which plays a very limited role in exports in the region.  
The critical significance of the United States in terms of Caribbean states trade is seen in relation 
to exports for the states of the Anglophone Caribbean region for the year 2015. In examining the 
data for states across the Anglophone Caribbean region for the year 2015, based on UN Comtrade 
data, the US is the major export destination for the region. As seen in table 6.5, in 2015, the 
Anglophone Caribbean states exported to the US in excess of US $ 6 billion worth of goods. 
Trinidad, the Anglophone Caribbean’s biggest commodities exporter, exported US $5 billion to 
the US market in 2015.  This is in sharp contrast to Trinidad’s export to China which amounted to 
US $39 million in that same year. The other more significant markets within the Anglophone 
Caribbean, including the Bahamas, Jamaica and Barbados, exported to the US market in excess of 
US$ 1.3 billion while exports to China amounted to only US $100 million. The smaller Eastern 
Caribbean group of states including Saint Lucia, St Vincent, St. Kitts and Grenada, exported US$ 
248 million worth of products to the US market for 2015.  In contrast, the Eastern Caribbean states 
exported to China was merely US 1.5 million in the same year. This clearly indicates that the US 
market is the Caribbean’s most significant export market while China’s market plays a more 
negligible role in Caribbean states export trade.  
 
Table 6.5 Caribbean States exports to the US and China for 2015 
Country Exports to USA  Exports to China 
Trinidad 5 B 39M 
Jamaica 329M 31M 
Guyana 440M 49M 
Bahamas 471M 24M 
Barbados 71M 19M 
Eastern-Caribbean  248M 1.5M 
Source: author calculation based on UN Comtrade data 
This consistent trend of US significance for the region’s exports is further demonstrated in a study 
of three Caribbean states export patterns with the US and China based on UN Comtrade data for 
2000-2015. These are Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad. The data explicitly suggests that China’s 
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rising economic influence in the Caribbean alongside the US needs to be kept in perspective. 
Essentially, China’s economic rise has failed to displace the economic influence of the US with 
respect to Caribbean states export trade.  
Trinidad’s case is particularly relevant in highlighting the differentiated patterns of trade in relation 
to the US and China within the region.  As seen in table 6.6, Trinidad exported a few million worth 
of goods to China between 2002-2005. Prior, in 2001, it exported less than half a million worth of 
goods to China. This is in sharp contrast to the US market where Trinidad exported in excess of 
US$ 2 billion on an annual basis for the fifteen year period under consideration. The US is the 
most important market for Trinidad’s oil resources. Likewise, in the case of Guyana, it has 
exported more than US $100 million worth of goods for the fifteen year period for the most part.  
In Jamaica’s case, its exports to the US on an annual basis, was worth close to US $ half a billion.  
While these trends may not necessarily come as a surprise, it does help to place in sharp 
perspective, the economic dominance of the US in the region. These patterns for the Caribbean 
region also indicate that there needs to be more robust assessments of claims regarding China’s 
economic rise in Latin America more broadly, when compared to the traditional US role in the 
region.  
Table 6.6 showing select Caribbean States exports to the US and China for 2000-2015 
 
Year Jamaica Trinidad Guyana 
 US Exports 
 
China Exports US Exports China Exports US Exports China Exports 
2000 461M 30M 2B 400TH 140M 4M 
2001 461M 34M 2B 67TH 140M 2M 
2002 426M 49M 5B 5M 134M 4M 
2003 452M 105M 5B 10M 137M 300TH 
2004 342M 270M 6B 4M 138M 1M 
2005 387M 107M 6B 4M 83M 5M 
2006 605M 301M 8B 7M 88M 14M 
2007 828M 70M 8B 22M 113M 10M 
2008 983M 2M 9B 12M 116M 12M 
2009 649M 17M 5B 60M 97M 13M 
2010 659M 2M 5B 33M 92M 7M 
2011 839M 21M 7B 79M 227M 6M 
2012 823M 11M 6B 18M 334M 13M 
2013 771M 15M 7B 19M 361M 7M 
2014 573M 38M 7B 55M 300M 23M 
2015 467M 29M 4B 102M 311M 20M 




Further, unlike the more asymmetrical trade relations between the Caribbean and China, patterns 
of trade with the US does not necessarily show the same level of imbalance. Interestingly, 
Caribbean states such as Trinidad have had a positive balance of trade with the US. As shown in 
table 6.7, Trinidad’s positive balance of trade with the US has been consistent throughout the 
fifteen-year period under study. Figures from the United States Census Bureau also confirms the 
US’s negative trade balance with Trinidad.265  
 
In the case of Guyana, the bilateral trade between itself and the US can be said to be fairly balanced 
for the most part. Guyana exported US $140 million worth of goods from the US in 2000 and 
imported US $ 159 million. In 2003, Guyana registered a positive balance of trade with the US by 
exporting US $137 million and importing US $117 million worth of goods from the US market. 
By 2015, it imported a little over US $ 1 million more than it exported to the United States. Jamaica 
has managed to export close to US $ half a billion on an annual basis to the US market and between 
2006-2015, Jamaica exported close to US $1 billion to the US. These more balanced trade relations 
between the Anglophone Caribbean and the US is in marked contrast to that between the Caribbean 
and China. 
 
Table 6.7 showing select Caribbean states balance of trade with US (US$B): 2000-2015 
 






US Imports US Exports US Imports US Exports US Imports 
2000 461M 1B 2B 1B 140M 159M 
2001 461M 1B 2B 1B 140M 141M 
2002 426M 1B 5B 1B 134M 128M 
2003 452M 1B 5B 1B 137M 117M 
2004 342M 1B 6B 1B 138M 138M 
2005 387M 2B 6B 2B 83M 242M 
2006 605M 2B 8B 2B 88M 243M 
2007 828M 3B 8B 2B 113M 259M 
2008 983M 3B 9B 2B 116M 377M 
2009 649M 2B 5B 2B 97M 342M 
2010 659M 2B 5B 2B 92M 402M 
2011 839M 2B 7B 3B 227M 445M 
2012 823M 2B 6B 4B 334M 458M 
2013 771M 2B 7B 3B 361M 406M 
2014 573M 2B 7B 3B 300M 427M 
2015 467M 2B 4B 3B 311M 429M 




3.5 Continued salience of the EU in Caribbean states export trade  
 
Like the US, the EU remained a significant export market for the Caribbean region as evident by 
export patterns for Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana based UN Comtrade data for 2000-2015. When 
compared to China as an export destination, the UK in particular, remains a major export 
destination for the region.  This contrasts with the trends identified earlier, in terms of the EU’s 
declining role as an import market for the region. However, the data concomitantly reveals that 
China’s significance as an export destination for the Caribbean has been on the rise post 2005, 
notwithstanding the UK’s continued significance as a market for the region.  
 
As illustrated in table 6.8, the Caribbean states mentioned, have almost consistently for a 15 year 
period, exported to the UK market, US $100 million worth of goods or more. For Trinidad, 
between 2007-2015, it exported between US $200-300 million to the UK market on an annual 
basis. The figures showed that even while exports to the UK have fluctuated, it is still a leading 
export destination for the Caribbean region in line with its traditional role as a salient actor in the 
region.  
 
However, there are broader economic developments which at times impact Caribbean states 
exports to the UK market and partly explains why it appears to diminish at various points, despite 
the salience of the UK as a traditional market for the region. As seen in table 6.8, while exports to 
the UK exceeded US $ 100 million annually for Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad respectively in 
2008, exports to the UK market declined significantly, immediately following that period. The 
decline in exports was partly due to the global financial crisis. This greatly impacted Caribbean 
states economies due to their interdependence with traditional partners like the UK and US. But 
from 2013 -2015, exports to the UK market by these Caribbean states rebounded to almost pre-
crisis levels. This again illustrates that while China’s economic influence has risen significantly in 
the Post-Cold War period, it has been able to do so in specific areas of Caribbean states trade. Thus 
pointing to the need for more holistic appraisals of the dynamic in order to more critically assess 
its influence in the Caribbean region.  
 
China’s rise in import trade in the Caribbean as exceptional as it has been post 2005, provides a 
partial portrayal of China’s economic influence in trade in the Caribbean vis-à-vis traditional actors 
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like the UK. As illustrated in table 6.8, Jamaica’s exports to the UK increased consistently from 
2005-2008. Thus, Jamaica exported an average of US$ 200 million to the UK on an annual basis. 
Trinidad also exported about US $ 300 million on a yearly basis to the UK between 2008-2012. 
Thus, for Caribbean states, China remains a limited export market in relation to the UK in the 
Caribbean region. 
 




Jamaica Trinidad Guyana 
 EU/UK Exports 
 
China Exports EU/UK Exports China Exports EU/UK Exports China Exports 
2000 188M 30M 90M >M 103M 4M 
2001 171M 34M 92M >M 92M 2M 
2002 164M 49M 101M 5M 75M 4M 
2003 105M 105M 158M 10M 81M >M 
2004 167M 270M 157M 4M 80M 1M 
2005 162M 107M 73M 4M 105M 5M 
2006 205M 301M 112M 7M 116M 14M 
2007 216M 70M 224M 22M 125M 10M 
2008 225M 2M 334M 12M 140M 12M 
2009 130M 17M 371M 60M 112M 13M 
2010 84M 2M 214M 33M 48M 7M 
2011 112M 21M 348M 79M 78M 6M 
2012 45M 11M 287M 18M 115M 13M 
2013 81M 15M 156M 19M 116M 7M 
2014 76M 38M 191M 55M 97M 23M 
2015 77M 29M 204M 102M 91M 20M 
Author elaboration: UN Comtrade data 
 
But the data overall, does obscure the rise in select Caribbean states exports to China although it 
is still not as significant an export destination for the Caribbean. As seen in figure 6.6, 
notwithstanding the UK’s more significant role as an export destination, there has been a trend 
towards increasing exports to China from Jamaica, Trinidad and Guyana for 2005 to 2015. This 
period coincides with deepening economic engagement between the Caribbean and China.  
 
As shown in figure 6.6, Jamaica witnessed an almost two-fold increase in its exports to China 
between 2013-2015. In 2012, its exports to China amounted to US $45 million, in the three years 
following, its exports to China amounted to an average of $ US 80 million. Likewise, for Guyana, 
there was a three-fold increase in exports to China’s market between 2014-2015. After registering 
US $ 7 million in exports to China in 2013, by 2014 and 2015, its exports were above US $ 20 
million on an annual basis. These are still lower export numbers when compared to traditional 
markets like the UK, but China’s rising role in trade with the region is fairly new when compared 
to established actors. 
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4. Assessing Caribbean states trade with China and traditional partners: US and EU 
As already discussed, while China has managed to substantially increase its import share across 
the Anglophone Caribbean, China plays a limited role in Caribbean states exports. On the surface, 
this shows an obvious imbalance when compared to traditional economic powers within the 
Anglophone Caribbean. But there are major caveats to be borne in mind when assessing China’s 
economic role in the region vis-à-vis the traditional actors mentioned. The trade ties strengthened 
remarkably only post 2005, this suggests that China is a recent actor in trade when compared to 
the traditionally dominant role of the US in the region. Further, China’s own emphasis on 
expanding market opportunities in relation to third states may not necessarily be overlooked when 
evaluating its rapid entry into external markets. Thus, China’s lack of salience to the Caribbean 
region as an export market is so for a variety of reasons.  
The existing trade pattern thus far, points to China’s own internal policies which may favour export 
trade rather than import penetration from third states. For instance, CARICOM, in an early concept 
note on trade with China in 2007,266 cited the difficulties of local firms in accessing China’s market 
in goods in niche areas. According to CARICOM, China’s import regulations, including granting 
of licenses, lack of transparency in custom duties and import taxes serve as effective impediments 
to China’s market. For small trading firms with limited capacity, navigating those areas within the 
 














Chinese market is likely to present difficulty. Coupled with this issue, establishing commercial 
offices in the host country and enabling distribution and marketing networks to overcome cultural 
and other barriers do come at significant costs. The latter also impacts on Caribbean states ability 
to engage in market penetration in new markets like China. An IADB (2014) study on LAC 
investments in China cited the latter as a major impediment to trade with China. The said study 
suggest that this hinders the expansion of business opportunities in China for Latin America and 
Caribbean firms, although certain firms from the region may benefit from China’s market.267  
However, having said this, access to China’s market is differentiated across various Anglophone 
Caribbean states. As seen in chapter 5, Jamaica has had a relatively vibrant export trade 
relationship with China and has even had a positive trade balance with China on the basis of its 
alumina exports. More recently, Jamaica’s exports of coffee to China is said to have grown at an 
annual rate of 26% between 2011 and 2016.268 
It may be said that at the official level at least, there appears to be some receptivity in China with 
regards to expanding Caribbean states export base despite the practical impediments encountered 
at the firm level. Within this context, China has undertaken various measures to strengthen its 
market connections with the Caribbean at the official level. In 2014, China’s LAC forum attempted 
to make some headway in that direction. Alongside its infrastructure forums for further 
investments in Latin America and the Caribbean, China also constituted the LAC and China 
Agriculture forum.  The aim of the forum is the promotion of trade in areas where the region is 
competitive.  
Moreover, trade ties between Caribbean states and China strengthened significantly post 2005.  
This suggests that China is a recent actor and its role in the region may evolve as time unfolds. 
China’s economic emergence should it continue on an upward trajectory, may mean increasing 
influence not only in import trade in the region but also increasingly, in bilateral trade flows 
overall.  Certain states within the Caribbean have been able to form significant export partnerships 
with non- traditional partners. As far back as 2010-2015, the Russian Federation has been a 





UN Comtrade data. This partnership emanated from Russia’s role in the sector in Jamaica in the 
Cold War period. Thus, there is a possibility for China’s economic role to progress within the 
region, with it becoming more significant for Caribbean states trade. The discussions in chapter 5 
have already underscored this possibility based on unfolding patterns in the data on specific 
Caribbean states trade with China.  Thus, should a more balanced trade relationship become an 
increasingly prevalent aspect of the economic relationship between the Caribbean region and 
China, it may be likely that China can more effectively consolidate its economic role alongside 
traditional actors. 
5. Discussion of research findings 
Caribbean states heightened economic engagement with China has meant that China’s economic 
role in the Caribbean and Latin America has grown substantially in the Post-Cold War period 
(2005-2015).  However, China’s economic rise has not altered the economic landscape within the 
Caribbean region when it comes to the dominance of the US. The US is still the predominant 
economic partner for the Caribbean both in terms of trade and financing for the period considered.  
 
In assessing China’s economic significance in lending vis-à-vis the US, the findings illustrated that 
China’s lending in the Caribbean has risen exponentially post 2005. But despite China’s 
significance in financing in the region, there are several significant caveats to consider and these 
potentially undermine generalisations that China has increased its influence in lending relative to 
the US.  
 
As discussed, Caribbean states concessional funding is still largely derived from institutions led 
by western actors including the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank and Caribbean 
Development Bank. Canada as already stated is the major shareholder in the latter while the US 
holds the majority of shares in the IADB for the period considered. US influence is also well 
consolidated in international financial institutions such as the World Bank, having played a central 
role in the organization from its inception.  
 
Another point which precluded one from arriving at generalisations pertaining to US decline in 
financing versus China’s rise in the region is the extent that China’s lending was shown to be 
differentiated among states in the Anglophone Caribbean. Thus, while China played a significant 
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role in lending in select Caribbean states such as Jamaica, the same may not be said for Barbados 
for the period under survey in the thesis.  
 
Additionally, the findings suggested that China has targeted its lending towards different areas 
when compared to western actors. Thus, leading it to play a major role in sectors that have not 
been necessarily prioritised in lending by traditional actors. This corroborated with findings from 
Brautigam (2009) who found that much of the focus of Chinese development assistance was 
apparent in areas where western donors had not prioritised either through lending or other financial 
assistance instruments in Africa. However, as already examined in this chapter, this does not 
suggest that the role of traditional actors have been all together absent in infrastructure financing 
in the Caribbean region. As discussed, IADB loans have been increasingly funding infrastructure 
investments in Anglophone Caribbean states such as the Bahamas and Trinidad. Thus, western 
actors interests have not necessarily been absent even in areas where China appears to be 
overwhelmingly represented. Therefore, while China’s economic role in the Caribbean has 
increased in both intensity and scope, this may not necessarily be equated to a decline in US or 
western influence in the Caribbean or Latin America for that matter.  
 
Moreover, the economic data discussed in this chapter not only refuted the idea of US decline but 
illustrated the need for an analysis that is much more nuanced and circumspect with regards to 
China’s growing economic influence in the broader region. The findings revealed that unlike the 
region’s trade relations with traditional partners like the EU and the US, there has been a high level 
of asymmetry in the Caribbean and China trade relationship.  For instance, while certain states in 
the Caribbean have carried positive trade balances with both the EU and US, the same may not be 
said for China post 2005, when trade strengthened soon after the First China Caribbean Economic 
Cooperation forum. With respect to Trinidad, the latter has had an almost consistently positive 
trade balance with the US between 2005-2015. At times, Guyana also reported favourable trade 
balance with EU states like the UK during the same period. However, while Jamaica had been able 
to benefit from China as an export destination as seen in chapter 5, the balance of trade turned 
negative as Jamaica increasingly turned to the Chinese market for both lending and import trade 
post 2005.  
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Thus the particularly asymmetrical trade relations between the Caribbean and China is in sharp 
contrast to trade with traditional partners. This suggested the need to assess in an empirical manner, 
China’s broader role in the Latin America Caribbean region versus that of traditional actors. Doing 
so also problematised claims in the literature on growing Chinese influence in the region vis-à-vis 
actors like the US. The relative lack of market penetration by Caribbean and Latin America states 
in terms of China as well as the more competitive effects of trade addressed in chapter 5, all 
suggested that economic relations between the region and China have been taking place in a 
complex environment. For instance, the findings illustrated that while China has been a leading 
import source for Caribbean states, it failed to play a significant role as an export destination unlike 
the traditional actors like the US and EU. But as discussed, one must also acknowledge that the 
economic ties with China only strengthened post 2005. Thus the relationship is still unfolding 




For the Caribbean region, China’s emergence represented an opportunity for pursuing extended 
economic partnerships with emerging actors in the international system alongside traditional actors 
like the US. But rather than acting counter to US dominance in the Caribbean, China’s role has 
been largely complementary to that of the US in the region. The analysis indicated that while 
China’s role in financing had increased markedly in the region post 2005, traditional actors like 
the US for various reasons, could not be overlooked. For instance, it was shown that the US still 
carried substantive influence in relation to traditional lenders operating within the region. Thus the 
role of the IADB and World Bank are still significant in the region. The analysis also suggested 
that China’s financing was very much variegated in the Caribbean region in that it played a 
significant role with respect to specific states. However, traditional actors influenced were well 
entrenched across the Anglophone Caribbean. 
 
In examining the trade dimension of the engagement in an effort to gauge the implications of 
Caribbean states rising trade with China in relation to the US, the data showed that much of 
Caribbean states trade was undertaken with the US. As such, the latter is the most significant 
import and export market for the region. This is very much differentiated from the region’s 
engagement with China whereby the data revealed that China is more of an “import market” for 
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the region, rather than an “export market.” Further, the findings suggested that the EU remains a 
significant export market for the Caribbean region, although it appeared that in terms of imports, 
China was able to increase its import shares in the region relative to the EU for the period under 
consideration.  
 
The analysis within the chapter highlighted the need to interrogate claims in the literature regarding 
China’s rise in relation to US influence in an empirical manner in an effort to arrive at valid and 
reliable assessments of China’s influence in the region alongside the US. Thus while China’s 
influence in financing and trade has risen exponentially in the Latin America Caribbean region, as 
argued, China has not displaced US pre-eminence in its traditional sphere of influence.  However, 
although Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China has not necessarily resulted 
in tandem decline of the fundamental US role within the region, China has to a certain extent, 





Chapter 7: Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China: responses to 
China’s economic practices  
 
Introduction 
In examining economic considerations as a key underlying driver in Caribbean states relations 
with China, the empirically based chapters of the thesis- chapters 4, 5 and 6, examined the nature 
and scope of the economic interactions, its impacts and its implications respectively. This chapter 
plays a complementary role in analysing Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with 
China by examining the consequent responses surrounding the commercial interactions. In doing 
so, a more critical, yet comprehensive assessment of the significance of intervening economic 
factors in shaping the Caribbean and China dynamic from the standpoint of developing states is 
undertaken. Moreover, the chapter aligns with the underlying theoretical premise within both FPA 
and NCR that domestic processes are essential to understanding inter-state relations. 
 
Within the Caribbean region, China’s economic practices within the local context often give rise 
to a range of reactions in the media and the public realm.  The discourse surrounding Chinese 
economic activity at the ground level largely revolve around Chinese enterprises perceived 
inability to deal adequately with labour and environmental standards. As such, the chapter aims to 
analyse Caribbean states responses at the ground level in relation to those two issues.  
 
The chapter argues that while Caribbean states responses to China’s economic activities often 
highlight the opportunities inherent in the commercial exchange, responses to labour and 
environmental issues also reveal tensions and contradictions in China’s corporate practices at the 
domestic level. Underpinning such issues are notions of vulnerability inherent in small states 
engaging a more powerful economic actor. This then gives rise to concomitant concerns pertaining 
to how effectively Caribbean states can safeguard their national priorities in commercial 
interactions with China given the power differentials.  
 
The underlying asymmetry between the region and China also leads to considerations pertaining 
to the extent to which Caribbean states can effectively respond to and mitigate perceived 
challenges in China’s economic practices within the region. However, there is nascent evidence 
that Caribbean states recognise the need to react to various constraints in the economic interaction 
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and formulate responses in an effort to guard against possibly adverse effects of China’s economic 
practices.  
 
These dynamics underscore that while responses at the ground level to China has been fairly 
positive, with ideas of south-south cooperation and mutual interests figuring prominently in the 
rhetoric surrounding the engagement, this does not equate with the absence of tensions at the 
ground level. In terms of labour, perceived challenges are related to China’s specific framework 
for development assistance. Possible environmental problems appear to stem from differing 
government responses across the Anglophone Caribbean region as well as the varied economic 
activities carried out by Chinese companies.  Certain economic endeavours appear to carry more 
environmental risks than others.  
 
The responses to China’s economic activities within the Caribbean region are somewhat complex. 
Caribbean states responses to economic practices by Chinese enterprises are mediated through a 
relatively robust legal framework for labour and environmental standards within the region. The 
public realm may also seek to influence responses to Chinese economic activities through a 
multitude of actors. These include a range of social and environmental groups, the media, 
commercial interests as well as other relevant stakeholders. Actors not only seek to shape foreign 
policy decision-making by amplifying the potential for risks in the engagement by engendering 
debates. Such actors also mediate their interests in the ongoing interactions between Caribbean 
states and China by giving voice to group and sector preferences in the dynamic. They also attempt 
resolutions of perceived problems through governmental and non-governmental mechanisms. 
These various elements facilitate an environment conducive to managing perceived challenges in 
Chinese actors engagement at the ground level within the Caribbean region.  
 
Thus far, there has been little academic studies on China’s economic practices and the subsequent 
responses to such within Caribbean states. Academics have managed to weigh in on issues of 
labour and environmental standards in relation to China’s corporate engagement in Latin America. 
However such issues are still under-examined in relation to the latter. A recent study by Ray et al 
(2015) examines Chinese economic practices and its effects Latin America’s sustainable 
development. But while scholarly studies appear to be few, it is not uncommon to find a plethora 
of media views on China’s economic practices in the Caribbean and Latin America. The Caribbean 
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region’s strategic position further engender debates on Chinese economic practices in the region 
as opposed to traditional actors especially in the US media and think tanks. For instance, the use 
of Chinese workers and the questionable benefits of such was the subject of 2018 article by the US 
Council of Hemispheric Affairs on China’s expanding presence in the Caribbean region.269 
 
In an effort to examine Caribbean states responses to China’s corporate practices, the chapter first 
focuses on examining China’s labour practices within the Caribbean context. The discussion draws 
on media and public responses to China’s the use of its own labour in infrastructure projects. The 
chapter will then examine the perceived environmental problems in China’s economic activity.  As 
such, two cases of Chinese companies practices and the consequent government responses in each 
case will be examined. These are; the Goat Island project in Jamaica undertaken by China Habour 
Engineering Company and Chinese Logging company in Guyana, Bai Shan Lin. These cases do 
not necessarily demonstrate the norm in China’s economic activity in the Caribbean region, 
however they do seek to illuminate how Caribbean states have sought to respond to possible 
challenges in Chinese economic activities at the ground level. 
 
 The chapter contributes to addressing the knowledge gap on China’s economic activities and 
Caribbean states subsequent responses at the local level. The chapter also extends knowledge on 
Caribbean states decision-making with regards to rising economic powers such as China. It 
highlights that despite the power differentials between developing states and China, this does not 
necessarily imply a lack of agency on the part of developing states in asserting their interests in 
the interaction. It also illustrates that underlying asymmetries may not necessarily indicate an 
inability to mediate possible risks in the region’s economic engagement with China. 
 
2.Caribbean states responses to labour practices in China’s economic activities 
 
China’s use of its labour has been a key part of China’s going out economic strategy in the 
developing world. This has led to heavy criticisms relating to China’s modus operandi in aid and 
technical assistance in Caribbean countries and other parts of the developing world. The 
unfavourable views associated with such has been examined in the scholarly literature (Mohan, 





Labour constraints in Caribbean states engagement with China have been perceived in two main 
ways. One relates to the lack of local content in terms of local labour and domestic firms input. 
The second revolves around the idea that Chinese companies may not necessarily adhere to labour 
standards within the Caribbean. These issues not only highlight the ambiguities in the interaction 
at the domestic level. But also question the extent to which political elites can foster the interests 
of the public in engaging China, especially given developing states weaker bargaining position in 
the relations. 
 
The perceived lack of local content has been seen to result in domestic firms and local labour being 
effectively locked out from participating in Chinese projects due to the economic agreements that 
revolve largely around the use Chinese labour and China’s state-owned enterprises. Such outcomes 
are seen to impact on employment opportunities for Caribbean nationals and firms. Although the 
possibly adverse effects resulting from the use of Chinese firms and Chinese labour have not 
necessarily been ascertained through empirical study within the Caribbean context, nonetheless 
local people and firms have provided indications that they have been affected by such practices 
(see subsection 2.1).  
 
Challenges have also been linked to Chinese firms perceived lack of adherence to labour standards 
within the Anglophone Caribbean. As already mentioned, the region is an area where labour is 
fairly well regulated. Both national and international labour laws are generally implemented in the 
region. Anglophone Caribbean governments oversee labour practices and implementation of 
labour laws through various government and non-government mechanisms. The labour laws in the 
Caribbean can be said to be in two categories; it is part of the domestic law or enshrined in local 
law through various international agreements regulated by the International Labour Organisation, 
as well as other international and regional instruments (Corthésy and Harris-Roper, 2014). 
Ministries of Labour also form part of government portfolios across the Anglophone Caribbean. 
Such ministries are partly responsible for monitoring and protecting labour rights. Trade unions 
within the Caribbean also seek to promote workers rights.  
 
While media reports have suggested that Chinese companies have not always adhered to labour 
standards, there has been little empirical support for claims that Chinese firms are prone to 
overlook labour laws in the Caribbean. In fact, there has been nascent evidence that the existing 
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legislative frameworks pertaining to labour within the Anglophone Caribbean, have enabled a 
more open environment for Caribbean nationals as well as Chinese labourers. Consequently, both 
local and Chinese labour have utilised the regulatory mechanisms within Caribbean states to help 
foster changes in working conditions imposed by specific Chinese firms within the Caribbean 
region.  
 
2.1 Chinese firms practices and challenges to local labour in the Caribbean 
Utilising largely Chinese labour have fuelled discontent in otherwise generally convivial relations 
between the Caribbean region and China. These issues also seem to conflict with the rhetoric of 
“win-win” cooperation favoured in commentary by the Chinese media and within other foreign 
policy statements issued by China.  
 
The view has been that local labour within the Caribbean region has been placed at a disadvantage  
especially given that the unemployment rate within the region  has been relatively high in the past 
few years.270 As Alden and Davies (2010: 93) point out when examining Chinese labour practices 
in the African context, “the use of nationals for labour by Chinese MNCs involved in construction 
and infrastructure projects, justified by Chinese managers in terms of their cost, productivity and 
cultural affinity, seems misguided when one examines the rates of local unemployment among 
Africans.” The authors go on to argue that this has important political and economic implications 
at the domestic level.  
 
Within the Caribbean region, the concern about the actual employment benefits to the local 
population have at times, built an unfavourable view of China’s economic activities versus other 
western state actors within the region. Although in western companies practices, it is not unknown 
for managerial and other technical roles to go to western counterparts rather than local labour in 
the Caribbean region. Therefore China’s assertion of its national economic interest in labour 
practices is therefore not quite unique to China. However, China appears to focus mainly on its 
own labour through-out the conceptualisation and implementation phases of its various projects, 





The employment of Chinese nationals has been a key aspect of the economic agreements 
undertaken by Caribbean states and China when engaging in concessional lending for various 
infrastructure projects in the region. US media reports suggest that as part of the Chinese 
Government agreement with the Bahamanian Government for construction of the US $2.5 billion 
Baha Mar hotel project, at least 7000 Chinese labourers were imported.271 The perception shared 
by certain members of the Bahamian public according to a US media report, is that while the 
investments were welcomed, “the feeling around the country is that the Chinese are taking 
over.”272 Jamaica’s media has also questioned the wide-spread use of Chinese labour in 
investments at the ground level. The Jamaica Observer newspaper, carried an opinion piece on 
March 11, 2017,  questioning the widespread use of Chinese labour in contracts undertaken by the 
government. Two salient issues were raised in relation to Jamaica. One was that more local labour 
needed to be employed on Chinese projects on the island and the other, was that there needed to 
be careful monitoring of work permits to Chinese nationals in an effort to safeguard local labour.273  
 
Notwithstanding the concerns raised in relation to China’s labour practices, Chinese contractors 
have often excused their hiring practices on the basis that Chinese workers are cheaper than local 
labour. For instance, Chinese contractors have indicated that while the cost of the Chinese worker 
amounted to no more than US$1.00, the cost of a Jamaican worker amounted to US$4.00 a day.274 
The issue of costs may be linked to the more stringent regulatory environment for labour within 
the Caribbean region. As such, it is expected that minimum wage laws for instance, be adhered too 
when hiring within the region.  
 
China’s labour practices have enabled certain sectors of the public to question the positive 
economic aspects of engaging China in particular, when compared to traditional western actors 
such as the United States. Sir Ronald Sanders, former Caribbean Ambassador in examining 
China’s modus operandi in terms of labour declared; 
	If the current practices continue in which Caribbean workers are for the most part, spectators at projects employing Chinese labour, 
there will eventually be resentment and a backlash, particularly if the projects are financed by loans to Caribbean governments that 
taxpayers have to repay. Such a backlash will harm relations between China and Caribbean countries at a time when these relations 








Such labour practices can minimise perceptions of positive contributions by China to Caribbean 
states economies. It can also preclude China from gaining economic influence in a manner similar 
to that of western actors. Thus undermining its economic influence alongside traditional actors 
such as the US, whose investments may not necessarily promote such views at the local level.  As 
already stated; it is not unknown for western actors to generally leave managerial and technical 
roles within their various business enterprises to non-local labour. This has been especially evident 
with respect to the tourism industry where such roles may go to persons outside the Caribbean 
region.  
 
What has differentiated Chinese economic practices thus far, with regards to labour, is perhaps the 
sheer magnitude of the practice when compared to traditional actors. The tendency has been to 
utilise Chinese labour almost exclusively at various levels of infrastructure projects and other 
investments on a scale that may not necessarily be compared with western actors within the region.   
 
The issue of Chinese labour has clearly been a sensitive one which frame responses at the ground 
level in Caribbean states. Chinese labour have fuelled views that such engagement has been 
designed to extract profits and maximise profitability without necessarily promoting a level of 
corporate responsibility with respect to local labour within the environment where Chinese 
companies operate. This has led certain Caribbean government representatives to call for more 
responsibility in China’s economic investments. Thus Guyana’s former President, David Granger, 
has indicated that Chinese investments need to be more closely aligned with providing 
employment and fostering national development.276  
 
Chinese firms have attempted to make some changes to their hiring practices in the Caribbean in 
an effort to counter the negative views associated with Chinese FDI in the region. There also 
appeared to be increased costs associated with the practice for China, despite its wide-spread use. 
As reported by the IADB, since 2013, in accordance with statistics published by China’s Ministry 
of Commerce, outflows of Chinese labour worldwide have contracted. While Chinese projects 
increased 17.6 percent in 2013, the total overseas stock of Chinese workers grew by only 0.4 




2010.277  In 2013, Chinese officials informed Caribbean media personnel in Beijing that given the 
rising costs of subsidising Chinese migrant labourers abroad, Chinese firms would look into hiring 
more local labour. 278 Therefore, although China’s labour practices have been seen as conflictual 
at the local level, China has sought to respond to Caribbean states concerns on the issue, albeit in 
line with its own broader interests in either being seen as enabling more corporate responsibility 
at the local level or reducing its own costs overseas.  
 
Moreover, heightening the difficulties in responding to an apparently conflictual practice, has been 
Caribbean states constraints in accessing financing on the international market to pursue projects 
that they deem of relevance to their development. Projects by IFI’s have generally been linked to 
the priority of such institutions in the engagement. As discussed in chapter 4, this fosters the view 
that such organisations may be focused on a top-down approach to development assistance, and 
may not respond adequately to domestic priorities. With regards to the Anglophone Caribbean 
then, “China enjoys a strong bargaining position relative to these countries, whose small market 
size and limited financing make partnering with Beijing a particularly attractive prospect.”279 This 
has brought about valid concerns regarding the ability of Caribbean governments to negotiate 
effectively with China in relation to the use of its own labour in investment practices.  
 
 However, there has been an attempt by select Caribbean governments to negotiate directly with 
China on the issue of Chinese labour in the region. In 2017, the Jamaican government launched 
discussions with China to formulate plans for training local workers to undertake more technical 
and other roles in Chinese projects. This was done with a view towards reducing the importation 
of Chinese workers.280 While the employment of local labour is likely to continue shaping 
responses to China’s economic engagement, Chinese commercial actors technical expertise and 
skills will continue to be vital for implementing its various investments in the Caribbean region.  
 
2.2 Chinese firms and challenges to local content in the Caribbean 
The presence of Chinese firms and its effects on local content within the Caribbean region have 








have been expressed by firms that they have not readily benefited from the knowledge and skills 
transfer that can be an inherent part of FDI activity within respective states. This is seen to have 
an impact on the competitiveness of various local firms. This brings about concerns pertaining to 
the inability of various political elites to foster the interests of local businesses in negotiating with 
China especially given the power differentials within the engagement.  
  
The issue of a lack of local content in Chinese investments has been addressed in various media 
reports across Caribbean states.  In the case of Trinidad, the award of a contract estimated at $ 1.6 
billion to build the Arima hospital funded by China in 2013, led to heavy criticisms. Certain local 
firms and particular members of the public criticised the government for failing to deliver local 
content on such projects by China. 281  Similar concerns have been raised in Jamaica. Thus local 
construction firms have viewed the near constant engagement of China’s SOE’s in various 
infrastructure projects in Jamaica as having a negative impact on local firms.  
 
This has led some to challenge the bidding process put in place when dealing with infrastructure 
investments from China. Thus in April 2017, the head of a construction firm in Jamaica criticised 
the prevailing practices within Jamaica in relation to Chinese companies. Thus noting, “When you 
invite Chinese companies to bid against local contractors, you are asking the local contractors to 
bid against the government of China because all of these companies are agencies of the government 
of China.” 282  While Chinese officials,283 have defended the use of Chinese firms by indicating 
that their competitiveness has been a factor in the award of contracts, this has not necessarily 
prevented concerns from being raised with regards to China’s modus operandi in infrastructure 
investments.   
 
Economic agreements with the Chinese government often stipulate the employment of Chinese 
firms and as such, the view has been that even when bidding is undertaken, there is no guarantee 
of advantageous outcomes for local firms or even competitive ones. In Trinidad, the government 
came under scrutiny for accepting a very high bid of $ 1.6 billion from China Railway Construction 







reports suggested that there were at least fifteen (15) Chinese companies operating in the 
construction sector in Jamaica. 285 It was felt that this created a situation whereby local firms were 
effectively rendered less competitive especially given that such companies benefited from 
advantages such as cheaper material and construction costs on the basis of various concessions put 
in place by government.  
 
While these concerns appear valid and have prompted a raft of criticisms regarding the lack of 
local content in Chinese investments more broadly, the issue of Caribbean states weaker 
bargaining position vis-à-vis China may not necessarily be overlooked.  Despite the possible 
disadvantages in the economic interaction, in return for perceived positive impacts from Chinese 
investments in the long term, Caribbean elites have shown some willingness to negotiate even on 
terms that have been deemed unpopular in the public realm. As seen in chapters 4 and 5, China 
has increased foreign direct investments in Caribbean states substantially since 2005 and has 
become a critical economic actor in the region, notwithstanding the constraints posed in the 
engagement at the local level.  
 
However there is evidence that Caribbean states and China have attempted to address constraints 
in the engagement. In the case of China, policies and standards for SOE enterprises engaged in 
overseas projects have been formulated. For instance, China’s National People’s Congress has 
promoted laws governing labour rights which apply to SOE’s as well as private enterprises (see 
Zimmerman, 2007:3) In terms of the Caribbean, there is burgeoning evidence that respective states 
are advocating for more local content. Trinidad has attempted to promote the idea of local content 
in terms of FDI, and has recently put in place legislation on this issue. The Public Procurement 
and Disposal of Public Property Act No. 2015, is partly aimed at promoting local content in terms 
of FDI. However, it is still unclear as to whether this will involve tangible changes at the local 
level in promoting more local content from Chinese firms in the local economy.  
 
2.3 Chinese firms practices contravene labour laws in the Caribbean?  
In gauging the conduct of Chinese firms within the Caribbean region, emerging debates have 
centered on the extent to which Chinese firms have adhered to domestic and international labour 




by Chinese companies within Caribbean states. As already stated, labour laws and contingent 
workers rights are fairly well entrenched within the local context in the Caribbean region. As such 
existing legislation provide a sufficiently comprehensive framework for responding to alleged 
malpractices by corporate actors.  
 
Once on the ground in the Latin America Caribbean region, whether cognizant of it or not, Chinese 
companies become legal entities that are subject to oversight by governments in the state where 
they operate (Ellis (2014:155). The legal frameworks within the domestic context or the 
international standards applicable at the national level, then become important instruments for 
mediating and resolving conflicts which result from native workers grievances or those from China 
operating within the local context. This relatively strong legislative environment have also 
encouraged Chinese workers to utilise the favourable and open climate for labour protection within 
the region to affirm their rights to adequate labour standards.  
 
The disputes concerning Chinese companies’ economic practices within the Caribbean region have 
revolved around work conditions, adequate compensation and fair remuneration in accordance 
with labour standards in the region. The responses to Chinese activities within the domestic context 
involve a multitude of actors including government institutions, trade unions and workers.  For 
instance, in Guyana workers protested health and safety regulations at a Chinese owned bauxite 
mine. The response from the government was to engage in mediation in an effort to encourage 
adherence to local labour laws. In light of workers protests, Guyana’s Minister for Social 
Protection, Simona Brooms, sought to address workers complaints by visiting the operations.286  
 
In Jamaica, trade unions have periodically protested working conditions at Chinese construction 
sites. They have also pressured the government to respond to seemingly unfair trade practices by 
Chinese companies in an effort to encourage such companies adherence to minimum labour 
standards. In 2017, one such protest prompted a response from Jamaica’s Prime Minister, Andrew 
Holness, who sought engagement with Chinese officials on the issue in an effort to promote 






Chinese workers have also utilised the various freedoms enshrined in labour laws in the Caribbean 
region to protest their working conditions with Chinese SOE’s operating within the region. In 
2014, Chinese labourers in the Bahamas engaged in public protest on their lack of pay on the multi-
billion Baha Mar hotel project. 288 The treatment of Chinese workers on the Baha Mar project 
prompted claims that the company was in gross violation of international and local labour laws. 
Among the concerns expressed was that identity documents of workers were said to be held as a 
means of controlling their movements.  
 
These alleged breaches of conduct in relation to labour laws, prompted the Grand Bahama Human 
Rights Association to ask the Government of the Bahamas to intervene on this issue.289 The issue 
also gave rise to discussions within the Bahamian Parliament on the contravention of laws relating 
to human rights by the respective Chinese SOE in relation to Chinese labour on the island.290 
Protests by Chinese workers in the Caribbean are not new. In 2009 in Trinidad, about 100 Chinese 
workers protested outside the site of China’s SOE, Beijing Liujian Construction Corporation, 
based on what they deemed to be appalling working conditions and no pay.291  
 
Moreover, within the Caribbean context, the familiarity with more western led economic practices 
versus that of China’s, do have an impact on how challenges have been perceived at the ground 
level. There is an underlying view that Chinese economic practices need to be more in line with 
that of traditional actors, especially in terms of China’s labour practices.  In responding to Chinese 
economic practices in the construction industry, an area of extensive Chinese engagement, the 
president of one of Jamaica’s trade unions challenged China’s labour standards as one 
diametrically opposed to that of western actors acting in similar environments. Thus stating “We 
have a Joint Industrial Council (JIC) for the building and construction industry that has stood the 
test of time…The French people, they honoured the JIC agreement to the letter...The French 











The view that Chinese enterprises economic practices have challenged labour regulations within 
the Caribbean have shaped responses at the local level. The extensive use of Chinese workers in 
economic activity has often been seen to not only affect local labour in terms of employment 
opportunities. The practice has also been seen to challenge rules and regulations pertaining to 
labour in the Caribbean. Such tensions are not necessarily attributed Caribbean states economic 
engagement with traditional actors like the US and neither are they seen as the norm in economic 
practices by western states in the Caribbean. And such views can exacerbate distrust in Chinese 
economic practices particularly as it relates to labour standards within the region.  
 
 Moreover, the seeming difference in western actors practices versus that of China’s can be rooted 
in existing regulations established by home countries of western multinationals. This  can affect 
how operations are carried out within the local contexts where such entities operate. Thus guiding 
their actions within domestic environments overseas to some extent. However as already stated, 
China’s pursuit of its economic interests despite the underlying views on the ground, is very much 
akin to that of western commercial actors, despite perceived differences.  
 
The perceived lack of adherence to international and local labour standards may be partly related 
to China being a fairly young player in the economic internationalisation process within the 
Caribbean compared to western actors. As such, these companies are still gathering relevant 
expertise and awareness of operating in diverse environments like the Caribbean region where 
labour laws are more entrenched.  As pointed out by Jing Gu (2009: 583), “China’s dramatic 
economic growth came with a high ….cost with corporate social responsibility a lower priority for 
Government in the past and, consequently, it has not really figured in China’s enterprise culture.”  
 
As Chinese firms globalise, they are gaining experiential knowledge and consequently undertaking 
a level of professionalisation in terms of labour in line with their western counterparts. As such, 
they are amenable to pursuing changes that would satisfy the domestic contexts within which they 
operate. For instance, in 2013, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued guidelines for encouraging 
inter alia, social responsibility. The guideline included 22 comprehensive provisions for corporate 





3. Caribbean States responses to environmental challenges in China’s economic activities  
This section focuses on consequent government responses to perceived threats to environmental 
standards within Caribbean states. The section examines Caribbean states responses regarding 
China’s corporate practices and its perceived effects on environmental norms in two Anglophone 
Caribbean states, Jamaica and Guyana (see subsections 3.1 and 3.2). The conflicts generated on 
the basis of Chinese companies activities in the region do not necessarily point to the norm in 
Chinese companies economic engagement at the ground level. But while these are exceptional 
cases, they highlight the perceived challenges in the engagement and subsequent responses of 
Caribbean governments.  They also shed light on the role of domestic and external actors in 
instigating pressure within the local context, in an effort to mitigate against the possibly adverse 
effects of China’s corporate practices  within the region.  
 
Contravention of local environmental laws have been brought to the fore in relation to China’s 
corporate activities in the Caribbean region. At times, perceived challenges with Chinese 
investment encompass views that Chinese companies may not necessarily adhere to environmental 
standards within various Anglophone Caribbean states. Thus environmental constraints with 
regards to Chinese economic activities within specific Caribbean states permeate the media’s 
discourse on China’s commercial presence in the region. Such portrayals often attempt to galvanise 
public support and place pressure on government in an effort to curtail possible environmental 
risks from corporate practices.  
 
However, environmental problems may be linked to the specific economic sectors within which 
Chinese enterprises operate as certain activities carry more environmental risks than others. 
Challenges also appear to be connected to differentiated government responses to the possible 
environmental risks in Chinese corporate practices at the domestic level. 
   
In domestic environments where environmental regulations have been more vigorously reinforced, 
Chinese companies have been willing to meet them. In certain instances, Chinese companies may 
not necessarily be focused centrally on environmental standards in their operations due partly to 
unfamiliarity with the domestic regulatory context. In other instances, Chinese enterprises may 
find ways of circumventing existing environmental rules according to media accounts. This can 
fuel debates pertaining to Chinese firms lack of corporate responsibility within the local realm. 
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However, such claims are by no means indicative of generalisations pertaining to Chinese 
enterprises inability to meet environmental standards in the Caribbean region. 
 
Possible environmental threats related to China’s corporate activities, is based not on the lack of 
regulatory environmental frameworks across the Anglophone Caribbean, as these are fairly well 
consolidated across the region. In the 1990s, each of the natural resource states in the Caribbean, 
namely; Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad, passed a National Environmental Policy Act. This was 
designed to balance economic development with environmental protection. Those acts are subject 
to revisions for continual protection of the environment. Guyana passed its first National 
Environmental Action Plan (NEAP) in 1994. Trinidad outlined its National Environmental Policy 
(NEP) in 1998.  The Jamaica Government passed the Jamaica National Environment Action Plan 
(JaNEAP) in 1999. Moreover, across the Anglophone Caribbean, various government ministries 
are dedicated with the task of preserving and managing environmental threats from economic and 
social activities.  
 
National environmental policies are also supplemented by international environmental standards 
within the Caribbean region. International financial institutions  such as the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank, all impose environmental 
standards on infrastructure projects and other investment flows.  As seen in chapter 4, these are 
key western dominated institutions that play an integral role in financing within the Anglophone 
Caribbean.  
 
These western- led institutions issue various environmental guidelines to assess and minimise 
environmental risks in relation to projects within the Latin America Caribbean region. These 
institutions also gauge the social impacts of the projects to which they dedicate funding. The World 
Bank has been implementing safeguard policies to its loans for infrastructure investments in the 
Caribbean and elsewhere since the 1990’s.294 The IADB has Environmental Safeguards and 
Compliance Guidelines that are applicable to its loans to governments in the Caribbean. 295As such 
projects financed by these western -backed financial institutions involve feasibility and impact 






Given that such regulatory frameworks are fairly well established across the Caribbean region, 
infrastructure projects by China also involve feasibility and impact studies to assess environmental 
risks. For instance in Trinidad, major development projects including those funded by China, have 
to attain a certificate of “environmental clearance” and “environmental impact assessment” from 
Trinidad’s Environmental Authority. These seek to prove the sustainability of the intended project. 
In instances where projects involve coastal lands, clearance has to be obtained from Trinidad’s 
Institute of Maritime Affairs.296  
 
Consequently, the discussions below will examine environmental challenges in two Anglophone 
Caribbean states, Jamaica and Guyana. It will focus on the responses to China’s economic 
activities at the domestic level and the subsequent management of constraints in terms of 
environmental risks from Chinese economic activities.  
  
3.1 Guyana: environmental challenges and responses 
Given the higher environmental risks associated with economic sectors like forestry in Guyana, 
Chinese companies activities in this area have been perceived as a threat to the environment. Thus 
in the timber industry, there has been concerns expressed regarding the unsustainable exploitation 
of Guyana’s forestry resources by Chinese companies.297 Particular companies have been 
perceived to act indiscriminately with very little regard for the national environmental protection 
laws of Guyana. The practices of Chinese company, Bai Shai Lin, in particular, have prompted 
questions regarding China’s corporate practices at the ground level in such an environmentally 
sensitive sector.  Bai Shan Lin, has been part of a group of eleven Chinese forestry companies 
operating in Guyana under the China Forest Industry Group (Hong Kong). These companies were 
provided with logging concessions in Guyana, covering a total area of 960,000 hectares according 
to reports.298 In 2006, Chinese logging company Bai Shan Lin Forest Development Inc. was 
granted permission to harvest and transport logs from Guyana for processing in China. 
 
Aside from obtaining very extensive concessions from the government of Guyana, the company 
was said to engage in practices contrary to the rules which regulated the logging industry. It has 
 






been alleged that the company engaged in several dubious business practices which had a direct 
impact on the environment. For instance, in order to meet the demand for Guyanese timber in 
China, reports suggest that Bai Shan Lin attempted to circumvent environmental protection laws. 
Thus the company sought to get around its logging quotas by purchasing from small loggers 
associations and exporting under their names.299 In doing so, Bai Shan Lin is said to have 
encouraged even more unsustainable exploitation of Guyana’s natural resources. The Chinese 
company was also accused of engaging in prohibited “venture agreements” by Guyana’s Forestry 
Commission. The prohibited practice involved leasing land from other parties to further its timber 
quotas.  Such a practice is incongruent with Guyana’s “landlording” laws. 300 
 
In relation to the case, the media viewed the response of the government of Guyana as inadequate. 
Such sources cited a lack of transparency in government dealings with the company. Officials were 
accused of overlooking the company’s multiple infractions. In 2014, Guyana’s President, Donald 
Ramotar, defended the company’s actions at a press conference by noting that “none of Guyana’s 
laws with regards to logging are being contravened in the case of Bai Shan Lin.”301 Despite this 
initial stance, eventually the government of Guyana, albeit impacted by media and public pressure, 
moved to remove concessions from Bai Shai Lin on the basis of the company’s failure to fulfil the 
terms of its investment agreement in 2016. 302  
 
But while constraints emerged due to that particular company’s operations in a high-risk sector, 
this case is not indicative of Chinese companies inability to obey environmental laws in Guyana. 
Moreover, there have been indications that the Chinese government has sought to promote 
environmental protection regarding its companies activities in Guyana. In 2017, the government 
of Guyana and China announced plans to pursue strategies for promoting a “green economy.” The 
decision was also in line with China’s thirteenth five-year plan (2016-2020), aimed at pursuing 
sustainable energy as well as forest protection. 303  
 
299 https://dialogochino.net/7173-bai-shan-lin-the-chinese-logger-with-multiple-interests-in-guyana/ 
300 “Landlording is a practice whereby a legal holder of a forest harvesting concession gives up managerial control and rents it 
out to another enterprise”.  It is said to be prohibited under Guyana’s national laws. For instance,  under Guyana’s Forest 
Regulations 1954, [regulation] 12 stipulates that  ‘No transfer of any lease or timber sales agreement shall be made by any forest 
officer without the prior approval of the President where such lease or timber sales agreement grants exclusive rights to any 
person over an area estimated to exceed three thousand acres or is for an unexpired period exceeding three years.” 





More broadly, what emerges from this unique case is that Caribbean states, do attempt to display 
a level of agency in relations with China despite underlying asymmetries and domestic constraints. 
Thus this company constituted a least likely case, designed to illustrate how Caribbean states 
through a multiplicity of actors, do shape responses regarding China’s corporate activities, should 
challenges arise. Responses to China’s corporate practices are often multifaceted in that varying 
actors seek to structure and influence government responses, thus promoting their own aims in the 
interaction.   
 
3.2 Jamaica’s Goat Island:  environmental constraints and responses 
The Goat Island project has been very much reminiscent of the environmental and strategic 
tensions in economic interactions with China at the domestic level in the Caribbean.  It also 
illustrates how a multitude of actors in the domestic realm including those at the official level as 
well as external actors, seek to fuel debates on China’s economic practices at the ground level and 
in doing so, shape responses to China’s economic activities within the immediate context. 
Moreover, it illuminates how Caribbean states economic engagement with China has broader 
implications for the US role in the Caribbean given the region’s strategic position.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, maritime infrastructure has been an important area for China’s economic 
engagement in the Caribbean. In 2012, the Government of Jamaica announced that the China 
Habour Engineering Company (CHEC) was interested in building a new transshipment port 
facility in Jamaica to accommodate expanded transshipment services through the Panama Canal. 
Then Minister of Transport and Works, Dr. Omar Davis, suggested that the project was designed 
to capitalise on Jamaica’s strategic proximity to significant international shipping lanes which 
connected Asia, the US and South America.304  
 
However, while a non-binding MOU was signed with CHEC to develop a specific area for the 
transshipment port in Jamaica, the representatives of CHEC returned to the Government of 
Jamaica with a new proposal for another site through which to develop the proposed facility. The 
reasoning from the Chinese representatives was that based on their own plans, the area proposed 
by Jamaica was not suitable.  Goat Island, which is a marine protected area due to indigenous 




made its opposition to the project known to the Jamaican Government in 2013 and 2016. 305 The 
framing of ideas again revolved around Chinese corporate interests having very little regard for 
the environment. 
 
The project also raised concerns within major US media outlets regarding the perceived 
environmental cost in allowing such a development to take place in Jamaica. On April 22nd, 2014, 
National Geographic, carried an article entitled; “Saving Goat Island.” The said article raised key 
questions as to why China’s SOE was so focused on that particular site. Thus the article concluded; 
“One of the largest questions surrounding the proposed project is, why, when alternative sites such 
as the existing Kingston Harbour exist, has Portland Bight Protected Area been chosen?” The well- 
known US media network, CNN on July 22nd, 2014, claimed that with regards to the Goat Island 
Development, Jamaica was “Selling out its Paradise.” 306  
 
Coincidentally, Goat Island was also a former US military base which was leased to the US 
government by the UK for a period of 99 years. 307 Thus for some, the Goat Island project 
highlighted not only the environmental impact of the project but also the underlying geopolitical 
dynamic inherent within the Caribbean region. US officials also raised their own concerns 
regarding the possible impacts of China’s corporate activities on Goat Island. Thus the US 
Embassy, reached out to Washington to clarify whether Goat Island was still retained by the United 
States government under the terms of the treaty under which it was initially ceded to the US by the 
British.308 The decision to wade on this issue by the US Embassy, does highlight broader concerns 
regarding economic practices at the ground level by China’s corporate actors. 
 
However, despite the promise of thousands of jobs to be brought by CHEC, in 2016, the 
government of Jamaica undertook the decision to rescind on the Chinese offer of billions in 
investments due to the perceived environmental cost of the Goat Island project. This issue 
highlights the complex constraints involved in Chinese economic practices within the Caribbean 
region. It also illustrates how internal and external factors can converge to influence responses to 








While Caribbean states have mainly viewed China as a positive force for economic development, 
like many developing states, the Caribbean region has had to consider the extent that certain 
economic practices can be an impediment to achieving maximum benefits from the economic 
interaction. Therefore, even while relations have been generally convivial, it may be said that there 
has been a level of tension in Chinese commercial activities at the ground level. China’s corporate 
practices in relation to labour and environmental issues have shaped more immediate responses 
from the public realm as well as the media within the local context.  Such mediums have also 
attempted to influence government responses to China’s entrepreneurial activities in the Caribbean 
region.  
 
Moreover, the power differentials between the Caribbean and China have prompted broader 
concerns regarding the extent to which Caribbean states can effectively respond to China’s 
corporate activities. While this is a valid concern in small states interactions with leading and 
emerging economic actors, power asymmetries may not necessarily be equated with the inability 
of Caribbean states to protect the domestic space in terms of possibly adverse economic practices 
by China’s corporate actors. Decision-makers in the Anglophone Caribbean act within a complex 
environment. This can shape responses to economic practices at the domestic level. As seen, 
decision-makers operate in a largely democratic realm and this subjects them to intermittent 
domestic pressures by both state and non-state actors.  As discussed, within the Caribbean region, 
there has been a complex web of domestic and external actors which have sought to influence 
responses to China’s corporate activities, especially in instances where China’s business entities 
may be seen to act counter to environmental rules or labour laws. Responses to China’s economic 
practices have also been guided by the fairly well developed legislative frameworks for labour and 
environmental protection within the Anglophone Caribbean. Such elements have created a space 
for more informed decision-making in relation to China’s commercial engagement at the ground 
level.  
 
But while Caribbean states have sought to respond to and manage China’s economic practices at 
the domestic level, doing so has not necessarily meant that they have effectively transcended and 
mitigated the common problems associated with China’s development aid in developing states. 
While China has facilitated the internationalisation of Chinese labour and domestic firms within 
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diverse economic contexts such as the Caribbean region, there has been limited input from local 
firms and actors. This has given rise to concerns within the public realm and the media. Thus it 
has been claimed that the knowledge and skills transfer inherent in FDI activities have lessened in 
engagement with Chinese enterprises.  
 
Additionally, possible environmental problems in the engagement, have also shaped responses to 
China’s corporate practices.  However, this issue in particular, is tied to differentiated government 
responses across various Caribbean states and the particular economic activity carried out by 
Chinese enterprises.  Notwithstanding, the cost of engaging China versus other traditional actors 
like the US, have been seen to rise considerably, especially when accounting for China’s labour 
practices within the region.  
 
However, as discussed, China has demonstrated sensitivity to the concerns within the Caribbean 
region at the official level. Discussions have ensued with a view to addressing issues in the 
engagement. Although there may be a divide between rhetoric, policy and practice, China is still 
a young economic player in developing states when compared to traditional economic actors. Thus 
it is still learning in the process of its internationalisation practices. China has played a tremendous 
role in areas such as financing in the region and its economic contributions to Caribbean states can 
be said to have promoted more goodwill than contention in the relations thus far. 
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This chapter focuses on perceptions as an intervening factor influencing the Caribbean and China 
relationship. It examines how and why perceptions are instrumental to unpacking the Caribbean 
and China dynamic. In examining the intervening variables shaping the Caribbean region’s foreign 
policy towards China, prior chapters focused primarily on policymaking and domestic economic 
considerations. While these are critical to understanding the patterns of continuity and change in 
Caribbean states relations with China, ingrained in the interaction are underlying perceptions 
regarding the evolving ties between Caribbean states and China. As argued by NCR adherents and 
FPA proponents, ideas have a key role to play alongside structural and material factors in 
influencing the foreign policy process (see Wholforth 1993; 1987, Christensen; 1996, English; 
2002).  
 
The analysis in a sense returns to where the thesis began in terms of the geopolitical significance 
of the Caribbean region in relation to the US. Embedded in the relations between the Latin America 
Caribbean region and China are ideas linked with the region’s strategic position. China’s rising 
influence in an area that has traditionally been considered part of the US hegemonic sphere, 
invariably gives rise to a particular set of precepts relating to the engagement.  
 
Within the discourse on the Latin Caribbean region’s interaction with China, two strands of the 
China threat thesis may be discerned drawing from the broader literature (see subsection 2.2). 
These revolve around the geopolitical and economic dimensions of engagement. In terms of the 
economic dimension of threat perceptions, given that substantial attention has already been paid 
to the domestic economic dynamics shaping Caribbean states relations with China, the objective 
here is not to focus extensively on such issues. Therefore, the intention is not to reiterate the 
challenges inherent in small states engaging an emerging global economic actor which in turn 
promotes perceptions of threat given the underlying power asymmetries.  
  
The Caribbean region’s geopolitical structure at times fuel particular images of China as a “threat” 
to US interests in the region. In focusing on threat perceptions based on the geopolitical dimension 
of the engagement, a central underlying theme within the discourses is that due to the Caribbean 
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region’s strategic position, China’s role has implicit and explicit consequences for US influence 
in the region. Perceptions of “strategic threat” are then linked to the structural context of the 
Caribbean region’s engagement with China. As already indicated in chapter 1, the region’s 
relations with China is not necessarily a linear interaction involving the Latin America Caribbean 
region and China at each end. Rather, it entails a triangular facet whereby the US role in the region 
is often considered an inseparable part of the dynamic.  
 
Interrogating threat perceptions is particularly important. Doing so facilitates a more informed 
rather than speculative interpretations of Caribbean and Latin American states relations with China 
especially given the very limited empirical and normative basis for perceptions of China as a threat 
to US interests in the Caribbean region. The chapter does not necessarily overlook the function 
and salience of threat perceptions in Caribbean states relations with China or that of Latin 
America’s with the latter. Rather, the chapter seeks to engage with those precepts by probing such 
notions more critically.  
 
The chapter argues that perceptions of threat linked to an underlying strategic discourse are 
overstated within the current context of the relationship between the Caribbean region and China. 
Such perceptions not only ignore the critical underlying diplomatic and economic elements that 
drive the Caribbean’s relationship with China, but also overlook the extent to which those very 
dynamics promote perceptions of opportunity, rather than threat, in the region’s engagement with 
China.   
 
The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section aims to examine the role of perceptions in 
the Caribbean region’s relationship with China through the lens of FPA and NCR. The second 
section seeks to examine why perceptions of threat are inconsistent with China’s engagement in 
the Caribbean and Latin America.  
 
Much of the debate which focuses on China’s rise in the region as one diametrically opposed to 
US interests, fail to adequately examine the actual engagement between the Caribbean region and 
China within an empirical and normative framework. Strategic threat perceptions overlook the 
critical underlying diplomatic and economic elements that drive the Caribbean and Latin 
America’s relations with China. Thus overlooking the extent to which these elements promote 
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perceptions of opportunity, rather than threat. Perceptions of strategic threat are also undermined 
by examining more strategic issues such as military assistance by China within the Caribbean 
region. Rather than engaging in strategic endeavours, cooperation has been largely predicated upon 
providing technical assistance in line with the region’s national security priorities.  
 
Moreover, the discourse on the possibility of China as a strategic threat in the region also tends to 
underestimate the internal constraints to the rise of alternative powers within the region. Caribbean 
and Latin American states are largely part of a liberal hegemonic order led by western states. 
Western powers influence have been almost consistently consolidated and reinforced within the 
space through varying periods. This may hinder various counter-hegemonic strategies either 
through external or internal means.  
 
The chapter contributes to illuminating how and why perceptions are an important analytical tool 
for explaining the evolving relationship between Caribbean states and China. More broadly, the 
analysis also contributes to the nascent literature on China’s rising influence in the Caribbean and 
Latin America by seeking to move beyond perceptions of strategic threat in the region’s growing 
interactions with China. In attempting to interrogate the claims of strategic threat, it seeks to 
challenge underlying assumptions of China’s rise in the Latin America Caribbean region drawing 




This section examines the role of perceptions in foreign policy behaviour in accordance with FPA 
and NCR and helps set the context for discussions in section 2.  
 
2. Significance of perceptions in NCR and FPA  
Perceptions are a key variable in analysing foreign policy behaviour in accordance with the NCR 
and FPA approach. Perceptions are linked to three major interacting themes which are regarded as 
salient in understanding foreign policy behaviour; perception of relative power, perception of 
threat and perception of opportunity. Such perceptions rests on decision-makers images and ideas 
of the international and domestic structures within which they operate. 
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 Under the FPA approach, it is asserted that belief systems, attitude, cultural characteristics, 
interpretations of historical events or contemporary phenomena, all lead to subjective inferences 
and particular images being rendered in relation to the foreign policy. The significance of 
perceptions in FPA is articulated by Hudson (2005: 1) who posits, “understanding how humans 
perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world 
around them, is central to inquiry in International Relations.”  Authors such as Goldstein and 
Keohane (1993) also examine the pertinent role that ideas play in formulating preferences and 
influencing outcomes in the foreign policy process. 
 
 In examining how perceptions play a role in foreign policy, adherents of NCR theory such as 
Lobell et al (2015: 62), acknowledge, “people possess a set of core values, beliefs, and images that 
guide their interaction with the outside world and their understanding of it.” For NCR theorists, 
perceptions of decision-makers are the filters through which systemic pressures are interpreted 
(Rose1998:157).  
 
For developing states such as those of the Caribbean region, in engaging China, perceptions 
assume a high degree of relevance when evaluating the relationship. Within the Caribbean region, 
perceptions of China are often structured through images of power, opportunity and potential risks 
in the interaction. According to Richard K. Herrmann (2013:338), “The pictures people have of 
other countries become central building blocks in their identification of the threats and 
opportunities their country faces. These images of others can become assumptions that are so taken 
for granted that they produce routinized habits that define basic parameters of what is seen as in a 
country’s interest or contrary to it.”  
 
The Caribbean region’s relationship with China is occurring with a perceptual framework which 
is an important element in analysing Caribbean states relations with China. Under the FPA and 
NCR approach, Caribbean’s relations with China brings into play particular perceptions of relative 
power, threat and opportunity in the Caribbean China dynamic. The table below provides a map 





Figure 8.0: Mapping perceptions in the Caribbean and China Relationship 
 
Perceptions in the Caribbean and China Relationship 
 
Ø Perception of relative power, opportunity and threat in Caribbean and China 
Engagement 
• Geopolitical Dimension 
• Economic Dimension 
 
• Perceptions of threat in the Caribbean and China interaction  
• Strategic threat perceptions 
• media images, scholars, elite views 
• Economic threat perceptions 
• media images, scholars, public and elite views 
 
Ø Argument; perceptions of threat are overstated in the Caribbean's relationship with China.	
 
 
2.1 Perceptions of power, threat and opportunity in Caribbean states relations with China 
 
Firstly, perceptions of relative power revolve around China’s economic power and US power, 
interacting if not in opposition to each other, then at least in tandem, in a space of immense 
geopolitical significance due to the Caribbean region’s proximity to the US and the economic 
utility of its strategic maritime spaces. China’s rise and the power manifestations of such rise has 
been postulated upon extensively in the literature (Shambaugh; 2016, Breslin; 2009, 2016, Samuel 
S. Kim; 1998, 2015, Kurlantzick;2007). Perceptions of relative power as it relates to China is 
confined not only to considerations of China’s economic strength and the opportunity for mutually 
beneficial engagement between Caribbean states and China. Given the Caribbean’s geostrategic 
significance in relation to the US, ideas of China and US power are likely to be part of Caribbean 
decision-makers perceptions in terms of the evolving relationship with China.  
 
 Decision-makers have to contend with the idea of a rising China in the Caribbean interacting with 
the traditional dominance of the US in the region. Rose (1998: 147) acknowledges, “Foreign policy 
choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative 
power that matter, not simply relative quantities of physical resources or forces in being.” 
Therefore, how increased engagement with a rising economic power can directly or indirectly 
impact on US perceptions of its interests in the region, is integrally tied to perceptions of relative 
power. Although not always the most significant driver in the relationship, such perceptions of 
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relative power involving the US and China, is an underlying element that may not be entirely 
discounted in the ongoing Caribbean China interaction.  
 
Perceptions of relative power as it relates to Caribbean states engagement with China and the 
subsequent US role, also operates within a historical, sociopolitical and economic context which 
can influence decision-making.  As explained by Levine (1994: 34), elites operate through both 
“formal and informal ideology.” The latter is often unstated but is informed by a particular thinking 
about reality which then impacts on the way actors not only perceive the world, but how they act 
towards it. In expanding ties with China, reflections on the region’s geostrategic position, is not 
always absent from decision-making vis-à-vis China.    
 
Mindful of historical knowledge, past experiences and contemporary manifestations of US power 
in the Caribbean region, how decision-makers implement policies with regards to China is likely 
to be an ongoing consideration in the relations. For instance, in the Post-Cold War era, there has 
been mostly benign manifestations of US power in the Anglophone Caribbean. However, US 
power can also bring to bear economic, social and political pressures on Caribbean states decision-
making in ways that constrain decision-makers.  
 
Elite decision-makers within the Caribbean region are operating within a perceptual environment 
guided by imperfect information where neither China’s intentions or US thinking on China’s 
motives in the region, has been clear-cut. As such perceptions of relative power in relation to the 
US and China, notwithstanding significant power shifts, especially as it relates to the latter, matters 
thus far in the Caribbean and China dynamic.  
 
Moreover, given the weakness of Caribbean states in the international system, perceptions of  
relative power also revolve around the perceived power imbalance between China and small 
Caribbean states. Consequently, the extent to which such states can effectively negotiate and 
address their interests in relations with China, have been an underlying concern in the ongoing 
dynamic.  
 
Secondly, perceptions of relative power also shape perceptions of threat in the Caribbean’s 
relationship with China. In an early, but nonetheless, quite relevant discussion on threat 
perceptions, J. D Singer (1958: 94) observes, that threat perception results from an actor’s 
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estimated capability and intent. With regards to Caribbean  states relationship with China, threat 
perceptions may be viewed through more strategic lens given the critical US factor in the region. 
Schweller (2006: 38) note that there are three elements to perceived threats; actual, potential and 
imagined. Actual threats result from clear signals of intent from actors.  Potential threats are that 
which can be, “inferred from factors or situations in the external environment or the capability of 
the opponent that may materialize into a danger.” Imagined threats may be plausible to the observer 
but is not necessarily supported by objective reading of available evidence.  
 
In less strategic terms, threat perceptions may redound to economic asymmetries which may 
heighten states vulnerability in relation to other states in the international system. In the Caribbean 
and China relationship, perceptions of threat arise  due to the various limitations inherent in small 
states engagement with China as a rising economic power.   
 
Thirdly, although perceptions of opportunity receive considerably less attention in the literature, it 
is also integrally linked to perceptions of relative power. Richard K. Herrmann (1985: 37) devotes 
considerable attention perceptions of opportunity and highlights it as a significant factor which 
shapes inter-state interactions. The rise of China’s economic power alongside traditional actors 
represented an opportune moment for Caribbean states. It meant not only a shift in global economic 
dynamics more broadly. China’s ascent also provided increased maneuvering space for accessing 
development assistance on seemingly favourable terms. Thus it emerged as a significant partner 
for developing states beyond traditional actors. As seen in chapter 3, at the dawn of the Post-Cold 
War period, Chinese and Caribbean leaders converged at the highest levels in pursuit of mutual 
economic interests. As seen in chapters 4 and 5, post 2005, China’s economic significance 
increased substantially in the Caribbean region. As argued, in analysing Caribbean states relations 
with China, it is important to see it as one largely steeped in opportunity based on mutual interests.  
 
2.2 Overview of perceptions in the Latin America and Caribbean and China engagement 
 
Perceptions pertaining to Caribbean and Latin America’s engagement with China is an underlying 
consideration in the discourse on China’s rise in the region due to such states geostrategic position. 
Perceptions relating to China’s rise in relation to the US have been part of broader academic 
discourse (see Breslin, 2013; 2009, Shambaugh 2012, 2013, 2016; Foot, 2009). The intention in 
this subsection is not necessarily to rehash many of those wider arguments. But rather, the 
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objective is to examine how the Caribbean and Latin America are situated within the broader 
debates and to reinforce why perceptions are an underlying intervening factor in Caribbean states 
relations with China.  
 
 Perceptions of threat in particular, derive from a cohesive set of discourses whose underlying 
concern is how China might possibly utilise its growing economic role in the region to increase its 
overall influence in the space vis-à-vis the US as the regional and international hegemon. 
Perceptions of the region’s engagement are often highlighted in various strands of the literature 
including academic works, the media and think tank sources.  
 
Certain scholars have veered towards a more strategic view of China’s engagement in the 
Caribbean and Latin America. Ellis (2014) in an article entitled, “Strategic Relevance of Latin 
America for the United States,” expressed some disquiet over China’s rise in the region. Ellis 
argues, “it is unthinkable that a power with global political, economic, and military ties, such as 
…China, would allow the United States to engage it in its own region without taking the fight to 
the U.S. backyard.”309 In postulating on the geopolitical position of the region in China’s interests, 
Stefania Paladini (2016: 166) asks; ‘Is China using Latin America and the Caribbean to rebalance 
its relations with the US? Many scholars of international relations and Chinese affairs believe so.” 
Along similar lines, Dreyer (2006: 2), argues, “Latin America and the Caribbean are crucial to the 
evolution of the world order that the Chinese leadership would like to see.” Others posit that with 
the rise of Xi Jinping, there has been a more a strategic bent to China’s engagement in the 
Caribbean and Latin America and that China has taken an opportunity to counter the US pivot to 
Asia under Obama. Cui and Garcia (2016: 24) argue, “Coincidentally, the US pivot to Asia-Pacific 
was followed by China’s twirl to LAC, which has geopolitical implications in the narratives of 
Sino-US great power politics, considering the rise of China and decline of the United States.”  
 
Beyond the academic discourse, less nuanced perspectives on the rise of China in the region is 
evident at times within selective think tanks and media sources. In 2004, during Hu Jintao’s first 
visit to Latin America, the Jamestown Foundation, entitled it; “China’s Encroachment into 





influence has also been the subject of other commentaries such as The Diplomat who view China’s 
role as having possible consequences for the US in its “backyard”.310 Nonetheless, such assertions 
are largely inconsistent with Caribbean states focus on largely south–south development 
cooperation and consequently, tend to overlook the region’s interests in the dynamic.  
 
The more rigid interpretations of China’s rise are intuitively seen to give a sense of predictability 
to China’s intentions given its rising power capabilities as well as historical evidence of the 
strategic dynamics that have unfolded with regards to rising powers in the Caribbean region. As 
seen in chapter 2, the Caribbean is indeed a sensitive and significant geopolitical space in terms of 
US interests. The validity of such precepts is rooted in historical evidence as already seen in 
Chapter 2. For instance, during the Cold War period, the former USSR attempted to utilise the 
Caribbean to influence various domestic actors which resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This 
was a defining moment in the Cold War period not only for the region, but globally.  
 
Moreover, threat perceptions can also be embedded within theoretical underpinnings that guide 
observers thinking on state behaviour. More power oriented theories such as Realism can generate 
particular expectations about what might likely constitute the external environment in which states 
interact. However outcomes of actual threat are not necessarily assured even based an analysis of 
historical events or in accordance with theoretical propositions such as Realism. The latter tend to 
assume that shifts in the balance of power are more conflictual. The peaceful end to the Cold war 
also laid bare the inability of Realism to effectively predict state behaviour. 
  
However, these perceived images of threat in the Caribbean China relationship is not necessarily 
indicative of scholarly consensus on the subject of the “China threat” thesis in the Caribbean and 
broader Latin American region. Some authors view China as largely steering clear of strategic 
interests within the space (see Brand et al, 2015; Tokatlian, 2008; Lanxin, 2008). This lack of 
consensus is partly due to the paucity of evidence that China is a threat economically or 
geopolitically and the still limited scholarly work on the Caribbean and China dynamic. These 
claims rely on an image of China as a rising economic power which eventually aims to challenge 





The evidence of the “China threat” as it relates to the US role in the Caribbean is indeed scant and 
at the empirical level, highly untenable. In examining Caribbean states domestic economic 
engagement with China in accordance with the empirical evidence in chapters 4 and 5, a more 
evidence-based picture of China’s economic intent in the Caribbean is uncovered.  
 
The research findings suggest that in empirical terms, a more nuanced view of China’s engagement 
in the Caribbean is called for.  In an effort to counter the more threat driven precepts surrounding 
China’s rising influence in the region, there is need to go beyond the media images attributing 
threatening motives to China. There is also need to interrogate more closely the scholarly debates 
that ensue regarding China’s more strategic intents in the Caribbean.  
 
While images of the Caribbean region strategic position bring about ideas of threat, certain 
observers see opportunity. Scholars have highlighted how developing states could present 
opportunities to expand Chinese influence in various regions of the globe (see Boon and Ardy, 
2017; Powles, 2016; Lanteigne; 2012, Yang Jian, 2011, Campell, 2008; Alden et al, 2008.) 
Perceptions of opportunity in relation to the Latin America Caribbean region has also been 
examined by various sources inside China. For instance, the China Daily on June 17th, 2017, called 
for the Caribbean and Latin America to be re- connected through a 21st century maritime silk 
road.311 These ideas are not necessarily new. As early as 2001, China’s president, Jiang Zemin, 
during a visit to ECLAC headquarters in Chile, called for a maritime silk road in the Caribbean 
Latin America region.312 Such ideas illustrate that China views the region as a means of furthering 
economic opportunity rather than strategic goals. 
 
Section 2  
3. Countering perceptions of threat with perceptions of opportunity 
This section draws on normative and empirical evidence to examine why perceptions of threat in 
Caribbean states relations with China can be argued to be overstated. The section asserts that 
perceptions of opportunity in both the political and economic realm influence interactions between 





understand how Caribbean states and China have interacted largely on the basis of mutual political 
and economic gains, notwithstanding underlying constraints in the relationship.  
 
3.1 Political opportunity in Caribbean states engagement with China: Undermining 
perceptions of threat  
 
While the Caribbean and Latin America’s  engagement with China has  been subjected to 
perceptions of threat especially within the broader context of the US role in the region and China’s 
rising influence within this geostrategic space, it may be said that  perceptions of opportunity more 
so than threat, determine Caribbean states relations with China. Often in the discourse on 
perceptions, inadequate attention is paid to how possible gains in the interaction promote beneficial 
relations between states. Thus, the discourse on perceptions can favour a more pessimistic and 
Realist driven view of inter-state relations which often contrast with the actual day to day 
interactions between states. Relations generally tend to be geared towards enhancing cooperation 
and reducing tensions in a bid to stave off conflict.  
 
Political gains evident in the Caribbean region’s interaction with China suggests that much of the 
strategic discourse on China’s rise in the region is overstated. For small states, the rise of China 
marked a significant shift in global affairs which needed to be accounted for in decision-making 
in the external realm. As such, Caribbean states increasingly sought to engage China within the 
economic and diplomatic realm.  Likewise, China also sought to derive benefits from the 
interaction. As seen in chapter 3, in terms of political opportunities, the increased diplomatic 
interaction between the Caribbean region and China has enabled the latter to pursue its core foreign 
policy aims in relation to Taiwan. China’s more extensive diplomatic role in the Caribbean and 
Latin America inevitably helps it to play a broader role in the developing world in line with its 
domestic goals.  
 
Moreover, the Caribbean region’s engagement with China also helps promote China’s ideals for a 
more multilateral order. In seeking to further its international status and influence, China has done 
so along the lines of various ideals including promoting the idea of multi-polarity. The concept of 
a multi-polar world was officially incorporated by Jiang Zemin into Chinese foreign policy at the 
14th Congress of the Communist Party of China in 1992 to support China’s stance that a fair, just 
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and peaceful world is only possible through multi-polarity.  By the release of China’s first Policy 
Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008, Beijing’s preference for a multi-polar order 
was made quite clear. Thus the first sentence of the said paper put forward the idea that the, “The 
move toward multi-polarity is irreversible…and gaining momentum.” 313 As Kunsheng (2012:8) 
argues, “China and Latin America and the Caribbean are important parts of international emerging 
forces and are positive forces to promote a multi-polar world and the democratization of 
International Relations.”  
 
In seeking to further its status in the international sphere, the Latin America Caribbean region can 
be beneficial to China as it seeks to co-opt various geographical regions in recognising diversified 
poles of influence in the international system. This is not necessarily a nefarious goal but simply a 
means of promoting the presence of a diversified set of leading economic actors in addition to the 
US that can play a supporting and responsible role in international affairs.  As Deng and Wang 
(2004: 11), acknowledge China’s foreign policy interests is driven partly by its sensitivity to its 
international status and is “characterised by concerns to simultaneously enhance …and cultivate 
international legitimacy as a peacefully rising power designed to create opportunities of upward 
mobility in the emerging international hierarchy.” 
 
Developing regions in the Americas, Africa and Asia form an integral framework of support for 
Beijing’s vision of a global order in which there is a diversified set of actors taking on a leadership 
roles in the international system. Doing so promotes the idea of multi-polarity in that it creates a 
favourable impression of China’s role in the world alongside the dominant role of the US in the 
Caribbean region. As discussed in chapter 3, Caribbean states have actively facilitated new and 
expanded  ties with China designed to further economic, social and cultural ties. As seen in chapter 
3, the Caribbean and Latin America have aided China in promoting its influence internationally 
through bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In engaging with CELAC, a membership of 33 
Caribbean and Latin American states, this has meant a new opportunity for China to engage 
multilaterally with the developing countries in the Americas hemisphere. The possibilities of 





region can be of significant support in furthering China’s goals in the international system as long 
as aims are of mutual benefit to the parties. 
 
Caribbean and Latin American countries are fairly active in the international sphere as it relates to 
developing country concerns within the UN and other multilateral fora, thus their support can be 
of some utility to China in pursuing its broad foreign policy aims in the international system. 
Therefore, there is some recognition by China of Caribbean states utility in promoting its role in 
the global realm. Caribbean states have also sought to diversify their relations by expanding ties 
with an emerging actor in the international system. Thus enhancing China’s role within the 
domestic realm. 
 
3.2 Economic opportunity in Caribbean states engagement with China: beyond threat 
perceptions 
Perceptions of opportunity is very important in examining the Caribbean and China relationship 
at the domestic level thus far.  Caribbean states and China have largely emphasised opportunities 
in the interaction, thus leading to China’s overwhelmingly benign role in the region. Thus, views 
pertaining to threat perceptions appear untenable when taking into account the economic 
opportunities involved in engaging China. 
 
 Given China’s leading economic role in developing countries, China’s facilitation of development 
goals within various Caribbean states have resulted in a strong cooperative framework with China 
in the Post-Cold War period. Thus, there has been an overwhelming commercial rationale behind 
the Caribbean and Latin America’s engagement with China as a source of trade and financing. 
China’s mercantilist goals in the region has also been evident in the region through much of its 
engagement. As seen through-out much of the analyses undertaken in chapters 4 and 5, economic 
considerations have been the driving factor in the region’s engagement with China.   
 
In emphasising the gains as well as risks in Caribbean states increasing economic interactions with 
China, the research findings signify the need to disentangle perceptions of strategic threat from the 
engagement in favour of a more balanced perspective on China’s role in the Caribbean and Latin 
America. For the Caribbean and Latin America, the idea of China as a threat is actually more 
multifaceted than that of simply China’s perceived strategic rise versus the US in the region. It 
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encompasses more so, the economic constraints which comes from engaging China at the domestic 
level.   
 
While the notion of economic opportunity does not necessarily negate controversies as well as 
risks in engaging China, what is seen instead, is that perceived advantages are thought to outweigh 
economic as well as strategic threat perceptions in the Caribbean and China relationship. More 
broadly, the Latin America Caribbean region is an important part of the developing world where 
China has emphasised its going-out corporate strategy. As seen in chapters 4 and 5, the Caribbean 
has been a market for China in terms goods, natural resources, FDI and financing. Furthermore, in 
accordance with discussions undertaken in chapter 2, the Anglophone Caribbean is a space where 
the majority of China’s financing outside Hong Kong is channeled. While some might view the 
specific areas where ODI is directed as tax havens, the Anglophone Caribbean is still critical to 
China’s broader economic goals. Therefore engaging the region makes economic sense from the 
perspective of Chinese actors. 
 
The business opportunities for China in the Caribbean region has been apparent not only in terms 
of its actual engagement at the domestic level, but also in relation to extending its investments in 
new economic areas. As seen in chapters 2 and 3, the Caribbean region’s strategic position in 
maritime terms, differentiates it from certain areas within Latin America. As discussed in chapter 
3, maritime infrastructure has been an area targeted by Caribbean states for increased investment 
flows. This has led to a turn to China for investments and financing to develop the sector further.  
China has also committed billions to infrastructure investments in the region. Therefore, Caribbean 
states economic engagement with China has largely been predicated on obtaining opportunities 
based on mutual interests.  
 
3.3 Economic opportunities in US and China’s role in the Caribbean: challenging 
perceptions of threat  
China’s rise in the Caribbean region may not be regarded as a zero-sum game whereby China’s 
increased economic influence automatically entails concerns about US decline. Caribbean states 
have sought to expand spaces for development assistance and attempted to generate increased 
opportunities for FDI in light of China’s economic emergence at the global level. This has 
occurred within an economic environment still largely integrated with western economic powers. 
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Thus suggesting that China’s influence exists alongside more entrenched economic linkages 
between Caribbean states and traditional partners. As such, there has been little evidence of an 
underlying significant shifts in US dominance in the region when compared to China’s increasing 
role.  
 
While undoubtedly in the Post-Cold War era, relations between the Caribbean region and China 
has shifted to deepening economic and diplomatic ties, this may not be equated with a challenge 
to US influence in the region. Western influence is deeply embedded in economic, social, and 
political structures. As seen in chapter 6, US economic influence in the region is still dominant in 
the areas where China has expanded its economic ties in the region. Consequently, the data showed 
that the US continued to play a preeminent role in trade and financing in the region when compared 
to China.  This was evident through a comparative empirical analysis of Caribbean states economic 
engagement with both the US and China, notwithstanding the exuberant and premature claims of 
US decline in the region favoured by select accounts as seen in chapter 6. 
 
Moreover, US economic interests is deeply entrenched across the Latin America Caribbean region  
unlike China whose rise is differentiated across not only states within the Anglophone Caribbean, 
but also the rest of Latin America. Thus, the research findings suggested that a level of caution 
was in order when viewing China’s rise as a zero-sum game. China’s expanding interests in the 
Caribbean and Latin America did not automatically result in a shift in US influence at the ground 
level in the broader region. 
 
Furthermore, the dominance of US in the Caribbean has been supported by empirical research 
conducted through a survey on Perceptions of China in Latin America and the Caribbean by the 
Latin America Public Opinion Project 2013 (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The results showed 
that the US was still regarded as the leading actor in the Caribbean and Latin America region. 
While the survey illustrated China’s rising influence in the Caribbean, this was not equated with 
China actually replacing US influence or being a threat to US interests in the region. In three 
Anglophone Caribbean states, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, about 70% agreed that China had 
influence within their respective states. In looking at how various groupings within the Caribbean 
and Latin America placed trust in China within the Anglophone Caribbean (CARICOM), almost 
50% trusted China (49.1%). When it came to trust in China versus the US, almost 65% trusted the 
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US versus China.  This serves as further empirical evidence that although Anglophone Caribbean 
states do acknowledge the influence of China, it is not seen as a means of displacing traditional 
US influence.  
 
3.4 Economic opportunities between the US and China: undermining threat perceptions 
It may be contended that the reliance of China on positive economic relations with the US may 
also lessen strategic opportunity in China’s engagement with the Caribbean region. China is reliant 
on a peaceful international environment within which to grow and develop and that positive 
climate is to some degree dependent on favourable relations with the US.  
 
The emergence of the Asian markets including China, have not been without the input of FDI from 
the west especially US multinational companies which in the 1980’s and 1990’s, concentrated 
extraordinary amounts of investments in countries such as China.  This in part assisted China with 
its development and its economic emergence on the global stage. Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001: 421), 
acknowledge that beginning in the 1980’s, East Asia including China, received more FDI than any 
other developing region in other parts of the world. This has now had an impact on China’s 
contribution to external trade and internal economic growth. Stallings (2008:240) argue that 
“China’s growth in trade is reliant on US technology, investments and the US market.” 
 
 This economic interdependence is still an important part of the US- China dynamic. This may not 
be wholeheartedly dismissed in China’s foreign policy calculations based on its self-interests. A 
Rand Corporation study by Dobbins et al (2011:8), looks at the significant interdependence 
between the two economies and suggests, “the two economies are linked with each other and with 
the rest of the world in a manner unparalleled in history…This mutual dependency can be an 
immensely powerful deterrent (for conflict).” As pointed out by Breslin (2007: 148) investment 
into China and trade with China is driven especially by the US. Thus showing how dependent 
China is on the US as its main consumer market.  This interdependence with the US economy for 
continued growth and prosperity challenges perceptions that China may likely pursue geostrategic 
goals in the Caribbean and Latin American region.  
 
Pacific relations with the US may still be considered important for continued growth and prosperity 
in China which despite its economic emergence. For many, China is still in certain respects a 
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developing country with internal challenges. Overall challenges to China’s economic rise has been 
examined by Breslin; 2007, Zheng; 2005, Alden and Hughes 2009. China, aware of its own 
shortcomings both economic and political, often refers to itself as a developing country. The 
inequalities and inability of many Chinese to achieve prosperity in line with populations in the 
developed states, is still a reality in China. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
still classify China as a developing country. For some analysts, China, with a per capita income of 
about $6,500, is still well below the cut -off point that distinguishes developing economies from 
their high-income counterparts. Almost 250 million Chinese, about one-sixth of the population, 
still live on less than two dollars a day.314  Such highly uneven economic growth not only pose 
internal challenges to China but can have some implications for playing a leading hegemonic role 
in the world alongside states such as the US. As Beeson (2009:109) argues, “The legitimacy of 
China’s political leadership is increasingly dependent on economic development, which while it 
has been spectacular, remains surprisingly brittle.”  
 
While China at present, is playing a leading and critical economic role in developing countries, 
given internal economic issues as well as the unsure external economic environment on which 
China is highly dependent for its growth, its continued ability to play a significant role in the 
Caribbean is not always assured. Such uncertainties have led certain scholars to view China’s rise 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, as one akin to that of Japan’s ascent in the region in the 
1980’s. Hence Stallings (2008:239) proposes, “For a second time in the last quarter century, Asia 
and Latin America appear to be joining forces in a complementary process, which could speed up 
Latin America’s economic development while increasing its independence from the hemispheric 
hegemon. In the earlier case, however, Japan’s initial enthusiasm petered out, and Latin America 
never realized the expected benefits from the relationship.” It is still left to be seen whether China’s 
engagement will continue with the same speed and intensity in the coming years. 
 
There is reliable evidence that China is not predisposed to challenging that status quo power within 
the Caribbean but has been acting in a responsible manner mindful of US hegemony in the region. 





challenging US pre-eminence in the region, it appears that China is working well within the 
established order rather than acting counter to it.  
 
The very foundation of China’s diplomatic strategy speaks of “big powers” being the key to its 
strategies and as such, the US is regarded as significant to China, as the leading actor in the 
international system. It is to China’s continued benefit to maintain non-geopolitical goals in the 
Caribbean and Latin America region. China is often perceived to be quite hesitant in pursuing 
strategic goals in the western hemisphere that can be misconstrued or subject to misinterpretation 
by the US.  Peter Hakim (2006: 45) points to the general restraint in China’s relationship with the 
Caribbean region and Latin America which is a traditional sphere of US influence. Hakim argues 
that Beijing is generally cautious in its relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and that it 
recognises US pre-eminence in the region. Former Chinese Ambassador to Barbados, Wei Qiang, 
also acknowledged that China’s intention is not to compete with other world powers in the 
Caribbean. Rather, China’s interests within the Caribbean is part of its overall foreign policy thrust 
in the developing world.315  
 
Thus far, there has been good indication that China is not likely to get entangled in ideological 
struggles in a geostrategic space which is centrally tied to US influence. There has been evidence 
that in Caribbean states such as Venezuela and Cuba where the US has always had a fraught 
relationship due to perceptions of US interference in internal affairs, China has continued to deepen 
its economic engagement in those states while seemingly sidestepping ideological involvement. 
While China shares close relations with Venezuela, it has also been quite measured in its approach 
to that state and has avoided anti hegemonic rhetoric in support of the various left leaning 
governments in Venezuela including that of Maduro and Chavez. Thus, the focus in Venezuela for 
instance, has been to promote its economic interests by undertaking a series of oil for loans deals 
with the latter (see Wang and Li, 2016; Giacalone, 2013; Sanderson and Forsythe, 2012).  
 
3.5 Economic opportunity not threat in China’s security assistance to the Caribbean region  
Even when undertaking an analysis of Caribbean states more strategic endeavours with China in 





assistance partnerships with the region. Caribbean states have sought to expand economic 
opportunities with China in facilitating security interests through increased access to technical and 
financial assistance.  Thus, China’s engagement has been in response to the Caribbean region’s 
domestic security interests and has not been geared towards playing a counter-intuitive role to the 
US in this area. Given China’s leading economic role in the international economic system thus 
far, it has played a more encompassing role in responding to development concerns within 
developing states.  
 
The various military aid pacts undertaken by the Caribbean region and China usually involve 
providing national security forces with equipment, logistic support and other training.  In 2011, 
China and Jamaica signed a military cooperation agreement for $1.1 million to provide equipment 
to the Jamaica Defense Force. This was followed by another agreement in 2012 for training and 
equipment worth $1.55 million.316 This deal was among the largest military aid 
packages undertaken with the Anglophone Caribbean. In 2014, China also sold its first long range 
vessel to Trinidad and Tobago for patrol of the Trinidad’s coast. 317 Assistance in training has also 
been part of the military assistance provided to the Caribbean by China.  The 2017 Annual Report 
to Congress on the PRC’s Military Activities indicated that many Caribbean and Latin American 
countries have sent officers for training in China. Assistance from China in this regard helps to 
respond to a number of immediate needs required by small national security forces within the 
region, due to shortfalls in equipment and training at the ground level.  
 
Moreover, Caribbean states engagement with China in terms of security assistance is quite limited 
when compared to the overwhelming role of the US in the region in security issues. While the 
Caribbean has engaged further with China in security partnerships, the US plays the leading role 
in the Caribbean in promoting military and other security interests. The bulk of US assistance to 
the Caribbean is based on hemispheric security. For instance, in 2017, US government report on 
security assistance to LAC, indicate that US military and police aid to Latin America and the 
Caribbean for 2017 was over half a billion (680,095,000).318 Since 2010, in just the Anglophone 
Caribbean, under the US Caribbean Basin Security initiative, the US committed $437 million in 
 
316 https://www.caribjournal.com/2012/06/20/china-jamaica-sign-deal-on-military-aid/ 
317 2017 Annual Report to Congress on the PRC’s Military Activities 
318 https://www.securityassistance.org/latin-america-and-caribbean 
	 266	
funding. 319 China’s security assistance in the region is very limited when compared to the outsized 
role played by the US.  
 
It is then important to understand that China’s rise within that particular area as one that has 
promoted economic opportunity for Caribbean states. Not only has China’s rise in the region been 
that of a benign power, there is little evidence that it seeks overtly or covertly to contend with US 
hegemony in this significant geopolitical sphere. Zakaria (2008:31) makes similar observations in 
relation to China’s rise and notes, “(China) does not seem to seek to overturn the established order 
as have many newly rising powers in the past but rather to succeed within it.” Therefore, it would 
be shortsighted to assume that China is a strategic challenge to US dominance in the Caribbean 
where American power has been pre-eminent. As succinctly put forth by Marcella (2012:1): 
There is, to be sure, a heightened Chinese interest in building alliances and extending contacts with governments and institutional 
players in the region—going beyond just trade and investment. But the notion that the Chinese are seeking to establish a strategic 
beachhead is…counterproductive to establishing a useful relationship with China as its global influence rises. Contrary to the 
headlines, China does not want to challenge the U.S. in the hemisphere. 
 
4. Limitations to China’s Rise in the Caribbean: undermining threat perceptions 
Exaggerated threat perceptions also fail to take into account the liberal hegemonic structure in 
which the Caribbean exists. This creates its own set of checks and balances to China’s growing 
influence in the region.  Caribbean states have been socialised and built on a western led liberal 
hegemonic order that can render its own set of challenges to alternative powers rise inside such 
states. Strategies which seek to pursue hegemonic counterbalancing may not be assured of success 
within the region based on both elite decision-making and civil society response especially given 
the economic significance of the US to the region. Therefore, relationships with other actors that 
are geared towards outright opposition to US influence or even perceived to act counter to it may 
experience significant roadblocks.   
 
The Caribbean as well as Latin America share social, political and cultural linkages with the US 
and other western states that facilitates close cooperation. While China has been expanding 
economic and soft power influence in terms of deepening its cultural and social ties with the region, 
these states are still deeply entrenched within a western liberal hegemonic order not led by China. 




in fact, the US benefited from hegemonic structures built hundreds of years prior to its ascendance 
by like-minded Western European powers. Such realities impose challenges to China’s rise in the 
region and while beyond the scope of this thesis to engage extensively in such discussions, these 
realities do illustrate the limits to China’s rise within the Caribbean and Latin American region.  
 
Moreover, as part of the liberal hegemonic order, the Anglophone Caribbean is part of a democratic 
structure which can impact on China’s influence in the Caribbean. Therefore, China’s rising 
influence in the Caribbean may not be construed in a vacuum. China’s promotion of its aims in the 
Caribbean region is very much dependent on those states. In the Anglophone Caribbean states 
decision-making can be impacted by civil society and the media which operates within a more 
open environment. This can shape responses to perceived deficiencies in the interactions. It can 
also impact on possible conflicts of interests in China’s engagement at the ground level. 
 
This more democratic structure enable government actions to be subject to scrutiny, criticism and 
debate. Thus, a variety of actors may seek to influence outcomes in the domestic sphere even with 
regards to external actors. This in effect can mean that decision-makers are operating within an 
environment that is subjected to intermittent pressure by the public and as such, this can constrain 
executive power. The political structure also promotes a degree of self -preservation for elected 
representatives, while at the same time, possibly limiting actions that may be regarded as adverse 
to the interests of the public. It is important that such relevant contexts be examined in the ongoing 
discourse on threat perceptions regarding Latin American and Caribbean states engagement with 
China.  
 
In light of those broader constraints, decision-makers may pursue particular courses of action that 
minimises China’s strategic influence in that space, should there be perceptions of strategic aims 
in the engagement. For instance, as examined in chapter 7, environmental and possibly strategic 
concerns merged, to shape responses to Chinese investments regarding the proposed Goat Island 
development project. The response to the investments subtly showed the power dynamics involved 
in the Caribbean region’s relations with China as well as the hesitance of small states to be drawn 
into possibly underlying geopolitical tensions.  
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 However, it may also be acknowledged that decision-making is not always a rational process, and 
that individuals involved in the process may not necessarily behave in predetermined ways. 
Individuals may attempt to bring in distinct motives, goals and ambitions within the foreign policy 
process and utilise their access to positions of power and influence to further goals that may not 
necessarily be viewed as part of the national interests. Decision-making may then give rise to 
unintended consequences. For instance, in the case of Grenada during the Cold War period, the 
leadership’s alignment with Russia to pursue mutual interests, had specific outcomes. This resulted 
in a controversial response relating to the use of force on Grenada by the US, albeit under the 
pretext of rescuing American students in perceived danger on the island.320  
 
What these underlying issues illustrate is that Caribbean countries are keenly aware that existence 
within the shadow of a hegemonic power brings with it opportunities as well as constraints. Thus, 
informing Caribbean states perceptions of the US is how it might utilise its power to achieve its 
end in the international system within such a geopolitically sensitive region.  As Ikenberry and 
Kupchan (1990: 283) posits:  
(a) more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than 
material payoffs (suggests that) acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites 
in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies 
consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order. 
 
As subordinate states in the international system coupled with the Caribbean region’s geopolitical 
significance, US thinking on Chinese intentions within the space can influence views of China’s 
motivations within the space. Thus leading states to act counter to strategic motivations in relation 
to the US role in the region. It is important that such realities be examined in the ongoing discourse 
on threat perceptions regarding Latin American and Caribbean states engagement with China.  
 
5.Conclusion 
In examining perceptions as an underlying intervening factor in the Caribbean’s relationship with 
China, the chapter argued that the relationship between the Caribbean region and China has been 
based on mutual opportunity rather than threat. In line with the underlying argument, the chapter 
attempted to offer a more calibrated assessment of the relations despite the likelihood of an 




continue to reshape the global order. This approach was not an oversight, but instead showed the 
need for more evidence-based analysis of the region’s evolving ties with China.  
 
The chapter sought to dismantle the underlying perceptions of threat in Caribbean states 
engagement with China both in normative and empirical terms. In doing so, the chapter sought to 
draw on the analysis undertaken in the empirical chapters of the thesis while also providing a more 
normatively driven assessment of why perceptions of threat have been overblown in the 
relationship. Consequently, it was shown that the extent to which the Caribbean region served as 
an area of political and economic opportunity tends to be overlooked within the discourse on China 
as a possible strategic threat to US interests in the region.  
 
Moreover, it was shown that even within more strategic areas such as military assistance to the 
Caribbean region, China’s role has been linked to the promotion of Caribbean states domestic 
security interests. China’s global rise enabled it to promote cooperation with developing countries 
in varied areas much like traditional powers. Consequently, China has furthered cooperation in 
this area in terms of technical assistance. However, the US still plays the leading role in security 
assistance in the Caribbean region and more broadly, within the Americas hemisphere.  
 
Further, as discussed, notions of strategic threat ignores the internal limits to China’s rise in the 
region. The region is encompassed by fundamental political, social and economic structures tied 
to a liberal hegemonic order which in turns undermine non-traditional actors role in the  region 
when compared to traditional actors like the US. These established structures may mediate rising 
external actors influence in the space in relation to more established powers. Overall, the analysis 
suggested that a more nuanced approach to China’s rise in this region is necessary in an effort to 
arrive at more valid and reliable conclusions pertaining to the Caribbean and Latin America’s 





The concluding chapter seeks to accomplish four essential tasks. Firstly, it re-emphasises the 
underlying gaps in the existing literature and restates the main hypothesis of the study. Secondly, 
it reiterates the main findings of the study and seeks to situate the empirical findings in the wider 
literature. Thirdly, the chapter focuses on the limitations of the study. Fourthly, the chapter 
proposes avenues for further research. 
 
In the main, the thesis sought to depart from conventional accounts in the literature on China’s 
engagement in developing states. Within the discourse on China’s rise in the Americas hemisphere, 
two substantial gaps have been evident. One, Caribbean states relations with China remained 
largely under-explored, thereby highlighting a sizeable knowledge gap in the Sino-Latin America 
Caribbean literature. Two, the dominant narrative appears to treat developing states as largely 
peripheral in the interactions with China. Thus, preferring to see such states as simply an addendum 
to China’s broader strategies and goals in the global realm, rather than as active agents seeking to 
derive their own aims in interactions with China.  
 
In light of these substantive gaps in the literature, the thesis sought to examine how and why a 
confluence of political and economic factors influenced the patterns of continuity and change in 
`Caribbean states relations with China. The analysis was undertaken chiefly from the vantage point 
of developing states. In doing so, the thesis sought to move beyond the more China-facing analysis 
evident in much of the literature on China’s rise in the developing world.  The thesis does not deny 
the salience of powerful actors in shaping interactions with secondary states. But conversely, it 
does assert that an analysis which accounts more fully for less developed states in the dynamic, 
adds a more comprehensive and critical assessment of the ongoing interactions between 
developing states and China.  
 
In the absence of the input of developing states in driving the dynamic at the ground level, it 
becomes invariably more difficult to talk of Chinese influence inside those very states. For 
instance, it is problematic to talk of China’s growing economic influence within developing states 
without at the very least, according deserved attention to how and why developing countries have 
actively structured and participated in driving China’s commercial outreach at the domestic level.  
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Yet, the literature accords developing states more minimal attention than perhaps ought to be the 
case. This itself may not be surprising as much of the International Relations discipline do tend to 
minimize attention on less powerful states. This deficiency has already been highlighted within 
the scholarly discourse on small states within IR, by various authors (see Long, 2015; Shaw, 2009; 
Braveboy, 2007; Hey, 2003; Keohane,1969, Vital; 1967). Likewise, the predisposition to under-
examine secondary states in relations with China has been examined by a few Sino-African 
scholars (see Gadzala; 2015, Large; 2008, Manji and Marks; 2007, Mohan and Lampert;2013). 
However, the tendency to reinforce and elevate China’s interests in relations with developing states 
is still very much the norm in the discourse on China’s relations with such states. 
 
The thesis underscored that Caribbean states relations mattered within the broader context of 
China’s engagement in the American hegemonic sphere, despite the lack of scholarly attention to 
the region. As such, the thesis initiated the process of thinking about Caribbean states relations 
with China as one which occurs within an overarching geopolitical structure informed by the US 
role in the region. This systemic factor shapes the region’s foreign policy behavior although not 
always primarily determinant of it. Nonetheless, it would be somewhat remiss to construe 
Caribbean and China relations as one independent of underlying and overarching power structures 
given the significance of the US factor in the space. As already noted, the region is suis generis a 
geopolitical space. This specific structure differentiates  Caribbean and Latin American states from 
all other developing states where China practices its economic statecraft. No other group of 
developing states lie squarely within the US hegemonic space.  
 
However, this overarching geopolitical structure does not appear to have hindered autonomous 
spaces for Caribbean states decision-making regarding China. In the Post-Cold War period (1990-
2015), Caribbean states reconfigured their relationship with China along highly economic lines, 
while utilising diplomacy to facilitate commercial goals. Given the salience of economic variables 
in shaping the relations, the thesis dedicated substantial attention to examining the economic 
considerations in the relationship as seen in chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7.  Consequently, how Caribbean 
states agency, interests and constraints fitted into the broader narrative on China’s rise in the 
Americas hemisphere was brought to the fore in the analysis. The thesis also sought to question 
underlying perceptions of threat in Caribbean states engagement with China deriving from 
competing interpretations of China’s role in the region especially in relation to the geo-strategic 
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significance of the space in chapter 8. Thus the analysis emphasised the economic opportunities 
that has thus far driven Caribbean states interactions with China. The research sought to focus on 
Caribbean states not necessarily as reactive agents in inter-state relations with China. But also as 
significant actors, initiators and partners in their own right, which sought to assert a level of agency 
in the relations amidst internal and external constraints, prompted largely by economic 
considerations.  
 
The thesis makes a timely contribution to unpacking relations with China from the perspective of 
less developed states more broadly and simultaneously sought to address empirical and conceptual 
gaps in Caribbean states relations with China. In examining the relations from the standpoint of 
Caribbean states, rather than the more China-facing analysis evident in much of the discourse on 
China’s rise within developing states, the study contributes to providing a developing country 
perspective within the literature.  Moreover, given the lack of evidence-based analysis on China’s 
engagement with the Caribbean region in the Sino- Latin America Caribbean literature, the thesis 
sought to address the substantial empirical gap pertaining to Caribbean states economic 
engagement with China.   
 
The thesis also makes a modest contribution to the literature on small states within International 
Relations by illuminating how and why particular factors influence such states foreign policies 
vis-à-vis emerging and established powers in the international sphere. Despite the various efforts 
to democratise the discourse within IR, as evident by a slight proliferation in small states literature 
(see Shaw, 2009; Long, 2015; Handel, 1981; Vital, 1967; Keohane,1969), in the main, IR’s more 
singular focus remains on powerful actors. In examining issues largely from the perspective of 
Caribbean states, the thesis highlights small states agency, interests and constraints in influencing 
relations with China.  
 
 Further, as already discussed, the thesis adds to the growing body of scholarly work on NCR for 
understanding the foreign policy behaviour of developing states. In doing so, it sheds light on the 
extent to which systemic, domestic and ideational elements have shaped the foreign policies of 
Caribbean states. The thesis highlights how and why the systemic environment is an important 
indicator of foreign policy behavior (Rose,1998: 151) for secondary states in the international 
system. Therefore, in the case of the Caribbean region, the study showed the significance of the 
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geopolitical power structure in influencing foreign policy behavior towards China. Likewise, the 
thesis focused on how and why intervening issues such as domestic economic considerations, 
policymaking and perceptions shape Caribbean states foreign policies in relation to an emerging 
China. As Lobell et al. (2009:43), argue, NCR’s focus on structural and intervening variables make 
it possible to examine the foreign policies of a vast range of states, including developing and 
developed states.  
 
2.Restating the main hypothesis 
Given the current status of the literature on China’s emergence in the Latin America Caribbean 
region, certain issues confronted the researcher. One; how do Caribbean states interests and 
constraints or even that of Latin American states fit into that broader narrative of China’s rise in 
the region? Two; how do Caribbean states relations with China challenge or support the implicit 
hypothesis that China’s role in the region meant a decline in traditional US influence? Three; what 
alternative hypothesis would explain Caribbean states foreign policy behavior towards China by 
accounting for the concerns raised in relation to the US factor, while at the same time, seeking to 
interrogate such issues?  
 
The research then proposed the main hypothesis that “while the Caribbean region’s geopolitical 
structure, diplomacy and underlying perceptions influence the region’s relationship with China, 
economic considerations are the driving factor in the relationship.” An appreciation for and 
awareness of the complexity in Caribbean states relations with China meant that the hypothesis 
put forward needed to take into consideration the varying factors that influenced the Caribbean 
region’s relationship with China. Therefore, the hypothesis proposed a causal correlation between 
the variables argued to shape the relationship. In doing so, the hypothesis acknowledged that 
variables at either the individual, systemic or state level interacted with each other along a causal 
chain to influence Caribbean states relations with China. However, crucially, it was also allowed 
that certain variables are more causal than others at particular points in time, under varying 
circumstances and within differing contexts. Hence, the thesis argued that economic considerations 
have been a decisive factor in Caribbean states relations with China. 
 
The analysis undertaken through-out the various chapters sought to validate the general hypothesis. 
In chapter 2, it was shown that while Caribbean states foreign relations occurred within an 
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overarching power structure informed by the US role in the region, the interactions between 
Caribbean states and China had to be understood as one driven primarily by mutual economic 
interests.  Chapter 3 illustrated that Caribbean states policymaking towards China have been 
actively centered around formulating and negotiating goals and strategies to further deepen 
commercial ties within the Post - Cold War context of engagement (2005-2015).  
 
Further, consistent with the overarching hypothesis, Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 explicitly showed that 
economic considerations have played an integral role in shaping the Caribbean region’s 
relationship with China for the period considered. Finally, in support of the main hypothesis of the 
thesis, Chapter 8 advanced the claim that the salience of economic interests in Caribbean states 
foreign policy decision-making toward China has resulted in perceptions of opportunity mediating 
the relationship more so than threat. The latter may be linked to an underlying strategic discourse 
given the Caribbean region’s geostrategic position.  
 
In emphasising economic dynamics, the thesis did not presume that Caribbean states geopolitical 
structure, diplomacy and perceptions relating to China’s rise in the region did not matter or shape 
foreign policy behaviour. Rather what the thesis sought to do was to account for such factors and 
engage with them on their merits, while allowing for the primacy of economic issues in Caribbean 
states relations with China.  
 
3. Reiterating main empirical findings 
 
Relations with China showed a close alignment of foreign policy decision-making with economic 
considerations. Thus the Caribbean region expressed a level of economic pragmatism in relations 
with China in the period under survey within the thesis as initially addressed in chapter 3, 
subsection 4.  As discussed, starting in the 1990’s, Caribbean states underwent significant foreign 
policy shifts driven primarily by economic concerns. China also more visibly transformed its 
rationale for interactions with small states in the region. By 2005, it became apparent that the 
Anglophone Caribbean region was an area not only for the pursuit of political interests in relation 
to Taiwan as part of furthering the “One China” foreign policy, but also an area for the broader 
pursuit of China’s commercial interests in the wider Latin America Caribbean region. The 
Anglophone Caribbean region was seen as a means of increasing market access for China’s SOE’s, 
financial institutions and entrepreneurs in line with China’s economic thrust in the developing 
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world. Moreover, the economic interactions with China increased Caribbean states maneuvering 
space for development assistance in relation to external actors while concomitantly enabling China 
to play a growing role in trade and financing in the region as seen in chapters 4 and 5.  
 
However, the empirical finding suggested that despite the significant opportunities in the economic 
relationship, there were also deep asymmetries involved in small Caribbean states engaging a more 
powerful economic actor like China.  The data analysed in chapter 4 indicated that between 2005 
and 2015, at least, US $1 billion in loans was committed to the Anglophone Caribbean by China 
for financing select infrastructure projects. This sum was inclusive of zero interest loans and 
concessional funding. These loans were geared towards various economic sectors in the region 
including sports, health, tourism and maritime infrastructure. However, it may be probable that 
such a figure might even be an under-estimation of the actual financial flows between the 
Anglophone Caribbean region and China for the period considered.  As already stated in 2013, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping committed US$ 3 billion to the Anglophone Caribbean  during his 
inaugural visit to the region as China’s president.  
 
 But these figures highlight some key issues which suggests that there are significant caveats to 
consider when estimating China’s financial flows to the Caribbean region and perhaps even within 
other developing states. Although billions of dollars have been committed to the Anglophone 
Caribbean region by China, there appeared to be a tangible difference between loan commitments 
and loan disbursement on the part of China in the region. Thus, it is still unclear whether within 
that same period, China has invested several billions of US dollars in the region. For instance, 
while over US $1 billion was slated for the redevelopment of Jamaica’s port infrastructure, as seen 
in chapter 7, the project was shelved due to environmental concerns.  
 
One also has consider that there has been an issue regarding the opaqueness in Chinese financing 
to developing states thus far.  Much of  China’s  financial assistance may not necessarily be made 
public in accordance with its foreign policy preferences. Therefore in gauging Chinese lending to 
the region, one may bear in mind that China’s development assistance cannot easily be compared 
to that of western actors. This is an important point already explored by Brautigam (2011) in 
relation to China’s lending in Africa. The research has at times utilised official government 
documentary evidence as well as media reports to gauge Chinese financing among other 
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triangulation strategies.  As allowed by Hudson (2007), foreign policy analysts deal with complex 
issues that are not always directly part of the public domain while also having to find ways to 
account for them. Thus as Hudson (2007: 5) argues, it is important to make use of, “artifacts of 
decisions- the traces that decisions leave in newspapers or chronologies.” However even while 
having done so, it may be allowed that despite scale and magnitude of Chinese lending to the 
region, gathering specific data on the phenomenon may pose some difficulty. Thus leading to 
possibilities of over-estimation and under-estimation of Chinese financing in the Anglophone 
Caribbean region.  
 
Moreover, the empirical findings highlighted more broadly the power differentials between small 
Caribbean states engaging an emerging economic power and the potential opportunities and 
constraints that arise from the underlying asymmetrical relationship. Although Caribbean states 
engagement with China for infrastructure financing has led to China playing a major economic 
role in the Caribbean alongside traditional actors, one of the issues that was considered within the 
thesis is the extent to which Caribbean states lending from China created new spaces for the re-
emergence of previous patterns of  debt and dependency  in relation to external actors.  
 
Despite the economic opportunities in the engagement, the findings suggested that increased 
lending from China does create the space for increased debt in relation to external actors. Much of 
China’s financing in the region appeared to be based on concessional loans. In fact as mentioned 
in chapter 6, within Jamaica where China is playing a substantial role in lending, it was found that 
more than 90% of the financing was on concessional terms based on reports from Jamaica Planning 
Institute, an arm of Jamaica Ministry of Finance. Moreover, Jamaica’s Government Information 
Service further confirmed that at least 99% of loans from China carried interest rates of 2-3%. 321 
Thus suggesting that China is very much driven largely by its commercial motives within the 
region. As discussed in chapter 4, given Caribbean states already high debt to GDP ratios, there is 
the possibility of a continued shift of resources to debt servicing. This can inevitably impact on 
development in Caribbean states.  As discussed in chapter 4, this issue is still unfolding in the 
region and as such the impacts of lending will become clearer as time unfolds. Nonetheless, it was 




experiences with high debt.322 Thus a more pragmatic approach to the increased lending by China 
to Caribbean states had to be considered, despite the economic gains procured in the engagement. 
 
Additionally, the empirical findings in chapter 5 revealed that there has been a high level of 
ambiguities in Caribbean states trade relations with China. The trade relationship has further 
heightened the asymmetry between small Caribbean states and China. The trade patterns 
highlighted much of the same center-periphery relations which underscore economic relations 
between economic powers and developing states. Consequently, much of the trade between 
Caribbean states and China have been  based on China’s search for commodities and primary 
resources. This has reinforced previous core and periphery economic patterns of the past in relation 
to external actors.  
 
Further, the empirical findings suggested while China’s rise resulted in the creation of alternative 
markets for Caribbean states alongside traditional actors, within the Latin America region 
especially, competitive effects resulting from China’s ascent in the trade realm, could not be 
entirely ruled out. As seen in chapter 5, the Latin America region took a number of actions against 
China at the WTO to prevent anti- dumping of manufactured products. This was based on the view 
that the increased market penetration by China affected productivity, innovation and 
competiveness in the region in the medium to long term.  
 
Furthermore, in empirical terms, the evidence suggested that while Caribbean states pursued 
economic opportunities with China, this was occurring amidst the continued economic 
significance of established economic actors like the US as seen in Chapter 6. The findings 
suggested that this was the case for various reasons. One reason was that China acted largely in 
areas that had not been prioritised in US led financing in the region or that of other western actors 
led by the US. As such, China was acting mainly in infrastructure projects that were not necessarily 
a priority for western dominated institutions including the IADB, World Bank, IMF and the 
Caribbean Development Bank. Beyond financing, the data revealed that the US is still a main 
market for Caribbean states bilateral trade, despite China’s increased import penetration in the 
region, post 2005. 
 
322 The high debt of the Latin America Caribbean region in relation to external actors  resulted in what has been considered in the 
wider political economy literature as the “lost decades” for growth and development in the region ( see Walton, 1989; Burton, 
1990; Panizza, 2008) 
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 The findings in chapter 6, also emphasised that the region’s trade with China contrasts with the 
region’s trade with the US as well as the EU.  For instance, while the US and EU are both 
significant import and export markets for the Caribbean region, the same may not be said of China. 
The latter has been a leading import source rather than a significant export market for the 
Caribbean region. 
 
While these empirical findings relate particularly to the Anglophone Caribbean, it does lead to 
broader questions as to whether one can readily generalise that China is a threat to US interests in 
the Latin America Caribbean region. Much of the region’s economic engagement is still linked 
with that of traditional western powers, including western Europe and North America (US and 
Canada). This does not suggest that China has not played a leading role in the region, it has. China 
has managed to emerge as a leading financier in particular Anglophone and Latin American 
Caribbean states  within a short space of time. However, allowing for China’s increased role in the 
region in the areas of trade and financing does not suggest that China has supplanted the role of 
traditional actors in the region. Thus, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the US 
economic role across Latin America and the Caribbean has declined as a result of China’s 
economic rise as assumed in certain studies.  
 
Further, despite the economic imbalances between the Caribbean with China, within the time 
period considered in the study, significant trends were unfolding in the region’s economic 
relationship with China. Such trends have been the growing significance of China as market for 
select states in the Caribbean region. As seen in chapter 5, for Caribbean states such as Trinidad, 
Guyana and to a lesser extent Jamaica, there has been an increasing level of commodities and other 
resource exports going to China from these markets up to 2015. Such outcomes have been in line 
with China’s own natural resource drives in Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, China 
has undertaken a number of investments in resource sectors across Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica.  
This creates the potential for possibly increasing two -way trade between these Caribbean states 
and China in future as discussed in chapter 5.  
 
It is also worthwhile to consider that notwithstanding the longstanding linkages between the 
Caribbean region and China, Caribbean states economic engagement with China deepened post 
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1990 and first increased substantially starting in 2005. Thus far, China has managed to rapidly 
increase its economic engagement with the Caribbean in a relatively short pace of time alongside 
established actors. Should growth trends continue in China, it is anticipated that it is likely to play 
a wider economic role in the region.  
 
In terms of the generalisability of particular findings explicated above, it may be noted that the 
thesis primarily focused on specific cases as “bounded systems of interests” (Stake: 1978:7), 
applicable across states in the Anglophone Caribbean region where China has diplomatic relations. 
These cases (trade and financing) not only closely approximated with the data on the economic 
dimension of Caribbean states engagement with China, but also allowed for the generation of 
inferences from the data. As pointed out by Levy (2008:5), researchers familiarity and proximity 
to the data, suggest that analysts using case study research are well positioned to suggest 
explanatory variables, causal mechanisms, and interaction effects. Thus enabling reasoned 
conclusions based on evidence.  
 
In examining cases more broadly, it is implicit that conclusions may be drawn and that inferences 
may be made concerning hypothesized explanations (Stake, 2005: 141; Bennett and Elman, 2006: 
459). Issues pertaining to generalisability in relation to cases in research have been well explored 
by Gomm et al. 2000. In determining the wider impacts of the economic relations with China, 
conclusions may be drawn not only pertaining to the specific states mentioned, such as Guyana, 
Trinidad and Jamaica, but also to other English-speaking Caribbean states whose patterns of 
engagement with China have not been especially differentiated in terms of the consequences of 
the interactions. Therefore, the cases studied not only enabled one to unpack the general trends in 
Caribbean states economic relations with China but also opened up spaces for understanding the 
agency of such small states as well as the opportunities and constraints underlying the commercial 
interactions.  
 
Moreover, specific conclusions arrived at regarding the economic engagement further corroborate 
with the academic literature on China’s commercial engagement with various developing countries 




3.1 Situating the findings in wider literature 
The thesis findings pertaining to Caribbean states economic engagement with China, corroborate 
with findings regarding other regions in the developing world. Studies have highlighted China’s 
increased economic role in developing states while also allowing that imbalances exist in engaging 
China.  Consequently, the thesis findings confirm those by inter alia Alden, 2006; Zafar, 2007; 
Brautigam, 2011; Mohan and Lampert, 2013; Jenkins, 2008. These studies all point to the  
asymmetrical patterns inherent in China’s relations with Africa, notwithstanding  it’s  increasing 
economic  role on the continent.  Similar findings of opportunity and constraints were also found 
in Latin America’s engagement with China (see Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2010; Gallagher, 
2015; Myers and Wise, 2016).  
 
More specifically, the thesis findings suggests that Caribbean states economic relations with China 
have been largely predicated on notions of  mutual benefit. Thus China has played an essential role 
in pursuing developing states commercial objectives at the ground level. Much like Dehart (2012)  
argument that China has remodeled the development landscape for Latin America, Caribbean 
states have also  sought to reconfigure spaces for development assistance  by increasing ties with 
China. Such findings align with the idea of south-south cooperation and “win-win” rhetoric 
promoted especially on the Chinese side. For instance, Yin and Vaschetto (2011) contend that 
China’s focus on infrastructure development is geared towards immediate and long term growth 
outcomes in developing states. They argue that this sets China apart from other traditional actors, 
whose strategies are very much differentiated from China’s. Mei and Hongwu (2012) also posit 
that China’s cooperation with Africa is largely beneficial. Other scholars have also postulated on 
the positive aspects of Chinese engagement within the developing world (Alves, 2013; Sautman 
and Yan, 2007). 
 
 While not bypassing China’s central role as a significant development partner for select Caribbean 
states alongside traditional actors, the thesis findings similarly highlight the imbalances and 
possibly adverse effects of developing states ties with China. Consequently, the research support 
the findings by various scholars that Latin America’s economic relations with China is challenged 
by highly asymmetrical trade patterns (Jenkins, 2012; Moreira, 2007; Lall et al, 2007; Ray, 2014; 
Ortiz et al, 2015). Although less explored in the wider Sino-LAC literature, the thesis also 
examines the debt and dependency patterns unfolding in Caribbean states engagement with China.  
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On the other hand, in relation to the China and US nexus within the region, the empirical findings 
problematises particular claims in the literature. The findings contrasted with underlying claims  
that China’s  economic rise has resulted in US decline in the region or at the very least, impacted 
on US interests in its traditional sphere of influence (see Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2010; Fornés 
and Phillip, 2012; Francisco De Santibañes, 2009; Bagley et al, 2015). 
 
More broadly, China’s development cooperation assistance within the Caribbean region appear to 
be closely linked to its distinct patterns of investments within developing states. Its ODA is closely 
integrated with promoting access to markets and enhancing the entry of its State Owned 
Enterprises at the local level. The findings of the thesis seem to confirm the FDI and trade nexus 
in China’s technical and development assistance within other developing states (see Sanfilippo, 
2010; Naidu and Davies, 2006; Taylor, 2006; McCormick, 2008).  
 
Moreover, the findings appear to suggest that the Caribbean region like other developing states are 
more or less, firmly anchored within China’s broader going out strategy designed to facilitate 
Chinese enterprises in playing a greater role in such states economies alongside traditional actors. 
This is in line with Eisenman and Kurlantzick (2006) argument that China’s foray into Africa is 
linked to its global strategy. Further, how Chinese multinationals have relied on innovative 
organisational strategies to penetrate new markets to enhance their internationalisation has been 
examined by John Mathews (2002). Mckay et al (2016) and Armony (2009) also argue that China’s 
expansion in  Latin America is closely linked to China’s search for global markets. 
 
In the case of the Caribbean region, the findings suggest that China’s broader commercial strategy 
is occurring in the presence of private Chinese enterprises who either have traditional ties within 
the region or are part of more contemporary migratory outflows keen on enhancing business 
opportunities within the space. The significance of these ethnic networks in expanding China’s 
commercial presence within the Caribbean region has been examined by Bernal (2016). These are 
distinct from SOE activities in that their businesses are not necessarily linked to state led projects. 
This particular mode of increased Chinese engagement within developing states has also been 
expounded on by Brautigam (2003:447) who argue that “ethnic business networks facilitate the 
exchange of inputs critical to global capitalism.”  Aguilar and Goldstein (2009) also examine such 
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ties. Likewise, Breslin (2016) also acknowledges this method of Chinese commercial engagement 
within third states. As argued by Alden (2008) a diverse range of sub-state and non-state actors 
complicate the conventional depiction of Chinese engagement within developing states. Such 
findings are highly relevant to the Caribbean context as China’s state led economic processes differ 
across states within the region. However, in contrast, such business activities driven by non-state 
actors seeking to further entrepreneurial interests, is identified across the Anglophone Caribbean 
region. Thus, driven by distinct private entrepreneurial interests as well as officially driven 
policies, actors within  Caribbean states and China have sought to promote commercial exchanges.  
 
4.Limitations of the study 
Three main limitations may be attributed to this study. In theoretical terms, critics of the study may 
find that it takes a broad but nonetheless comprehensive analysis of Caribbean states relations with 
China. This could be a strength or a weakness. It may be construed as a weakness in that in 
addressing the various core variables, the researcher can sacrifice depth for breadth. Thus a 
possible approach regarding the research could have been to simply focus on particular intervening 
variables rather than seeking to draw from system structures. This may be regarded as perhaps an 
efficient, exemplary and more expedient engagement of Caribbean states relations with China.  
 
However, the broader approach deployed in the thesis has been constituted as a strength of the 
research for various reasons. For one, the author had to contend with the significant knowledge 
gap on the Caribbean region’s relationship with China. Given the limited studies in the area, a 
broader approach to understanding the relationship served the purposes of the research well in that 
the study was able to undertake a more effective analysis of Caribbean states interactions with 
China.  
 
Another reason for the efficacy of the broader approach is that it serves the intent and purposes of 
the theory of Neo Classical Realism which undergirds the research. NCR adherents understand the 
dilemma faced by foreign policy analysts. The dilemma is that foreign policy behavior cannot 
always be explained solely in terms of systemic, ideational or domestic factors, although varying 
factors may assume more causal weight than others dependent on issue, time and context.  Thus 
the research sought to transcend the level of analysis problem that often confronts researchers 
attempting to situate and explain the causes of foreign policy behaviour. This is an issue recognised 
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by successive NCR researchers such as Rose (1998), Zakaria (1998), Christensen (1996), 
Schweller (1998) and Lobell et al. (2009). States then act in a complex internal, external and 
perceptual environment. The thesis recognised the salience of the economic element in the 
analysis. But focusing solely on the economic side of the engagement would have its limitations. 
It may be asserted that Caribbean states decision making vis-à-vis particular actors such as China 
cannot be fully understood and accounted for, without comprehending the overarching geopolitical 
power structure within which the Caribbean region exists. Nor can it be effectively understood 
without understanding the ideas as well as the important diplomatic factor involved in the 
relationship.  
 
While limitations may also be linked to the methodological and subsequent empirical aspects of 
the study, at the crux of this research, has been a data collection method that relied on a 
triangulation of sources to further validity and reliability. These included, inter alia,  UN Comtrade 
data, government records from the Caribbean, the US and China as well as newspaper and other 
media reports, rather than focusing largely on interview feedback. This lessened the more 
“methodological individualism” that may be derived from the selectivity associated with the latter 
(Lamont and Swidler, 2014: 163). 
 
At the heart of any research design is a consideration by the researcher as to the method which 
may constitute a best fit in terms of the underlying hypothesis of the study (Burnham et al., 
2008:40). As part of a vast range of methodological choices, interviews represent the potential for 
obtaining at times, an insider view on issues and this can be desirable in helping to confirm 
evidence. However, as Bryman (2001: 274) argues, while consistent with the principle of 
triangulation, interviews may be considered as a supplementary means of investigation rather than 
as an alternative for the use of documentary evidence within research. In examining elite 
interviews in particular, Burnham et al., (2008:231) acknowledge, “elite interviewing is 
characterized by a situation in which the balance is usually in favour of the respondents.” Rathburn 
(2008:689) concedes that although interviews offer significant insights, its shortcomings, “lie in 




The empirical focus of the research dictated an approach whereby an analysis of data and other 
documentary evidence was required to not only formulate generalisations regarding Caribbean 
states domestic economic engagement with China, but also, to gauge the impacts and implications 
of the interactions. The emphasis was on examining cumulative outcomes evident by common 
patterns of engagement evolving over time across a cross-section of states which share diplomatic 
relations with China within the Anglophone Caribbean region. As seen in the empirical chapters 
of the thesis (chapters 4, 5, and 6), there were two observable trends in the economic relationship 
between Caribbean states and China; financing and trade. Hence the focus on these issue areas as 
case studies within the thesis. Through these economic pathways, it became possible to consider 
the wider consequences and responses of Caribbean states in economic interactions with China. 
 
The analysis of the case studies relied extensively on primary and secondary sources of data. For 
instance, in addition to utilising trade data, the focus was also on government records and media 
sources. According to George and Bennett (2004: 97), “the evidentiary worth of various sources 
including government documents, (is) increased through a careful examination of contemporary 
public sources, such as daily media accounts of the developments of a case unfolding over time.” 
In drawing from the data, Caribbean states domestic economic engagement with China was 
examined within an evidence-based framework rather than relying on the more qualitatively 
informed analysis which may underlie interviews. Thus, despite being a supplementary source of 
information, interviews did not prove to be an essential method of data collection within the 
context of the empirically-based case studies considered within the thesis.  
 
Further, it may be said that in examining the case studies, while data on Caribbean states trade 
relationship with China was more readily available based on UN Comtrade data, the same may not 
be said for the availability of data for the case study pertaining to the financing dimension of the 
economic relations. Consequently, the research showed the shortcomings inherent in analysing 
developing states relations with China. China’s foreign policy decision-making in terms of 
documentary and archival evidence may not always be readily available to researchers in the public 
domain.  However, the researcher has attempted to compensate for this shortcoming by examining 
primary and secondary data from Caribbean states, although this does not entirely bypass the 
difficulty of researching China’s financing in the region.  However researchers in the foreign 
policy domain, do at times have to contend with the fact that areas of interests to researchers are 
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not always readily available in the public realm as these can at times be of a sensitive nature (see 
Hudson 2007).  Thus the possible constraint in accessing important primary documents and data 
is not unique to China.  
 
Therefore, in an effort to offset such limitations to some extent, the researcher relied on the 
triangulation method to gather the data on Chinese lending. It may be said that the triangulation 
method for examining Chinese lending to the developing world has been seen in a number of other 
studies seeking to trace Chinese financing to developing states (Brautigam, 2010; Gallagher, Irwin 
and Koleski, 2012).  The research utilised media sources and government reports in the Caribbean 
and the US as well as primary loan documents from various Caribbean states.  However, there was 
a level of inconsistency across the Caribbean states studied in terms of accessing primary loan 
documents. The study also made use of Chinese press reports.  Chinese government institutions 
such as the  Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Chinese 
embassies in the Caribbean region were also utilised (English sources).   
 
However, triangulation may not necessarily eliminate uncertainty regarding China’s financial 
flows to the Caribbean and caution may be exercised in terms of estimating financial flows in the 
absence of more centralised and concrete data from China on its overseas financing. Thus the 
research has to allow for the possibility that Chinese lending to the Caribbean can be under-
estimated or over-estimated.  The researcher, out of an abundance of caution has probably under-
estimated the actual financial flows to the Caribbean region especially in light of the lack of 
centralized data relating to China’s financial flows to the developing world. 
 
5. Avenues for further research 
The thesis contributes to opening up avenues for further research on the Caribbean and Latin 
America’s engagement with China.  In examining the economic dimension of the Caribbean’s 
relationship with China, the question arose as to whether the rise in lending from China by the 
Caribbean has the potential to re-create previous patterns of debt and dependency in the region. 
While the thesis has focused on examining the impact of China’s increased lending to Caribbean 
states in light of the already high/debt to GDP ratios experienced in the Caribbean, it may be useful 
to examine the impact of Chinese lending to Latin America. This will help further the literature on 
Latin America and China relations in the Post-Cold War era.  
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Also meriting further investigation is the extent, if any, to which China is reconfiguring and 
challenging existing the development aid and financing architectures in the Latin America 
Caribbean region.  This may be considered in relation to actors such as the US and EU. 
 
Another issue which  may be explored further is the extent to which China’s rise can be considered 
a competitive threat to the region in light of the over-representation of Latin America in 
antidumping cases brought against China at the WTO level (see chapter 5). This suggests the need 
to explore further, the possible effects of China’s rise on developing states in light of various 
conflicts and constraints. 
 
Further research may also be undertaken regarding the extent to which China’s rising role in the 
Caribbean has had an impact on its soft power influence in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
China has been playing an increased role in the Caribbean in socio-economic sectors such as 
education and through other forms of technical assistance.  There have been indications of a 
growing level of “people to people” diplomacy through a diverse set of programmes aimed at 
deepening social and cultural links.   
 
How such interactions influence Chinese soft power in the Caribbean region is perhaps an 
important issue worth considering. While the research touched on these issues in chapter 3, these 
more socio-economic dimensions of the relations can benefit from further examination when 
seeking to understand China’s growing role in the Caribbean and Latin America. For instance, in 
terms of “people to people diplomacy,” Chinese diasporic influence in the region based on 
anecdotal evidence appears to be widening. This seems to be taking place even within the more 
contemporary context of China’s engagement with the region.  This presence is not limited to 
states where China has diplomatic relations, but rather, it appears to be occurring across the 
Anglophone Caribbean as private Chinese entrepreneurs seek economic opportunity.  
 
Moreover, the growing level of “people to people” exchange is a two - way process. It is 
increasingly being undertaken by Caribbean persons to China especially in relation to educational 
exchanges. The same goes for Latin America. In countries which conduct relations with Taiwan, 
the cultural exchange with China continues through numerous educational programmes between 
Taiwan and these countries.  On an annual basis, it then means that more and more Caribbean and 
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Latin American nationals are encountering the Chinese language and culture, either through the 
mainland or nearby Taiwan.  Should such trends continue, it does create additional avenues to 
build Chinese soft power in the region which is an area where China has had a traditional diaspora 
historically. This is in marked contrast to China’s emerging social and economic ties in developing 
regions like Africa where the Chinese increased diaspora presence appears to be more of a Post-
Cold War occurrence. Therefore, how these various socio-economic areas have strengthened 
Chinese broader soft power in the region is worth examining further.  
 
Further, the extent to which China’s engagement in the Caribbean and Latin America can be 
conceived of in geopolitical terms from the point of view of China’s foreign policy interests in the 
region, merits further investigation. The region is suis generis a geopolitical space and ideas matter 
in foreign policy. Thus geopolitical calculations cannot be entirely divorced from US perceptions 
of China’s rise in the region.  There is need to not only reflect on the obvious geopolitical character 
of the region, but crucially,  to examine how and why the region’s geopolitical significance matters 
or does not matter, in China’s foreign policy outlook on the region.  While doing so, maybe 
arguably dependent on whether China continues its growth trajectory or whether it retreats in a 
manner akin to other alternative powers rise in the region, it can further add to the literature on 
China’s rise in the region. But this may be subject to the major caveat that China’s role in the 
region has to be kept in perspective. This is a salient point made by Stallings (2008) who 
acknowledged that other Asian powers like Japan have attempted in the 1980’s to do what China 
has attempted, and that is; seeking economic influence in the Latin America Caribbean region. 
Breslin (2005:735) also poses this pertinent question: ‘Is China as powerful as some people are 
making it out to be?’ 
 
 Therefore it may be considered that China’s geopolitical ambitions, if any, in relation to Latin 
America and the Caribbean, can be limited by China’s own internal constraints as well as various 
other limitations emanating from the Americas hemisphere. Impediments may emerge specifically 
from these developing states themselves or taking into account the critical US factor. As already 
explained at the start of the thesis, the particular global power configuration which exists within 
the Caribbean and Latin America, differentiates the region from other developing states.  This has 
implications not only for the region’s foreign policy behavior but also has implications for non-
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traditional actors within the region. However, even with these particular limitations in mind,  an 
added perspective from the point of view of China  in terms of whether the geopolitics of the space 
influences its foreign policy towards the region, can contribute to the broader discourse on China’s 
rise in the Latin America Caribbean region. 
 
Finally, an emerging area of debate when considering the post 2015 scenario in relation to the 
Caribbean and China is the extent to which financing will continue to be a substantial marker of 
Chinese economic influence in the region. While China’s economic footprint has been growing in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, it is still left to be seen whether the scope of the engagement 
will deepen post 2015. For instance, despite Jamaica being among the leading beneficiaries of 
Chinese financing in the Anglophone Caribbean within the period considered in the thesis, the 
Economic and Social Survey of Jamaica (ESSJ) for 2018, suggests that for that year, Jamaica 
sought no new loans or grants from China. This indicates that China’s rise in financing within the 
region may likely be subjected to a series of ebbs and flows dependent on policies within such 
small states and China’s own foreign policy goals within the region. Similar trends regarding 
Chinese financing in Latin America has also been evident post 2015. According to the Global 
Development Center, 2018 was among the lowest on record for Chinese state-to-state financing 
within Latin America. Consequently, approximately $7.7 billion in loans from China Development 
Bank and China Eximbank was made either to Latin American governments or Chinese SOE’s.323  
 
Nonetheless, it is still left to be seen whether the above-mentioned outcomes, indicate a retreat of 
Chinese economic influence within the region in the long term. Some have argued that China may 
be becoming more risk-averse within the region partly due to instability within specific states such 
as Venezuela. The domestic regulatory contexts which seek to regulate firms activities have also 
been cited as possibly inhibiting deepened economic engagement. A shift in domestic policies in 
relation to extended financing and debt have also been viewed as another possible reason for the 
down turn (see Myers, 2019; Ferchen, 2018; Gallagher and Myers, 2018).  However, despite the 
relative decline in Chinese financing for the period mentioned, Tulchin (2019) argues that the 





promoting its international status as well as power projection in the developing world.  Likewise, 
Avendano et al. (2017) proposes that Latin America will continue to be a favourable destination 
for Chinese firms.  
 
Although changes in Caribbean states economic relations with China may not be entirely 
discounted, even with the possibility of diminished Chinese financing within the region, the 
relationship may continue to be defined along the lines of south-south cooperation. China may 
seek to maintain an outreach to new and traditional partners within the Latin America Caribbean 
region to further political and commercial aims as evident by its foreign policy interactions with 
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